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Klls
UNIVERSITY OP
CALIFORNIA
SAN DIEGO
KANT
AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS.
Published by
JAMES MACLEHOSE, GLASGOW.
LONDON: MACMILLAN AND CO.
London, , . . Hamilton, Adams & Co.
Cambridge, . . . Macmillan <fc Co.
Edinburgh, . . . Douylas & Foulis.
MDCCCLXXXl.
KANT
AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS.
A COMPARISON OF
CRITICAL AND EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY.
JOHN WATSON, M.A., LL.D.,
PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IX QCEKX'8 UNIVERSITY, KINGSTON, CANADA.
GLASGOW:
JAMES MACLEHOSE, ST. VINCENT STREET,
^publisher to the glnidcrsttjj.
1881.
All fiiyhts Jteeerved.
PREFACE.
IN this work an attempt is made to point out the
misconceptions of its real nature that still prevent
Kant's theory of knowledge from being estimated
on its merits, notwithstanding the large amount of
light recently cast upon it, and to show in detail
that the Critique of Pure Reason raises, and partially
solves, a problem that English Empirical Psychology
can hardly be said to touch. The general point of
view is similar to that of Professor Edward Caird
in his Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant — a
work without which mine could not have been written.
But, whereas Mr. Caird confines himself almost en-
tirely to a statement and criticism of Kant himself,
I devote most attention to the criticisms, direct and
indirect, with which Kant has recently been assailed.
At the same time, I have thought it advisable to
prepare the way for a defence of the Critical theory
of knowledge, and for a comparison of it with Em-
pirical Psychology, by a short statement of its main
positions, as contained in the Kritik der reinen
Vernunft and the corresponding sections of the
vi PREFACE.
Prolegomena, together with the Metaphysiclie An-
fangsgrilnde der Natunvissenscliaft. Those doctrines
receive the fullest treatment which have been the
object of recent attack, or which have a close bearing
on prevalent modes of thought. To the Refutation of
Idealism, the principles of Substance and Causality ',
and the Metaphysic of Nature, in its relations to
Mr. Spencer's First Principles, a good deal of space
is therefore allotted. The negative side of the
Critique, setting forth the limitations of knowledge,
is entered into only so far as seemed necessary to
complete the consideration of the positive side, and
to exhibit the divergence of the Critical distinction
o
of Phenomena and Noumena from the Spencerian
opposition of the Knowable and the Unknowable, to
which it bears a superficial resemblance. The direct
criticisms which I examine are those of Mr. Balfour,
Mr. Sidgwick, and Dr. Hutchison Stirling, all of
which rest, as I believe, upon a misapprehension
of Kant's theory of knowledge, and lose their
apparent force when that theory is properly under-
stood. Minor objections, and objections such as those
of Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, which recognize the
essential distinction of Metaphysic and Psychology,
I have not considered. Nor, in examining recent
Empirical Philosophy, as the most formidable rival
of Critical Idealism, have I thought it necessary to
go beyond the typical systems of Mr. Spencer and
PREFACE. vii
the late Mr. Lewes. By far the larger part of the
work is occupied with the exposition and defence
of Kant's system, and with the contrast of Criticism
and Empiricism in their fundamental doctrines. In
the last two chapters, however, an attempt is made
to show that while right in principle, the theory of
knowledge presented in the Critique, is not altogether
free from incoherent elements incompatible with its
unity and completeness.
Besides Mr. Caird's Philosophy of Kant, I am most
largely indebted to Professor Green's Introduction
to the Works of Hume, and his articles on Mr. Spen-
cer and Mr. Lewes in the Contemporary Review,
and to the EncyTdopddie and Logik of Hegel.
The greater part of the criticism of Mr. Spencer's
Philosophy in the ninth and tenth chapters has
already appeared in the Journal of Speculative Phil-
osophy.
QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY,
KINGSTON, CANADA.
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
THE PROBLEM AND METHOD OF THE CRITIQUE OF PURE
REASON— MR. BALFOUR'S CRITICISM OF THE TRANSCEN-
DENTAL METHOD.
Kant and his recent critics — Ambiguity in Mr. Balfour's formulation of the
Problem of Philosophy — His misapprehension of the "premises" of Kant
— Object and Method of the Critique — Relation of Kant to Hume — Con-
trast of Criticism and Dogmatism — Examination of Mr. Balfour's Objec-
tions to the Transcendental Method, . . . Pages 1-33
CHAPTER II.
THE A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF PERCEPTION— MR. SIDGWICK'S
VIEW OF THE REFUTATION OF IDEALISM.
First question of Critical Philosophy, How is Mathematical Knowledge pos-
sible?— Mathematical Judgments synthetical a priori — Logical result of
Hume's mistake in supposing them to be analytical a priori — Difficulty of
showing how Mathematical Judgments are a priori — The Problem insol-
uble by Dogmatism — Critical Solution, forming the Transcendental
Exposition of Space and Time — Provisional character of the ^Esthetic —
Metaphysical Exposition of Space and Time — Result of the ^Esthetic in
abolishing the Dualism of Subject and Object — Mr. Sidgwick's charge of
inconsistency in Kant's two Refutations of Idealism — Examination of the
charge — Harmony of the Prolegomena and Critique on the question of
Idealism, . . . . . . . 34-59
CHAPTER III.
THE A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL—
THE CATEGORIES AND SCHEMATA.
Second question of Critical Philosophy, How is a Science of Nature possible ?
— Failure of Dogmatism to answer this question — Universal and Necessary
Principles presupposed in pure Physics — Distinction of Judgments of
Perception and Judgments of Experience — Illustrations of the Distinction
• — How are Judgments of Experience possible ? — Forms of Judgment as
x CONTENTS.
presupposing the Categories — Discovery of the Categories — List of Cate-
gories— Synthesis as the condition of Knowledge of Objects — Understand-
ing as a Unity — Empirical Consciousness as implying Synthetical Unity of
Self-consciousness — Deduction of the Categories — Limitation of Knowledge
to Objects of Experience — Imagination as mediating between Under-
standing and Perception — Knowledge of Self as an object — Summary of
results — Schematism of the Understanding, . . Pages 60-91
CHAPTER IV.
RELATIONS OF METAPHYSIC AND PSYCHOLOGY— EXAMINATION
OF G. H. LEWES'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.
Relation of Recent Psychology to the Critical Theory of Knowledge - Kant's
view of Psychology — Lewes's Psychology — His Theory not a Monism but
a Dualism — Lewes's view of the relations of Psychology and Physiology —
Examination of his view — Lewes's contrast of Observation and Introspec-
tion— Untenableness of the Contrast — Statement and Criticism of Lewes's
Psychogenetic Theory, . . . . . .92-137
CHAPTER V.
THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDGMENT— DR. STIRLING'S INTER-
PRETATION.
Advance from Pure Conceptions to Pure Judgments — Distinction of Objects
and their Relations — Contrast of Mathematical and Dynamical Principles
— These Principles also distinguished as Constitutive and Regulative —
Dr. Stirling's view of the Principles of Judgment— Examination of his
view — The Critique not a Phenomenology — The Principles of Judgment at
once Propositions and Laws — Order of Kant's Exposition, . 138-168
CHAPTER VI.
PROOF OF THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDGMENT.
1. Axioms of Perception — Their Application — Dr. Stirling's misconception of
Kant's Proof — 2. Anticipations of Observation — Their Application — Rela-
tions of Extensive and Intensive Quality — 3. Analogies of Experience —
(1) First Analogy : Substance — This Principle universally assumed — (2)
Second Analogy : Causality— (3) Third Analogy: Reciprocity — 4. Postul-
ates of Empirical Thought, . . . . .169-197
CHAPTER VII.
OBJECTIONS TO KANT'S PROOFS OF SUBSTANTIALITY AND
CAUSALITY EXAMINED.
Mr. Balfour's Criticism of the First Analogy of Experience — First objection :
Kant doea not prove absolute Permanence — Mr. Balfour's failure to dis-
tinguish Criticism from Dogmatism — Second Objection : Substance, as
CONTENTS. xi
either a Substratum or a Relation, cannot be perceived — Misconception of
the Critical idea of Substance — Mr. Balfour's Criticism of the Second
Analogy — First Objection : Kant's conclusion that all sequences are causal
inconsistent with his assertion that the sequence of feelings is arbitrary —
Reply : only real sequences or external changes held to be causal — Second
objection : Kant assumes objectivity of sequence — This objection confuses
the data assumed with the philosophical hypothesis explaining them —
Mr. Caird's statement of the proof of Causality — Dr. Stirling's view of
that proof — His interpretation wrongly supposes Perception and Concep-
tion to give different kinds of knowledge, . . Pages 198-235
CHAPTER VIII.
THE METAPHYSIC OF NATURE.
Relation of the Categories to External Nature — 1. Phoronomy, the science of
Matter as the Moveable in Space — Relative and Absolute Space — Relativ-
ity of Motion — Composition of Motions, as determined by the category of
Quantity — 2. Dynamics, the science of Matter as occupying space —
Repulsive Force as essential to Matter — Impenetrability — Infinite Divis-
ibility of Matter — Mistake of the Monadists — Matter not composed of an
infinite number of simple parts — Attractive Force implied in Matter —
Distinction of Repulsion and Attraction — Matter as subsumed under the
category of Quality — 3. Mechanics, the science of Matter as communicating
Motion — Quantity of Matter and Quantity of Motion correlative — Three
Laws of Mechanics — (1) Quantity of Matter unchangeable — (2) Changes
of Matter due to an External Cause — (3) Equality of Action and Eeaction
— These Laws subsumed under the category of Relation — 4. Phenomenology,
the science of Matter as an Object — (1) Relative Motion possible, Absolute
Motion impossible — (2) Circular Motion of a Body actual, contrary Motion
of space not-actual — (3) Contrary Motion of a Body acted upon necessary —
Relation of these Propositions to the category of Modality, . 236-259
CHAPTER IX.
COMPARISON OF THE CRITICAL AND EMPIRICAL CONCEPTIONS
OF NATURE.
1. Kant's Phoronomy compared with the third chapter of Spencer's First
Principles — The method of Spencer — His unphilosophical identification of
Sequences and Co-existences with Feelings — Time and Space not abstrac-
tions or derivable from Muscular Feeling — Matter not resoluble into
Impressions of Resistance and Muscular Adjustments — Assumptions
involved in the derivation of Motion from Movements of the Organism —
Force, the most concrete of the Categories of Nature — 2. Indestructibility
of Matter and Persistence of Force — Kant's First Law of Mechanics pre-
supposes Substance — Spencer's Proofs of the Indestructibility of Matter
inconclusive — Kant's Second Law of Mechanics presupposes Causality —
Examination of Spencer's views, that Force is an Ultimate Truth, and the
Persistence of Force improvable— Correlativity of Matter and Force, 260-288
xii CONTENTS.
CHAPTER X.
THE DISTINCTION OF NOUMENA AND PHENOMENA IN KANT
AND SPENCER.
Distinction of Phenomena and Noumena in the ^Esthetic and Analytic — The
Noumenon of Kant as the Idea of a Limit — Paralogisms of Rational
Psychology — Antinomies of Rational Cosmology — Contrast of Kant and
Spencer as to the Relativity of Knowledge — Spencer's confusion between
Absolute Knowledge and Knowledge of the Absolute — His Absolute an
Abstraction — Indefinite Consciousness of the Absolute impossible — Ex-
amination of Spencer's opposition of Subject and Object— His Proofs of
Realism inconclusive — His Universal Postulate no Criterion of Truth —
Transfigured Realism a self -contradictory Theory — Imperfection of
Spencer's Conception of Mind as a Substratum — Ultimate Scientific Ideas
not self-contradictory, - Pages 289-328
CHAPTER XL
IMPERFECT DEVELOPMENT OF KANT'S THEORY OF
KNOWLEDGE.
1. Contrast of the Manifold as given and the Forms as originated untenable —
2. Provisional character of the distinction of a priori and a posteriori
Knowledge — 3. Want of logical development in Kant's Theory of Know-
ledge— 4. Inter-connexion of the Categories of Substance, Cause and
Reciprocity — 5. Imperfection in the opposition of Pure and Mixed
Categories, - - 329-351
CHAPTER XII.
EXAMINATION OF KANT'S DISTINCTION OF SENSE,
IMAGINATION AND UNDERSTANDING.
1. Examination of Kant's view of the Manifold of Sense — Various meanings of
Sensation — Confusion of the Manifold with immediate Feeling — Confusion
of it with Perception as a stage of knowledge — The Manifold properly an
element in Knowledge and Existence — 2. Examination of Kant's view of
Space and Time — Space and Time not mere Forms of Perception — They
are the simplest determinations of Knowledge and Existence — Source of
Kant's mistake — 3. Examination of Kant's view of Pure Imagination —
Confusion between Imagination as a phase of Knowledge and as an element
in Knowledge — The Transcendental Schema really expresses the relation
of the Elements of Knowledge — 4. Examination of Kant's view of Concep-
tion— Various meanings of Conception — Conception as a phase of Knowledge
— Scientific Conception a unity of Analysis and Synthesis — False Contrast
of Induction and Deduction — Conceptions as the Product of Abstraction —
Contrast of Abstract Conceptions and Categories— 5. Examination of Kant's
view of Judgment — His mistaken assimilation of Analytical and Syntheti-
cal Judgments — 6. Examination of Kant's view of the Self — The Noumenal
Self an Abstraction, , - , r - 352-40?
KANT
AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS.
CHAPTER I.
THE PROBLEM AND METHOD OF THE CRITIQUE OF PURE
REASON. — MR. BALFOUR'S CRITICISM OF THE TRANSCEN-
DENTAL METHOD.
TT is no longer possible for any one but a superficial
reader of the Critique of Pure Reason to regard
Kant as a benighted "a priori" philosopher of the
dogmatic, type, afflicted with the hallucination that
the most important part of our knowledge consists of
innate ideas, lying in the depths of consciousness and
capable of being brought to the light by pure intro-
spection. The labours of recent commentators have
compelled us to see that this short and easy method
of disposing of the Critical Philosophy is altogether
unsatisfactory. At the same time I cannot help
thinking that much of recent criticism rather shows
the need on the part of the critics of a closer acquaint-
ance with Kant's writings and mode of thought, than
calls for direct refutation. I am far from saying that
Kant has produced a final system of philosophy,
admitting of no development, and demanding only a
docile acceptance. All that I mean is, that along
with much that is imperfectly worked out, and
even with some self-contradiction, he has given us a
A
2 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
philosophy which must be regarded, not as a rival of
English psychology, but rather as above and beyond it.
I cannot, therefore, accept so sweeping a condemnation
of his system and method as that which is contained
in the very strong language of Dr. Hutchison Stirling,
who regards the system as "a vast and prodigious
failure," and the method as only "a laborious, base-
less, inapplicable, futile superfetation." So very harsh
a judgment, modified even as it afterwards is by
the remark that "Kant nevertheless abides always,
both the man and the deed belonging to what is
greatest in modern philosophy," l seems to show a
plentiful lack of intellectual sympathy on the part of
the critic. In spite of the minor contradictions and
the incomplete development of his theory, Kant has
opened up a "new way of ideas/' which should win
a general assent the moment it is seen as it really is.
I propose, therefore, to state in my own way the
main points in his theory of knowledge; and as the
critical philosophy is most likely to commend itself to
living thinkers when brought into connection with the
difficulties they feel in regard to it, I shall interweave
with this statement a review of recent criticisms, and
an examination of the empirical psychology of out-
own day.
Not long ago Mr. Balfour gave us a vigorous criti-
cism of the general method of Kant, which, if conclusive,
would virtually foreclose any more detailed inquiry into
the merits of the philosophy developed by its aid.
That method he regards as radically unsound, and the
main propositions to which it conducts us he therefore
holds to be unproved assumptions. I am aware that
Mr. Balfour directs his artillery rather against those
1 Princi-tnn Review, Jan. 1870, p. 210.
i.] CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON— MR. BALFOUR. 3
whom he calls Neokantians or Transcendentalists than
against Kant himself. I cannot, of course, hold myself
responsible for the opinions of all who may be called,
or who may call themselves Transcendentalists; but in
so far as such writers as Mr. Green and Mr. Caird are
concerned, I think I may venture to say that, as they
undoubtedly conceive of the problem of philosophy
very much as Kant conceived of it, and seek to solve
it by a method similar, if not identical, with his,
whatever applies to Transcendentalism applies in all
essential respects to Critical Idealism as well.
In opening his battery against Transcendentalism,
Mr. Balfour has occasion to state the problem of phil-
osophy as he understands it. But unfortunately he
has done so in terms that are fatally ambiguous. "The
usual way," he says, "in which the Transcendental
problem is put is, How is knowledge possible 1 " . . .
But "the question should rather be stated, How much
of what pretends to be knowledge must we accept as
such, and why ?" . . . Now, " if we were simply to
glance at Transcendental literature, and seize on the
first apparent answers, we should be disposed to think
that the philosophers of this school assume to start with
the truth of a large part of what is commonly called
Science — the very thing which, according to my view
of the subject, it is the business of philosophy to prove."
. . . Nevertheless " Transcendentalism is philo-
sophical, in the sense in which I have ventured to use
the term : it does attempt to establish a creed, and,
therefore, of necessity it indicates the nature of our
premises, and the manner in which the subordinate
beliefs may be legitimately derived from them/'1
1 Mind, XII., p 481. The article from which I quote is reprinted with
little change in Mr. Balfour's Defence of Plriloso/Jiic Doubt.
4 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
Now Kant would certainly have been willing to
admit that the problem of philosophy might be thrown
into the form, " How much of what pretends to be
knowledge must we accept as such ? " and he would
also have admitted that it is the business of philosophy
to prove " what is commonly called science ; " but as
certainly he would have insisted at the outset upon
defining more exactly what is to be understood by
"knowledge" and "science." For, manifestly, Mr.
Balfour's words may be taken in two very different
senses; they may mean either (1) that philosophy has
to prove the truth of the special facts of ordinary-
knowledge and the laws embodied in each of the
special sciences, or (2) that philosophy must show from
the nature of our knowledge that the facts of ordinary
knowledge and the laws of the special sciences rest
upon certain principles which make them true univer-
sally, and not merely for the individual. I cannot help
suspecting, from the general tenor of his criticism, that
Mr. Balfour has allowed these very different proposi-
tions to run into one in his mind, so that, having
shown, as he very easily may do, that Kant does not
prove the first, he rashly concludes him to have failed
in proving the second. Surely Mr. Balfour does not
seek to lay so heavy a burden on philosophy as is im-
plied in the demand that it should prove the truth of the
special facts of observation and the special laws of the
natural sciences, or even the generalizations of empirical
psychology. No one, I should think, would seriously
ask a philosopher to prove it to be a fact that we have
experience, say of a ship drifting down a stream, or
that the three interior angles of a triangle are equal to
two right angles, or that bodies attract each other in
proportion to their mass and inversely as the square of
i.] CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON— MR. BALFOUR. 5
the distance. Manifestly if philosophy is to attempt
a task of this kind and magnitude, it must go on for
ever without reaching any final conclusion, since the
special facts and laws of nature are infinite in number.
Philosophy has certainly to do with the proof of know-
ledge, but he would be a very foolish philosopher who
should attempt to unite in himself the functions dis-
charged by all the special sciences. "The sceptic,"
says Mr. Balfour, " need not put forward any view of
the origin of knowledge." The sceptic is a privileged
person, and of course need not put forward any view
of anything; but supposing him to be reasonable, he
will not dismiss without enquiry the view of those
who hold that the question as to "the origin of know-
ledge " is the question of philosophy. The follower of
Kant, at any rate, must refuse to have the formula,
which best expresses the problem of philosophy as he
understands it, replaced by the very different formula,
How much of what pretends to be knowledge must we
accept as such? if by this is meant, How are we to
show that this special fact or law is true ? The special
facts of ordinary knowledge and the special laws of the
natural sciences, are not propositions which the philoso-
pher seeks to prove, but data which he assumes. Of
all our knowledge the conclusions reached by mathe-
matics and physics are those which we have least doubt
about; and hence I do not understand how Mr. Balfour
can object to the philosopher assuming to start with
" the truth of a large part of what is commonly called
science." I have no objection to find with Mr. Bal-
four's assertion, that a philosophy must consist partly
of premises and partly of inferences from premises. I
should certainly prefer another mode of expression,
from the fact that the process of inference, according
6 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
to the account given of it by formal logic, does not
allow of any inferences except those which are purely
verbal ; but as Mr. Balfour probably only means to say,
that there are certain facts which do not stand in need
of proof by philosophy, and certain conclusions which
it is the business of philosophy to prove, I am content
to accept his way of stating the case. My objection
lies against what he very strangely supposes to be the
" premises " of transcendental philosophy. The actual
premises of Kant are the special facts of ordinary ex-
perience in the widest sense, and especially the facts and
laws of the mathematical and physical sciences. No
doubt the particular philosophical theory we adopt will
cast upon these a new light, but it will in no way alter
their nature or validity. Should the Critical explana-
tion of the essential nature of knowledge be accepted, a
new view of the process by which knowledge has been
obtained, and therefore a new view of the general
character of the objects of knowledge will grow up,
but the facts themselves will remain just as they were
before. The philosophical theory, that the existence
of concrete objects, apart from the activity of intel-
ligence by which they are constituted for us, is an
absurdity, does not throw any doubt upon the scientific
truth, that bodies are subject to the law of gravitation.
The evidence for a scientific law is purely scientific.
The philosopher who should attempt, from the general
nature of knowledge, to establish a single individual
fact, or a single specific law of nature, would justly
draw upon himself the censure of taking the "high
priori road" which leads only to the kingdom of shadows.
From a general principle only a general principle can be
inferred: the proof of a special law demands special
evidence. If the philosopher, by a mere examination of
i.] CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON— MR. BALFOUR. 1
knowledge, is able to establish a single qualitative fact,
why should he not evolve a whole universe out of his
individual consciousness ? If, however, the sceptic
is so unreasonable as to ask him to prove the truth
of any such fact, he will at once transfer the re-
sponsibility to the physicist : all that he pretends to
do is to show that the law is not a mere fiction of the
individual mind, but can be accounted for by the very
nature of human intelligence. On the other hand,
should the philosophical theory advanced be such as to
reduce our knowledge to a mere series of individual
feelings, we shall of course have to admit that the facts
of individual consciousness have no universality or
necessity ; we shall, in other words, be compelled to
say, that there are no facts, in the ordinary sense of
the term, but only supposed facts, or, if you will,
fictions. It will no longer be safe to say that there
is a real connection between objects, but we may at
least say that there is for us a connection between what
we ordinarily understand by objects. The empirical
philosopher, with the fear of Mr. Mill before his eyes,
may hesitate to say that two and two are four, but at
least he will feel entitled to say that two objects added
to other two are for us four.
It may be, however, that Mr. Balfour admits all
this. In that case the problem of philosophy will be
for him, as for Kant, What are the universal principles
which are presupposed in the facts of our ordinary and
scientific knowledge ? But if so, I must take the
strongest exception to Mr. Balfour's way of stating the
"premises" of Kant and his followers. The problem
being to show how we may justify the knowledge we
all believe we possess, by an exhibition of the nature
of our intelligence as manifested in actual knowledge, it
8 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
is manifestly inadequate and misleading to say, that
the Transcend entalist begins by begging the sceptic to
admit " that some knowledge, though it may only be of
the facts of immediate perception, can be obtained
by experience ; that we know and are certain of
something — e.g., of a coloured object or a particular
taste." The Transcendentalist, unless I am altogether
mistaken, would not state the matter in that way at all.
Kant at least would not ask anybody to admit that he
has just a little knowledge ; much less would he ask
him to grant that he has a consciousness of a coloured
object or of a particular taste. The difficulty is not at
all a quantitative one. Nothing is gained by reducing
the facts " postulated" to a minimum, so long as the
sceptic is asked to admit a fact at all ; and if he does
admit such a fact as the immediate perception of a
colour or a taste, why should he refuse to grant the
carefully established laws of the special sciences ? Is
the evidence for the consciousness of the laws of gravi-
tation less cogent than the evidence that a coloured
object is perceived ? What the sceptic should object to
is not the mere number of facts assumed as true, but
that any facts are assumed as true, in the sense of being
more than phenomena of the individual consciousness.
What I object to, the sceptic would say, is the assump-
tion that the particular facts and laws which no doubt
exist in our consciousness, are universally and neces-
sarily true ; I ask you, therefore, to prove the supposed
absoluteness, objectivity or necessity — state it as you
please — of these facts and laws. The request is per-
fectly reasonable, and the father of Transcendentalism
claims that he has in all essential respects resolved the
sceptic's doubt. It is in the process by which he en-
deavours to prove that there are universal and necessary
i.] CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON— MR. BALFOUR. 9
principles underlying knowledge and making it real or
objective, that Kant is led to refer to such simple
experiences as the consciousness of a coloured object or
of a particular taste ; but he does so, not because he
has more faith in such immediate feelings than in the
established laws of science, but, on the contrary, because
he has no faith in them at all. The argument is indi-
rect, and proceeds somewhat in this way : If it
is to be maintained that all external concrete objects
are without or outside of consciousness, an attempt
must be made to account for knowledge from a mere
" manifold" or detached series of impressions — as, for
example, the impression of a bright colour or a sweet
taste ; but from such an attenuated thread of sensation
no explanation of the actual facts of our experience can
be given. Kant, in other words, argues that we cannot
suppose an unrelated feeling to be a constituent of
real knowledge. Mr. Balfour completely misses the
point of the reasoning, and actually supposes Kant to
be begging the sceptic to grant him the fact of a little
knowledge, in order that he may go on to extract from
it a great deal more.
Philosophy presents itself to the mind of Kant with
a certain antique largeness and nobility of conception.
Psychology, which with us is usually made to bear the
whole burden and strain of philosophical thought, he re-
gards as a special branch of knowledge, ranking in scien-
tific value along with Chemistry and standing below those
sciences which, as admitting of mathematical treatment,
assume the most precise and the most systematic form.1
Kant's impulse to philosophize arises in the first place
from his interest in such purely metaphysical questions
as the existence and nature of God, the freedom of the
1 Mttaphyaische Anfangsgrunde der Naturwissenscha/l, ed. Hartenstein, 1867,
p. 361.
10 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
human will, and the immortality of the soul. His
ultimate aim is, in the language of Mr. Lewes, to lay
the " foundations of a creed." But he soon discovers
that in our common knowledge, and in the mathematical
and physical sciences, certain principles are tacitly
assumed, which are not less metaphysical than those
commonly bearing the name. We are perpetually
making use, for example, of the law of causality, and
the natural philosopher assumes the truth of such
principles as the indestructibility of matter. Thus an
examination into the nature of human knowledge is
forced upon us, both as a means of determining the
limits of our real knowledge and of justifying, if that
be possible, the universal and necessary principles
which are imbedded in ordinary experience and the
special sciences. Until we determine the essential
conditions of human knowledge, it seems vain to attempt
the solution of the more ambitious problem as to the
existence of supersensible realities. Hence Kant seeks,
by starting from what every one admits, to discover
whether or no those purely metaphysical questions are
capable of any solution. And it is his special charge
against all previous philosophy that, from neglect of
this preliminary criticism, it has fallen either into a
dogmatism that can give no reason for its existence
or into a scepticism that can only be a temporary phase
of thought. His aim is thus in one way dogmatic, but
his is a dogmatism which comes as the crowning result
of a critical investigation of the nature of knowledge,
which has enabled us to distinguish demonstrable from
indemonstrable or problematic assertions. The Critique
of Pure Reason undertakes the preliminary task of
determining what are the ultimate constituents of
knowledge, and this cannot be done without drawing
i.] CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON— MR. BALFOUR. 11
in outline the sketch of a true metaphysic, the details
of which, as Kant asserts, can easily be filled in by
any one who has firmly apprehended its main features.
Hence we are told that " we must have criticism com-
pleted as a science before we can think of letting
metaphysic appear on the scene."1 Metaphysic is thus
compelled to undertake a kind of investigation which
is not required in other branches of our knowledge.
Other sciences may properly occupy themselves with
the agreeable task of increasing the sum of knowledge ;
metaphysic, before it can make a single dogmatic
assertion, must first prove its right to exist. Failure
to apprehend this fact has led in the past to aimless
wandering in the region of mere conjecture and to the
continual alternation of over-confident dogmatism and
shallow scepticism. The first and most important task
of philosophy is therefore to prove that there are
metaphysical propositions implied in our ordinary
knowledge, which can be established upon a secure
foundation, and, as it turns out, that the propositions
ordinarily known as metaphysical do not, at least by
the theoretical reason, admit of either being proved or
disproved. Thus the enquiry into the nature of know-
ledge proves to be at the same time a discovery of the
limits of knowledge.
The first problem of critical philosophy — one that is
necessarily bound up with the second — is, How can
there be any knowledge of real or objective existence ?
The question is not, as Mr. Green has pointed out,2
Is there real knowledge ? but, How can there be real
knowledge ? It is true that we may accept the first
mode of statement if, like Mr. Balfour, we interpret
1 Prolegomena, Mahaffy's translation, p. II.
- Contemporary Review, xxxi., p. 20.
12 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
it to mean, How am I to distinguish real from pre-
tended knowledge ? but, on Kant's view, this is only
another and less definite way of asking how knowledge
is possible. For wecan separate re al from apparent
knowledge only by pointing out what are the essential
conditions of there being any real knowledge for us, and
this is just another way of asking, How is knowledge
at all possible ? By determining what are the condi-
tions of real knowledge, we at the same time deter-
mine indirectly what is not real knowledge. Now, an
enquiry into the nature of knowledge must in some
way comprehend all the facts that make up the sum of
knowledge, and hence, to find the problem workable at
all, we must get these facts into a convenient and port-
able shape. But this has in large measure been already
done for us. Our common-sense knowledge of the
world of nature and the world of mind has been carried
up into a higher form in the mathematical and physical
sciences on the one hand, and in psychology on the
other, and from these we may therefore start as from
facts that every one admits. Thus the general and
somewhat indefinite question, How is knowledge pos-
sible ? breaks up into the two closely connected ques-
tions, How is mathematical knowledge possible ? and
How is scientific knowledge possible ? We are not
here concerned with the special truths of mathematics
or physics, or even of psychology, but only with the
necessary conditions without which there could be no
mathematical or physical or psychological knowledge.
The special truths of those sciences we assume to be
true : they are the facts from which we start, not the
conclusions we desire to reach. Our object is to dis-
cover, by a consideration of the nature of human
intelligence, what are the essential conditions without
i.j CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON— MR. BALFOUR. 13
which there could be no sciences of mathematics,
physics, and psychology.
As to Kant's method of solving this problem, we
may say that, like the scientific discoverer, he sought
for a hypothesis adequate to account for the facts
in their completeness. The only exception which can
properly be taken to this way of putting the matter is,
that it is not so much a statement of the peculiar
method of Kant, as of the method by which all know-
ledge is advanced. It is rather a truism than a truth
that the discoverer must cast about for some hypothesis
that shall harmonize with the facts he is seeking to
explain. The merit and characteristic difference of
Kant's method lies, not simply in setting up tentatively
a hypothesis and testing it by admitted facts, but in
the comprehensiveness with which he has stated the
problem of philosophy, and in the special solution he
proposes. Like all discoverers, he began with certain
facts which he sought adequately to explain, and like
them he was assisted in making his discovery by
observing the failures of his predecessors. This accounts
to a great extent for the peculiarities of his mode of
statement. All through the Critique, he combines with a
statement of his own theory of knowledge a polemic
against the theories of others. This union of exposition
and criticism makes it peculiarly difficult to follow the
course of his thought. In a sense, his method is
dialectical ; that is to say, he brings forward certain
propositions as if they were precise statements of his
own theory, when in reality they are merely stages in
the gradual evolution of his thought. Thus he not
infrequently speaks of " sensible objects," or " objects
perceived by the senses," as if sense of itself were
an independent source of knowledge, instead of being
14 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
merely, in the critical meaning of the term, a logical
element in knowledge. So also he speaks of an abstract
conception and a category, of an analytical judgment
and a synthetical judgment, and of experience in its
simple and its philosophical sense, as if each of these
terms belonged to the same stage of thought. In truth
it must be admitted that Kant was, to some extent at
least, the victim of his own mode of statement ; for
while he always keeps the ordinary conceptions in
regard to knowledge distinct from the purely critical
formulation of it, it cannot be said that he has com-
pletely harmonized in his own mind the two very
different points of view.
The distinction, then, between the data from which
he starts and the philosophical theory by which he
endeavours to account for them, is never absent from
Kant's mind. It does not seem to have occurred to
him that any one would refuse to admit that mathema-
tics, physics and psychology do as a matter of fact
contain propositions that are true within their own
sphere. Repeatedly he states this assumption in per-
fectly definite language. Mr. Balfour himself quotes
from the Critique Kant's remark, that, " as pure mathe-
matics and pure natural science certainly exist, it may
with propriety be asked how they are possible ; for that
they must be possible is shown by the fact of their
really existing." And many other passages might be
cited to the same effect. Thus he remarks in the
Prolegomena,, that pure mathematics is "a great and
well established branch of knowledge," 1 and again in
speaking of the mistake of supposing mathematical
judgments to be analytical, he remarks that had Hume
but seen that his onslaught on metaphysics was virtually
'Proleg. tr. § 6, p. .41.
i.] CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON— MR. BALFOUR. 15
an attack on mathematics as well, " the good company
into which metaphysic would thus have been brought
would have saved it from the danger of a contemptuous
ill-treatment, for the thrust intended for it must have
reached mathematics, and this was not, and could not
be Hume's intention."1 Kant was mistaken about
Hume's intention, as Mr. Mahaffy and others have
noted, but as to his own opinion there can be no pos-
sible mistake. But perhaps the clearest passage of all
is that in which he says that " pure mathematics and
pure science of nature had no occasion for such a
deduction, as we have made of both, for their own safety
and certainty, for the former rests upon its own evidence
and the latter upon experience and its thorough con-
firmation. Both sciences therefore stood in need of
this enquiry, not for themselves, but for the sake of
another science, metaphysic."2 Kant therefore invari-
ably assumes the truth of the mathematical and physical
sciences, and only asks how we are to explain the fact
of such knowledge from the nature of knowledge itself.
It is true that he qualifies this unlimited statement so
far as to admit, that the special sciences are ultimately
dependent for their truth upon philosophical criticism,
but the qualification applies, not to the special truths
which form the body of those sciences, but to the uni-
versal principles which they take for granted, and which,
strictly speaking, belong to metaphysic. " The possi-
bility of mathematics," he says, " may be conceded, but
by no means explained without [philosophical] deduc-
tion."3 That is to say, while no one can doubt that
mathematical judgments are universal and necessary,
this must be an article of faith, until we are shown
philosophically the ground of their universality and
1 Proleg. tr. § 4, p. 29. 2Ibid., § 40, p. 114. 'Ibid., § 12, p. 48.
16 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
necessity. But this does not mean that proof is de-
manded of the special truths of mathematics, but only
that, in accounting for knowledge, we must find out the
secret of their universal character. The problem of the
Critique is, therefore, the purely metaphysical one as to
the objective validity of the knowledge we possess, not
the scientific problem as to the evidence of the truth
of special laws. No doubt Kant would have admitted
that a failure to account for the possibility of real
knowledge must throw doubt on the absolute truth of
the conclusions of mathematics and physics, since these
sciences cannot get along without making use of princi-
ples which they do not seek to prove. But Kant's
attitude towards the scepticism of Hume, and his
unwavering faith in the truth of the sciences, shows us
that his conclusion in that case would be, not that
science has no truth, but that the metaphysical theory
propounded is marred by some inherent flaw. The
extreme scepticism which Mr. Balfour's language sug-
gests, would have seemed to him a voluntary creation
of self-tormenting difficulties. The truth of mathemati-
cal propositions as such was in his view necessarily
mathematical, and of physical propositions physical,
and it would have appeared to him mere folly to ask
philosophy to prove what no one denies. It is surely
enough, he would have said, if I show that my system
is consistent, and alone consistent, with the undoubted
truths of mathematics and physics.
In developing his proof, as has been said, Kant was
warned by the utter failure of previous dogmatic
systems — a failure which he regards Hume as having
proved beyond dispute, so far at least as the principle
of causality is concerned — that the mode of explanation
must follow a completely new track. The inherent
i.] CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON— MR. BALFOUR. 17
vice of those systems betrays itself in the double defect
(1) that they assume knowable objects to exist, in the
fulness of their attributes and in their relation to each
other, quite independently of our intelligence, and (2)
that, as a consequence, they suppose that we can, by
mere introspection or analysis, obtain judgments which
hold good of things in themselves, and which therefore
are true not merely subjectively or for us as individuals,
but objectively or universally and necessarily. This
twofold assumption is a characteristic mark of dogma-
tism. In the statement of his own theory Kant starts
provisionally from the dualism of knowledge and reality
and seeks to develop a true theory by a gradual trans-
formation of the false theory. Adopting the objection
made by Hume against the ordinary proof of causality,
and expressing it, to borrow the language of mathema-
ticians, in its utmost generality, he points out that the
principle upon which it goes cannot possibly account
for the fact of real knowledge. (1) If known objects,
as the dogmatist assumes, are without consciousness,
and yet are known as they exist, we must, to account
for that knowledge, say that we go to them and appre-
hend them one by one, and also observe that they are
permanent, that they undergo changes, and that they
act and react on each other. Our knowledge of concrete
things and of their succession and co-existence is thus
resolved into a series of particular perceptions. Philo-
sophically, therefore, the dogmatist tries to account for
our knowledge of real objects by saying that objects
are revealed to us in the individual apprehensions or
perceptions which come to us from without. Now,
if in the meantime we grant that things exist without
consciousness just as they are known, it is plain, that
so far as our actual knowledge goes, and so far, there-
18 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
fore, as the dogmatist is entitled to affirm, knowledge
will resolve itself into a succession of feelings or ideas in
consciousness. But the most that we can philosophi-
cally base upon a series of feelings or ideas is a
knowledge of particular objects, particular series of
events, and particular co-existencies. This was what
Hume pointed out, so far as the sequence or causal
connection of events is concerned. I observe flame to
be attended with the feeling of heat, and finding this
particular sequence repeated frequently in my con-
sciousness, I infer that flame is actually connected with
heat> and that the one cannot exist without the other.
The inference, however, is unwarranted. All that I
can legitimately say is, that in my past experience as
remembered, and in this particular experience I am
now having, flame and heat occur successively. Indi-
vidual perceptions of such sequences I have, but the
inference based upon them, that these could not be
otherwise, arises merely from the nature of my
imagination, which illegitimately leaps beyond the
immediate perception and converts it into a universal
rule. On perception, as we may say, generalizing
Hume, no judgment in regard to the existence of real
objects, or of their connection or co-existence, can pro-
perly be founded. The affirmation of the reality of the
objects, or of the relations of objects, is something that
we add to perception, not something actually given in
perception. (2) This leads us to ask whether we are
more successful when we attempt to prove the per-
manence, the causal connection, or the interaction of
objects, from conceptions instead of perceptions. Now,
conceptions are for the dogmatist simply ideas in the
mind, which are completely separated from things
without the mind. The conceptions of the permanence,
i.] CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON—MR. BALFOUR. 19
the changes and the mutual influence of substances, are
separated by an impassable gulf from the substances
themselves. It is thus perfectly evident that we
cannot legitimately pass over from the conception of a
substance to the substance itself. Completely shut up
within our own minds, we shall vainly endeavour to
break through the walls of our prison. We can
certainly frame judgments in regard to the ideas which
exist in our minds, but we cannot show them to have
any application to real objects or events. Thus, having
the conception of substance, we may throw it into the
form of the judgment, " Substance is that which is
permanent." Such a judgment is no doubt correct so
far as our conception is concerned, and is even neces-
sarily true in the sense that it is free from self-
contradiction or conforms to the logical principle of
identity, but it has no demonstrable relation to the real
substance we suppose to exist without consciousness.
All that we have done is to draw out or state explicitly
what was contained in the conception with which we
started, and however necessary and valuable this pro-
cess may be in making our conception clear, it is value-
less as a means of proving the reality of an object
supposed to correspond to it. The mere analysis of the
conception of substance no more shows that there are
real substances in rerum natura than the analysis of the
conception of a hundred dollars entitles me to say that I
have a hundred dollars in my pocket. Now, dogmatism
never gets beyond purely analytical or tautological judg-
ments of this kind ; the account it gives of the nature
of knowledge is such that we cannot understand from it
how it is possible to have the experience of real objects
or of their connection at all. We may, therefore,
summarise Kant's criticism of previous philosophy as
20 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
follows : — Knowledge of real objects existing beyond
the mind, and of their connection and interaction, must
be obtained either from perception or from conception ;
but perception cannot take us beyond the consciousness
of a particular object as now and here, and conception
tells us nothing at all about objects ; hence dogmatism
cannot explain the possibility of knowledge at all.
So far Kant has closely followed in the wake of
Hume, at least as he understood him ; the main differ-
ence being, that whereas Hume shows the imperfection
of dogmatism only in regard to the principle of caus-
ality, Kant universalizes the criticism and throws it
into the comprehensive form : real knowledge cannot
be accounted for from mere perceptions or from mere
conceptions. It is in fact the great merit of Hume
in Kant's eyes, that he shows with such clearness
wherein the weakness of dogmatism consists. All
a priori judgments, i. e. judgments derived from con-
ceptions, seem to be merely analytical, and therefore,
however accurately I may analyse the conception of
cause, T can never get beyond the conception itself.
Hence, as Hume argues, the supposition that the
conception of causal connection proves a real connection
of objects is a pure assumption. The moment I am
asked to explain how I get the knowledge of objects, I
must refer to my perceptions, and no perception can
entitle me to make universal and necessary affirmations.
Expressed in the language of Kant, Hume's difficulty
is this : How can the conception of cause be thought
by the reason a priori, and therefore possess an inner
truth independent of all experience ? J And this ques-
1 This mode of statement is provisional, and suggests that very abstract opposi-
tion of thought and reality which it is the main aim of Kant to overthrow.
The required correction is given afterwards, more particularly in the Analytic.
See below, Chap. iii.
i.] CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON— MR. BALf OUR. 21
tion, when put universally, assumes the form, How are
synthetical judgments a priori possible ? Hume indeed
does not content himself with pointing out the purely
subjective character of the notion of causality, but
endeavours to explain how we come to suppose a
necessity where none exists ; and in this Kant refuses
to follow him. A series of perceptions can never yield
necessity, for, however frequently one given perception
follows another, we cannot thence conclude that the
one must follow the other. Our belief in the connec-
tion of perceptions is therefore explained by the psy-
chological law of frequency or repetition : we naturally
suppose that what is often associated is really connected,
and thus by the influence of custom we confuse an
arbitrary association of our ideas with a real connec-
tion of objects. Accepting Hume's criticism of dog-
matism, and rejecting his psychological account of
the principle of causality, Kant endeavours to show
that we can have a synthetical a priori judgment
of causality, as well as other judgments of the same
kind which Hume altogether overlooked.
We can now see why Kant states the problem of
philosophy as he does, and what is the general method
he is likely to follow in attempting to answer the
question, How are synthetical judgments a priori
possible ? As the failure of dogmatism evidently arises
from the assumption, which no one prior to Kant had
questioned, that objects and events exist beyond con-
sciousness as they are known, it was only natural to
ask whether this assumption may not be a mistake.
The general answer therefore given by Kant to the
problem he has himself propounded, is that known
objects instead of being passively apprehended, are
actively constructed by intelligence as operating on the
22 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
material supplied by the special senses. The existence
of things in themselves is not indeed positively denied,
but such things are shown to be absolutely distinct
from the objects we actually know. The theory that
intelligence constitutes known objects instead of pas-
sively apprehending them, is held to be the only
theory that explains the facts as a whole. In the
development of his proof of this theory we find Kant
continually seeking to intensify the persuasiveness of his
own solution, by showing the inherent imperfection of
the dogmatic conceptions previously accepted as conclu-
sive. His method of proof thus takes, in many cases,
an indirect form. All through the first part of the
Critique, we find him asserting that unless we admit
the activity of intelligence in the constitution of know-
ledge, we are reduced to a " mere play of representa-
tions," or, what is at bottom the same thing, we are
compelled to attempt the impossible feat of extracting
reality from subjective conceptions. These two things
always go together in Kant's mind : the impossibility
of justifying universal and necessary judgments from a
mere manifold of sense, i. e. from an arbitrary succes-
sion of feelings, and the impossibility of accounting for
knowledge on the supposition that known objects are
things in themselves independent of our intelligence.
When he proposes to show why mathematical judg-
ments are apodictic and yet refer to individual objects,
Kant points out, on the one hand, that such judgments
cannot be obtained by an analysis of conceptions, and
on the other hand, that their demonstrative character
is unintelligible if we suppose the objects of mathe-
matics to be known by particular observations of sense
or by empirical measurements. In proving the prin-
ciple that the knowledge of permanent substances is
i.] CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON— MR. BALFOUR. 23
one of the conditions of a real knowledge of objects in
space, he shows, that apart from the schema of the
" permanent," we can have only a number of unrelated
feelings, which by no possibility can be identified with
real substances ; and in confirmation of this criticism
he remarks, that the ordinary derivation of permanent
things from the conception of substance assumes that
an analytical or tautological judgment is capable of
bridging the gulf between mere conceptions in the
mind and things in themselves. So, in his proof of
causality, he seeks to show that our knowledge of
a real sequence of events can be accounted for, neither
from an arbitrary train of feelings, coming one after
the other without determinate order or connection, nor
from the mere conception of cause as we find it lying
ready-made in our minds, for in the former case we should
not be entitled to say that there are real sequences, but
only that there are sequences of our perceptions, and
in the latter case we should have no criterion by which to
distinguish the conception of cause from an arbitrary
creation of the imagination. Again, the existence of
a primary self-consciousness he establishes, both on the
ground that a succession of states of consciousness, not
bound together by a single identical self, will not
account for the systematic coherence and unity of our
actual experience, and on the ground that the mere
fact that we always think of the self as one does not
prove the self to be one in its own nature. Lastly,
in the Refutation of Idealism this indirect method of
proof assumes an open and explicit form; the argument
being, that the " psychological idealist " can never show
that the mere sequence of ideas in the individual mind
could give us the knowledge of real substances as per-
manent ; but that, on the contrary, we could never have
24 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
experience of the self as in time, had we no knowledge
of real objects in space. It should be observed, however,
that this polemic against dogmatism might be elimin-
ated from Kant's proof without really destroying its
intrinsic force. The transcendental proof has assumed
this form chiefly from historical causes, and Kant, in
stating it as he does, only intends to commend to the
lips of the dogmatist the ingredients of his own poisoned
chalice. The conclusiveness of the theory does not lie
in its indirect mode of proof, but in the completeness
with which it accounts for the facts of experience
as a whole. Kant might have stated his proof alto-
gether in the affirmative form that known objects must
exist in relation to intelligence ; and, having done so,
the details of the system would have consisted entirely
of a presentation of the essential elements of knowledge
in their relation to each other. The " manifold of
sense " or " flux of sensations," is not, as Mr. Balfour
seems to suppose, a ghost of Kant's raising, but the
unlaid ghost of dogmatism itself. Transcendentalism
" convinces by threats," only in so far as, like every
other system of philosophy, it must take some account
of accepted systems that differ from it.
If the above is at all a correct account of Kant's
problem and method, the objections of Mr. Balfour
have been virtually disposed of beforehand. Those
objections seem to me to be rather the difficulties which
naturally occur to one who has not seen into the heart
of a system, but still looks at it from the outside, than
the sympathetic and luminous criticism of one who, by
the very act of mastering and thoroughly assimilating
the thought of another, is already, as Fichte remarks,
to some extent beyond it. This judgment can only be
completely justified by an examination of Mr. Balfour's
i.] CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON— MR. BALFOUR. 25
objections to the proofs of Substance and Causality, and
to the Refutation of Idealism ; but even without a
special consideration of these we may see that his
criticism is destitute of that sureness and lightness
of touch which can only come from close familiarity
with the subject.
What the Transcendental philosophy is called upon
to prove is, we are told, that the principles it asserts to
be true are " involved in those simple experiences which
everybody must allow to be valid."1 Now, in the first
place, there is no need, as has already been indicated,
to lay special stress on simple rather than on complex
experiences. When Kant is speaking of experiences as
data he has to explain, he places scientific truths on the
same level as common-sense knowledge, and with the
whole body of experience, as thus understood, he con-
trasts purely philosophical knowledge as a higher way
of dealing with the very same facts. In speaking of
the distinction between mathematical and philosophical
knowledge, he remarks that the essential difference
between them lies in the fact that the former
sees the particular in the universal, and the latter
the universal in the particular ; and that those
thinkers who propose to distinguish philosophy from
mathematics on the ground that the former deals with
quality, and the latter with quantity, have confused
a difference in the objects of those sciences with the
true difference, W7hich consists entirely in the point of
view from which the objects are regarded.2 In the
second place, Mr. Balfour, unless I misunderstand him,
entirely misrepresents the Critical method when he
speaks of certain principles — by which he means, as I
suppose, such principles as the permanence of sub-
, xii, p. 483. 2 Kritik, Methodenlehre, p. 478.
26 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
stances, the causal connection of events, and the like-
as " involved in " our simple experiences. We may
indeed say that the principle, say of causality, is
" involved in " our experience, in the sense that an
analysis of our ordinary beliefs will show that as a
matter of fact we do suppose events to be really
connected together. Every one is "natural philoso-
pher " enough to know " that the property of rain is to
wet, and fire to burn ; that good pasture makes fat
sheep; and that a great cause of night is lack of the
sun." Mr. Balfour's words may therefore mean, that,
while every one has the belief that there is a real con-
nection between certain known objects, it is only by a
process of abstraction that we learn to throw this belief
into the general form of a principle, and to affirm, not
that fire is the cause of heat, and rain the cause of wet-
ness, but that ever}7" event has a cause. I am loth to
suppose that Mr. Balfour is under the impression, that
the Transcendentalist has no other means of establish-
ing his principles than simply taking our ordinary
beliefs, abstracting from the concrete or individual
element in them, and straightway baptizing the residuum
by the name of a " principle." For this is just what
Kant means by dogmatism, consisting as it does in the
mere explicit statement of what is wrapped up in our
ordinary conceptions. By such a process, as he points
out, we can only frame analytical judgments that
do not take us a single step beyond the assumptions
with which we begin. And yet it is difficult to resist
the conviction that Mr. Balfour has fallen into this
mistake, when we find him saying that the principles
of the Critical philosophy are the " casual necessities
of our reflective moments," which are supposed to be
established by showing that they have " always been
i.] CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON— MR. BALFOUR. 27
thought implicitly ; " and that " to argue from these
necessities [the principles] to the truth of things is to
repeat the old fallacy about innate ideas in another
form."1 What these utterances mean, except that
Kant and his followers endeavour to prove the truth of
their principles by an analysis of our ordinary beliefs
and conceptions, I am unable to understand. Kant's
doctrine can only be assimilated to "the old fallacy
about innate ideas " on the supposition that it assumes
certain conceptions as true, and proceeds to " deduce,"
or set forth in abstract language, what is implied in
them. But this is exactly what Kant does not do. If
he has one merit more than another, it is, that he has
disposed for ever of the supposition that knowledge
may be justified by merely analysing the beliefs we
happen to possess. Instead of admitting the absolute
separation of thought and reality, an assumption under-
lying and vitiating the whole procedure of dogmatism,
he maintains that reality is meaningless apart from
its relations to thought. Mr. Balfour's mode of state-
ment can be regarded as a correct formulation of the
method of Transcendentalism, only if we suppose him
to mean that the facts and laws of our whole experience
imply or presuppose certain principles belonging to the
constitution of our intelligence ; and when it is under-
stood in this way, his objection loses any force it seemed
at first to possess. But let us consider Mr. Balfour's
criticism more in detail.
Let us suppose the Transcendentalist to be asked by
the sceptic, how he proves the absolute truth of such a
principle as that of causality. The reply, according to
Mr. Balfour, will consist in begging the sceptic to admit
1 Mind, xii., p. 489. Cf., p. 484. On this point, see Mr. Caird's remarks,
Mind, xiii., 111-114.
28 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
that we " get some knowledge small or great by ex-
perience ;" and having obtained this very moderate
concession, he will proceed to show, that his transcen-
dental necessities or principles are involved in it. To
take a concrete instance, the sceptic may be asked
whether he admits that we have an experience of
change, and if he assents, the Transcendentalist will
attempt to show that experience " is not possible unless
we assume unchanging substance." Or again, the
sceptic, enticed into the admission that we have an
experience of real events, will be straightway forced to
admit that such an experience is possible only if we
virtually think of those events as under the law of
causation. The essence, then, of the Transcendental
method consists in showing, or attempting to show, that
in questioning the truth of such principles as substanti-
ality and causality, the sceptic contradicts himself, since
he grants the reality of certain experiences and yet
"makes an illegitimate abstraction from the relations
which constitute an object." He has, therefore, either
to rescind his admission of the reality of the object, or
to admit that a certain principle is involved in his
knowledge of it. " He cannot, in all cases at least,
do the first ; he is bound therefore to do the
second."
I acquit Mr. Balfour entirely of any intentional mis-
representation of the Critical method ; but the fact is
not the less certain, that he has given, not a fair state-
ment, but a travesty of it. I see nothing in his way of
stating the case, to distinguish criticism from dogmatism.
Mr. Balfour's criticism of the Refutation of Idealism
seems to show that he has not carried his scepticism so
far as to doubt the correctness of the ordinary dualism
lMind, xii., p. 482 ff
i.] CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON— MR. BALFOUR. 29
of intelligence and nature. But without appreciating
in the clearest way the essential absurdity of this
dogmatic assumption, the method of Kant is simply
unintelligible. The only way, Mr. Balfour evidently
thinks, in which the Transcendentalist can seek to make
good his position, is by analysing, after the method of
formal logic, the ordinary or uncritical knowledge which
we all possess. The Transcendentalist is supposed to
reason, that cause, substance, &c., are really thought,
although only in an obscure way, by us in our ordinary
consciousness. And no doubt this is true enough ; but
it does not constitute the essential nerve of proof. If
this were the sole force of the argument, Mr. Balfour's
objection, that the principles are assumed, not proved,
would be perfectly sound. The explicit statement of
the implications of ordinary experience cannot prove
the necessity and universality, or, what is the same
thing, the objectivity of the principles in question.
But the ready answer to such reasoning is, that no re-
flection upon our ordinary beliefs which does not in some
way transform the current view of them, can justify us
in asserting that they are laws of nature. What Kant
maintains is, that reasoning back from our actual
experience, we perceive that there are certain forms
of intelligence without which there could be no experi-
ence at all. His method is, starting from our ordinary
knowledge of concrete facts, and from our ordinary
dogmatic judgments in regard to them, to show that
we can never prove the reality of the facts, or the ob-
jectivity of our judgments concerning them, so long as
we oppose thought and nature as abstract opposites.
This Kant endeavours to make intelligible to the dog-
matist by saying, that the observation of independent
objects owing nothing to intelligence, can never yield
30 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
real knowledge, because it cannot take us beyond an
empirical " is." And this leads him to say, that, while
intelligence may be dependent on separate impressions
for its apprehension of the determinate properties of
things, it is yet active in combining or relating those
impressions, and so constituting them as real individual
objects, real events, and real co-existencies, It is only
in accordance with Kant's method of thought to say,
that he who maintains the independent reality of things
as known, and denies to intelligence any share in the
construction of that reality, must attempt to account
for the knowledge, which we at least seem to possess,
without any other material than separate impressions.
What else indeed can there be, if we assume that
thought has nothing to do with the constitution of
phenomenal objects "? On the other hand, supposing
known objects to exist only in relation to our faculties
of knowledge, intelligence must have certain functions
of synthesis, which at once combine into unity the
detached differences supplied by the special senses, and
enable us to explain how we can have a knowledge of
objects other than our own subjective conceptions. For
if nature exhibits everywhere a system and unity of
objects, which have been actively constructed by
thought as acting upon the manifold of sense, the
puzzle which dogmatism completely fails to solve, at
once disappears : we are no longer perplexed by the
essentially unmeaning riddle, How can we pass from
conceptions in the mind to objects without the mind ?
for objects as known are seen to have no existence
except in relation to the intelligence by which they are
made real. The functions of synthesis, or potentialities
of combination, we may, if we please, call "relations;"
but it must be observed, that they are able to operate
i.] CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON— MR. BALFOUR. 31
whether they are brought into explicit consciousness or
no. A function is not an " innate idea," but the
potentiality of an indefinite number of cognitions. But
how do we know that thought has such functions ? We
know it because the workmanship of thought is mani-
fested in actual knowledge or experience, in so far as
we combine or unite impressions and thus form judg-
ments about real things. From the fact that we have
scientific knowledge, we are enabled to reason back to
the functions of thought by which such knowledge is
made possible. We do not beg the sceptic to admit
that, in our immediate perceptions, there are involved
principles which we can discover by mere analysis, and
that, unless this is granted, we are making "an illegiti-
mate abstraction from the relations which constitute an
object ;" but we ask him to explain how there can be a
knowledge of objects apart from the activity by which
intelligence constitutes them. Kant has no thought of
cajoling the sceptic, or anybody else, into the admission,
that there is a confused metaphysic even in such simple
experiences as a perception of colour or a feeling of
taste ; all that he asserts is, that any one who is
earnest in his endeavour to account for our experience
in its totality must come to the conclusion that intelli-
gence contributes an essential element in the constitu-
tion of the known universe. And those who refuse to
accept his theory of knowledge he asks to explain how
real knowledge can be derived from a mere analysis of
conceptions, or from the perpetual rise and disappear-
ance of individual feelings. In this sense alone, and
not in the sense that each of us has a confused consci-
ousness of the "relations which constitute an object,"
do Kant and his followers hold that there can be no
objects apart from the relations of thought. Mr. Bal-
32 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
four objects, quite in the vein of Locke's criticism of
Descartes' innate ideas, that " the majority of mankind
have habitually had certain experiences without ever
consciously thinking them under the relations asserted
to be implied in them ;" and from his point of view he
very naturally remarks, that, as an implicit thought is
" simply a thought which is logically bound up in some
other thought," it is " a mere possibility which can be
said to have existence only as a figure of speech." The
simple reply to this is, that when certain relations are
said by the Critical philosopher to be involved or im-
plicit in ordinary experience, all that is meant is that
they are manifestations of the activity of intelligence in
relation to its own objects. That the majority of man-
kind do not consciously bring those relations before
their minds only shows that they are not metaphysi-
cians : it does not show that they can know objects
which by definition are beyond consciousness altogether,
and are therefore in the strictest sense unknowable.
Intelligence, as Kant maintains, has an essential nature,
which comes into operation in our actual experience ;
but the recognition of this fact must necessarily be
made only after actual experience has been had. Mr.
Balfour asks how it comes that, " if relations can exist
otherwise than as they are thought, sensations cannot
do the same."1 The answer of course is, that a sensa-
tion can only exist as it is felt, whereas a function of
thought must operate before we can be conscious of it
as having operated. A function of thought, in other
words, is in itself a pure capacity or potentiality, the
existence of which can only be revealed to us when, in
relation to the material which it informs, it develops
into actuality. The fact that people are unaware of the
lM'md, xii., p. 488.
i.] CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON— MR. BALFOUR. 33
part played by intelligence in the combination and
connection of impressions, no more shows that in-
telligence is a pure blank, than the ignorance of the
calculus on the part of the " majority of mankind,"
is a proof that the judgments of pure mathematics
are untrue.
34
CHAPTER II.
THE A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF PERCEPTION. — MR. SIDGWICK'S
VIEW OF THE REFUTATION OF IDEALISM.
"V/\7"E have seen what the problem of philosophy is,
the general method by which it is to be solved,
and the direction in which the answer must lie. Unless
it can be shown that there are synthetical judgments
a priori, no consistent and adequate theory of know-
ledge is possible. Now, of all the knowledge which we
possess independently of philosophical criticism, none is
so sure and free from doubt as that which is embod-
ied in the mathematical sciences. The judgments of
mathematics are self-evident, universal, and necessary,
and they are a priori or independent of all observation
of sensuous things. In building up his science the
mathematician does not need to verify his conclusions
by the perceptions of the senses ; in fact, such percep-
tions are for him useless, since they never could give
rise to apodictic certainty. No actual measurement of
the sides of a triangular object could entitle us to affirm
that the two sides of all possible triangles are necessarily
greater than the third side. And not only are mathe-
matical judgments a priori, but they are at the same
time synthetical. The ideal objects on which the
mathematician operates are always individual, and are
ii.] A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF PERCEPTION. 35
therefore given in pure perception. Hence mathematical
judgments are unlike those of any other science : they
rest upon perceptions, and yet they are independent of
sensible observation. This is the reason why mathe-
matics deals only with quantity to the exclusion of
quality ; for only quantity can be constructed or pre-
sented a priori in immediate perception. Mathematics
is therefore distinguished from other sciences, not by
the objects with which it deals, but by the way in
which it looks at those objects. For pure perception
is at once individual and universal. This is manifest
when we consider that the science of mathematics is
built up by means of definitions, axioms, and demon-
strations. A definition, in the strictest sense, must be a
precise, complete, and primary representation of an ob-
ject, and such a definition mathematics alone can give.
The object to be defined is directly originated or con-
structed, and hence the definition is immediately verified
in a pure perception. Axioms, also, are based upon
the immediate perception of individual objects, which,
as constructed, are universally and necessarily true.
And, lastly, mathematical demonstrations are alone
self-evident, because they alone are capable of direct
verification.1 The judgments of mathematics, then,
have these two characteristic marks: (1) They rest upon
individual perception, and (2) they are a priori or in-
dependent of sensible perception. Now a proper appre-
ciation of the nature of mathematics gives us the key to
the solution of the special problem of metaphysics. For
that problem is, as we have seen, to explain how con-
ceptions and perceptions can be brought together in the
unity of real knowledge ; in other words, how the mind
can be shown to be in actual contact with known
1 Kritik, Methodenkhre, 478-90.
36 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
objects. Hume, accepting the ordinary dualism of
thought and things, made a divorce between conception
and perception. Hence he summarily rejected all
universal and necessary judgments, and admitted only
particular judgments resting upon an immediate per-
ception of concrete objects ; at least, this is the logical
consequence of an extension of Hume's criticism of
causality to such conceptions as substance and reci-
procal action. From a mere conception, as he main-
tained, no synthetical judgment applicable to real
objects, and therefore true universally and necessarily,
can be derived. But Hume, while he reasoned correctly
on the basis of ordinary dualism, overlooked a conse-
quence of it which would certainly have led him to a dif-
ferent conclusion had he only taken note of it. If there
are no synthetical a priori judgments, what becomes of
the judgments of mathematics, which every one admits
to be universal and necessary? Either those judgments
must rest on sensible observation, or they must be
derived from mere conceptions ; and while, in the one
case, they can have no universality, in the other case
they can only be regarded as mere analyses of the
conceptions we find in our minds. As a matter of fact,
however, mathematical judgments are at once a priori,
and yet rest upon individual perceptions. Now, this
casts doubt upon the assumption of Hume, that all
a priori judgments are necessarily analytical. If
mathematics is entitled to form a priori synthetical
judgments, we need not despair of showing that there
are a priori synthetical judgments of a metaphysical
kind. Hume would not have allowed himself to con-
demn all metaphysical judgments as subjective had he
not shared in the common fallacy, that mathematical
judgments are analytical. And when we see that
ii.] A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF PERCEPTION. 37
these judgments are synthetical, and yet a priori, the
problem of metaphysic no longer seems to be on the
very face of it insoluble.
In mathematics, then, we have instances of a priori
judgments which yet are synthetical; but, while mathe-
matical judgments are true universally and necessarily,
we find, upon looking more closely at them, that they
differ from such metaphysical principles as those of
substance and cause in one very important point. To
entitle us to affirm that " every event must have a
cause," we must be able to show that this judgment is
legitimately derived, not from a perception of individual
sequences, but from the conception of cause in gene-
ral. No mere sequence of perceptions, however often
repeated, can entitle us to say that there is an actual
connection between real objects. The causal connection
of events must therefore be proved, if it is capable of
proof at all, entirely from the conception of cause. A
mathematical judgment, on the other hand, is verifiable
in an individual perception constructed by the mind
a priori. Thus mathematics, after all, does not seem
to help us so much as it at first promised to do,
in explaining the possibility of purely metaphysical
judgments. There is no great difficulty in showing
how mathematical judgments can be synthetical. We
have simply to say, that we go directly to perception,
although, of course, not to empirical perception or ob-
servation, and form our judgments in accordance with
the object perceived. To explain philosophically the pos-
sibility of mathematical knowledge, it is, however, neces-
sary to show, from the nature of our intelligence, how
we can have the synthetical judgments of mathematics.
And this we seem to do when we say that such judg-
ments are derived, not from conceptions, but from
38 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
perceptions. But thus we escape one difficult}?- only to
fall into another not less perplexing. The "synthetical"
of a mathematical judgment we explain simply and satis-
factorily by saying that we go to our perceptions and
obtain the object on which the judgment rests, but
how shall we explain the " a priori 1 " For we have
always been accustomed to regard perception as giving
us only the individual, not the universal and necessary.
A perception certainly implies the immediate presence
of the object perceived, and if in mathematics we are
dependent upon the actual presence of the object in
regard to which we form a judgment, by what right
shall we affirm that the object always and necessarily is
of a certain nature 1 There is no difficulty in under-
standing how we can say that this individual triangle
now before us has its interior angles equal to two right
angles, but what entitles us to say universally and
necessarily that all triangles must have their interior
angles equal to two right angles 1 The mathematician
of course does not require to answer this question,
because he is not dealing with the ultimate conditions
of knowledge ; but philosophy, having undertaken to
explain the possibility of all kinds of knowledge, cannot
evade the responsibility of accounting for the univer-
sality and necessity of mathematical judgments, as
well as for their synthetical character.
Now, it is perfectly vain to suppose that this question
can be answered on the lines of the dogmatic philosophy
hitherto in vogue, according to which judgments and
perceptions, thoughts and things, are separated by an
impassable gulf. If the objects of mathematics are, as
the dogmatist supposes, real existencies, constituted
independently of our intelligence, no justification of the
universality and necessity of mathematical judgments
ii.] A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF PERCEPTION. 39
can possibly be given. For, in the first place, if mathe-
matics deals with real objects or things in themselves
existing apart from our consciousness of them, it is
evident that, whether such objects exist or no, at least
they cannot be known by us as they are in themselves.
It is self-evident that the properties of real things can-
not at the same time be perceptions in us. But, in the
second place, even if we waive this objection, we cannot
explain how the mere succession in which real objects
are revealed to us can form the basis of universal and
necessary judgments. If the object perceived has a
nature of its own, quite apart from any relations to our
faculty of perception, we are necessarily dependent upon
the actual perception of the moment for any knowledge
of it we may possess. What the object may be when
it is not perceived we are utterly unable to say. The
only judgments we can form must therefore be par-
ticular. We may say, This object now perceived is of
a certain nature ; but we cannot say, This and all
objects of which this is a type must always be of a cer-
tain nature. The universality and necessity of mathe-
matical judgments must therefore be explained in a
very different way from that relied upon by the dog-
matist. The first step towards a true theory must
consist in denying that the objects of mathematics
are either, as Clarke supposed, things in them-
selves, or relations of things in themselves, as was
held by Leibnitz. The justification of the apodictic
character of mathematics we must seek, not in the
nature of things lying beyond consciousness, but
in the constitution of our intelligence itself. We
have to explain how there can be perceptions which
yet are a priori, and the explanation, it is manifest,
must be of such a character as to revolutionize our
40 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS, [CHAP-
ordinary conception of the relation of thought to its
objects.
Now mathematics, as we can at once see, deals with
perceptions which are determinations or limitations of
space and time. " Geometry is based upon the pure
perception of space, mathematics obtains its conception
of number by the successive addition of units in time,
and pure mechanics at least cannot reach its conception
of motion without making use of the idea of time." ]
Philosophy, however, does not concern itself with these
specific determinations of space and time, but only
with space and time themselves. Can we then, from
a consideration of space and time as related to our
faculty of perception, account for the universality and
necessity, or what is the same thing, the a priori
character of mathematical judgments ? The deter-
minations of space and time which are the objects of
mathematics, cannot, as we have seen, be empirically
observed things in themselves, or definite proper-
ties of such things, nor can they be mere abstract
conceptions, obtained by the grouping of the observed
properties common to many concrete objects. " There
is therefore only one way in which my perception may
anticipate the reality of the object, and yet be a priori,
viz., when perception contains nothing but the form
of sensibility, which precedes all the real impressions
through which I am affected by objects." 2 Space and
time, therefore, Kant regards as pure forms of percep-
tion, by which he means, that they are logically prior
to the impressions of the special senses, and that as
belonging to the constitution of our perceptive faculty,
they are in themselves mere capacities or potentialities,
which come into operation only in relation to those
1 Prolegomena, tr., § 10, p. 45. 2 Ibid., § 9, p. 44.
ii.] A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF PERCEPTION. 41
impressions. We can now see generally what is the
critical solution of the problem, How are mathematical
judgments possible ? They are possible, Kant answers,
because they rest upon determinations of space and
time, of which, as belonging to the very nature of our
intelligence on its perceptive side, we cannot possibly
divest ourselves. To determine space and time as
the mathematician does, without bringing into play
these forms of perception, would be to perceive without
employing the faculty of perception. The universality
and necessity of mathematical judgments is therefore
quite compatible with the fact that they are syn-
thetical ; as specifications of the forms of perception
they are a priori, and as specifications of those forms
they are synthetical.1
This general statement of the answer to the question,
How is pure mathematics possible ? will enable us to
understand without much difficulty the various points
in the ^Esthetic. In this division of the Critique, Kant,
as he tells us, "isolates the sensibility ; " in other words,
he does not enquire into the constitution or connection
of real concrete objects, but contents himself with
pointing out the relation of space and time to our
intelligence. The discussion, therefore, is so far of a
provisional and incomplete character, certain assump-
tions being made, which are afterwards shown to
require more or less of correction. (1) Kant does
not in the first instance question the ordinary view,
that individual objects as existing in space and time are
known as individual by the special senses : he merely
1 Up to this point I have, in this chapter, mainly followed the discussion in
the Prolegomena, and especially §§ 6-12. I may here make the general remark,
that my interpretation is based throughout on a comparison of the Kritik itself,
with the other writings of Kant, and particularly the Prolegomena, the Meta-
jihyslsche Anfangsgriinde der Naturwittsenschaft aud the Loyik.
42 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
asks how, assuming this in the meantime to be true, we
are to account for the necessary element in the know-
ledge of individual things, i. e. the knowledge of their
quantitative relations. (2) As he does not enquire into
the constitution or relation of concrete objects, Kant
leaves for future consideration the question as to the ap-
plicability of mathematics to those objects. His reason
for doing so no doubt is, that the answer cannot properly
be given until the categories have been discovered and
justified, and the schemata limiting them set forth. (3)
In treating of the nature of space and time in their
relation to our faculty of knowledge, Kant assumes
the ordinary explanation of conception, as the product
of abstraction from the individual peculiarities of ob-
jects, and goes on to show that space and time are not
conceptions in this sense of the term. This provisional
assumption he was in fact compelled to make, unless
he had begun the Critique, as he might have done, with
an investigation into the nature of the categories as
standing under the supreme unity of self-consciousness.
(4) Lastly, Kant does not, in the ^Esthetic, attempt to
explain the process by which the potential forms of
space and time are determined to specific spaces and
times, but with a glance forward to the completion of
this process, he assumes those forms to be already
determined. Hence he speaks of space and time as
perceptions, although strictly speaking they are not
perceptions but merely forms of perception. Here
again the order in which he has seen fit to develope
his theory compels him to anticipate to some extent
the results which he afterwards proves; for, without
entering into a discussion of the doctrine of the cate-
gories and of the schematism, the process by which
space and time are determined could not be explained.
ii.] A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF PERCEPTION. 43
The ^Esthetic confines itself, therefore, to the task of
showing that space and time are not known to us
through the special senses, but are universal forms
belonging to the nature of our perceptive faculty ; that
they are not abstract conceptions but perceptions ; and
that no other account of their nature is consistent with
the peculiar character of mathematical judgments. The
discussion naturally breaks up into two parts : the
metaphysical exposition in which space and time are
shown to be a priori perceptions, and the transcen-
dental exposition, which seeks to show that mathema-
tical judgments are actually based on determinations
of space and time, and cannot be accounted for on any
other theory of their nature than that given in the
metaphysical exposition. The relative incompleteness
of the ^Esthetic as compared with the Analytic, arises
mainly from the fact that Kant does not yet question
the assumption that individual objects, as distinguished
from space and time, are known by the special senses
without assistance from thought, and that he so far
accepts the account of the nature of conception which
is given by formal logic. This incompleteness is how-
ever partially modified by the inferences in regard
to the relation of individual objects to consciousness,
which are shown to follow from the new view of space
and time which Kant adopts. For, as space and time
are now denied to be realities external to conscious-
ness, the concrete objects assumed to be revealed by
the special senses can no longer be identified with
things in themselves, which by hypothesis are beyond
consciousness.
The first point, therefore, to which Kant directs his
attention in the Esthetic is to show that space and time
are a priori forms of perception ; in proof of which the
44 KAN2" AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
following reasons are adduced. (1) Space and time are
not, as is usually supposed, derived from an observation
of the spatial and temporal relations of individual
objects. The external objects I observe are without
me, and without or side by side with each other ;
while all objects, whether external or internal, either
co-exist or follow each other. These objects therefore
diifer not only in . having distinct properties, but in
occupying different places, and presenting themselves
in different moments of time. Admitting, then, that
individual objects are apprehended by external or in-
ternal sense, I must still presuppose space and time
in order to explain my knowledge of the relative posi-
tions of external objects, as without me and without
or side by side with each other, and to explain my
knowledge of the relative position in time of both
external and internal objects. Space and time are
therefore independent of, and presupposed in, the
special perceptions of the senses. (2) The concrete
objects which we observe to exist in space and time
we can think away, but it is impossible to think away
space and time themselves. We must therefore regard
space and time as a priori.
The next point to which Kant addresses himself is
to show, that space and time belong, not, to our think-
ing faculty, but to our perceptive faculty. In proof
of this he brings forward two considerations. (1) A
general or abstract conception always refers to a num-
ber of individual objects, which agree in certain general
relations, while they differ in their specific properties.
But there is only one space and one time, not a number
of distinct spaces and times. We do indeed commonly
speak of various spaces and various times, but these
are not separate individuals, but parts in the one single
ii.] A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF PERCEPTION. 45
space and the one single time. Again, in a general
conception the individual objects standing under it are
first known as complete, and the conception is derived
from them by abstraction, whereas the parts or con-
stituents of space and time are simply limitations, exist-
ing not prior to space and time but in them.1 From
these considerations it is evident that space and time
cannot be regarded as conceptions. (2) If we take any
abstract conception, we must of course say, that the
marks or attributes which distinguish it from other
conceptions will be found in all the individual objects
we can ever observe to which it is applicable. But the
conception itself has a definite number of marks which
constitute its individuality as a conception : the indi-
vidual objects to which it refers are not contained in it,
but externally brought under it. Space and time,
however, actually have individual parts within them-
selves, and these parts are not externally brought
under space and time as conceptions, but are infinite
in number.2 Space and time, therefore, are evidently
not conceptions but perceptions. And as they have
already been shown to be a priori we may formulate
their character in the proposition : Space and time are
a priori perceptions. They are a priori, to summarise
Kant's reasoning, because every special perception pre-
1 It is possible, as Dr. Stirling points out (Jour. Spec. Phil., xiv. 90), that
" Bestandtheile " may mean physical or chemical constituents, in which case
we must substitute for "Again, in a general conception ... in them"
the following : — "Nor are these parts constituents that pre-exist, and have to
be put together (as bricks to make a house, or oxygen and hydrogen to form
water), but they are limitations of space and time as forms." The objection
to this is, that physical parts or chemical elements, when combined, produce
an integral whole, whereas Kant is seeking to show that space and time are
not universal wholes. He may, however, merely mean here to emphasize the
a priori character of the "parts."
8 Space and time, as Kant points out in his Metaphysic of Nature, are addible
»nd divisible to infinity.
46 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
supposes them, and because they are not variable but
constant ; and they are perceptions, inasmuch as they
neither denote separate individuals, nor connote a defi-
nite number of attributes belonging to separate indi-
viduals, but are themselves determinate individuals.1
By the application of his peculiar method of seeking
to account for the actual knowledge we admittedly
possess, Kant has begun that transformation of ordi-
nary conceptions as to the nature of known existence
which is the result of every earnest effort to apprehend
the relations of thought and reality. His way of
presenting his thought, as was natural, consists in
exposing on the one hand the vice of ordinary Dualism,
and on the other hand in substituting for it his own
view, that our intelligence has as perceptive an essential
part to play in the formation of the objects in regard
to which mathematical judgments are formed. So far
he has dealt only with the pure perceptions of mathe-
matics, leaving the question as to the nature of concrete
objects, external and internal, for subsequent considera-
tion. Without at present going into the solution of
the question, How is the science of nature in the widest
sense of that term possible ? we can see that the ordi-
nary dualism of thought and things is no longer tenable.
If space and time are forms of our perception, it is
absurd any longer to speak of known external objects
as existing without consciousness. Such a supposition
compels us to adopt the self-contradictory view that we
have a series of feelings representative of the properties
of real things, which are yet not merely successive but
1 For the reasons given above (pp. 40-42) the metaphysical exposition re-
quires some correction even to express Kant's own final view. Cf. Caird's
Philosophy of Kant, pp. 264 ff. The transcendental exposition need not be
given, as it simply repeats what has already been explained. See especially
pp. 39, 40.
ii.] A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF PERCEPTION. 47
also co-existent or permanent in time, and that we
have a knowledge of objects which by definition are
beyond consciousness altogether and yet are identical
with the objects which we perceive. Such a superfluous
doubling of external realities must be the result of a
false theory of knowledge. Kant's own theory seems
to himself to have all the simplicity of a true hypo-
thesis, and to have the merit of explaining adequately
the necessity and universality of mathematical judg-
ments. Instead of a double series of objects, an object
in space and an object in consciousness, and a double
faculty of perception, having before it at once states of
consciousness and properties of things, we have merely
objects in space in essential relation to our perception
of them. Kant's charge against dogmatism, or as he
calls it in the present reference, psychological Idealism,
is that it confuses externality in space with externality
to thought. Real things are certainly external in the
sense of being arranged in relation to each other in
space, and our perceptions are internal in so far as they
are arranged as successive events in time ; but objects
are not external because they are without intelligence,
nor are perceptions internal because they alone are
within intelligence. External and internal have mean-
ing only for a being who is conscious of both alike. I
call a thing external either because I perceive it to stand
apart in space from another thing, or to be distinct
from my perceptions as they occur successively in
time ; and in both cases I am speaking of externality
in the sense of position in space, not in the sense of
independence on consciousness. I say my perceptions
are internal, on the other hand, because they are not
made up of parts that stand out of each other, and
because two perceptions do not stand apart from each
48 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
other like two objects in space; in other words, ray per-
ceptions are internal because they are not in space but
only in time. But although I distinguish in conscious-
ness objects as external from perceptions as internal,
the objects and the perceptions alike exist only for me
as a conscious being. What Kant proves, then, is
that space and time exist only in relation to intel-
ligence, or in other words, that the opposition of
external objects to internal perceptions is a logical
distinction within consciousness, not a real separation
of consciousness from something without it. And this
involves the transformation of the ordinary concep-
tion of the self as known. According to the psycho-
logical idealist, we are immediately conscious by internal
observation or introspection of self as a real subject of
knowledge. Hence the self is supposed to be real
apart from our knowledge of it. But if the self as it
exists is independent of our knowledge of it, what
relation does it bear to the self as known ? It can
only be revealed to us in the series of our own mental
states, and such states as in time imply the determina-
tion of the form of time by the faculty of perception.
Thus we have, according to the dogmatist, a self that
is given as successive in time and is yet independent
of time. Here therefore we get into a difficulty similar
to that which we have found to beset the dogmatic
theory of our knowledge of external objects. The real
self and the self as known fall apart and can by no
legitimate process be brought into connection with
each other. On Kant's theory, on the other hand, the
self is known in the series of its determinations in time,
and hence the real and the known self come together
in the unity of knowledge. Kant does not indeed deny
that there is a noumenal self distinct from the self as
ii.] A PRWRI CONDITIONS OF PERCEPTION, 49
known ; but he maintains that of such a self nothing
whatever can be said, whereas the phenomenal self as
within consciousness admits of the fullest knowledge.
In illustration of what has just been said, it may be
well to refer here to Kant's refutation of the charge of
Idealism. Mr. Balfour l maintains that in the Critique
Kant confuses the existence of external objects in space
with the existence of objects external to the mind, and
instead of proving the latter, as he supposes he is doing,
only proves the former. This criticism is endorsed by
Mr. Sidgvvick, who adds in support of it, that a com-
parison of the pertinent passages in the Critique, and
Prolegomena respectively, shows that Kant must have
allowed the two meanings of externality to run into
one in his mind, since the same or similar words are
used in totally different senses. In the Prolegomena
he rejects Idealism on the ground that we are conscious
of ourselves in relation to noumenal things : in the
Refutation of Idealism on the ground that we are
conscious of ourselves only in relation to phenomenal
things. Now " it is more than strange, it is simply
incredible, that Kant should in the two replies have
used the same cardinal terms in different senses, with
a perfect consciousness of their equivocality, and yet
without giving a hint of it to the reader." 2
I do not think that the charge of confusion as pre-
ferred against Kant by Mr. Balfour and Mr. Sidgwick
can be substantiated. Kant, as I understand him, had
only one argument against Idealism. The relative
passages in the Prolegomena and Critique respectively
only differ in so far as the former explicitly refers to
1 Mind, xii. 498.
2 Mind, xvii. 113. Compare with what is said below Mr. Caird's remarks,
Mind, xvi. 557 ff, xvii. 115.
D
50 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
things in themselves, while the latter allows the reader
mentally to supply the reference. Nor do I think that
there is such an extraordinary similarity of language,
combined with an absolute difference of meaning, as
Mr. Sidgwick seems to suppose. Let us first look at
the passage in the Prolegomena}' Kant's object here
is to repel the charge of Idealism, which had been
brought against him by certain critics who had mis-
understood the proper bearing of his theory of space
and time on our conception of the external world. He
begins by saying that " whatever is given us as object
must be given in perception." The first meaning we
naturally attach to this saying is, that objects in their
determinate properties exist independently of conscious-
ness, and that the individual coming to those objects
apprehends them through his senses and receives them
into consciousness. Kant, however, whose aim here is
to convince those who accept this dualistic view of their
mistake, and at the same time to show that his own
theory preserves, and alone preserves, the reality of ex-
ternal objects, insinuates into the popular language em-
ployed a new meaning. Fully expressed, the remark
quoted amounts to this, that whatever we may say of
the relation of the external world to consciousness this
at least must be admitted, that external or sensible
objects are external not to thought but to perception.
That Kant here makes use of dualistic language only
provisionally is plain from the fact that he imme-
diately adds, that " the senses never and in no manner
enable us to know things in themselves, but only their
phenomena, which are mere representations of the
sensibility." The dualist, in other words, admits
that external objects are revealed to us by sense, and
1 § 13. Remark ii.
ii.] A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF PERCEPTION. 51
therefore he must further admit that those objects
as known are not things in themselves, but only things
as relative to our consciousness. The properties of
things, as Kant has said before, " cannot migrate into
our faculty of representation," 1 and hence, unless per-
ceived objects were formed by the application of space
and time to impressions of sense, external things could
not be shown to be more than projections of our imag-
ination. " Hence we conclude," says Kant, " that all
bodies, together with the space in which they are, must
be considered as being merely representations in us,
which exist nowhere but in our thoughts." That is to
say, the ordinary view that determinate things are
independent of our consciousness, turns out to be a
mistake, when we refuse to accept any theory of per-
ception but that which is consistent with the real
knowledge of determinate "things. Perceived objects
are therefore not things in themselves, independent of
our perceptive consciousness of them, but objects con-
structed out of impressions of sense as brought under
the forms of our perception. They are therefore
" representations," not in the sense that they are mere
ideas of objects existing beyond consciousness, but in
the sense that they are objects within consciousness,
and yet real because formed by the necessary constitu-
tion of our perceptive faculty. Those who are still
unable to rid themselves of the preconception that
determinate things exist beyond consciousness or inde-
pendently of our faculty of perception will of course
say that this is manifest Idealism. Kant's reply is,
that whether we call his view Idealism or no, at least
it must be carefully distinguished from what he else-
where2 calls "psychological Idealism."
1 Prolegomena, tr., § 9, p. 43. a Kritik, p. 29, note.
52 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
" Idealism," says Kant, " consists in the assertion
that there are none but thinking beings, all other things
which we suppose to be observed by perception being
nothing but representations in the thinking beings, to
which no object external to them really corresponds."
The psychological Idealist, in other words, reduces
external objects to a mere series of feelings in con-
sciousness. " I say on the contrary," continues Kant,
" that things as objects of our senses existing outside
us are given, but we know nothing of what they are in
themselves, knowing only their phenomena, that is, the
representations which they cause in us by affecting our
senses." That is to say, Kant differs from the ordinary
Idealist in holding that what we call sensible or external
objects, i.e., determinate objects, are not merely transient
feelings or subjective states, but perceptible objects
which, as existing in space, are distinct from any mere
series of feelings in time. To this Kant adds, to
prevent misunderstanding, that he is not denying
the existence of things in themselves, but only the
existence of such things as known. The objects we
know are things in space, or phenomena, not things
without consciousness. The force of Kant's reply
does not lie, as Mr. Sidgwick seems to suppose, in the
assertion of the existence of noumenal objects, but in
the affirmation that the objects we know are real,
because they exist for us in consciousness and are yet
distinguished from the mere sequence of our repre-
sentations.1 I am not an Idealist, Kant argues, because
while I do not deny the existence of things in them-
selves without consciousness, I do not, on the other
hand, reduce known objects as existing in space to a
1 The admission that there are, in any ordinary sense, things in themselves
is provisional. See below, Chap. x.
ii.] A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF PERCEPTION. 53
mere succession of transient impressions as the Idealist
does. If to this interpretation it be objected that Kant
speaks of " the representations which objects cause in
us by affecting our senses," and therefore must be here
contrasting states of consciousness with unknown things
in themselves, the answer is, that in reasoning with
the Idealist, Kant naturally adapts himself so far to the
Idealist's point of view, and that, as the whole course
of his reasoning shows, he mentally interprets " repre-
sentations " to mean phenomenal objects, i.e., objects
formed by the action of space and time on detached
impressions of sense. Accordingly he goes on to say
that he "grants by all means that there are bodies
without us, i.e., things which, though quite unknown to
us as what they are in themselves, we yet know by the
representations which their influence on our sensibility
procures us, and which we call bodies, a term signifying
merely the appearance of the thing which is unknown
to us but not therefore less real." Here, again, Kant
affirms that he is not an Idealist, because, while grant-
ing, or rather affirming, that things in themselves
cannot be known as they are, he yet holds that there
are bodies in space which are known as distinct from
the mere series of representations belonging to the
phenomenal self. No doubt the phrase about " things
in themselves which we yet know by the representa-
tions which their influence on our sensibility procures
us," might be used by one who accepts the ordinary
view that objects as determinate exist beyond con-
sciousness and are only known through the perceptions
which they excite in an individual rnind separate and
distinct from them ; but this only shows that, while
using common language, Kant infused into it the new
meaning which it acquires when viewed in the light of
54 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
his own theory. "Representations" does not here
mean, as it would in the mouth of the psychological
Idealist, ideas in an individual mind which is cut off
from all direct contact with determinate things, but
objects determined by the forms of space and time in
relation to individual sensations. The contrast of
"representations," as informed sensations or pheno-
mena to "things quite unknown to us," is perfectly
clear and unmistakable to one who reads Kant's words
in connection with his general theory and with the
immediate context. The refutation of the charge of
Idealism is therefore made in the Prolegomena to turn
upon the distinction between a mere succession of ideas,
which constitutes the whole material from which the
psychological Idealist has to explain the knowledge of
real existences, and known objects existing in space and
contrasted with the series of our perceptions as only in
time. The reference to things in themselves is not es-
sential to the proof, and is merely introduced to explain
the difference between Kant's view of known or pheno-
menal objects and the ordinary conception of objects as
constituted apart from any influence of our perceptive
faculty. The Idealism which is sought to be refuted is
that which maintains that we are immediately conscious
only of the self as having a series of mental states ; and
Kant distinguishes his own theory from such Idealism
by showing that for the absolute distinction of deter-
minate ideas in consciousness, and determinate things
as existing beyond consciousness, we must substitute
the relative or logical distinction of determinate ideas
in time and determinate things in space and time.
Let us now look at the argument as stated in the
Critique.1
1 Kritik, p. 198.
ii.] A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF PERCEPTION. 55
The proof is of the nature of an argumentum ad
hominem. Kant seeks to convict the Idealist out of his
own mouth by showing that the consciousness of self,
as having a series of states, is bound up with the
correlative consciousness of the not-self as a congeries
of objects in space ; and this he does by endeavouring
to show that the consciousness of our feelings as before,
now, and after is possible only on the presupposition of
the consciousness of external things as permanent. The
thesis to be established is that the " mere consciousness
in experience of my own determinate existence proves
the existence of determinate objects in space outside of
me." The proof begins with a statement of what is
granted by the Idealist and everybody else, viz., that I
am conscious of my own determinate existence as in
time ; in other words, that I am conscious of having a
series of mental states. Then follows the proof itself,
which contains the following steps : — (1) The conscious-
ness of time as determinate can only be accounted for
on the supposition that something is known as per-
manent ; (2) This permanent cannot be found in my
mental states per se, i.e., the permanent is not the mere
idea of the permanent, and hence it must be' bound up
with the consciousness of external things ; (3) Conse-
quently the consciousness of my mental states as
internal necessarily implies the consciousness of things
in space as external. Let us take these steps in order.
(1) " All determination of time presupposes something
permanent in perception." Kant gives no proof of this
assertion, mainly, no doubt, because he had proved it
at length in the first analogy of experience.1 It is
enough to say here that if we eliminate the permanent
altogether, we cannot conceive how there should be a
1 For a statement of this proof, see Chap. vi.
56 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
consciousness of time as before, now and after, since
time is the mere form of perception of which we cannot
become conscious except in relation to the particulars of
sense. Now (2) " this permanent cannot be anything
in me, because the only way in which my existence in
time can be determined is through this permanent.
Hence the perception of this permanent is possible
only through a thing outside me (Ding ausser mir] and
not through a mere idea ( Vorstellung] of a thing outside
me." These two sentences really contain the whole of
Kant's argument against Idealism, and to fail in under-
standing them is to miss the point of the whole refuta-
tion. It must be observed that a strong contrast is
drawn between (a) a " permanent in me," which is
equivalent to the " idea of a thing outside me," and (6)
the permanent as a " thing outside me." The gist of
the argument is, that a " permanent in me " is a " mere
idea " or subjective state, and that this is the only per-
manent which the psychological Idealist is entitled to
speak of. Now, argues Kant, the mere idea of the
permanent will not account even for the consciousness
of time as determinate. This is further explained in
the remarks appended to the Refutation, wrhere it is
pointed out that the mere " I " of consciousness must not
be identified with the " I " as determinate, because the
self as determinate is in time, and therefore the object
of inner perception ; and again that the " I " is destitute
of even the least determinateness, and hence cannot
supply the permanent required as " correlate of the
determination of time." In other words, the pure " I "
is not a permanent in time, and therefore not a per-
manent in contrast to which we can become conscious
of the self as in time, or of time as determinate. The
permanent, therefore, which we require is a permanent
IL] A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF PERCEPTION. 57
in time. But there is no permanent in time except the
permanent in space, since mere ideas have no perma-
nence in themselves, and the pure " I," as the mere
abstraction of relation to consciousness, is not in time
at all. If there were no permanent in space, but only
the idea of the permanent in space, there could be no
consciousness of time as determinate, since an idea is
in itself a mere transient state. The permanent there-
fore is not in me, or is not a mere idea of a thing out-
side of me : it is a thing outside of me, i. e. in space.
The Idealist is therefore compelled to admit that the
permanent is not outside of consciousness, but only
outside of a mere series of mental states ; in other
words, external phenomena are known as directly as
internal phenomena. Thus the opposition of mere
ideas to things without consciousness, is transformed
by Kant into the relative distinction of real internal
events and real external things, both alike being, in
Kantian language, phenomena, and not the one a
phenomenon and the other a thing in itself, as the
Cartesian idealist might say; or the internal events
real and external things nonentities, as the Berkeleyan
idealist might say. Mr. Sidgwick is therefore in error
when he supposes1 that the "thing outside of me (Ding
ausser mir) " of the Critique is identical with "the un-
known but not the less real object (unbekannter aber
nichts desto weniger wirklicher Gegenstand) " of the
Prolegomena, and is contrasted with the "mere idea of
a thing outside of me (blosse Vorstellung eines Dinges
ausser mir) " as a thing external to consciousness with
a state of consciousness. The " unknown but not the
less real object " of the Prolegomena is distinguished
from the "thing outside of me" of the Refutation as
i Mind, xv. 410.
58 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
thing in itself from phenomenon, and, as has been shown
above, the " thing outside of me " is contrasted, not as
a thing external to consciousness with an idea in con-
sciousness, but as a thing in space with that mere idea
of a thing in space, which the Idealist according to Kant
is alone entitled to speak of. Mr. Sidgwick has mis-
understood Kant's argument, from not bearing in mind
that it is not direct but indirect. The interpretation I
have given is borne out by the conclusion of the proof,
which runs thus : " Consequently the determination of
my existence in time is possible only through the exis-
tence of real things which I perceive as outside of me.
Now consciousness in time is necessarily bound up with
the consciousness of the possibility of the determination
of consciousness in time, and therefore with the exis-
tence of things outside of me, which are the condition
of the determination of time ; i. e. the consciousness of
my own existence is at the same time an immediate
consciousness of the existence of other things outside
of me." In other words, my own existence in time
(my phenomenal existence) is possible only through
the existence of things in space (their phenomenal
existence) ; for the consciousness of myself as in time
can only be explained, as has been shown, on a theory
which accounts for the consciousness of determinate
time, and this again presupposes the consciousness of
things as in space. The Refutation of Idealism there-
fore differs from the passage in the Prolegomena simply
in omitting any reference to things in themselves,
and in containing a complete proof of the correlation
of external and internal phenomena instead of a mere
assertion of their correlativity. That in the Critique
Kant does not explicitly refer to things in themselves,
is easily accounted for when we consider, that in the
ii.] A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF PERCEPTION. 59
remarks added to the ^Esthetic, as well as in several
passages both before and after the Refutation, the
distinction between thing in itself and phenomenon is
clearly drawn, and hence might be assumed to be
familiar to the reader.
60
CHAPTER III.
THE A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. — THE
CATEGORIES AND SCHEMATA.
first question of critical philosophy, viz., How
is mathematical knowledge possible 1 has been
answered by showing that space and time, on which
mathematics rests, are pure forms of perception. One
inference from this is that external objects are not out-
side of consciousness, but are products of the perceptive
forms as applied to our impressions of sense. As the
external objects we know are thus, contrary to our com-
mon-sense view of the world, not things in themselves
but phenomena, we may expect that the second ques-
tion of critical philosophy, viz., How is a science of
nature possible? will be answered in a similar way.
And indeed it is easy to show that if by nature we
understand things in themselves, there can be no science
of nature. A scientific knowledge of things that exist
in complete independence of our intelligence can neither
be accounted for on the supposition that things are
known a priori, nor on the supposition that they are
known a posteriori. (1) If things exist independently
of thought, they must have an unchangeable nature of
their own, irrespective altogether of their relation to
our faculties of knowledge. It is therefore impossible
in.] A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE. 61
to pass from thought to things. By hypothesis our
conceptions are completely separated from real things,
and however perfectly we may analyse them, and ex-
press what is implicit in them in the form of judgments,
we are at the end of our labour no nearer to real things
than at the start. Analytical judgments, valuable
as they are in giving clearness to our conceptions, do
not, and cannot, carry us over to things assumed to be
independent of all relation to thought ; only synthetical
judgments, taking us beyond conceptions to realities,
are of any avail, and such judgments cannot be shown
to be a priori, so long as we assume the independent
existence of real things. The difficulty here is, there-
fore, to explain how there can be a priori judgments
that are not merely analytical. (2) Equally impossible
is it to account for a science of things in themselves by
observation. Real things must evidently have a ne-
cessary nature of their own, or they would not be real.
But if we begin by saying that they are complete in
themselves apart from any relation to our intelligence,
we can only obtain knowledge of them by coming
directly into their presence. We are thus dependent
for our knowledge of things upon the extent to which
our observation has gone, so that we can say nothing
about objects except what our special observations
enable us to say. But a science of nature must con-
tain laws that are necessary and universal, and hence
it cannot rest on mere observation. In other words,
by observation we cannot know things as they really
are. As before we saw that assuming things to be
completely independent of thought, our judgments
might possibly be a priori but could not be syntheti-
cal, so now we find that admitting them to be synthetical
they cannot possibly be a priori.
62 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
And yet there must be some way of showing that we
are capable of making judgments that are not merely
analyses of assumed conceptions, but hold of Nature
herself. For that there is a science of Physics resting
upon certain universal and necessary principles is uni-
versally admitted. Physics is no doubt based upon
observation, in so far as its concrete content is con-
cerned, but it also presupposes certain elements that no
mere observation can supply. Not only does the
physical investigator make use of the necessary truths
of mathematics, but he also assumes the truth of certain
discursive principles, resting on pure conceptions. Of
course Physics is not based entirely upon pure percep-
tions and pure conceptions ; for such conceptions as
motion, inertia, and impenetrability have an element
due to sensible perception and therefore cannot be called
pure. Besides, Physics is not the science of Nature
in the widest sense, for it deals only with facts of the
external world, to the exclusion of internal or psycho-
logical facts, while by Nature we properly mean to
embrace both classes of facts. Notwithstanding these
limitations, however, Physics does contain, or rather
rest upon, certain necessary and universal principles,
such as these : that Substance is permanent, and that
Every event depends on a cause. Confining our atten-
tion, then, to these a priori principles, the truth of
which alone makes a science of Physics possible, we
get the conception of a pure science of Nature, and the
problem we have to solve is to explain how such a
science, containing a body of necessary and universal
principles, can be accounted for. Nature therefore
must mean the sum of knowable objects, and the
Science of Nature the necessary principles making
them knowable. We may, in fact, say that our pro-
in.] A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE. 63
blem is to justify, if that be possible, those necessary
and universal propositions which the scientific man
assumes to be true, and which, without such justifica-
tion, can only be a matter of faith. Now the objects
to which a science of Nature applies cannot be things
the nature of which is in no way dependent on our
thought, for this assumption, as we saw above, either
prevents us from accounting for our knowledge of
reality or from accounting for the reality of our know-
ledge. But while of things in themselves we can have
no experience, it does not follow that everything
which comes within our experience is real. Because
only phenomena are capable of being known, it does
not follow that all that appears to be true really is
true. There are real phenomena, and phenomena that
are mere illusions, and again phenomena that are true
only for the sensitive individual. These distinctions,
however, do not in any way affect the question as to
the conditions of real knowledge. Whether a judg-
ment is true only when limited to the individual as
sensitive, or applies to objects as external ; or whether
again a judgment about a matter of fact is only pro-
bable or certain ; these are questions for the scientific
specialist to determine : our concern is solely to show
the possibility of apodictic judgments in regard to
nature from an examination of the conditions of there
being any real knowledge. It will, however, aid us in
solving our special problem, if we first consider the
difference between those judgments which the scientific
man regards as existing laws of nature, and those
which have not reached this degree of scientific cer-
tainty. The former we may call Judgments of Ex-
perience, the latter Judgments of Perception. Real
experience always consists in judgments as to objects
64 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
that are true not merely in reference to the sensitive
nature of a particular individual, but in relation to real
things. We never in any of our judgments which deal
with observed objects, come into contact with things in
themselves. This is an utter impossibility, because, as
we have seen, things in themselves cannot possibly
come within the range of our observation. Were there
nothing else, the fact that Space and Time are simply
forms of our perception, not real things or real qualities
of things, must prevent us from ever observing any-
thing but phenomena. Even the simplest perception is
therefore not the perception of a thing in itself, but only
of a phenomenon. But this is in no way inconsistent
with the fact that our first judgments as to phenomena
are only provisional. Now these judgments we may
call Judgments of Perception, not because they deal
with phenomena, while judgments of experience deal
with things in themselves — for both alike are limited to
phenomena — but because the former class of judgments
do not go beyond the observation of phenomena as they
first present themselves to us in apparent independence
of each other, while the second and higher class of
judgments imply a more thorough comparison and con-
nexion of phenomena, and therefore the arrangement of
them under the categories of relation. In the one case
we take things as they first present themselves to us in-
their apparent disconnexion ; in the other we go be-
yond this first view of things, and find out how they
are related to each other. All our common-sense
observations of things are, in the first instance, judg-
ments of perception, which can attain to the rank of
judgments of experience only by scientific investigation.
Every instance of a judgment about a mere matter of
fact is a judgment of perception ; every discovery of a
in.] A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE. 65
law regulating matters of fact is a judgment of experi-
ence. " All our judgments," as Kant says, " are at
first mere perceptive judgments." In other words,
when we look at the gradual way in which our know-
ledge of phenomena of nature grows up, we see that,
in the order of time, judgments of perception go before
judgments of experience. Now a judgment of experi-
ence is a judgment which we regard as true, not merely
of this or that individual, but of all individuals ; we
regard it as universally and necessarily valid. Thus
judgments of experience, just because they'are regarded
as universally and necessarily true, we conceive to be
objective. Judgments of perception, of course, refer to
objects, but they are not objective, because they are not
proved to be necessarily and universally true for all
human intelligences under all circumstances.
Let us take one or two illustrations. When I say
This room is warm, I do not make a judgment that is
true for every one, but only one that is true for myself
as a particular sensitive individual, and only for me so
long as my sensitive organism is in a particular state.
Here, then, we have a mere judgment of perception.
This, indeed, is not the best instance that could be given,
for it is evident that such a judgment could never
become a judgment of experience, because heat does
not exist in external objects apart from their relation to
our sensitive organization. It may, however, serve to
illustrate what a judgment of experience is not. Here
is a much better instance. When I say "The air is
elastic," I do not, in the first instance, mean more than
that a certain phenomenon recognized by relation to
my senses is associated in my observation with a certain
property also relative to my senses. But when by
scientific observation I find that " elasticity " is bound
66 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
up with the very nature of air, iny judgment of percep-
tion passes into a judgment of experience. Or again, I
observe a stone to grow warm, and I observe that this
takes place when the sun shines upon it. But it may
be that these two phenomena are not really connected
with each other but only happen to follow each other
in my observation. Until, therefore, I have proved by
scientific observation that the heat in the stone is com-
municated by the sun, I am only entitled to say : So
far as / can see; the sun is the cause of the stone grow-
ing warm ; I cannot say, The sun is the cause of the
stone growing warm. In the one case, I make a judg-
ment of perception ; in the other, a judgment of experi-
ence. Now it will be seen that in passing from a
judgment of perception to a judgment of experience,
I bring into play a connecting conception — in the
cases mentioned, the conception of cause. The ques-
tion, therefore, for transcendental philosophy is to show
of what nature such conceptions must be, if we are to
account for necessary and universal judgments. There
can be no doubt that science does suppose itself to be
entitled to make such judgments, and that in doing so,
it brings into operation certain conceptions. The ques-
tion, therefore, for us is to show, if we can, how there
can be conceptions entitling us to make judgments
about real objects, i.e., to form a priori synthetical
judgments of experience.1
We have seen, then, that by Nature is to be under-
stood the sum of knowable objects as determined by
certain universal and necessary judgments. Nature, in
so far as it is external nature, means not determinate
1 So far the Prolegomena, §§ 14-20, is in this chapter followed. With the above
account of the distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of
experience compare Caird's Philosophy of Kant, pp. 354 ff.
HI.] A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF KNO WLEDGE. 67
things existing apart from our intelligence, but those
real objects connected by apodictic judgments with
which physical science has to do. Kant, in other
words, accepts the judgments of science as distinguished
from the non-scientific judgments of ordinary conscious-
ness, and, pointing out, in accordance with the conclu-
sions established in the Esthetic, that all known
objects, and therefore the objects of science, are pheno-
mena, he translates the question, " How is a pure
science of Nature possible ? " into the form, " How are
judgments of experience possible ? " His problem,
therefore, is not to establish the fact that there are
judgments of experience — judgments which, as neces-
sarily and universally true, are " objective," in his
sense of the term — but to explain, if possible, how we
can have such judgments. This is the same question in
a more specific form than that with which he started,
viz., How are synthetical judgments a priori possible ?
All these ways of putting his problem he has : How is
real knowledge possible ? How are synthetic judg-
ments a priori possible ? How is a science of Nature
possible ? How are judgments of experience possible ?
and even, How are objects possible? Put the problem
as we please, it always comes back to this, How can we
justify the conviction held by every one, and empha-
sized by science, that our knowledge is not a mere
combination of coherent fictions, but a knowledge of
actual existences ?
Now the especial difficulty in answering this ques-
tion arises from the apparent impossibility of showing
that judgments which rest upon conceptions can yet
apply to real things. But, taking the hint from what
we have already discovered as to the basis of mathe-
matics, we may expect to find the solution in explaining
68 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
things from the nature of thought, not thought from
the nature of things. In any case, our problem is to
account for real or objective judgments, and hence an
analysis of our faculty of judgment ought to give us the
clue to the a priori conceptions of thought, if there are
such, as we cannot doubt there are. I need hardly
say that Kant, accepting so far the analysis of ordinary
logic, endeavours to reason back from the distinctions
he thus obtains to the pure conceptions or categories
which are to serve as the basis of objective judgments.
This way of discovering the categories is evidently in
harmony with Kant's general method of seeking for a
hypothesis which shall adequately explain the facts of
experience. Just as the judgments of mathematics and
physics are made the starting point from which phil-
osophy has to work back to the ultimate conditions of
knowledge, so the common analysis of judgments, which
is assumed to be correct within its own sphere, is used
as the stepping-stone to the pure conceptions which
express the ultimate nature of thought. That we do
make real judgments no one doubts ; and that there are
certain formal rules or laws to which thought must
conform, formal logic has shown ; and hence we may
state the special problem now to be solved in this way,
What are the ultimate forms of unity belonging to the
constitution of our intelligence, in so far as it is not
perceptive but thinking ? In the ^^Esthetic, the neces-
sary element implied in our knowledge of individual
things considered as simply existing in space and time
was determined ; now we wish to know what is the
necessary element which introduces unity into all our
knowledge. And this element must of course be sup-
plied by thought, not by sense. Now as all acts of
thought may be reduced to judgment, an analysis of
in.] A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF KNO WLEDGE. 69
the various forms of judgment must enable us to find
out the pure conceptions which bring unity into real
knowledge. This analysis we find ready to our hands
in formal logic. Concentrating itself upon the faculty
of thought, and leaving'to metaphysic the determination
of the supreme conditions of knowledge, formal logic
asks what are the laws by which the understanding is
guided, consciously or unconsciously, in the actual pro-
cess of knowing. Now judgment is the act of thought
by which various representations are reduced to unity
by being brought under a common representation. And
unity of representation may be brought about either in
the way of (1) quantity, (2) quality, (3) relation, or
(4) modality. (1) Every conception is capable of being
made the predicate in a judgment, and as a universal,
it is a possible predicate of various judgments. And as
in judging we may either bring the whole of the indi-
viduals denoted by the subject, or only some of them,
or again a single concrete individual, under the concep-
tion taken as predicate, judgments in respect of quantity
are either universal, or particular, or individual. It is
true that formal logic practically treats the individual
judgment as universal, and therefore divides judg-
ments into those whose quantity is universal and those
whose quantity is particular ; but this elimination of
the individual judgment, which is perfectly justifiable
when we abstract from all the content of knowledge
and deal only with the relation of whole and part, is
not admissible when we use the functions of judgment
as a clue to all the modes of unity belonging to the
constitution of thought. In real knowledge the indi-
vidual cannot be identified with the universal, and
hence there must belong to thought a form correspond-
ing to the individual. In the universal judgment, then,
70 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
the sphere of one conception is completely enclosed by
the sphere of another conception ; in the particular, a
part of the one is within the sphere of the other ; and
in the individual, a conception which, as indivisible, has
no sphere of its own, is enclosed within the sphere of
another conception, (2) As to quality, judgments are
affirmative, negative, or infinite. Here again formal
logic rejects, and rightly rejects, the infinite judgment,
because there is nothing gained by distinguishing the
infinite from the affirmative judgment when we are not
determining the conditions of real knowledge. In the
affirmative judgment, the subject is thought of as within
the sphere of the predicate ; in the negative as without
the sphere of the predicate ; while in the infinite judg-
ment, the subject is placed within the sphere of one con-
ception and at the same time is excluded from the sphere
of another conception. The distinction of affirmative
and negative judgments is familiar to every one ; but a
word may be said about the negative judgment. In
the proposition, " The soul is not mortal," the subject
" soul" is placed within the class " not mortal," and is
therefore so far affirmative ; but on the other hand, it
is excluded from the class " mortal," and is therefore in
a sense negative. The infinite judgment thus depends
upon a function of thought distinct from those functions
manifested in the affirmative and negative judgments ;
and hence it must be taken note of in our attempt to
discover all the pure conceptions which the functions of
thought in judgment presuppose. (3) Besides quantity
and quality, judgments are distinguished as to relation,
i.e., as categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive. In
the first, we have the relation of two conceptions ; in
the second, of two judgments, and in the third of several
judgments, separate from each other and yet combined
in.] A PRIORI CONDI27ONS Of KNOWLEDGE. 71
into a whole. (4) Modality is a distinction of judg-
ments that has reference merely to the relation be-
tween our knowledge and reality. Here judgments
are classified as problematic, assertative and apodictic,
according as they affirm possibility, actuality, or neces-
sity of the objects of thought.1
Starting, then, from the forms of judgment as syste-
matized by formal logic, we are enabled to discover the
pure conceptions which they presuppose. Whatever
differences there may be in the objects judged of,
thought must conform to certain general rules, on pain
of falling into contradiction with itself, and destroying
even the possibility of true judgments. We cannot,
indeed, from a consideration of the forms of judgment,
tell whether a given conception represents a real or a
fictitious object, but we can tell what relations it bears
to another conception also given to us. The conception
of " body," e.g., as the product of comparison, reflection
and abstraction, we may bring into relation with the
conception "metal," and so determine the judgment
thus formed in respect of quantity and quality. Now
the fact that in such analytical judgments we determine
abstract conceptions to certain relations, shows us that
our understanding has these functions as belonging to
its constitution or inner nature. The "matter" of con-
ceptions and judgments must no doubt be given to
thought, but the rules observed by thought in combin-
ing conceptions into judgments must belong to thought
itself. It is therefore plain that in these functions of
judgment we have the key to the explanation of the
conditions of knowledge, so far as knowledge is related
to thought as distinguished from sense. All real know-
ledge must at the very least conform to the laws
1 Prolegomena, § 21 . Kritik, § 9. ' Loyik, §§ 20-25.
72 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
binding upon thought as displayed in judgments.
Hence, just as formal logic, by an analysis of the judg-
ments we make in our ordinary and scientific knowledge,
is able to discover the functions by which unity is pro-
duced in our conceptions ; so, by reasoning back from
these functions of judgment, we may discover all the
ultimate conceptions which are essential to the consti-
tution of real knowledge ; we may, in other words,
reach to the pure conceptions which such knowledge
presupposes. While the combination of conceptions in
the analytical judgment is quite a different thing from
the combination of the manifold of sense by which real
objects are at first made knowable, it is not less true
that the functions of judgment manifested in each of
these modes of combination, do not vary, but are neces-
sarily the same in both. " The same function," says
Kant, " which gives unity to the various representations
in a judgment, also gives unity to the mere synthesis
of various representations in a perception ; and this
unity, expressed generally, is a pure conception of
thought. Thought at once gives analytical unity to
conceptions, and synthetical unity to the manifold of
perception in general ; and indeed the logical form of
judgment presupposes and rests upon the very same
acts of thought as those by which a transcendental
content is given to our various representations. Hence
it is that the pure conceptions of thought, as they are
appropriately called, apply a priori to objects." That
is to say, the act by which, in an analytical judgment,
we subsume one conception under another of higher
generality, implies the exercise of a function of unity
belonging to the nature of thought itself; and having,
by analysis of our actual judgments, discovered this
1 'Kritik, § 10, p. 99.
in.] A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE. 73
function to belong to our understanding, we may be
sure that in the actual process of knowing real objects
the same function has been exercised. Now, as the
content of our judgments must have been obtained by
synthesis, and not by analysis — since analysis does not
supply or add to our knowledge, but merely brings
into clearness what we already know — we at once see
that there are certain pure conceptions belonging to the
form of thought, which are the necessary conditions of
unity in our knowledge of real objects and of their con-
nexions. The functions of unity in judgments, as
systematized in formal logic, therefore point unerringly
to the pure conceptions or categories by which the unity
of the known world is produced. The table of categor-
ies, as we may be sure, is complete, because it is ob-
tained from an analysis of all the functions of thought
as exhibited in judgments. It was because Aristotle
did not deduce his categories from the nature of thought
itself, but simply gathered together those conceptions
which struck him, and which seemed to him to be prim-
ary, that his list is at once redundant and defective. Con-
tenting himself with simply gathering together those
conceptions which he happened to hit upon, and which
seemed to be primary, it is not surprising that he should
omit some categories altogether, and include others
that are not primary but derivative (action, passion),
as well as an empirical conception (motion), and mere
modes of time (when, where, position). Let us see,
then, what are the pure conceptions or categories, as
implied in the various functions of judgment. These
will, of course, like judgments themselves, come under
the heads of quantity, quality, relation, and modality.
(1) Judgments, as we said, are in quantity universal,
particular, or individual. Now the corresponding cate-
74 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
gories are pure forms of thought, by the application of
which to the mere multiplicity of sense, concrete indi-
viduals and specific connections of individuals, are con-
stituted. By reducing to the unity of quantity the
manifold of sense, objects are constituted as unities,
pluralities, or totalities. The categories of quantity
therefore are unity, plurality, totality. (2) The quality
of judgments is affirmative, negative, or infinite. The
categories presupposed, as conditions of unity in real
existence in so far as it is knowable, must account for
the affirmation, the denial or the partial affirmation and
partial denial of objects ; and hence we have as categor-
ies, reality (existence to be affirmed), negation (existence
to be denied), and limitation (existence partly to be
affirmed, partly denied). (3) As to relation, judgments
are categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive. Now a
categorical proposition affirms the relation of a given
predicate to a given subject ; and if we regard this
relation as real, and not simply logical, we have the
relation of a real subject to a real predicate, i.e., we
have the categority of substance and accident. In the
hypothetical judgment, we have the logical relation of
antecedent and consequent ; and this, when viewed as
a relation between real objects or events, is the category
of cause and effect. Again, in a disjunctive judgment,
we have the logical distinction of the different parts of
a conception and at the same time their combination ;
and this relation of parts and whole, when taken as
applying to real existence, yields the category of recip-
rocity. (4) As to modality, judgments are problematic,
assertative, or apodictic. And a problematic judgment
as to real objects presupposes the category, possibility
— impossibility ; an assertion as to reality may be either
affirmative or negative, and hence the category, actu-
in.] A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE. 76
ality — non-actuality ; and, lastly, an apodictic judg-
ment, applicable to the real world, either asserts that
something must be, or denies that it is necessary, and
accordingly, the category is necessity — contingency.1
Assuming, then, that these are the categories, and
all the categories, the next point is to justify them, i.e.
to show how they serve to unify knowledge. This
justification or "deduction" of the categories constitutes
the very heart of Kant's theory of knowledge.
The misconception that determinate objects exist as
they are known independently of any relation to our
faculty of knowing, and are simply taken up into our
minds from without, has been partly dissipated in the
^Esthetic. It was there shown that known objects are
not independent of our perceptive faculty, but are the
product of the pure forms of space and time as applied
to impressions of sense. Now this transforms our ordi-
nary view of things. When it is seen that known
objects are not independent of our perceptive faculty,
the dualism of consciousness and nature is replaced by
the logical distinction of internal and external percep-
tions. For individual objects we substitute individual
or separate impressions of sense, only existing for us
as perceptive beings. Similarly, for space and time
as realities beyond consciousness we substitute space
and time as mere potential forms belonging to the con-
stitution of our perceptive faculty. Thus perception
has two elements : impressions of sense as the " matter "
of perception, and space and time as the "forms" of
perception. Determinate things independent of con-
sciousness, and apprehended as they are in their own
nature, transform themselves under criticism into a
" matter " and a " form " that have a meaning only for
lKrUik, §10.
76 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
us as conscious and perceptive. For this reason Kant
says that perceived objects become for the critical
philosopher "simply the way in which the subject is
affected." A still further transformation takes place,
when we examine critically into the relation of our
thinking faculty to objects. For all thinking or judging
is a purely spontaneous act of combination (conjunctio),
as distinguished from perception, which is universally
held to be receptive. On the ordinary view, thought
or understanding combines the real things which the
senses reveal to us, or the real lines, figures, &c., dealt
with by mathematics, and this act of combination is
judgment. Even from the ordinary point of view,
therefore, thinking is a process of combining multi-
plicity so as to produce unity. The critical philosophy
likewise holds that thinking or judging consists in
combining multiplicity, but of course the multiplicity
combined assumes a different aspect. We cannot say
that thought combines individual objects having a nature
independent of our knowledge, for the main result of
our critical investigation in the ^Esthetic is to show that
the objects which we know are not independent of per-
ception, but are resolvable into a "matter" of sense and
two potential "forms " of sense, and that the whole per-
ceived object exists only in relation to consciousness. It
may perhaps be thought that the forms of sense contain
in themselves a faculty of combination, and that in co-
alescing with the impressions of sense they yield objects
known as arranged in space and time. But this is to
attribute to a mere receptive faculty a power of com-
bination it cannot possibly possess. Moreover, the
forms of perception are in themselves mere potentiali-
ties ; they must not be confounded even with mathe-
matical figures — which are not forms of perception but
in.] A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF KNO WLEDGE. 77
determinations of those forms — and hence they are not
of themselves capable of arranging sensations in space
and time. The only combining faculty is the under-
standing, and the "manifold" which is to be combined
is either impressions of sense or determinations of space
and time. Into this manifold or multiplicity — this
mere difference — the understanding by its combining
activity introduces unity. Now this leads to a still
further transformation of the common-sense view of
things than that effected in the ^Esthetic. If known
objects, in so far as their perceptive element is con-
cerned, are resolvable into an uncombined manifold,
thought must have been at work combining that mani-
fold before objects can be known as objects at all.
Thus, whether we take an individual object as a sum of
properties, or two or more individual objects as con-
nected in experience, we must, to account for our
knowledge, suppose thought to have combined the
mere manifold of perception into unity. "Nothing," as
Kant says, "is thought as combined in any object which
the understanding has not itself previously combined."
Thus the ordinary theory of perception which supposes
individual things to be given independently of thought,
is an inversion of the truth, and equally the ordinary
view of judgment as a mere analysis of perceptions or
conceptions. Analysis presupposes synthesis, and hence
the combining activity of thought is exercised even in
the unconscious combinations which take place in the
growth of our knowledge, and not merely, as common
logic supposes, in the conscious or reflective combina-
tion of perceptions under abstract conceptions. Now
this combining of multiplicity by thought must imply
that thought is in its own nature essentially a unity.
From the uncritical point of view, the combinations of
78 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
thought are simply the external comparing of two or
more individual things supposed to be known in percep-
tion as individuals prior to the comparison, or the
arbitrary arranging of one conception under another of
greater extension. The product of such external com-
bination can only be contingent. I combine objects in
a certain way, but I might combine them in any other
way I pleased. The only unity therefore is one which
our individual reflection must be supposed arbitrarily
to impose. We never can show that the unity which
we suppose to exist is a real or necessary unity. Our
judgments cannot be proved to be objective. The only
way therefore 'in which the unity of known objects,
either taken separately or in their connection, can be
established, is by regarding thought as in its very
nature a unity, and as therefore capable of producing
unity in known existence. That this must be so is
evident from what has already been said. For- when
known objects, in so far as they are relative to percep-
tion, are reduced to a mere multiplicity, the only other
source from which unity can come is thought or under-
standing. The unity, then, must belong to the very
nature of thought ; and, as all knowledge, even the
simplest and least reflective, has been shown to imply
the combining activity of thought, it follows that
thought possesses the faculty of producing unity, be-
cause it is itself essentially a unity. It should be
observed that we are not here speaking of the category
of unity. That category is a special application of the
unity of thought in relation to objects, not the unity of
thought itself. Can we then show how thought is a unity ?
The answer to this question will give us the principle
on which the deduction of the categories must proceed.1
tik, §15.
in.] A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE. 79
In our ordinary or uncritical consciousness, we do
not reflect that the unity of thought must be the neces-
sary condition of cur knowledge of real things. We
suppose on the contrary that things as they are in
themselves are immediately revealed to our senses.
We have an immediate consciousness, as we suppose,
of individual things, irrespective altogether of any unity
introduced by our consciousness into things. " The
empirical consciousness, which accompanies different
ideas, is in itself scattered and without relation to the
identity of the subject." In other words, we do not in
our ordinary knowledge know what is the principle
which makes a connected knowledge of things possible,
but simply have a consciousness of now one thing and
then another. We suppose ourselves to be immediately
apprehending things as independent of consciousness,
and hence it never occurs to us that there must be a
unity of thought in our knowledge of things. We have
seen however that we must seek for the unity of know-
ledge in the nature of thought as combining the
detached multiplicity of perception. Now it may easily
be shown that such a unity is presupposed in ordinary
consciousness. My knowledge must be so connected
in all its parts as to form a rounded whole or it would
not be knowledge at all. If it were not connected by
a central unity, I should have no connected knowledge :
an idea that I cannot bring into unity with other ideas
is an absurdity ; or at least, granting its possibility, it
is nothing at all for knowledge. I must therefore,
consciously or unconsciously, connect all my ideas in a
unity. On any other supposition, I should have " a
self as many-coloured and various as the ideas I have."
Each of my ideas must therefore be connected with
every other. Hence there must be a single self as the
80 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. |CHAP-
condition of there being for me a faculty of thinking, a
faculty of reducing multiplicity to unity. We can see
this by taking any idea we please. Suppose, e.g., I
have the idea "red." Now I can be conscious of
" red" only in contrast to some other idea, and hence I
must in being conscious of " red," relate it to other
ideas previously experienced. Thus the fact that I
have a connected consciousness of things necessarily
presupposes that there is a supreme unity connecting
them. This unity is manifestly the unity of the self
as the principle of connection. The conception of the
self as the condition of all synthesis is the supreme
principle of all thinking ; it is in fact, as we may say,
thought itself. It must be observed, however, that it is
only as the condition of the connection of the manifold
of perception that the "/" is synthetical: I = I is a merely
analytical or identical proposition; " I " as the supreme
unity making the unity of conscious experience possible
is alone synthetical. This shows that our thought can-
not operate of itself, but only in relation to the manifold
of sense : in other words, as supplying only an element
of knowledge it of itself gives no knowledge. Thought
cannot perceive any more than sense can think, and
hence known objects would be nothing were the ele-
ment contributed by either faculty absent.1
We have seen above that thinking is judging, and
that, reasoning back from the various forms of judg-
ment as classified by formal logic, we get the funda-
mental forms or functions of unity, which we call the
categories. And as the manifold of perception can
only be reduced to unity by reference to the synthetical
unity of self- consciousness as the supreme condition of
thought, it of course follows that the manifold of per-
1 Kritik, § 16.
m.J A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE. 81
ception which is to be reduced to unity or objectivity
must stand under the categories. It must be observed,
however, that the categories are in themselves only the
formal conditions of the combination of the manifold
of perception, and do not originate the manifold which
they are capable of combining. A perceptive under-
standing may not be impossible, but such is not
the nature of human intelligence. A manifold must
therefore be supplied to the categories before they can
possibly operate, and this manifold, as we have seen,
belongs to us as receptive or sensuous beings. Now
a manifold of perception may be either pure or mate-
rial : i. e., it may be either a determination of space
and time as in mathematics, or it may imply in
addition those sensuous impressions which give to us
the concrete element of real objects. The categories
can certainly operate on pure perceptions, but in
doing so they do not give us any knowledge of Nature
as the sum of real objects. Mathematics deals only
with the determinations of the forms of perception
and therefore of perceivable objects, not with real
objects themselves : its judgments are universally and
necessarily true, supposing real objects to exist, but not
otherwise. Besides the categories and the forms of
perception, the possibility of objective judgments or
judgments of experience therefore implies that a mani-
fold of sensuous impressions is given to the categories
to operate upon. And this shows not only how a
science of nature is possible, but what are the limits to
our possible knowledge. No doubt thought could
combine any manifold supplied to it; but this mere
possibility is useless for us, since the only manifold we
can have is a manifold of sense. The limit of our
knowledge is therefore fixed by the compulsion we are
82 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
under of obtaining a manifold of sense before we can
give determination to our conceptions. A non-sensuous
object is thinkable only as that which is not a real
object of knowledge : it can be defined only by negative
predicates, and therefore cannot be known to be real.1
We have now so far determined the elements which
real knowledge implies, and marked out its boundaries.
There must be a manifold of sense, referred to the "I"
as the supreme principle, and standing under the forms
of space and time, which again stand under the cate-
gories as functions of unity. But while all these
elements are necessarily implied in our knowledge
of real objects, there is still a difficulty in seeing what
binds the different elements together. For it must be
remembered that the manifold of sense when taken in
its abstraction is merely a number of blind or isolated
points, having no principle of unity in them. It must
further be remembered that the forms of space and time
are in themselves mere potentialities having neither
unity nor determinateness. In like manner the cate-
gories are forms of unity, but they also are in themselves
mere potentialities, which can be called unities only on
supposition that they can be called into exercise. And
lastly, the " I " is in itself a pure, dead identity ; it is
the condition which must be presupposed before we
can possibly explain how unity comes into knowledge,
but it is powerless to account of itself for actual know-
ledge. The manifold of sense, the forms of space and
time, and the categories, are in short abstract elements
of knowledge ; but in no one of them, nor in the whole
of them taken together, do we find that which accounts
for the actual movement of thought in the knowing of
1 Kritik, §§ 18-23. A fuller discussion of the limitations of our knowledge
will be found in Chapter x.
in.] A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE. 83
real objects. Wherein then shall we find this principle
of movement ? Kant finds it in the pure Imagination,
which is not to be confounded with Imagination in the
psychological sense, since it does not reproduce its
objects, but produces or constructs them. Its function
is to determine the forms of space and time in certain
universal ways, under guidance of the categories and
in relation to a given manifold of sense. It is thus
the necessary medium between the purely intellectual
forms of thought on the one hand, and the purely
perceptive forms of space and time, together with the
differences of sense, on the other hand.1
So far we have been directing our attention mainly
to nature in its external aspect ; and we must now
show how the deduction of the categories affects the
knowledge of self as an object. It was mentioned
before that self as known is not self as it exists apart
from our human faculties of knowing, if for no other
reason than that all determinate objects, and therefore
the self as the subject of determinate states, are only
knowable under the form of time. This is quite a
different view from that held by the dogmatic philoso-
phers, according to whom the self is an immediate
object of consciousness, or, in other words, a thing in
itself. Kant, on the other hand, holds that the self
as the supreme condition of the unity of knowledge is
not identical with the self given as an object of know-
ledge. This follows from the account of the conditions
of the knowledge of real objects. Thought is purely a
faculty of combination, and requires to have the mani-
fold of perception supplied to it before it can operate.
Perception has two elements, the pure forms and the
sensuous material, which are brought into relation with
1 Kritik, § 24. See below, p. 86 ff.
84 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
each other and with the categories through the figur-
ative synthesis of pure imagination. Now imagina-
tion as determining the manifold in relation to time,
the pure form of inner sense, makes possible the con-
sciousness of self as existing in determinate states.
But imagination cannot operate except in accordance
with the categories : the " figurative " implies the
u intellectual " synthesis. Hence the self is only
knowable as co-relative to the object : i.e., the same
synthetical process which determines external (pheno-
menal) objects also determines the self as an in-
ternal (phenomenal) object. The " I" as a concrete
object of knowledge must therefore be carefully dis-
tinguished from the synthetical " I," which as the
source of the caregories is the supreme condition of the
unity of knowledge, and therefore of the known world,
in both its external and its internal phases.1
The above is substantially the deduction of the
categories ; but it may not be without advantage to
run over, in a less methodical way, the path by which
Kant has come, and to point out the transformation in
the ordinary explanation of knowledge which is the
result of his enquiry. The great difficulty which seems
to bar the way to a solution of the problem of philoso-
phy, as it first presents itself to Kant's mind, may be
expressed in the alternative : either there is no abso-
luteness in our knowledge, or we must be able to pass
over from our conceptions to realities. The dogmatist
while assuming that our knowledge is absolute or real,
yet imagines that it can be obtained by means of mere
conceptions ; the sceptic maintains that conceptions
1 Krittk, p. 127 ff. It will be observed that I only pledge myself to the
substantial validity of the Deduction of the Categories. What modifications
Kant's theory of knowledge requires I try to show in Chap. xii.
i ii. J A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE. 85
cannot possibly yield reality, and hence he denies that
there is any absoluteness in knowledge. Kant agrees
with the former in holding that we have a knowledge
of actual existence, and with the latter that from con-
ceptions as ordinarily understood no explanation of the
possibility of such knowledge can be given. Evidently
therefore the reality OF absoluteness of knowledge must
be preserved by showing somehow that there are con-
ceptions which do not lie apart from real objects, but
are essential constituents in them. But to do this we
must change our view at once of the nature of real
things, and of the nature of conception. The trans-
formation is partly effected in the Esthetic, where it is
shown that known objects are not things in themselves,
but are relative to our consciousness. Existence and
knowledge thus begin to come nearer to each other. If
the existence that is real is existence in and for consci-
ousness, things may be real and may yet be relative to
our knowledge. To complete the transformation, how-
ever, we must show how there can be conceptions which
are constituents in real objects. Abstract conceptions
can of course never be such constituents; for, as
defined, they are merely ideas in our minds, separated
absolutely from realities without our minds. But a
conception which is a form of our intelligence intro-
ducing unity into known objects and connecting them
together, so far from being separated from reality, must
evidently be essential to such reality as known by us.
Kant therefore solves the difficulty raised by the scep-
tic by denying that all conceptions are separated from
realities. His first way of conceiving the problem of
knowledge, viz., How do we go beyond conceptions to
realities ? is shown to admit of no solution because it
is essentially absurd ; for conceptions separated from
'86 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
realities, can of course never tell us anything about
realities. It is shown however that there are pure
conceptions which, so far from being apart from reali-
ties, are actual constituents in them. For external
objects, not less than internal, are relative to know-
ledge : and if so, conceptions or forms of thought may
very well apply to objects. The only question now is
as to the different elements within knowledge. And
conception is evidently the element which gives unity
to known objects, as sense is the element which gives
diversity. Thus reality and knowledge, which were by
the Esthetic brought into proximity to each other, are
shown by the Analytic to come close together and
coalesce in the unity of sense and thought, resulting
in the formation of a concrete knowledge which is at the
same time concrete objects as known. And in this
fusion of sense and thought, reality and knowledge, we
have a systematic unity of knowledge which is at the
same time a system of nature. The unity of nature
therefore is a unity due to intelligence. And as of in-
telligence and therefore of nature the supreme condition
is the unity of self- consciousness, in the reference of
every known object to the single self we have the
supreme condition at once of the unity of knowledge as
a whole and of the unity of nature as a system of real
objects. Kant's "secret" then, as Dr. Stirling might
say, is the conversion of abstract conceptions into ulti-
mate forms of thought, supreme conditions of know-
ledge, or elementary constituents of objects. But
besides the synthetical unity of self-consciousness, the
categories, the forms of perception and the manifold of
sense, another element is introduced to complete the
transformation of known reality. This element is the
schema, which, as we have seen, Kant finds it neces-
in.] A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE. 87
sary to refer to in the deduction of the categories, but
which he also treats of separately.1 A few words will
be enough to complete the explanation of this part of
his system.
As the schema is the product of the pure imagina-
tion, Kant begins with the ordinary view of the nature
of Imagination, and proceeds to work back to the
critical conception of it. An empirical conception is
capable of being verified in a perception because there
is something common to both. Having in our minds,
e. g., the conception of a plate we may form the analy-
tical judgment that a plate is round, but in order to
determine whether the predicate is real or imaginary,
we must go to perception, and ask whether we can
find in it a determinate object corresponding to that
predicate. We of course find that we can, for round-
ness is realised in the pure perception of a circle. Our
analytical judgment thus becomes synthetical, and we
are justified in regarding the conception as having a
reference to something real. But when we pass from
those conceptions which are simply abstractions from
ordinary perceptions, and are therefore easily verifiable
in perception, and ask how pure conceptions are to be
realised, the answer is by no means so simple. The
difficulty arises from the fact that a comparison of pure
conceptions and pure perceptions shows not likeness
but absolute unlikeness. The attribute implied in an
abstract conception and expressible in a judgment is
found in concrete in the perception from which it was
originally abstracted; but a pure conception or category
is not obtained by abstraction, and hence it is difficult
to understand how it can be realised in perception.
And yet the categories must apply to perceptions if
1 Krtiik, pp. 140-6.
88 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
real knowledge is possible at all. The difficulty here
is of the same nature as that which we have all along
had to contend with : it is in fact simply another form
of the question, How are synthetical judgments a priori
possible ? how from mere conceptions can we obtain
judgments which are binding on nature ? We cannot
get rid of the difficulty by assuming the pure concep-
tions to be applicable to things in themselves, as the
Deduction of the Categories has sufficiently shown; nor
can we say that pure conceptions are abstracted from
real perceptions, and hence the categories cannot be de-
rived from a mere analysis of objects supposed to be
passively apprehended. The true answer lies in a
hitherto unsuspected characteristic of Imagination.
This we may explain by a reference to what takes place
in the every-day processes by which we assure ourselves
that we are not dealing with mere abstractions but
with concrete realities. There is an essential distinc-
tion between an image and a schema. I have in my
mind a conception of some object — say, that of a dog
— which can be verified in perception since it has been
obtained by abstracting from the differences of a number
of individual objects. To assure myself that I am not
dealing with a mere fiction, I bring before my mind
the image of some particular dog which I have seen ;
but this mere image will not enable me to make a
judgment about dogs in general, and hence I have to
draw in imagination a sort of monogram or schema of
a four-footed animal. The schema is therefore neither
a conception nor an image, but partakes of the char-
acter of both. It at once conforms to the generality
of the conception, and is kept within limits by the con-
crete image. We can see that the same process comes
into play in our mathematical judgments. When e. g.
in.] A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE. 89
the geometer forms judgments in regard to the triangle
he has more before him than the individual perception
or image of a special triangle. The image of a triangle
is an isosceles, a right-angled, an equilateral, or a scalene
triangle ; but the schema of a triangle is a sort of mono-
gram or outline of a triangle in general. The image
of a triangle can never be adequate to the concep-
tion of a triangle, for it cannot enable us to make
universal affirmations : to say e. g. that every triangle
has its interior angles equal to two right angles. In
fact it is not images but schemata that lie at the foun-
dation of our mathematical judgments.
Now these examples of the peculiar faculty possessed
by the productive imagination of drawing monograms
of objects of perception gives us the clue to the solution
of the difficulty with which we are here concerned. If
we can show that there is a transcendental product of
the imagination enabling us to realize the categories,
our difficulty will be resolved. Now it has to be borne
in mind that transcendental philosophy does not treat
of the special facts or laws of nature, but only of the
a priori conditions which make known objects in gene-
ral possible. To account for knowledge there must be,
as has been shown, impressions of sense, that come into
our consciousness because we can refer them to the
"I" through the categories and the forms of perception.
But these impressions, taken in abstraction from the
a priori elements of knowledge, are mere detached
differences or points of impression. So also the deter-
minations of time and space as perceptions — which
must be carefully distinguished from time and space as
mere forms of perception — may be described as mere
points or disunited parts of space and of time. Our
special question at present is, how these points of im-
90 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
pression, and points of space and time, enter into or
constitute- our knowledge of objects, whether these
objects are the pure perceptions of mathematics or the
mixed perceptions of ordinary consciousness and science.
Now it is evident that there is a difference between
imagination as it is exercised in our ordinary knowledge
and imagination as transcendental, i.e., as a necessary
and universal condition of knowledge in general. In
the latter case there can be no image ; for we are deal-
ing with the universal and necessary elements of know-
ledge, which enter into and constitute real objects. The
imagination must therefore act on the pure forms
of perception, and be guided by the pure conceptions of
the understanding. But there can be no transcenden-
tal image giving concreteness to our pure conceptions.
We can indeed have an image of a mathematical figure,
but this image comes into play only in the special per-
cepts of mathematics, with which we are not in tran-
scendental philosophy concerned. While however there
can be no pure image, enabling us to visualize, so to
speak, our pure conceptions, there may be a pure schema.
And as this schema is to be the condition in imagina-
tion of all possible phenomena, in so far as these are
regarded from the universal point of view, it must be
related to that form of perception which is common to
all phenomena, whether internal or external : it must
i.e. be related to the form of time. This schema is not
to be confounded with the pure form of time any more
than with the pure form of thought : it is, in fact, not
a determination of time itself, but a universal deter-
mination of the manifold in relation to time. Now,
there are various universal ways in which the manifold
is determined in time ; there is the synthesis of homo-
geneous units in time, or number ; the synthesis of
in.] A PRIORI CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE. 91
intensive units in time, or degree ; the representing of
the permanent in time ; the representing of orderly
sequence in time ; and lastly, the representing of real
co-existence in time. These various universal modes
of determining the manifold in time constitute the
schemata of Imagination, and the process by which the
categories are applied to the manifold of sense through
time is the schematism of the Understanding. Thus
the categories are actualized and the knowledge of objects
is made possible. And as the manifold of sense is that
element of knowledge without which the Understanding
would have nothing to operate upon, the necessity we are
under of schematizing the categories makes it impossi-
ble that the categories should apply beyond the limits
of the phenomenal world. The manifold of sense is
knowable only as in time, and hence things in them-
selves as falling outside of time cannot possibly be
known. The schemata therefore at once give individu-
ality to the category and universality to the manifold
of sense. In determining a house, e.g., as an extensive
quantity, I must combine its special parts in succession,
and this successive addition of homogeneous units is
guided by the category or intellectual form of quantity.
Thus the units are put together by a process of
numbering (the schema) in which I at once individual-
ize the pure conception (the category) and at the same
time bring those units (the manifold of sense) under it.1
JDr. Stirling now thinks (Journ. Spec. Phil., xiv. pp. 257-285) that Kant,
intending to make the schema a determination of time, changed his mind and
made it a determination of the manifold in time ; and that, in so doing, he fell
back on " empirical instruction " — in other words, on sensible perception. To
this I should reply, that to say the schema is not derivable from pure time, is
not the same as saying that it is given in mere sense. The schema is virtually
the relation of sense and thought. See below, Chapters v. and vii. Cf. Chap. xii.
92
CHAPTEK IV.
RELATIONS OF METAPHYSIC AND PSYCHOLOGY. — EXAMINATION
OF G. H. LEWES'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.
most important result of the critical account of
knowledge, as we have seen, is to establish the
correlativity of the inner world and the outer world, as
both alike only existing in relation to our intelligence.
Enough has probably been said to make clear the
radical distinction between the critical and the dog-
matic account of that relation. But as it has been
confidently asserted by the late Mr. Lewes and others
that recent advances in biology and psychology have
superseded Kant's account of the relation of subject
and object, it may be profitable to consider shortly the
main positions of the new psychology, and to contrast
it with Kant's conception of psychology, as subordinate
to metaphysic. I think it will be found that recent
empirical psychology, not less than that prior to Kant,
must be regarded as coming under the ban of " dogma-
tism." To attempt anything like a discussion of the
various forms assumed by that psychology would lead
us too far, and I shall therefore confine myself to the
general theory of Mr. Lewes.
In common with all empirical psychologists Mr.
Lewes speaks of the external world as existing inde-
iv.] LE WES' S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 93
pendently of our consciousness, and as endowed with
forces, by the action of which upon the organism, a
certain molecular motion in the nervous system and a
corresponding feeling in consciousness are set up in the
living being. The external world he conceives of as
" not the other side of the subject, but the larger circle
which includes it;"1 and feeling he calls " the reaction
of the sentient organism under stimulus."2 So far
there is nothing to distinguish recent psychology from
the psychology of Locke. But Mr. Lewes, following
Fechner, claims that the nervous excitation and the
feeling are not two independent phenomena, due to
two distinct agents, the organism and the mind, but
that they are different aspects under which the one
agent, the organism, manifests itself. Sentience as
well as the molecular movement of the nervous system
is a reaction of the organism. Thus we have, on the
one side, the Organism with its twofold aspect, and on
the other side, the Cosmos, at once including the
organism, and calling forth its reactions.
The first remark to be made on this view is, that, in
so far as it is an account of the relation of the external
world to the individual man, Kant would not have
made any radical objection to it. It is, on the face of
it, an explanation of the connection between man as a
living being and the other objects which make up the
world of nature. And we have Kant's own authority
for saying that men considered as individuals are simply
parts of nature. Looking at existence from the point
of view of the different species of objects composing
it, we may broadly divide objects into corporeal and
incorporeal, or living and non-living things. And it is
the object of the physical sciences to investigate nature
1 Problems of Life and Mind, vol. i., p. 195. * Ibiil., p. 210.
94 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
in the first aspect, and of psychology to investigate
nature in the second aspect. Just as physics deals
with the laws of matter and motion, so psychology
attempts to classify the various phases of mental life,
and the successive stages through which the individual
and the race pass.1 The world as a whole therefore
may be said, from this point of view, to comprehend
both men and things, or, in Mr. Lewes' language, the
Object is "not the other side of the Subject but the
larger circle which includes it." There is nothing,
again, in Kant inconsistent with the contention of Mr.
Lewes, that to every mental state there is a correspon-
dent nervous excitation. It is true that Kant speaks
rather slightingly of the value of the physiology of the
brain in the culture of the individual, on the ground
that in it we are dealing with "what nature brings out
of man, and not with what man, as a freely acting
being, makes out of himself," and hence that, so far as
physiological processes are concerned, man is " a mere
spectator," since he " cannot be directly aware of what
is going on in the nerves and fibres of his brain."2 But
the very form of his remark implies that there is an
aspect in which man must be regarded as passive, and
there is no denial but rather a recognition of the asso-
ciation of nervous and mental phenomena. How does
it come then, that, agreeing so far with empirical psy-
chology, and therefore in some sense admitting the
independence of nature on man, Kant yet regards the
separation of thought and things as the evidence and
consequence of a false philosophy ? The answer is
perfectly simple. Psychology, as Kant conceives of it,
is simply a discipline, helping us to widen and syste-
1 Metaphysische Anfangsgrilnde d. Naturwissensckaft, Vorrede, pp. 357-362.
2 Anthropologie, p. 431.
iv.] LEWES S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 95
matize our knowledge of the world of men, as physics
enables us to learn the special laws regulating the
world of matter. Psychology, in other words, deals
not with the relation of intelligence to nature, but only
with one aspect of nature itself. The classification of the
various faculties of knoAvledge, the systematic statement
of the gradual way in which our knowledge grows up, and
the consideration of individual and national character-
istics, tell us nothing about the essential conditions of
there being for us any knowledge whatever. For here
we are dealing not with the knowing subject in relation
to the object of thought, but simply with one aspect of
the known object. That we have certain mental states,
which we may analytically distinguish as sensation,
imagination, thought, &c., does not entitle us to say
anything about the primary conditions of our know-
ledge of nature. When we have completed our account
of mental states as objects which we know, we have
left untouched the question as to the relation of those
mental states, together with things in space, to our
intelligence as capable of comprehending both in the
unity of a single known world. In other words,
psychology is an empirical science, treating of the
nature of the individual man as a known object. It
has no occasion to ask how knowledge is possible, i.e.,
what are the conditions without which we could have
no knowledge either of ourselves or of external things,
but leaves this problem to be dealt with by metaphysic.
To suppose, as Mr. Lewes does, that Kant would have
been compelled completely to alter his metaphysic, had
he only seen that the " a priori elements " might be
explained as " originally formed out of ancestral sensi-
ble experiences " is a delusion arising from an incom-
plete apprehension of what Kant's problem was. " Even
96 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
granting," Kant would have said, " that we as indivi-
duals inherit certain tendencies, this in no way affects the
question as to the essential conditions of knowledge.
No matter how we as individuals have come to obtain
our knowledge, at least it is not denied that we do
have knowledge ; I ask you, therefore, what theory you
propose in explanation of this fact. That we have
a knowledge of external objects and also of our own
mental states is a fact ; but it is not an explanation of
the fact. It is this explanation which I have tried to
give. And I maintain that, on the supposition of the
independence of nature, whether as external or internal,
on our intelligence, no consistent explanation of the
fact of knowledge is possible."
And this leads me, in the second place, to say that
Mr. Lewes's psychological theory is simply a new form
of that dogmatism to which Kant so strongly objects.
It assumes the essential independence of nature on
intelligence, and in so doing confounds the logical
distinction of external and internal phenomena, as
existing only for intelligence, with the real separation
of subject and object.
No point is more emphatically dwelt upon by Mr.
Lewes than the identity and yet distinction of neural
changes and changes of feeling. The ordinary concep-
tion of the relation of body and mind is that of two
independent things, substances, or agents, externally
acting and reacting upon each other. This conception
must, he asserts, be rejected. We cannot accept the
view of the Rational Psychologists, who " treat mental
facts simply as the manifestation of a Physical Prin-
ciple, at once unknowable and intimately known, a
mysterious agent revealed to consciousness;"1 we must,
1 Lewes's Study of Psychology, § 1.
iv.] LEWES 'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 97
on the contrary, " frankly accept the biological point of
view, which sets aside the traditional conception of the
mind as an agent apart from the organism."1 Having
got rid of this fiction of abstraction, what shall we have
to substitute ? Mr. Lewes is equally clear on this head.
The only agent is the organism. " To many thinkers,
the contrast" of objective and subjective "seems far
more than that of aspects, it is that of agents." But
" what we know is that the living organism has among
its manifestations the class called sentient . . . and
states of consciousness. . . . It is not known, nor is
there any evidence to suggest that one of these classes
is due to the activity of the organism, the other to the
activity of another agent. The only agent is the
organism."2 When we "seek the agent of which all
the phenomena are the actions, we get the organism."3
In place of the conception of two agents, the organism
and the mind, we have to put the conception of a single
agent, the organism. All the actions performed by a
living being, including those that have usually been set
apart as mental, and ascribed to an independent source,
must now be ascribed to the organism alone. Evi-
dently, then, the organism will have a double duty to
perform : to it the operations formerly ascribed to the
body, as well as those ascribed to the mind, must
both alike be ascribed. We have thus a single agent,
performing diverse operations. But these operations
have at least this in common that they are alike pre-
dicable of a single agent. The organism, e.g., is not
only the bearer of neural tremors, but it feels, thinks,
and wills. And it must be observed that, while all
vital actions are now perceived to belong to the organ-
ism, we are still compelled to draw a broad distinction
1 Lewes's Study of Psychology, § 4. 2 Ibid., § 6. 3 Jbid., § 7.
Q
98 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
between subjective phenomena — those formerly ascribed
to mind — and objective phenomena — those formerly at-
tributed to body. Thus the organism has two sets of
functions, broadly contrasted as subjective and objective.
Now it has always been held, even by those who main-
tained the existence of a mind distinct from the body,
that there is the closest correspondence between the
two. This conception must be retained, but it must
be transformed in such a way, that the correspond-
ence shall be regarded as not exceptional, but
perpetual.
Every event, then, has at once an objective and a
subjective aspect. What exactly does this mean ? It
means that " states of consciousness are separable from
states of the organism only in our mode of apprehending
them."1 Now there is a certain imperfection of expres-
sion in this way of stating the matter; for, if the
organism is the sole agent, "states of consciousness"
are " states of the organism," and therefore should not
be contrasted with them. What Mr. Lewes means,
however, is evident enough so far : he means, that the
" sentient changes " of the organism are inseparable
from its " neural changes." But even after this expla-
nation there is an ambiguity in Mr. Lewes's words to
which it is important to refer. States of consciousness,
we are told, are separable from neural changes, " only
in our mode of apprehending them." Now our "mode
of apprehending" both kinds of change must be by
" states of consciousness," and hence it would seem that
states of consciousness are separable from neural changes
only in states of consciousness. How then can the
broad contrast of subjective and objective be still pre-
served ? Instead of a broad contrast, the relation
1 Study of Psychology, 4.
iv.] LE JVES'S THEOR Y OF KNO IVLEDGE. 99
would seem to be one of subordination, the subordina-
tion of the neural affections to the states of conscious-
ness. There can be no doubt, however, that Mr. Lewes
means to affirm, not a relation of subordination, but a
relation of coordination : both sets of changes he regards
as on the same level. By " states of consciousness "
we must accordingly understand a series of feelings,
taken in abstraction from a series of movements in the
organism. Mr. Lewes may therefore mean, either (1)
that, while in our mode of apprehending them, the two
kinds of changes are "separable," in reality they are
identical, or (2) that they are identical in being parallel
phenomena of the same organism. Mr. Lewes, as it
seems to me, does not distinguish between these two
very different points of view : he virtually assumes the
forme^ while ostensibly he is only asserting the latter,
and it is by this confusion of thought that he is enabled
seemingly to preserve at once the separation and the
identity of the sentient and the neural changes. " The
living organism," he says, " has among its manifesta-
tions the class called sentient ; and these are known as
sensible affections, i.e., the changes excited by the con-
tact of external causes, and assignable to visible organs
of sense ; and states of consciousness, i.e., the changes of
feeling, excited by internal causes, and not assignable
to visible organs."1 "What on the objective side is
material combination is on the subjective side spiritual
combination ; mechanical and logical are only two
contrasted aspects of one and the same fact."2 "All
psychological processes are objectively organic pro-
cesses," and " the mechanism of these processes may be
expressed in objective or subjective terms at will, sen-
sorial changes being equivalent to sentient changes/'8
Study of Psychology, §6. 2 Ibid., § 17. 3 Ibid., § 19.
100 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
"A sensation or a thought is alternately viewed as a
physical change or as a mental change." l
It will be admitted, I think, that there is an un-
doubted want of precision in the use of terms in the
above extracts. On the one hand, we are told that
the same event has its "objective and subjective
aspect," that "mechanical and logical are only two
contrasted aspects of one and the same fact," and that
" sensorial changes are equivalent to sentient changes."
On the other hand, it is pointed out that sensible
affections are "assignable to visible organs of sense,"
while states of consciousness are "not assignable to
visible organs," and that " a sensation or a thought is
alternately viewed as a physical change or as a mental
change." Now if the "event" or "fact" is "one and
the same," it cannot be assignable to different organs ;
if there are two " events " or "facts," it is not correct
to speak of them as "one and the same." As Mr.
Lewes insists upon interpreting everything by what
we know, and refuses to take refuge in the unknow-
able,2 we must conclude that, as the two sets of events
are distinct to us, they cannot be regarded as in
themselves "identical" or "equivalent," and that in
predicating identity and equivalence of them, Mr.
Lewes only means to insist on their thorough-going
parallelism ; i.e. that there never is a " molecular change "
without a corresponding "sentient change," and vice
versa, and further that molecular and sentient changes
are "identical" only in the sense that they are both
alike predicable of "one and the same" organism, of
which they are " aspects."
• "* Study of Psychology, § 38.
2 See especially Problems of Life and Mind, vol. ii., prob. vi. 2. Cf., how-
ever, Hodgson's Philosophy of Reflection, vol. i., p. 189 ff, where the con-
tradictory utterances of Mr. Lewes are cited and discussed.
iv. J LE IVES'S THE OR Y OF KNO WLEDGE. 1 0 1
Now this is none the less a dualism that it masque-
rades as a monism. A monism it cannot be, unless
the mere assertion of the identity of the two aspects is
allowed to pass muster as a proof of that identity.
The series of feelings which constitutes the "subjective"
aspect goes on independently of the series of move-
ments in the organism, and of all relation to intelligence.
As the subjective aspect cannot be at the same time
the objective, the two cannot logically be brought
into any relation with each other. As described by
Mr. Lewes, feeling is no more comprehensive of the
molecular movements than the molecular movements
comprehend feeling ; we have simply a series of
neural changes, and a series of feelings, without any
explanation of how they come to be known as standing
in necessary relation to each other. They are said
to be related, but they are tacitly separated from each
other, and assumed to be independent. No other
explanation indeed is consistent with the premises of
Mr. Lewes : for a series of feelings cannot be aware
of itself as a series, and without such consciousness
of itself, a consciousness of the neural changes is
impossible. The root of the imperfection in this
conception of subject and object consists in the abstract
separation of intelligence as knowing, both from the
series of feelings and from the molecular movements.
Thought is conceived of as a mere passive spectator
of the subjective and objective aspects, and conscious-
ness as a light that reveals but has nothing to do with
the constitution of its objects. But when the object
in its two aspects is allowed to fall apart from self-
consciousness, the mental states necessarily become a
mere series of feelings which, as Kant says, are "as
good as nothing for us as thinking beings;" and the
102 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
nervous changes, being separated at once from the
mental states and from the supreme unity of self-
consciousness, necessarily sink into a mere succession
of movements independent of all relation to conscious-
ness. Only when we see, that without the activity
of intelligence in the constitution of both objects alike
no real knowledge is possible, do the separate elements
of knowledge come together in the unity of a world at
once intelligible and real. The contrasted "aspects,"
in short, are but logical abstractions, which are not in
themselves objects of knowledge at all, but merely
elements which, when regarded as in essential relation
to each other and to self-conscious intelligence, combine
in the concrete life of knowable existence.
It may perhaps be replied that Mr. Lewes is right
in regarding himself as a monist, because he denies
the existence of two separate agents, the organism and
the rnind, and maintains that there is but one agent,
the organism. This, however, is a way of securing
monism that makes the opposition of the two "aspects"
unmeaning: it is simply an assumption of the correla-
tivity of intelligence and nature, expressed in terms
that rob intelligence of its constitutive activity, and
make the explanation of real knowledge impossible.
The nature of any known reality, as Mr. Lewes is
continually reminding us, consists in the sum of its
properties. There is not, on the one hand, an indepen-
dent thing or substratum beyond knowledge, and, on
the other hand, the known properties by which this
substratum reveals itself to us; but the only reality
is the properties taken together as a whole. The
organism, then, we must not for a moment conceive
of as an unknown something, now manifesting mole-
cular changes, now sentient ; it is simply a term
iv.] LEWES 'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 103
designating a certain complex of properties. We
group the one set and call them body, and another
set and call them mind, but body and mind are but
names connoting respectively the molecular and the
sentient changes, just as organism is a more general
term comprehending both under itself. "We learn
to distinguish the different parts of our organism and
their different activities ; generalizing and abstracting,
we get the conception of body representing one group,
and of mind as representing another."1
Let us look first at the molecular changes — the
" objective " aspect of the organism — which form one
of the groups of properties comprehended under the
general term organism. Here we have, Mr. Lewes
tells us, simply the " mechanical sequence of objective
motions, and could we see the molecular changes in
the nerves, centres and muscles, we should still see
nothing but sequent motions."2 So far, therefore, the
organism is a term for molecular movements. And
movements, of course, pre-suppose material atoms that
move, and the motion of material atoms must be
comprehended under the higher conception of force.
Now it seems evident enough that so far we are
outside of the region of sentiency altogether. An
organism conceived of simply as recipient of force, is
not as yet conceived of as sentient. Were there
nothing but molecular movements, we should have
no reason whatever for predicating sentiency of the
organism. And it must be observed that excluding
sentiency of every kind, and therefore consciousness,
there is so far no reason for calling the group of
movements named as body "objective" rather than
"subjective;" for, as Mr. Lewes himself says, "only
1 Study of Psychology, §11. - Ibul, § 17.
104 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
when sentient activities have become so developed
that a conscious ego or personality has emerged from
them, which establishes distinctions between one class
of feelings and another, can this famous contrast of
object and subject arise."1
The organism, therefore, conceived of as a group of
neural units, is neither object nor subject, but lies out-
side of the region in which this " famous contrast " has
place. There is another group of properties, however,
the " sentient changes," comprehended under the term
organism. These are conscious states, or at least
states that " may be " conscious. As these states are
said to be purely " subjective," and to be contrasted
with the neural changes which alone are objective, they
must be defined as simply a series of feelings. And
here again it must be observed that there is no distinc-
tion of object and subject, for, if there were, it would
not be correct to classify feelings as subjective and
movements as objective ; feelings would be a com-
bination of subject and object.
But these two groups of properties are classed to-
gether as the objective and subjective aspects of one
and the same organism. And as there is no " agent "
but the organism, the distinction of objective and
subjective must be made by the organism. Thus,
while the two groups of properties are separate and
distinct, they are yet brought together and recognized
as objective and subjective by the organism, as con-
scious both of itself and of its contrasted states.
The facts then are, as we must now suppose, that
two sets of functions are distinguished as respectively
movements and feelings, and are yet brought together
by the organism as conscious of both alike, and there-
1 Study of Psychology, § 11.
iv.] LEWES 'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 105
fore as conscious of each as at once distinct and yet
related to the other. Now, an organism that separates
between its own subjective and objective aspects, ap-
prehending two distinct sets of functions as in essential
relation to each other, must be self-conscious — conscious
of self as a unity combining these opposite " states."
The organism thus becomes a term for a self-conscious
being, comprehending at once subject and object. We
may, if we please, still retain the term organism, but
evidently what we are speaking of is neither move-
ments nor feelings, but that which comprehends both
alike as in necessary relation to itself. Thus, by simply
interpreting Mr. Lewes's terms, so as to bring out their
implications, we find that in one of its senses the
term organism is an outlandish name for self-conscious
intelligence.
But with this pleasant recognition of an old friend
with a new face the opposition of movements as " ob-
jective " and feelings as " subjective " loses its plausi-
bility. We have seen that, taken by themselves, they
cannot be regarded as either objective or subjective, but
are both equally indifferent to such a distinction. Ob-
ject and subject exist only for that which is conscious
of the distinction of object and subject. Evidently,
therefore, movements must be regarded as objective
only in the sense that they exist for a subject conscious
of them — a conscious subject which Mr. Lewes, by
an unpardonable abuse of language, calls the organ-
ism. What movements, apart from our knowledge of
them, may possibly be, it is impossible to say. They
could at best only be an unknown and unknowable
something lying beyond the realm of knowledge, and
such an " unknowable " Mr. Lewes, above all others,
is debarred from admitting by his frequently expressed
106 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
denial of any one's right to assert the reality of that
which is unknown, not to say unknowable. The
" objective " aspect is therefore also " subjective/' in
the sense that it exists only in relation to a conscious
subject of it. Similarly, the so-called " subjective "
aspect is not purely subjective, since a feeling apart
from its object is unthinkable. But if movements and
feelings are alike subjective and objective, i.e., exist
only as relations to a conscious intelligence, we must
no longer oppose them as coordinate and independent
phenomena, but must regard both as objects of an
intelligence that has each before it and in essential
relation to it as an object which it constitutes.
Is there, then, no distinction between the so-called
" objective" and " subjective" aspects? Most assur-
edly there is ; but it is not the distinction of the " ob-
jective" from the "subjective" — both alike implying
the synthesis of object and subject — but simply the
distinction of one class of objects, as a given sum of
properties, from another class. A series of molecular
movements cannot be identified with a series of feelings,
but it is not less true that a series of feelings cannot be
identified with self-conscious intelligence. Self-con-
sciousness is the ultimate unity comprehending all
relations as manifestations of itself. And hence the
difference between Metaphysic, the science of intelli-
gence as such, and Psychology, the science of man, is,
as Kant maintains, that between the general science of
reality and the science of a special aspect of reality.
The fundamental principle of philosophy is the unity
of subject and object, and psychology, accepting this
principle, must go on to enquire into the character-
istics of that unity as specified in the sensitive and
conscious nature of man. This will be more clearly
iv.] LEWES' S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 107
seen if we go on to ask what is Mr. Lewes's conception
of the relations of physiology and psychology.
Starting from the view that there is a strict parallel-
ism between the objective and the subjective factors.
Mr. Lewes goes on to say, that " psychology is some-
what less, and somewhat more than the subjective
theory of the organism. It is less, because restricted to
the sentient phenomena, whereas physiology embraces
all vital phenomena. It is more, because it includes
the relations of the organism to the social medium,
whereas physiology is concerned only with the relations
to the cosmos."1 The parallelism is thus restricted to
the "molecular changes" of the nervous system, and
the "sentient changes'' corresponding to them. Physio-
logy and psychology are two special branches of the
general science of biology. The latter "includes plants,
animals and man, with the respective subdivisions,
phytology, zoology and anthropology. Each of these
is again divided into morphology, the science of form,
and physiology, the science of function." " I must
reject the separation of psychology from biology so
long as I am unable to separate mind from life."2
It is thus evident that Mr. Lewes conceives of psycho-
logy as a special science on the same level as physiology.
Both, moreover, deal, not with the structure or form
of the organism, but with its functions ; hence the
difference between them must be in the different func-
tions of which they take note. They are both said to
be biological sciences, because they deal with the
functions of the " organism." With what " functions "
then are they respectively concerned ? Physiology is
limited to a consideration of the mechanical functions,
which may be all reduced to " molecular changes."
1 Study oj Psychology, § 15. 3 Ibid., § 5.
108 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
The physiologist "traces the sequence of stimulation
through sensory nerve, centre, motor nerve and
muscle."1 Physiology is the theory of "the sentient
functions as the direct activity of the organs." 2
Psychology, on the other hand, deals with sentient
functions, with "feelings as such, and their relations
to other feelings," with "changes in feeling," with
"processes which are conscious processes, or which
have been and may again be conscious." 3 It is the
theory of the "soul, its functions and acquired faculties,
considered less in reference to the organism than in
reference to experience and conduct." 4 Physiology
and psychology are thus concerned respectively with
the "objective" and the "subjective" aspects of the
same event. "Physiology deals directly and chiefly
with the objective aspect of sentient facts, and their
relation to the visible organism," 5 i.e. to the organism
as having "solidity, form, colour, weight and motion."6
Psychology deals with " the same facts in their sub-
jective aspect as states of feeling, not as organic
changes " ; 7 with the " ideas and volitions that consti-
tute the subjective, intelligible self.'" But although
each of these branches of biology is directly concerned
with a different aspect of the organism, each is indirectly
concerned with the other aspect also, for both deal with
the sentient organism. Were the physiologist to limit
himself entirely to molecular changes "the sequences
would have no more significance for him than similar
sequences in a machine ; " and, on the other hand, the
psychologist, if he is to " know the subjective facts
with accuracy and fulness . . must learn their objective
conditions of production." Physiology and psychology
1 Study of Psychology, § 8. 2 Ibid., § 9. 3 Ibid § 8. 4 Ibid., § 9.
6 Ibid., § 8. 6 Ibid., § 6. 7 Ibid., § 8. 8 Ibid., § 6.
iv.] LEWES 'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 109
are farther contrasted as the science of " the conditions
of production and the science of the " products." The
place of physiology is " that of the organic conditions
of production ; the place of psychology being that of
the products." The two sciences are thus complemen-
tary of each other. "Although the exclusive province
of the psychologist is that of the sentient changes as
products, the aid of physiology is needed to supply the
conditions of production ; it alone can disclose the
operation of changes which escape subjective appre-
ciation."1 Hence "all psychological processes are
objectively organic processes."5
Physiology, then, in so far as it is limited to the
mechanism of the nervous system, is, according to Mr.
Lewes, concerned with molecular changes, which may
further be regarded as related to the stimuli which
produce them ; in other words, its province is with
changes that can be brought under the categories of
motion and force. Psychology, on the other hand,
treats of feelings, whether these are actually known
as feelings by the agent or no. And this distinction of
movements and feelings Mr. Lewes naturally, from
his point of view, identifies with the distinction already
considered of the "objective" and the "subjective" aspect
of the organism. Now, it must be repeated that this
distinction of objective and subjective has really no
proper application, until the relation of the movements
and the feelings to a conscious intelligence is recog-
nized. And in the next place, it must be remarked
that when the relation of movements and feelings to a
conscious Intelligence is recognized, there is no longer
any propriety in calling the former "objective" and
the latter " subjective ;" each is objective or subjective
1 Study of Psychology, § 8. * Ibvl., § 19.
110 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
according to our point of view. The " molecular
movements" may be regarded as " subjective," when
they are contemplated as objects of a personal con-
sciousness; the feelings may be regarded as " objective"
when they are opposed to the self to which they are
related. In other words, subject and object only exist
in relation to each other. But Mr. Lewes further
contrasts physiology as the science of the " conditions
of production," with psychology, the science of the
" products." Now it is of course a truism that apart
from the molecular changes of the nervous system,
there could not be in the individual man any succession
of feelings, and therefore there could not be any
consciousness of feelings. Nevertheless the molecular
changes are not the cause of the feelings. For, for
one thing, these movements are dependent upon stimu-
lation by an extra-organic force, and this is as much a
" condition" of production as the movements. But the
great objection to this contrast of " conditions of pro-
duction" and " products" is that it really abstracts not
only from the new element introduced by conscious-
ness, but even from the new element introduced by
the presence of life. Mr. Lewes says that, were
the physiologist to limit himself to molecular changes,
" the sequences would have no more significance for
him than similar sequences in a machine." And the
fact is that they have "no more significance" to the
physiologist as such than "the sequences in a machine."
Molecular movements are molecular movements, no
matter whether they occur in a "machine" or in an
animal organism. It no doubt is a very imperfect
account of a living being simply to describe the mole-
cular movements that occur in its nervous system ; but
the " imperfection" lies solely with those who take this
iv.] LE WES'S THEOR Y OF KNO WLEDGE, 1 1 1
as a sufficient account of life, not with the physiologist
as such, who has completed his task when he has done
so, and who puts forward no theory as to the position
of the facts of his science in a general scheme of know-
ledge and existence. Mr. Lewes talks as if the physi-
ologist could not advance a step without recognizing
that he is dealing with the " objective" aspect of the
organism, or the " conditions of production." In truth,
the physiologist need not pronounce any opinion on the
question at all, and as a physiologist it is not his business
to pronounce any opinion. But while the physiologist
must be freed from overlooking the nature of the
sentient organism, Mr. Lewes cannot. For to speak
of molecular movements as the conditions of production
of feeling and consciousness, is simply to apply the
category of cause and effect where it becomes meaning-
less. A movement in the sentient organism is not the
cause of which a feeling is the effect. We can follow
up the line of molecular movement from the vibration
of a candle, through the vibration of the ether, to the
vibration of the nervous system, and we end as we
began with molecular movement. If we please, we
may call the molecular movements last considered an
" aspect" of the organism, but we have no right to call
it the "objective" as opposed to the "subjective"
aspect of the organism, for it is no more "objective"
than the vibration of the molecules constituting the
candle. We have therefore no right to pass from this
"molecular" aspect of the organism to its "sensitive"
aspect, without allowing for the change in our point
of view. Contemplated in its molecular aspect, the
organism not only does not differ from a machine,
but it does not differ from a stone. The highest
category we can apply to it is that of reciprocal action,
112 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
and that we can equally apply to the knocking of two
stones against each other. When therefore we advance
o
from this "molecular" aspect of the organism to its
"sensitive" aspect, we are compelled to substitute a
new and higher conception of the "organism." It is
not right even to speak of the extra-organic thing as
the cause or force, of which the molecular movement
in the organism is the effect; we must at least recognize
that the co-operation of the molecules of the organism
is required before there can be any " stimulation."
Much less even can it be correct to speak of the mole-
cular movements as the " conditions of production" of
feelings. The most essential condition of production is
the life manifested in the organism, and apart from
that, the molecular movements are nothing. While
therefore we must recognize that molecular movements
are presupposed in the existence of sensations as animal
feelings, there is in these sensations a new factor which
is not implied in the molecular movements. We may
if we please contrast this "sentient" aspect with the
"molecular" aspect, but it is absurd to contrast them
as "objective" and "subjective." It is perfectly true
that there is no sensation without an appropriate mole-
cular movement, but only in the sense in which there is
no molecular movement in the organism without a cor-
responding molecular movement in the extra organic
world. The relation is therefore not a parallelism, but
a subordination. The molecular movements take on a
new hue by being viewed as pertaining to a living
being ; life in fact becomes their " condition of produc-
tion." For while there are molecular movements which
exist apart from life, these particular molecular move-
ments can only take place in a living organism ; and if
we in any way alter the nature of the living organism, we
iv.] LE WES'S THEOR Y OF KNO WLEDGE. 113
alter the molecular movements correspondently. Hence
the movements in the higher animals are very different
from the movements in the lower ; the complexity and
adaptation of the parts, which is one "aspect" of the
intensity of the life, is the condition of the special
molecular movements. It is necessary therefore to
insist strenuously upon the subordination of the
mechanism to sentience (in the sense explained). We
must refuse to recognize the adequacy of the phrase-
ology which speaks of molecular movements as the
cause of which sensations are the effect. If we are to
apply the category of cause and effect at all, we must
rather call the "sentience" the cause of the molecular
movements, since apart from the sentient being these
particular movements could not take place. We have
in fact to view sentience as the ideal aspect of that
co-operation of organs which is the essential condition
of life, and which alone entitles us to speak of an
" organism."
Thus we have the mechanism and the organism,
manifesting themselves respectively in molecular move-
ments and in feelings. Higher still we have conscious-
ness. Just as in passing from molecular movements to
feelings, we have a subordination of the former by the
latter, so, in a still more striking way, we have now
the subordination of movements and of feelings to con-
sciousness. And this subordination of course varies in
different individuals in accordance with their intelli-
gence (which is just another name for the subordination).
The essential difference between life and consciousness
lies in that subordination of all feelings to a single self-
consciousness, which is the condition of experience.
Now for the first time the distinction of " object " and
" subject " appears ; but it so presents itself as to show
114 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
the absurdity of opposing feelings as "subjective" to
"movements" as objective. Feelings comprehend and
explain movements, consciousness comprehends and
explains both. Thus both feelings and movements are
alike objects of consciousness, and are at once objective
and subjective, since they are possible only as relations
to consciousness. Now if this is at all a correct view
to take, it is evident that Mr. Lewes's conception of the
relations of physiology and psychology cannot be ac-
cepted. As a science of molecular movements, physi-
ology does not fall within the range of psychology, and,
in fact, has no further bearing on psychology than to
illustrate the relation of sentient and conscious life.
But this just means that psychology is a philoso-
phical science, and therefore has to consider intelli-
gence as displayed in the manifestations of living
and conscious beings. Psychology, in fact, is com-
pelled, whether it will or no, to go upon certain
metaphysical presuppositions, because metaphysic en-
quires into the relation of subjects and object, and it is
impossible to treat of consciousness without asserting
or implying some theory of those relations.
As there are two aspects in which the organism mav
be contemplated, so, it is held by Mr. Lewes, there are
two ways in which we may endeavour to solve the
problem of psychology — the way of "observation of
external appearances," and the way of " introspection,"
the latter differing from the former " only in that the
phenomena observed are subjective states or feelings,
and not objective states or changes in the felt."1
Now the supposition that such a method of introspec-
tion is possible, rests upon an untenable separation of
feeling and its objects. It is, of course, perfectly true
1 Stndy'of Psychology, § 62.
iv.] LE WES'S THEOR Y OF KNO WLEDGE. 115
that a man experiences feelings that are experienced
by no one else, but it is not true that he can experience
a mere succession of feelings, i.e., a succession of feelings
occurring in his own mind apart from all relation to
thought and its objects. A being conceived of as but
the medium of a succession of feelings is a being that
is not conscious. Apart from reference to a thinking
self — a self which is not a mere colourless and passive
medium, but is active in the constitution of the feelings
that pass — there is no knowledge of feelings, and there-
fore no experience. If we imagine a being to whom
each feeling in turn arises and passes away without
being fixed in relation to a central self, we get the
nearest conceivable approach to introspection. But
such a being could never form a theory of itself, be-
cause, not only would it have no power of connecting
the data of its experience in a system of thought, not
only would it be unable to draw inferences, but it could
have no data from which, by inference, to construct a
system. We nfay suppose the lower animals to be
in this condition ; but then the lower animals do not
form a system of psychology, or connect their feelings
in a coherent whole of experience. Thus the observa-
tion of merely " subjective states " is an impossibility,
because there are no merely " subjective states " to
observe. Every feeling that is known, and enters
into the context of experience, is by that fact a re-
lation between subject and object, or depends for its
constitution upon the intelligence to which it is
related. We cannot observe bare feelings, because
the fact that they are observed, i.e., are referred
to the unity of self-consciousness, makes them not
mere passive feelings, but thoughts or relations.
Introspection, therefore, in so far as it is said to be
116 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
the "observation of subjective states or feelings," is
an absurdity.
Not less certain is it that " observation of external
appearances " is an impossibility. We can certainly
have a knowledge of a world in space, and in that
sense we can observe " external appearances " ; but it
is not possible to observe that which is purely " ob-
jective," in contrast to " subjective states or feelings."
For that which is known as an object, becomes by
that very fact a relation to consciousness ; and only so
does it enter into and become part of the world of ex-
perience. Why then is a distinction usually made
between introspection and observation ? The answer
is simple enough. In the first place, there are feelings
which we do not think of ascribing to the extra-organic
world, but which we refer to the organism itself, and in
this sense we may, if we please, speak of these as " sub-
jective states or feelings." In truth, however, they
are no more mere feelings, than extra-organic objects
are feelings, for they exist in experience only as rela-
tions to a conscious intelligence, and therefore are at
once objective and subjective. In the second place,
introspection and observation may be contrasted as the
less to the more complex. Thus we may say that in
our ordinary consciousness we have a sensation of light,
and that this is known by simple introspection ;
whereas, if we wish to get a knowledge of the process
by which we come to have that sensation, we must
appeal to " observation." But the contrast of feeling
and object, introspection and observation, is a false
one.1 We are not entitled to say that the sensation of
light is purely subjective, on the ground that we do not
1 This false contrast runs through the whole of Fechner's " Psychophysik "
and Wundt's " Physiologische Pftychologie."
iv.] LEWES' S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 117
know its conditions of production in the organism ; it
is just as much an object, determined by relation of the
permanent self to it, as is the knowledge of the retina
and the nervous system. The contrast here is not be-
tween subjective and objective at all, but between less
and more concrete knowledge, between simple relations
and complex relations. In considering the nature of
knowledge, as we are compelled to do when we speak
of methods of psychology, we have no right to speak
of the organism as if it could be known to exist apart
from relation to an intelligent apprehension of it ; and
in formulating our knowledge, we must insist upon the
strict continuity in the development of knowledge, and
therefore in the precedence of the less to the more
complex.
It will still further illustrate the critical theory of
knowledge if we contrast it with Mr. Lewes's "psycho-
geny," according to which knowledge is held to be
"partly connate, partly acquired, partly the evolved
product of the accumulated experience of ancestors,
and partly of the accumulated experiences of the indi-
vidual."1 Kant's view of the origin of knowledge, it is
held by Mr. Lewes, is fundamentally erroneous, because
it supposes the individual to bring with him a priori
conditions of knowledge, and even a priori experiences.
And the reason of the imperfection is that biology and
psychology were not at the time it was formed suffici-
ently advanced to suggest the true interpretation.
Mr. Lewes, therefore, claims that he has given the
only theory of knowledge which reconciles the conflict-
ing claims of the a priori and a posteriori schools of
philosophy. This theory maintains that the individual
inherits what may be called " a priori conditions of
1 Problems of Life and Mint/, vol. i., p. 120.
118 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
knowledge, and even a priori experiences . . . which
must determine the result of our individual a posteriori
experiences." Such a priori conditions of knowledge
and experiences are for the individual a priori ; that is,
they are not acquired by his own individual experience,
but were acquired by his ancestors and have been trans-
mitted by them to him. Still they were obtained by ex-
perience, and hence are true only within experience. Kant
is therefore mistaken in supposing that "the mind brings
with it a fund of a priori knowledge in which no em-
pirical influence, personal or ancestral, is traceable."1
Had he only seen that a priori knowledge is simply
" the organized experiences usually termed instinct,
which we inherit from our ancestors, and which form,
so to speak, part of our mental structure," he would
have also seen that his view of a priori knowledge
is altogether a mistake. We may be said to be born
with "a knowledge of space, with a knowledge of
causality, &c., because although these registered tend-
encies were originally framed out of sensible experi-
ences, we who inherit the structure so modified only
need the external stimulus, and forthwith the action of
that structure produces the pre-determined result." 2
I have already examined Mr. Lewes's view of neural
process and sentience as the subjective and objective
aspects of the one organism, What I propose at
present to consider is whether the knowledge of Nature
as a coherent system of objects is really explained on
the " psychogenetic " theory expressed in the remarks
just quoted. I shall say nothing as to Mr. Lewes's
misunderstanding of Kant's theory, which will be at
once apparent to any one who has followed the account
of it given above. I shall rather ask whether Nature,
1 Problems of Life and Mind, vol. i., p. 440. 2 Ibid., p. 446.
v.J LEWES 'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 119
as a world of knowable objects revealed to conscious-
ness, can be accounted for on Mr. Lewes's premises.
Does the doctrine of evolution, when extended by Mr.
Lewes so as to include the evolution of a known world
in consciousness, do what it pretends to do ? Does
it really supersede Kant? Does it not rather fail
altogether to grapple with Kant's problem ? 1
In his " psychogenetic " theory of knowledge Mr.
Lewes makes certain assumptions which he may,
perhaps, be quite entitled to make, but which, at any
rate, it is important to see that he does make. In the
first place, he assumes that nature or " the cosmos "
exists independently of its relation to consciousness,
and that consciousness is gradually evolved. The
object is " not the other side of the subject, but the
larger circle which includes it." True, "the cosmos
arises in consciousness : " " the objective world, with
its manifold variations, is the differentiation of exist-
ence, due to feeling and thought ; " but this differen-
tiation is the result of the forces manifested by the
cosmos, as acting on the living organism. Hence, in
the second place, it is assumed that organisms exist to
be acted upon by the forces of the cosmos. As an
evolutionist Mr. Lewes would no doubt say that
originally animal organisms were " evolved " from cos-
mical forces ; but this has no immediate bearing on
the psychogenetic theory of knowledge. Let us sup-
pose, then, that the cosmos as possessed of various
forces exists, and that animal organisms have been
evolved from them. The question will then be :
Granting animal organisms to have come into exist-
ence, and to be gradually developed by their reaction
1With what follows compare Mr. Green's criticism of Lewes's "psycho-
geny," to which I am much indebted. Contemporary Review, xxxii. pp. 762-72.
120 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
against material forces, can it be shown how the
knowledge of the world of nature grows up, as the
result of such continuous action and re-action \ Mr.
Lewes holds that it can, and it is in the account which
he gives of the evolution of consciousness from the
unconscious that we are at present interested.
An organism exists only in relation to the cosmical
medium or to its environment. And, although we
distinguish each organ or function logically, we must
be careful to observe that no organ or function really
exists or operates independently, but only in relation
to the complex of organs and functions and to the
medium in which it is placed. Each function of an
organ is the product of the interaction of structure and
stimulus. The structure of the organism, e.g., " is
built up from materials originally drawn from the
external medium, but proximately drawn from its
internal medium, or plasma." Nutrition is a process
which involves the co-operation of the organism and the
inorganic material, and both are required for the final
product. Now, " there is a marked tendency in organic
substance to vary under varying excitation, which
results in the individualization of the parts, so that
growth is accompanied by a greater or less differen-
tiation of structure." But the parts "are not only
individualized into tissues and organs, but are all
connected." Again, while the reaction of an organ is
determined by its structure at the time it reacts, "yet
the very reaction itself tends to establish a modification
which will alter subsequent reactions ; " "by the exer-
cise of an organ its structure becomes differentiated,
and each modification renders it fitted for more energetic
reaction and for new modes of reaction." Function
and structure are thus mutually dependent. Finally,
iv.] LEWES 'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 121
as the structure is modified by its reactions on stimula-
tion these modifications "tend to become transmitted
to offspring." Thus, gradually, a great change in the
structure, and therefore in the functions, of organs is
produced. Thus the vital organism is evolved from
the bioplasm ; in simpler language, the living organism
assimilates inorganic substance, and so grows, differen-
tiates, changes, and transmits its modified structure to
offspring.1
Let us now see "how the psychical organism is
evolved from what may be analogically called the
psychoplasm." Here we do not consider the whole
vital organism, but only its "sensitive aspects;" we
" confine ourselves to the nervous system." The move-
ments of the bioplasm consist of molecular compositions
and decompositions, out of which arises the whole
mechanism or structure of the organism. The bioplasm
may be viewed in two aspects, the process of assimila-
tion and the material assimilated. Similarly, the psy-
choplasm may be viewed as, on the one hand, the
nervous structure or medium, and, on the other hand,
the function of the nervous structure. As the bioplasm
has molecular movements, so the psychoplasm has
" neural tremors." " The forces of the cosmical medium,
which are transformed in the physiological medium
[the whole vital organism] build up the organic struc-
ture, which in the various stages of its evolution reacts
according to its statical conditions, themselves the
result of preceding reactions." The forces of the
cosmical medium thus act in conjunction with the
organism itself, and the product is the special structure
of the organism. This organic structure, again, is
gradually modified by the exercise of the vital functions
1 Problems of Life and Mind, vol. i., pp. 115-118.
122 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
of the organism, and hence the reactions under the
same external stimuli are altered. And "it is the
same with what may be called the mental organism.
Here, also, every phenomenon is the product of two
factors, external and internal, impersonal and personal,
objective and subjective. Viewing the internal factor
solely in the light of feeling, we may say that the
sentient material, out of which all the forms of consci-
ousness are evolved, is the psychoplasm incessantly
fluctuating, incessantly renewed. Viewing this on the
physiological side, it is the succession of neural tremors,
variously combining into neural groups." This evolu-
tion of all the forms of consciousness is experience, i.e.,
"organic registration of assimilated material." The
psychoplasm then is "the mass of potential feeling
derived from all the sensitive affections of the organ-
ism, not only of the individual but through heredity of
the ancestral organisms. All sensations, perceptions,
emotions, volitions are partly connate, partly acquired,
partly the evolved products of the accumulated experi-
ences of ancestors, and partly of the accumulated
experiences of the individual, when each of these have
left residua in the modifications of the structure."1
This view of the origin of knowledge may perhaps
be expressed somewhat more simply. The organism, it
is held, is a combination of independent organs. But
these organs act only in relation to the forces of the
external world. Now we can distinguish, although we
cannot separate, the structure of the organism from the
function it discharges. Thus the organism, if we look
only at its vital aspect, without directing our attention
to its sensitive aspect, assimilates inorganic substances,
or works them up into its own structure. But this
1 Probkms of Life ami Mind, vol. i., pp. 118-123.
iv.] LEWES 'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 123
process of assimilation has an influence on the structure
itself, and hence an influence on the process of assimi-
lation. The structure gradually changes, and so does
the process ; and so, as one living being gives rise to
another, the changes in the structure of the organism
of the parent give rise to a structure in the offspring
different from that with which the parent began life.
This gradual change in structure, and consequently in
the function relative to structure, results in the course
of innumerable generations in an organic structure and
function very unlike the structure and function of the
first animal of the series. Now from this we can see
how experience is gradually evolved : how "the cosmos
arises in consciousness." The nervous system is the
special structure of which sentience is the function.
Given a certain nervous structure, and a certain stimulus,
and the product will be a certain impression or feeling.
But the nervous structure is not always the same, but
varies from generation to generation. The vital organ-
ism changes under the influence of its own reaction
against the forces of the cosmical medium, and in course
of time the organism is very much altered. And the
nervous system, as part of the organism, of course
changes along with the other organs. As therefore
the general structure of the organism alters, so also
does the special structure of the nervous system. That
structure is adapted to receive external stimuli. But
according to the state of the nervous structure at a
given time will be the character of the reaction it
o
manifests. And as the reaction of the nervous struc-
ture has an effect upon the nervous structure itself, the
consequence is that it changes, and correspondently
with it the feelings which are the product of the mutual
action of the external stimuli and the nervous structure
124 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
undergo modification. Now we can look at the nervous
system either from the external or from the internal
point of view. From the external point of view, we
have neural tremors which combine to form neural
groups ; from the internal point of view we have
feelings. But feelings are the " sentient material, out
of which the forms of consciousness are evolved." And
experience is a "registration of feeling;" hence the
" cosmos which arises in consciousness " is a product
of the organism in relation to the forces of the cosmical
medium. As the structure of the nervous system
changes, so do the feelings which are the product of
its reaction. Hence each organism, inheriting the ner-
vous structure of its ancestors, has an a priori part of
knowledge transmitted to it, as well as an a posteriori
part which it acquires for itself. For as the struc-
ture is relative to the function, change in the structure
implies change in the experience. Coming therefore
into the world with a special structure handed down as
a legacy from the ceaseless action and reaction of
medium and function, each organism inherits part of
the garnered wealth of experience acquired by all
preceding organisms. This explains why part of our
knowledge seems, and in a sense, is, a priori or connate.
One ought to be grateful to Mr. Lewes for expressing
the doctrine of the evolution of experience in so definite
a form. So long as it is simply asserted vaguely that
the revolution in our biological conceptions caused by
the acceptance of the Darwinian theory of development
must compel us to give a new account of the nature of
knowledge, it is difficult to resist the claim. But when
we see the specific application of the biological notion
of development to the explanation of knowledge, I
think it becomes very manifest that there is nothing in
iv.] LEWES 'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 125
the " new psychology " which really helps to settle the
problem of knowledge as it was stated and partially
solved by Kant.
On careful consideration it becomes plain that Mr.
Lewes does not avoid that separation of intelligence and
nature which he rightly regards as the essential weak-
ness of the old empirical psychology, but simply brings
it back in a new form. In fact, it is difficult to see
how the continuous development of the whole animal
world, should prove the evolution of the conscious from
the unconscious, any more than the evolution of indi-
vidual living men from human ancestors should prove
it. Nor is there any reason why Kant, who saw
nothing in the latter fact to throw doubt on his conclu-
sions, should be overwhelmed by the former, supposing
him to be alive now, and familiar with the recent
developments of biology and psychology. For, whether
the individual man is developed from human ancestors
only, or finds his pedigree go back also to non-human
ancestors, the conditions under which he comes to know
a world of connected objects would seem to be very
much the same. In the order of time, it is plain
enough that unconscious processes precede conscious
processes : that each man is at first a mere animal, with
only potentialities of knowledge ; but the clearest re-
cognition of this fact is not inconsistent with the denial
of the independence of the " cosmos" in intelligence.
As, however, Mr. Lewes, and evolutionists generally,
are of a different opinion, let us look at the matter
more closely.
As we have seen, Mr. Lewes does not attempt in
his " psychogenetic " theory to explain what is implied
in the existence of living organisms, but assuming these
to exist, he goes on to enquire into the way in which
126 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
nature, or the cosmos, " arises in consciousness." The
explanations he gives therefore concern, not the exist-
ence of living beings, but the process by which they
are gradually changed or evolved. Each organism as
living must be nourished by the assimilation of inor-
ganic substances, and this assimilation is not a mere
transference of those substances into the organism, but
the working up of them into living substance. The
organism is therefore an essential factor in the con-
version of the inorganic into the organic ; the internal
medium is as essential to the final result as the external
medium. Organic structure is built up by the forces
of the cosmic medium co-operating with the organism
as vital. And the differentiation of structure, resulting
in the course of ages in the evolution of new types of
organism, is the result of the continuous interaction of
the organism and the external medium. The organic
structure in relation to external forces is gradually
modified by the function which that structure condi-
tions. For the reaction of the organism on the forces
of the cosmic medium leaves residua in the structure
which alter it, and hence in each new phase of evolu-
tion there is a modification of structure, and therefore
a modification of function. And this explains the way
in which existing organisms are connected with the
remotest organisms. The continuous accumulation of
slight differences in the structure goes on pari passu
with a continual change in the character of the func-
tions which that structure conditions.
Now so far there is nothing to which Kant or his
followers need object. It may be all very true, and very
important in its place ; but it does not seem to explain
in any way how " the cosmos arises in consciousness."
Aristotle has said what is virtually the same thing,
iv.] LEWES 'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 127
although of course he did not suppose the ancestors of
man to run further back than man. It is the next step
that contains the peculiar doctrine of the psychology of
evolution. There is one part of the organism, it is said,
to which the mental life is related in a closer and more
intimate way than to the organism as we have yet con-
sidered it — viz., the nervous system and the special
organs connected with it ; and the nervous system is
only one of the differentiations of the organism. Now
this of course is perfectly true ; but at the same time it
must be borne in mind that in framing a theory of the
organism, we must take due note not only of the
differentiations which occur, but of the unity which is
differentiated. Now the organism regarded merely as
vital, i.e., as organic structure capable of assimilating
inorganic substances, is a less concrete unity than the
organism regarded as differentiated in a special nervous
structure, with a correspondent function of sensation.
Here too there is a relation between structure and the
forces of the cosmic medium, but it is a relation of a
different kind from that involved in nutrition. The
organism has a structure fitting it for discharging the
function of nutrition, but it has also a structure so
differentiated as to fit it for responding to stimuli and
discharging the function of sensibility. Thus in passing
from the general structure which is the condition of
nutrition, to the specific structure which is the con-
dition of sensation, we must not only attend to the dif-
ferentiation of the organism, but we must also realise
clearly that the organism now connotes a new sum of
relations. I refer to this, not for its own sake, but for
its bearing on the general method by which Mr. Lewes
endeavours to explain how " the cosmos arises in con-
sciousness."
128 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
The organism, then, must now be regarded as con-
noting both the structure which conditions nutrition,
and the structure which conditions sensation. And
when we fix our attention on the structure of the
nervous system, we find that the function which it,
or rather the whole organism through it, discharges,
has an effect on the structure of the nervous system
itself. " Pathways " are established, which make the
nervous system ready to respond " whenever the new
excitation is discharged along the old channels." In
other words, the response of the nervous system to an
external stimulus becomes different by the fact of its
responding, and as the nervous system is gradually
modified, so also is the function, and hence the response
is different. Function and structure being always
relative to each other, we can understand how in the
course of many generations organisms of an altered
structure are generated, which respond differently to
the same external stimuli.
This is what seems to be involved in Mr. Lewes'
remarks on the " Psychoplasm," and to it Kant, I
should say, would have made no special objection.
There is nothing in it but an extension to the whole
animal creation, not excluding man, of what was long
held as to the connexion of animals of the same species.
But evidently we have not yet got to the explanation
of how " the cosmos arises in consciousness." For
what is the response of a nerve under stimulation ?
Mr. Lewes himself tells us that it is a "neural tremor,"
and that neural tremors are " variously combined into
neural groups." It must be observed, however, that
Mr. Lewes now adds a new element, which he dis-
tinguishes and yet identifies with neural tremors and
neural groups. For he holds that what is on the
iv.] LE WES 'S THEOR Y OF KNO WLEDGE. 1 29
objective side " the succession of neural tremors
variously combining into neural groups," is subjectively
a " sentient material." This " sentient material " must
be the product of the nervous structure as stimulated
by the " forces of the cosmical medium " : it must, in
other words, be a succession of impressions.
It is unnecessary here to repeat what I have said as to
the propriety of distinguishing the neural tremors as ob-
jective from the succession of impressions as subjective.
But I shall ask the reader to observe, that the nervous
structure is now regarded as the condition at once of
neural tremors and of feelings, and that these must be
distinguished from each other. And here we come to
close quarters. It is easy to understand what is
meant by a writer who tells us that " pathways " are
established in the nervous structure by its excitations,
and that this affects the structure itself, causing it to
react differently on the same stimulus. But what is
meant by saying that " the evolution of mind is the
establishment of definite paths ? " " Definite paths " in
what \ " Mind " is a term, as Mr. Lewes gives us to
understand, connoting the purely sentient phenomena
of the organism, i.e. it is a term expressing a combina-
tion of feelings. But feelings cannot have " definite
paths " established in them in the same sense in which
definite paths may be established in the nervous
structure. When a writer speaks of such "paths,"
the metaphor suggests the transmission of an excitation
along a nerve to the nerve centre, and in this sense the
phrase has a perfectly intelligible meaning. But a
succession of sensations is a series of transient feelings
following each other in time, and it does not seem as if
we could properly speak of the " establishment of
definite paths " in connexion with them. If there are
130 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS, [CHAP.
" paths " in feelings, what is it that goes along with
the "paths ?" A nerve, if we conceive of it as made
up by atoms, may have a " definite path established in
it," since the vibration which constitutes the excitation
as produced by the external stimulus, will travel in a
certain direction. But here it is the norvous structure
which has the path, and the neural tremors are affections
which each nerve-atom has in turn. Are we then to say
that the sensation travels along the nerve-atoms? This
can hardly be the case, because the sensation does not
exist except when the nerve-vibration reaches the brain.
There can be no doubt then, I think, that it is of the
nervous structure Mr. Lewes is thinking when he speaks
of " definite paths " being " established," and that, as
applied to feelings in consciousness, the phrase has no
proper meaning at all. Nevertheless, as we shall im-
mediately see, the " psychogenetic " theory of know-
ledge owes its plausibility entirely to the transference
to feelings in consciousness, of language which can
properly be applied only to neural tremors.
We have seen then that the organism is differentiated
as a nervous structure which has the function of nerve
excitation. Now the transmission by heredity of a
particular nerve structure, with its correspondent
function, one can understand. But can there be a
transmission of the feelings which are the products of
the interaction of the nerve structure and the external
stimuli ? Mr. Lewes implies that there can. Let us
see how he gives plausibility to the supposition.
The " sentient material " - is spoken of as " forming
the psychological medium." Now this " sentient
material" may either mean (1) the nervous system as
to its structure, or (2) the feeling which is the function
correspondent to this special structure.
iv.] LEWES 'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 131
(1) As Mr. Lewes says that the sentient material
forms the psychological medium, we naturally take his
view to be that the nervous structure is the "medium"
which determines the evolution of " the cosmos as it
arises in consciousness." The whole tenor of his
remarks is most consistent with this supposition.
For if the sentient material is equivalent to the
nervous structure, we can understand how it should
gradually change under stimulation, and how by the
influence of heredity, a nervous structure very different
from what we might call the primary nervous structure
should be " evolved." The "sentient material" on this
interpretation will mean the nervous structure as the
condition, or rather part-condition, of a sequence of
feelings. By the " sentient material " therefore must
be understood, not the " manifold of sense " of which
Kant speaks — the flux of feelings coming and going
perpetually — but the material structure, which for us
is the condition of our having such a " manifold of
sense." Taking the " sentient material" in this sense,
there is a manifest propriety in speaking of the
psychoplasm, which is but another name for the
nervous system, as "incessantly fluctuating, incessantly
renewed." It is "incessantly fluctuating, incessantly
renewed," because it is only by perpetual repair of
waste that it ministers to life, and because it is inces-
santly undergoing stimulation and reacting against the
forces of the cosmical medium. And we can also
understand, how by the influence of heredity, or rather
by the exercise of its function of sensation, the
organism should in the course of ages be greatly
modified, and therefore be the condition of feelings
different from those of which its former structure was
the condition. All this is easily understood ; but what
132 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
is not so easy to understand is how the "sentient
material" so defined can be "the mass of potential
feeling derived from all the sensitive affections of the
organism, not only of the individual, but through
heredity of the ancestral organisms." If the " sentient
material" is equivalent to the nervous structure as
part-condition of feeling, it cannot be a "mass of
potential feeling;" it must differ from the "mass of
potential feeling " as " condition of production " from
" product," or " medium " from " function." If, there-
fore, Mr. Lewes is right in calling the " sentient
material" the " medium," he is utterly wrong in calling
it a " mass of potential feeling derived from all the
sensitive affections of the organism." The nervous
structure is not the feeling which it makes possible :
while the one is co-relative to the other, they may not
be identified, any more than matter can be identified
with force. A centre is not a circumference although
the one cannot be thought apart from the other.
(2) There is not the slightest doubt that Mr. Lewes
does identify the " sentient material" out of which the
cosmos is to arise with the nervous structure as internal
" medium." But it is just as certain that he takes it
in the sense of the Kantian " manifold of sense " — the
succession of feelings which is the " product " of the
interaction of internal and external media, i.e., of nerv-
ous structure and external stimuli. Now taking the
" sentient material," or " mass of potential feeling," in
the sense of individual feelings, it is not easy to see
how there can be any transmission or evolution of
them. How can any one have another's feeling ?
When a feeling is experienced, it immediately gives
place to another feeling, and it never returns. The
same individual therefore cannot ever experience
iv.] LEWES 'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 133
the same feeling over again. And if this is true of
each individual in regard to his own experience, it must
be still more true in regard to that experience which is
said to be " the evolved product of the accumulated
experiences of ancestors." Feelings cannot be repeated
and hence they cannot be transmitted. That there can
be no evolution of feeling is also evident, since evolu-
tion implies identity in change : but in a mere series of
feelings there is no identity and therefore no evolution.
Mr. Lewes therefore when he says that experiences
leave "residua in the modifications of the structure;"
when he speaks of the " controlling effect of the estab-
lished pathways," without which " every excitation
would be indefinitely irradiated throughout the whole
organism ;" when he tells us of " the establishment of
definite paths " by which mind is fitted " for the recep-
tion of definite impressions ; " and when he refers to
" registered modifications of feelings," by which feelings
" must always be reproduced, whenever the new excit-
ation is discharged along the old channels ; " in all
this he is speaking in language that is quite mean-
ingless, unless he is thinking, not of the succession of
feelings out of which experience is to be evolved, but
of the nervous structure as the condition of such feel-
ings. Certainly, the actual having of sensation, leaves
" residua in the modifications of the structure ; " but it
does not leave residua in the sensations that are had.
The nervous structure changes, and so, no doubt, does
the sensation which is its " function " or " product ; "
but we can speak of sensations being modified, only
when we mean to say that one sensation is not the
same in content with another. So, when we hear of
the controlling effect of the " established paths," we
must suppose that the nervous structure as a condition
134 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
of sensation is referred to, since there can be no
" established paths " in a mere sequence of sensations.
And when we are told that " feelings must always be
reproduced whenever the new excitation is discharged
along the old channels/' we must suppose Mr. Lewes
to mean that a feeling similar in content with another
formerly felt, is felt whenever the nervous system is
stimulated in the same way. But all this only shows
that, in identifying the " sentient material " with the
mere sequence of feelings, Mr. Lewes must give up his
view of the transmission of the " sentient material."
What is really transmitted is the structure, modified
by the exercise of its function, and so responding in a
different way to stimuli. But no modification of the
nervous structure will account for the origin of the
cosmos in consciousness. We may explain in this way
how the " sentient material" — the manifold of sense —
alters, but we have not shown how experience develops
because we have not shown how it begins. Something
cannot be developed out of nothing, experience out of
non-experience. The changes in the nervous system,
gradually produced by the accumulated activity of
innumerable individuals lineally connected, and the
corresponding change in the products, does not account
for the origin of the cosmos in consciousness, because it
does not account for the very simplest experience, the
experience that there is something known by me. Thus
whether we take the " sentient material," as (1) the
nervous structure conceived of as the part-condition of
feeling, or as (2) the feelings of which the nervous
structure is the condition or medium ; in either case
we are no nearer an explanation of knowledge than
when we began.
Mr. Lewes has, therefore, in order to make plausible
iv.] LEWES 'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 135
the derivation of the knowable world from the changes
of the organism, to make a further unwarrantable
identification — the identification of a series of feelings
with the consciousness of a world of connected facts.
Just as the nervous structure is confused with the
sensation which is its function, so a series of feelings
is confused with the consciousness of such feelings, i.e.,
with the relation of real objects to the unity of self-
consciousness. The "sentient material" or "mass of
potential feeling" is that "out of which all the forms
of consciousness are developed ;" but on the other
hand experience is called " the organic registration of
assimilated material." Now it is true that out of the
"manifold of sense," not as a mere manifold but as
the particular element in knowledge reflected on
the universal, "all the forms of consciousness are
developed." Our knowledge undoubtedly comes to
us in fragments, and these fragments we may call
the " sentient material " of knowledge. But observe
that this "sentient material" is not a mere feeling
as it is for a being that has no self, but the reflection
of something real on the self. As universal, real know-
ledge does not begin in mere sensation but in sensation
informed by thought. Sensation is an immediate feel-
ing, passing with the moment ; knowledge even in its
simplest phase implies the judgment that " something
is." Hence if we call experience the " registration of
assimilated material," we must understand it to be
a registration which implies the reference of the
material assimilated, i.e., the feeling, to a universal
self. Mr. Lewes, however, supposes that the regis-
tration is somehow an organic process, and hence that
experience develops by the gradual alteration in the
nervous structure as medium, and the consequent
136 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP
alteration in the " sentient material." As, however,
the organism as having a succession of feelings must
be taken to connote less than the organism as self-
conscious, the evolution of the organism in the one
sense does not imply its evolution in the other sense.
Experience cannot possibly evolve before it begins,
and it only begins when the mere succession of feelings
is converted into a system of real objects. Thus the
cosmos does not arise in consciousness from the inter-
action of nervous structure and external stimuli, but
only from the gradual evolution of intelligence in
relation to the objects which it makes possible. And
if feelings cannot be transmitted, much less can self-
consciousness. An organic structure as gradually
altered by successive stimulations, and responses to
stimulations, is inherited ; but experience is nothing
apart from self-consciousness, and self-consciousness is
not handed down from one being to another. When
Mr. Lewes talks of knowledge being a priori, he
confuses the organic conditions of our having sensation
with the experience of sensations as objects. Such
experience is nothing for us as thinking beings ; it is
but the potentiality of our having knowledge ; and,
unless there were a universal self distinct from the
nervous structure and the succession of feelings, the
knowledge of the cosmos would never arise in con-
sciousness at all. External forces as stimuli, and the
nervous structure as reacting on stimuli, are nothing
for consciousness but a mere " manifold of sense "
unless we suppose the self as synthetic to relate that
manifold to itself, and so to give rise to a known world.
But as the mere manifold, as Kant has shown, is not an
object of knowledge, but only an element in knowledge,
it is not possible to show that self-consciousness is
iv.] LEWES 'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 137
evolved from that which only exists in relation to
self-consciousness. Abstract from intelligence itself,
and therefore from all relation to intelligence, and the
world becomes a mere " unknowable." The supposition
that Kant's theory of knowledge is affected by the
recent advances in biology and psychology arises from
a confusion between the transmission of a modified
organism, and the transmission of experience. The
organism is indeed transmitted, but experience is not
transmitted : it is appropriated in virtue of intelligence.
In the above remarks I have gone somewhat beyond
the letter of Kant's system, but I do not think that
I have said anything inconsistent with its spirit. The
essential point is the necessary correlativity of con-
sciousness and its objects, a correlativity such that the
object must be carried over into consciousness and not
consciousness into the object. It is the recognition of
this essential unity of all known objects in intelligence
that constitutes the peculiar merit of Kant, and makes
the publication of the Critique an epoch in modern
speculation.
138
CHAPTER V.
THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDGMENT. DR. STIRLING'S
INTERPRETATION.
CjTILL following the lead of formal logic, Kant, after
considering the pure conceptions, goes on to con-
sider the pure judgments of the understanding, or the
fundamental propositions which formulate the unity of
individual objects and the unity of their mutual connec-
tion. These judgments or propositions embody the
last result of the investigation into the problem of
critical philosophy in its positive aspect, viz. : How are
synthetic judgments a priori possible ? The materials
for the final answer have already been given in the
^Esthetic, taken along with the deduction and schema-
tism of the categories, and little remains except to show
in detail how the elements implied in real knowledge are
joined together in a system constituting the known
world. Kant, however, after his manner, goes over the
old ground again, and shows, but now more in detail, on
the one hand that the opposition of intelligence and
nature, from which the dogmatist starts, cannot explain
the actual facts of our knowledge ; and, on the other
hand, that these facts may be explained if we recog-
nize the constructive power of intelligence in nature.
By a roundabout road he has come back to the problem,
v.] THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDGMENT. 139
Hume's statement of which " roused him from his
dogmatic slumber," but he has come back enriched with
the spoils of a large conquest of new territory. Not
only has the single question as to the application to
real objects of the law of causality expanded into the
comprehensive question as to the fundamental laws of
nature as a whole, but the point of view from which the
relations of intelligence and nature are contemplated
has been completely changed. Philosophy no longer
perplexes itself with the irrational problem, How do
we come to know objects existing as they are known
beyond the confines of our knowledge ? but occupies
itself with the rational and soluble problem as to the
elements involved in our knowledge of objects standing
in the closest relations to our intelligence.
Even in our ordinary consciousness, in which we do
not think of questioning the independent reality of the
world as we know it, we draw a rough distinction be-
tween objects immediately perceived, and the relations
connecting them with each other. Things, with their
distinctive properties, seem to lie spread out before us
in space, and by simply opening our eyes we apparently
apprehend them as they are. On the other hand we
regard these objects as continuing to exist even when
we do not perceive them, and as acting and reacting
upon each other. Thus, although in an unreflective or
half- unconscious way, we draw a distinction in our
ordinary every-day consciousness between individual
objects and their relation to one another. Moreover,
the separate parts of individual objects and the degrees
of intensity they display we also recognize, and we
count and measure them. Corresponding to this broad
distinction between objects and their relations, we have
respectively the mathematical and physical sciences.
HO KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
Mathematics, abstracting, in the first instance, from
objects in space and time, fixes upon the relations of
space and time themselves, and after dealing with these
abstractions, it goes on to apply the results thus reached
to individual objects. The physical sciences, borrowing
from mathematics its results, proceed to inquire into
the connections of objects with each other. Thus,
mathematics and physics deal respectively with the
spatial and temporal relations of individual objects, and
with their dynamical relations. It is at this point that
critical philosophy begins its task. In the science of
mathematics, on the one hand, and in the physical
sciences, on the other hand, our knowledge of nature is
systematized ; and the problem of philosophy is to show
what are the essential conditions of such systematic
knowledge. Assuming the results of mathematics and
physics to be true, the question still remains, whether
nature, regarded either as a complex of individual
objects, or as a system of laws, is independent of the
activity of thought. This problem neither of those
sciences has taken any notice of. The mathematician
goes on making his ideal constructions without for a
moment questioning the necessary truth of the conclu-
sions he reaches, and therefore without attempting to
show from the nature of knowledge how we can know
them to be true. The physicist assumes that matter is
real, and that it is endowed with forces of attraction
and repulsion, expressible in mathematical symbols,
but it is no part of his task to justify that assumption.
But philosophy, aiming to explain the inner nature of
knowledge, cannot evade the double problem : first,
what justifies the supposition that mathematical propo-
sitions are necessarily true, and are applicable to the
individual objects we perceive ? and, secondly, what
v.] THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDGMENT. 141
justifies us in assuming that there are real substances,
real connections, and real coexistences ? Now, looking
more particularly at the nature of that which is known
in relation to knowledge, we may further divide the
known world as perceived into concrete objects and the
spatial and temporal determinations of such objects.
We may, in other words, ask what is implied in the
ordinary experience of individual things, and in the fact
that we can count or measure them ; as well as what is
implied in the scientific application of quantity to such
objects, and in the rules of quantity considered by
themselves. As a complete theory of knowledge must
explain the possibility of the various kinds of knowledge
which we undoubtedly possess, it must be shown how
we come to know individual objects, and to apply
quantitative relations to them. Philosophy has therefore
at once to justify the universality and necessity of
mathematical propositions, and to explain by what right
mathematics is applied to individual things. The pos-
sibility of mathematics, regarded simply as a science
determining the relations of space and time, has been
explained in the ^Esthetic, where it was pointed out that
space and time are a priori forms of perception. The
general result of the Aesthetic was to show (1) that the
demonstrative character of mathematical judgments
arises from the fact that these rest upon specifications
of the forms of space and time, which belong to the
constitution of our perceptive faculty, and (2) that
mathematical judgments are not mere analyses of pre-
existing conceptions of numbers, figures, etc., but are
synthetical judgments resting upon the active construc-
tion of numbers and figures themselves. But the
elements of knowledge implied in mathematical propo-
sitions, and in their application to individual objects,
142 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
can only now be completely set forth. For in these
there are implied, not only the forms of space and time,
but certain pure conceptions or categories. It should
be observed that the question as to the application of
mathematics has nothing to do with our reasons for
determining special objects by mathematical formulae ;
we are not asking, for example, how we can determine
the distance of the sun from the earth, but simply how
we are entitled to apply the category of quantity to any
object whatever in space. In answering this question,
philosophy abstracts in the meantime from the actual
relations of things to each other, as well as from the
concrete properties of things, and from the specific de-
terminations of space and time. It has to point out
what is implied in the knowledge of any individual
object of perception ; but it does not seek to determine
what are the specific differences of objects. These
differences may be summarily expressed by the term
" manifold," and as this manifold involves a relation to
our perceptive faculty, it may be called the " manifold
of sense." The meaning of the term " manifold" there-
fore varies, according as we are referring to the proper-
ties of individual things, to their spatial and temporal
relations, or to the determinations of space and time
themselves. In considering the principles which justify
the application of mathematics to phenomena, Kant
uses the term in all these senses, but in no case does he
mean by it more than what may be called isolated
points of perception, that is, mere differences taken in
abstraction from their unity. From the point of view,
then, of the Critical philosophy, the objects of percep-
tion are not real external objects, but merely the
sensible, spatial or temporal parts out of which objects
are put together. The manifold, e.g., of a house is
v.] THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDGMENT. 143
the spatial parts or the sensible units which together
make it an object, and mark it out in space ; the mani-
fold of a line is the parts or points, by the successive
construction of which the line is determined. This
mere manifold, which is really only an abstract element
in known objects, is all that is due to perception ; the
unity of the manifold is contributed entirely by the
understanding.
Turning now to the relations of objects, as distin-
guished from objects themselves, we can see that our
problem is somewhat changed. So far we have sup-
posed real things to be known ; now we must inquire
what justification there is for that assumption. Grant-
ing that we can prove all objects in space and time to
have extensive and intensive quantity, we must still
ask on what ground we affirm that there are real sub-
stances, real sequences, and real coexistences. There
can be no doubt that, in our ordinary consciousness,
we have the conceptions of substance, cause, and reci-
procity ; but philosophy must be able to show that
these conceptions have an application to real objects.
Our question, then, is as to the possibility of ultimate
rules or principles of judgment, which are at the same
time fundamental laws of nature. In those universal
principles, which the scientific man assumes in all his
investigations, and which form the prolegomena to
scientific treatises, we have indeed a body of universal
truths; but they are limited in their application to
external nature. Our aim is, on the other hand, to
discover and prove the objective validity of the prin-
ciples which underlie nature in general, as including
both external and internal objects; or, what is the same
thing, to show that there are synthetical judgments
belonging to the constitution of our intelligence, which
144 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
account, and alone account, for the existence and con-
nection of real objects.
In accordance with the distinction of individual
objects and the relations of individual objects, the
principles of judgment naturally separate into two
groups, which we may distinguish respectively as the
mathematical and the dynamical principles. Following
the clue of the categories, we find that these groups
again subdivide into two sets of propositions. Mathe-
matical principles prove (1) that individual perceptions,
whether these are simple determinations of space and
time, or concrete objects, are extensive quanta, and (2)
that in their content individual objects have intensive
quantity or degree. In the dynamical principles it is
shown (1) that there are real substances, real sequences,
and real coexistences, and (2) that the subjective criteria
of knowledge are the possibility, the actuality, or the
necessity of the objects existing in our consciousness.
From what has been said, it will be easily understood
why Kant divides the principles of judgment into two
classes, the mathematical and the dynamical. The
former are not mathematical propositions, but philoso-
phical propositions, formulating the process by which
the axioms and definitions of mathematics are known
and applied to concrete objects. For the method of
philosophy is quite distinct from the method of mathe-
matics. The mathematician immediately constructs
the lines, points, and figures with which his science
deals, and only in that construction does he obtain a
conception of them. The proposition that a straight
line is the shortest distance between two points, is not
obtained by the analysis of the conception of a straight
line, but from the actual construction of it as an
individual perception. The axioms and definitions of
v.] THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDGMENT. 145
mathematics are, therefore, immediately verified in the
perception or contemplation of the objects to which
they refer. Philosophy, on the other hand, must show
how there can be conceptions which yet apply to per-
ceptions ; how, for example, we are justified in saying
that there is a real connection between events. Any
direct reference to immediate perception is here inad-
missible, for from such perception no universal proposi-
tion can be derived. The two principles that "all
perceptions are extensive quanta" and that " the real
in all phenomena has intensive quantity or degree," are
called mathematical, because they justify the assump-
tion that the axioms and definitions of mathematics are
necessary, and at the same time, because they account
for the application of mathematics to individual things.
As to the first point, the axioms in mathematics rest
upon the immediate perception of the object constructed
by the determination of space and time. And while
the necessary truth of such axioms admits of no doubt,
philosophy, having undertaken the task of showing the
relation of intelligence to all its objects, must be able
to point out what in the constitution of intelligence
gives them their binding force. The axioms of percep-
tion therefore, express in the form of a proposition the
supreme condition under which mathematical axioms
stand ; showing that unless the mind, in constructing
the pure perceptions on which those axioms rest,
possessed the function or category of quantity, there
could be no necessity in a mathematical proposition.
"Even the judgments of pure mathematics in their
simplest axioms are not exempt from this condition
[the condition that synthetical judgments stand under
a pure conception of the understanding]. The principle
that a straight line is the shortest distance between
146 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
two points, presupposes that the line is subsumed under
the conception of quantity, which certainly is no mere
perception, but has its seat in the understanding alone."1
Besides showing the possibility of mathematical propo-
sitions, the axioms of perception and anticipations of
observation justify the application of mathematics to
known objects. A complete theory of knowledge must
evidently explain why the ideal constructions of the
mathematician hold good of actual objects in the real
world, for the propositions of mathematics might be
true in themselves, and yet might have only the co-
herence of a well-arranged system of fictions. In
showing how there can be a knowledge of the laws of
nature, we must, therefore, explain what justifies the
scientific man in making free use of the conclusions of
mathematics. Now there is a distinction between the
way in which we establish the mathematical and that
in which we establish the dynamical principles. In
both cases we have to show that the pure conceptions
of the understanding apply to real objects. But, in
the case of the mathematical principles, we deal directly
with individual objects as immediately presented to us,
without making any inquiry into the connection of
these objects with each other, or into their relations to
a knowing subject. This is the reason why the cate-
gories of quantity and quality, unlike those of relation
and modality, have no correlates. Taking individual
perceptions just as they stand, without seeking for any
law binding them together, we necessarily exclude all
relation. To prove the mathematical principles, we
must show that they rest upon, and presuppose, the
categories of quantity and quality ; but this we can do
simply from the contemplation of the immediate deter-
* Prolegomena, tr., § 20, p. 75.
v.J THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDGMENT. 147
urinations of space and time ; and hence the evidence
for them may be said to be direct or intuitive. And
as these principles, in referring to immediate unrelated
objects of perception, show how the parts of the object
are put together, they may be called constitutive, in
distinction from the dynamical principles, which, as
binding together concrete objects already constituted
as concrete, may properly be called regulative. Every
object of perception must conform to the mathematical
principles, since these show what are the essential con-
ditions without which there could be no individual
objects for us. The dynamical principles, again, are
not principles of dynamics, such as Newton's three laws
of motion ; for these, while they are necessarily true, do
not reach the universality of principles of judgment,
but apply only to corporeal existences. The dynamical
principles are so called because they express the ulti-
mate conditions, without which there could be no
science of nature at all. The analogies and postulates
are dynamical, because they show how we can account
for the relations of objects to each other, or to the sub-
ject knowing them. Thus, when it is said that matter
has repulsive and attractive forces, it is evidently pre-
supposed that one material object acts upon another,
and hence that there is a causal connection between
them. The justification of this assumption of real
connection is the task of philosophy. Now, this cannot
be done by directly bringing the immediate objects of
perception under the categories of relation and modality.
For the dynamical principles do not hold good of per-
ceptions simply as such, but involve the connection or
relation of such perceptions. Hence they cannot, like
mathematical principles be, directly proved. The mere
fact that individual objects, to be known at all, must
148 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
be known as in space and time, shows that they must
conform to the nature of space and time, and must
therefore admit of the application of mathematical
formulae to them ; but it does not show that they must
be connected with each other. Hence, in the proof of
the dynamical principles, it is necessary to show that
real objects are something more than immediate per-
ceptions, that real events cannot be immediately appre-
hended, and that the coexistence of real objects is not
accounted for, if we suppose them to be directly per-
ceived or contemplated. The real existence therefore
of known objects, which it was not necessary to inquire
into in the proof of the mathematical principles, comes
directly to the front in the investigation of the reality
and connection of objects.1
The first step toward a full comprehension of the
Principles of Judgment is to realize with perfect clear-
ness that Kant does not, in the fashion of a dogmatic
philosopher, separate absolutely between nature and
intelligence, things and thoughts, sense and under-
standing. Unless we put ourselves at the right point
of view, and make perfectly clear to ourselves the
necessary relativity of the known world and the world
of knowledge, the reasoning of Kant must seem weak,
irrelevant, and inconclusive. That Dr. Stirling has
not done so seems to me plain from the fact that he
supposes those principles to be abstract rules, which
are externally applied to knowledge independently
supplied by the senses. The net result of the ^Esthetic,
as I understand Dr. Stirling to say, is, that space and
time, together with the objects contained in them, are
not realities without, but ideas within. And from the
Analytic, taken in conjunction with the ^Esthetic, we
1 Kritik, pp, 154-5, 477 ff., 103, 166-8, 191, 369. Prolegomena, §§ 25-26.
v.] THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDGMENT. 149
further learn that sense gives us a knowledge of indi-
vidual facts or objects, but only in the arbitrary order
of a mere succession in time ; while the understanding
brings those facts or objects under the categories, and
so makes necessary or objective what before was merely
arbitrary or subjective. On the one side, therefore,
we have the " manifold of sense," a term which is
applied not to " a simple presentation alone, but even
to such compound presentations as the phenomena in
any case of causalty ;"* on the other side we have the
rule of judgment, under which the manifold is sub-
sumed. And Dr. Stirling objects, with manifest force
and collusiveness, that this account of the relations
of sense and understanding is untrue, and the proofs of
the various principles utterly inconclusive, since no
rule of judgment could possibly make any succession
of perceptions necessary, unless there were already
necessity in the perceptions themselves.
I accept unreservedly this criticism of Kant's theory,
as interpreted by Dr. Stirling. If sense gives us a
knowledge of real objects, facts, or events, it is per-
fectly superfluous, and worse than superfluous, to bring
in the faculty of thought to do that which has been
done already. First to attribute knowledge to one
faculty, and then to introduce a new faculty to explain
it over again, is sure evidence of the failure of a philo-
sophical theory to accomplish the end for which it was
designed. But I cannot believe Kant to have blun-
dered in this fashion. The vigorous blows which Dr.
Stirling believes himself to be showering upon Kant,
really fall only upon a simulacrum which he has
fashioned for himself out of Kant's words read in a
wrong sense. It is as well at least that it should be
1 Journal of Speculative Philosophy, xiv. 76.
150 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
distinctly understood that, in accepting Dr. Stirling's
interpretation of Kant's theory of knowledge, we at
the same time commit ourselves to his radical con-
demnation of it. For my own part, I must decline to
follow Dr. Stirling either in his interpretation or in
his condemnation.
It is not, as I venture to think, a fair representation
of the ^Esthetic to say that it merely makes space and
time, and the objects in them, ideas within the mind,
instead of actual realities without the mind. I find it
difficult to attach a precise meaning to such language
as, that " we know an actual outer space, an actual
outer time, and actual outer objects, all of which are
. . . things in themselves, and very fairly perceived by
us in their own qualities."1 This may mean that space
and time, together with individual objects and events,
are completely independent in their own nature of all
relation to intelligence. It may be, in short, an ac-
ceptance of the common-sense realism which one is
accustomed to associate with the name of Dr. Reid.
In that case, I prefer Kant to Dr. Stirling. But if
the meaning is, as I am fain to think, that space, time,
and concrete things are not dependent for their reality
upon us, although they are relative to intelligence, I
do not understand why Kant should be so strongly
rebuked for making space and time forms of perception
instead of sensible things. One may surely reject the
subjectivity of space and time, and yet see in the
^Esthetic a great advance on previous systems. A
theory may have in it an alloy that lessens its absolute
value, and may yet contain a good deal of genuine
gold. Kant's view of space and time, were it only for
the necessity it lays upon us of conceiving the problem
1 Joum. S^ec. Pk'd., xiii. 11.
v.] THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDGMENT. 151
of knowledge from an entirely new point of view, and
of seeking for a theory truer than itself, possesses an
importance difficult to over-estimate. I do not see
how any one who has undergone the revolution in his
ordinary way of thinking, which the critical philosophy,
when thoroughly assimilated, inevitably effects, can
any longer be contented simply to announce that space
and time are realities, without feeling himself called
upon to explain at the same time what relation they
bear to intelligence. Ordinary Realism, and its off-
spring, psychological Idealism, have received their
death-blow at Kant's hands, and no attempt to resus-
citate them can be of any avail. Kant himself, at
least, was firmly convinced that, in maintaining space
and time to be forms of our intelligence on its per-
ceptive side, he was initiating a reform of supreme
importance in philosophy. Dr. Stirling speaks of
Kant's doctrine of the external world exactly as if it
were identical with the sensationalism of such thinkers
as Mr. Huxley and Mr. Spencer. But it is surely
one thing to say that space and time are given to us
in feelings set up in us by an object lying beyond con-
sciousness, and another thing to say that they belong
to the very constitution of our intelligence in so far as
it is perceptive. If space and time are forms of per-
ception, we can no longer go on asking how a world of
objects lying beyond the mind gets, in some mysterious
way, into the mind. Kant never, in his philosophical
theory, makes any attempt to prove the special facts
of our ordinary knowledge, or the special laws of the
natural sciences ; these he simply assumes as data
which it is no business of his to establish. But, al-
though he leaves the concrete world just as it was
before, he does not leave the philosophical theory
152 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
commonly put forward to explain it just as it was.
From the critical point of view, things can no longer
be regarded as unintelligible abstractions, as they must
be in any theory which, by extruding them from the
inner circle of knowledge, virtually makes them un-
knowable ; being brought into relation with our intel-
ligence, there is no barrier to their being known and
comprehended. I cannot see that it is doing Kant
justice simply to say that space and time, and the
objects filling them, which before were without the
mind, are by him brought within the mind. He cer-
tainly holds them to be " within," but they are within,
not as transient feelings, but as permanent and un-
changeable constituents of knowledge, belonging to
the very nature of human intelligence. Omit the
" human," and we have a view of the external world,
which is consistent with its reality, in the only intel-
ligible meaning of the term, and which yet denies
space and time to be subjective any more than objec-
tive. Kant here, as always, is greater than he was
himself aware of, and that seems to me criticism of
a very unsympathetic and uninstructive sort which
closely scans the mere outward form of his theory, and
fails to see behind the form an idea rich in suggestive-
ness and far-reaching in its issues.
Dr. Stirling's appreciation of the ^Esthetic seems to
me to be inadequate ; his view of the relations of sense
and understanding, as expounded in the Analytic, I
regard as a complete inversion of the truth. The
objects of sense fall completely apart from the forms of
thought. A broad distinction is drawn between per-
ceptions and judgments about perceptions, and sense is
supposed to have completed its work before thought
begins to operate. The Critique we must, therefore,
v.] THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDGMENT. 153
regard as a phenomenology, tracing the successive
phases through which our knowledge passes on its way
to necessary truth. All our knowledge is at first
simply an immediate apprehension of special facts,
coming to us without order or connection; and only
afterwards, when thought brings into play its schema-
tized categories, is necessity imposed upon our percep-
tions. I maintain, on the contrary, that sense does
not give a knowledge of individual objects, facts, or
events ; that of itself it gives us no knowledge what-
ever; and that understanding does not externally
impose necessity upon perceptions, but is essential to
the actual constitution of known objects, facts, or
events. The Critique I therefore regard, not as a
phenomenology, but as a metaphysic, i.e., as a syste-
matic account of the logically distinguishable, but not
the less real, elements that together make up our
knowledge in its completeness. The importance of
the issue at stake may perhaps excuse the repetition of
some points I have already tried to explain.
The Critique may almost be said to part into two
independent halves, in the first of which Kant speaks
from the ordinary or uncritical point of view, and in
the second of which he advances to the critical, or
purely philosophical point of view. This implicit
division arises partly from the fact that, as Kant never
attempts to prove a single qualitative fact or special
law of nature, in referring to the data which he has to
explain he naturally speaks in the language of every-
day life, and, therefore, seems to be accepting the
common-sense view of things ; but it partly arises also
from his accepting the account of the process of know-
ledge given in formal logic as true outside of the
sphere of philosophy proper. According to the ordi-
154 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
nary conception of our knowledge of things, sense
immediately reveals to us actual objects lying outside
of our consciousness, and passively taken up into it.
In speaking of the facts demanding philosophical ex-
planation, Kant does not, as he might have done, deny
this assumption at the very threshold of his inquiry,
but seeks gradually to undermine it by showing
the conclusions to which it leads. Moreover, Kant's
own theory of knowledge harmonizes with the ordinary
view in these two points ; (1) that sense or feeling
supplies to us all the concrete element in our know-
ledge of external objects, and (2) that it also reveals to
us the particular feelings belonging to ourselves as
individuals. Notwithstanding this partial agreement,
however, the divergence of criticism and dogmatism is
radical and complete. For it is one thing to say that
sense contributes the concrete element in knowledge,
and quite a different thing to say that it gives us a
knowledge of concrete objects. The latter statement is
only true of sense, understood in the loose and popular
meaning of the term, as when we speak of " sensible
objects," or the " world of sense." Taken simply as an
expression of the^ac^ that we have a knowledge of exter-
nal objects, and that, as it seems, by immediate appre-
hension of them, such language may be allowed to pass ;
but, in the philosophical meaning of the term, sense is a
name for the particular, not for the individual. This
follows directly from Kant's conception of space and
time as forms of perception, not realities perceived.
So long as these forms were supposed to be actual
realities existing in themselves, apart from any relation
to us, it seemed correct enough to say that by sense
we directly receive into our minds at once individual
objects, and the space and time in which they are
v.] THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDGMENT. 155
contained. But, if space and time are not realities
without our consciousness, but potential forms coming
into existence for consciousness on occasion of know-
ledge, it is evident that our view of the relation of
objects to knowledge must be radically changed, and
therefore our view of that which belongs to sense
as distinguished from thought. Things which exist
beyond our consciousness cannot be contained in space
and time, which exist only within consciousness. The
distinction of the inner from the outer world is no
longer a distinction of ideas within the mind, from
material or actual realities without the mind ; internal
feelings and external objects are alike within conscious-
ness, being logically distinguishable, but not really
separable. The contrast of internal and external
objects arises, so far as sense is concerned, from the
fact that external objects are informed by space as well
as by time, while our internal life passes in time
alone ; but otherwise our perceptions, and what we
know as objects of perception, are composed of the
same elements. Knowledge always comes to us in
successive apprehensions ; and this is true, whether we
look at our feelings as in time, or at known objects as
in space. Now, as sense is the faculty by which we
immediately contemplate the particular taken by itself,
it contributes a mere " manifold/' which is not yet an
individual object, but only the sensuous material for
such an object. On the internal side we have a series
of feelings, perpetually coming and going, and, there-
fore, destitute of universality, unity, or connection.
Isolate this mere series, as the dogmatist does, from
objects in space, and these feelings are not knowable
even as a series. On the other hand, separate the
external from the internal, and the former becomes
156 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
unknowable and unintelligible. This is the sum of the
Refutation of Idealism. Sense, therefore, while it con-
tributes the particulars implied in our actual knowledge
of objects, cannot of itself give us any knowledge what-
ever. We might as well claim that, from the mere
form of space or time, we can know definite objects, as
hold that the special senses reveal to us concrete things.
The dogmatist makes the problem of knowledge very
easy for himself by assuming that we immediately
apprehend actual objects; the actuality he assumes,
and the knowledge of actuality he figures to himself as
a direct glance of sense. But now that sense is seen
to be capable of supplying only a series of unconnected
particulars, a new mode of explanation must be adopted.
The actuality of things must be explained, and not
simply assumed ; and the manner in which the mere
particularity of sense becomes for us the knowledge of
individual objects must be shown. The individuality
of things, so far as sense is concerned, vanishes with
their supposed independence of our intelligence, and
we are left by the progress of philosophical reflection,
with a mere " manifold of sense," an unconnected con-
geries of particulars, entirely destitute of unity, connec-
tion, or system. To explain our actual knowledge of
objects and of their connections with each other, we
require to produce the universal element belonging to
our intelligence, by the action of which on the particu-
lars of sense real knowledge takes place. We have
discovered the faculty of differences ; we must now
show what is the faculty of unity, and how it produces
the various kinds of unity which we can see to be
implied in our actual knowledge.
It will be evident from what has been said, how Dr.
Stirling has been led to suppose that Kant regards
v.] THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDGMENT. 157
sense as giving us a knowledge of individual objects or
facts. Unless we resolutely keep before our minds the
fact that the Critique is an analysis of the logical con-
stituents of our actual knowledge, and not an account
of the temporal stages by which the individual and
the race advance to knowledge of the highest kind, we
shall inevitably confuse the popular with the critical
point of view. When he is leading up to his own
theory, and simply stating the facts he has to explain,
or when he is criticizing the dogmatic theory of his
predecessors, Kant naturally speaks as if sense immedi-
ately reveals to us special objects or events. From
the philosophical point of view, however, sense he
conceives of as the faculty which supplies to us the
isolated differences which thought puts together and
unites into individual objects or connections of objects.
The "manifold of sense" is, therefore, simply that
element in knowledge which supplies the particular
differences of known objects. And these differences,
of course, vary with the special aspect of the known
world which at the time is sought to be explained. In
the Axioms of Perception, for example, in which Kant
is seeking to show that individual objects in space and
time are necessarily extensive quanta, the special fact
of knowledge to be explained is the apprehension of
objects as made up of parts forming individual aggre-
gates. These parts Kant regards as directly perceived
or contemplated. The " manifold " may be the parts
of a line, the parts of any geometrical figure, or even
particular figures regarded as constituents of more
complex perceptions ; or, again, it may be the parts of
individual objects in space. But in all of these cases
the particulars, as due to sense, are, when taken by
themselves, mere abstractions ; they are, in fact, not
158 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
even known as particulars apart from the synthetic
activity of imagination, as guided by the category of
quantity. To have a knowledge of the parts of a line,
or the parts of a house, as parts, is to know at the same
time the combination of those parts. But the combin-
ation takes place for us only through the act by which
we successively determine space to particular parts,
and in that determination combine them. Thus, in the
knowledge of the line, there are implied both the
particular element of sense and the universal element
of thought. We do not first perceive the line and then
apply the category, but, in perceiving the line, we apply
the category. And as in all recognition of objects in
space we necessarily determine the particulars of sense
through the schema, as silently guided by the category,
we may express this condition of our knowledge in the
proposition, " All percepts are extensive quanta" This
proposition, therefore, rests upon a discrimination of
the elements which wre are compelled to distinguish in
explaining how we know any individual object to be a
unity of parts ; it is not a proposition which we acquire
by reflection before we know objects to be extensive
quanta. Observing that all external objects which we
can possibly know must be in space, and having seen
space to be a necessary form of thought, we can say
axiomatically that every precept is an extensive quantum;
but this proposition is not one which precedes the
knowledge of objects as quanta, but one which is
required to explain the fact of such knowledge. On
Dr. Stirling's view, sense gives us a knowledge of indi-
vidual objects as extended, and thought "varnishes"
this knowledge with necessity.1 How Kant could
possibly suppose sense to give us the perception of
ljourn. Spec. Phil., xiv. 103.
v.] THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDGMENT. 159
things in space, without at the same time determining
these as extensive quanta, I am unable to understand.
But, in truth, Kant makes no such supposition ; what
he holds is that spatial objects are known as extensive
quanta in the act by which the productive imagination
determines their parts successively, under control of
the category of quantity. The necessity is implied
in our actual knowledge, and philosophical reflection
merely shows it to be there.
The " manifold," again, assumes a different aspect
when Kant goes on to deal with the dynamical prin-
ciples. Here the question is no longer in regard to the
quantitative parts of external objects, but in regard to
the philosophical justification of the permanence, the
causal connection, and the mutual influence of these
objects. In our ordinary and scientific knowledge we
take it for granted that we know real objects, which do
not pass away with the moment, but persist or are
permanent. Permanence, in fact, is the mark by which
we ordinarily distinguish actual existences from passing
feelings or creations of the imagination. To show
philosophically how this assumption is justified from
the nature of our intelligence is the object of the First
Analogy of Experience. Now, the ordinary explana-
tion of the permanence or actuality of an external
object is, that we simply see, apprehend, or observe the
object, and immediately know it to be permanent.
But the consequence of this assumption, as the psycho-
logical Idealist has seen, is that the actual object itself
is not apprehended or perceived at all. So far as the
theory can show, we have indeed a consciousness of
ideas or feelings supposed to represent actual objects,
but we do not really come in contact with those objects
themselves. Kant, taking up the problem at this stage,
160 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
points out what is really implied in a series of feelings
or ideas, and from this he shows the necessity of the
action of thought on sense for the knowledge of actual
objects as permanent. The " manifold" here is indi-
vidual objects regarded simply as revealed in the direct
glance of sense. If we immediately apprehend or per-
ceive objects which are permanent, we cannot have more
before us than separate percepts, coming the one after
the other. I open my eyes and see a house ; I move
my eyes and see a tree, then a mountain, etc. ; but I
cannot, as is usually supposed, see the house, tree,
mountain, etc., to be permanent substances. At each
successive moment a fresh presentation of sense comes
before me ; and, as immediate apprehension does not go
beyond the moment, I can say nothing about objects
when they are not actually present. Thus, the ordinary
explanation of the permanence of things really reduces
actual objects to successive affections or feelings, coming
and going like the phantasms of a dream. They are a
mere " manifold of sense," a number of unrelated feel-
ings, really incapable of revealing to us any actual or
permanent thing. The true explanation of the fact
that we have a knowledge of permanent external things
or substances must bring in an element quite distinct
from sense, and this is the element of thought. The
mere isolated particulars of sense never could give us a
knowledge of actual objects; only thought in conjunc-
tion with the manifold of sense can do so. Kant, then,
does not hold, as Dr. Stirling supposes, that sense first
gives us a knowledge of actual things, while thought
comes after and makes this special knowledge universal
and necessary. On the contrary, he argues that if we
are to explain the actual fact that we do have a know-
ledge of permanent things, we must not say that sense
v.] THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDGMENT. 161
gives us a knowledge of real substances, but, on the
contrary, that it supplies only the particular differences
of things, leaving to thought, in conjunction with the
imagination, the combination or unification of those
differences. Kant simply shows, by an inquiry into
the mental conditions, without which a given kind of
knowledge would be impossible, what are the logically
distinguishable elements in that knowledge; and to
convert such purely metaphysical distinctions into
temporal phases in the development of our knowledge
is to turn his theory upside down.
A proper comprehension of the way in which cri-
ticism transforms the dogmatic or psychological con-
ception of the nature of sense makes the corresponding
transformation of the ordinary view of the nature of
thought easily intelligible. As sense supplies the
particular element in knowledge, so thought reduces
the particular to unity. From the dogmatic point of
view judgment is always a process of analysis. Kant
does not deny that analytical judgments are valuable
within their own sphere, but he denies that they in any
way enable us to solve the problem of philosophy.
For such judgments, valuable as they are in bringing
clearly before our minds what we already know in an
obscure and half-unconscious way, cannot explain the
process by which we obtain a knowledge of actual
things and their connections. The analysis of such
pure conceptions as substance and cause can never
establish the application of these conceptions to real
objects, but only brings out explicitly what we mean
when we speak of substances or causes. Analytical
judgments thus fall outside of the domain of philosophy
proper. They rest upon the purely formal principle
of contradiction. If we but express in the predicate
162 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
what is implied in the subject, and do not attach to the
subject a predicate inconsistent with it, we conform to
the only condition demanded by the analytic judg-
ment. The affirmative proposition, "body is extended,"
satisfies this condition, since " extension" is an attribute
implied in the conception of "body;" the negative pro-
position, "body is not immaterial," satisfies it equally,
since it merely excludes from the conception of body
an attribute contradictory of it. We can thus see
wherein the essential vice of the dogmatic theory of
judgment consists. The dogmatist supposes we may
establish the objective application of a conception
by simply showing that a given judgment is not self-
contradictory. Wolff, e.g., thought he could prove the
conception of causality to be true of real things,
because that conception, when analysed, yields the
judgment, "Whatever is contingent has a cause."
But the judgment is purely analytical, only expressing
explicitly what is implicit in the conception of the
" contingent." How, then, are we to account for the
application of conceptions to real things ? How, in
other words, can we show that there are judgments
which are synthetical, and yet rest upon conceptions ?
This question, insoluble on the dogmatic method, may
be answered by the critical method.
We have seen that sense can contribute only the
particular element in knowledge, and that the universal
element is supplied by thought. A conception, there-
fore, on which a synthetical judgment is to rest can be
nothing but a pure universal, having in it no concrete
element. In all thinking which yields real knowledge
the particulars of sense must be reduced to unity by
being referred to a single supreme self, for, on any
other supposition, there would be no unity in our
v.] THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDGMENT. 163
knowledge as a whole. It is nothing to the point that
we may not, in our ordinary consciousness, be aware
that the self is the supreme condition of any real
knowledge. It is enough if we can show that in all
knowledge of reality the " I " must be present, and
must manifest its presence in the actual fact of know-
ledge. Certainly, if we take the self apart from its
activity, as manifested in knowing, we cannot get
beyond the merely analytical judgment, 1 = 1; but,
when we seek to explain actual knowledge, we are
compelled to see that, were there no identical " I,"
expressing its activity in uniting the particulars of
sense, we could have no connected knowledge. The
" I think," or " I unite," is, however, but the general
expression of the condition of any real knowledge.
But, as all knowing is definite knowing, or the think-
ing of the real world in specific ways, to intelligence
as thinking there must belong universal forms or
functions of unity, enabling us to reduce the manifold of
sense to definite unity, order, and system. How do
we know that to thought there belong such forms or
functions'? We know it from the fact that in our
actual knowledge, the reality of which no one doubts,
we do form real judgments. The fact that there are
such judgments we do not seek to prove ; our object
is simply to show what the constitution of our thought
must be in order to explain the fact. Now, if
the self is the supreme condition of unity, and the
categories the forms potentially capable of reducing
the special manifold of sense to specific unities, we can
see how real judgments are possible, and what will be
their character. A real judgment must be the act by
which a category, or pure universal, comes together
with a manifold of sense. One other point, however,
164 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
must be mentioned in order to complete our account of
the conditions of real knowledge. All our knowledge
comes to us in successive acts, and hence real judg-
ments must operate upon the manifold of sense under
the form of time. We must, therefore, explain how
actual knowledge is possible, in accordance with the
fact that we know real objects and their connection in
a series of cognitions. Accordingly, it will be our aim
in setting forth the various classes of real judgments to
point out how the manifold of sense is related to the
schemata or general determinations of time.
I have endeavoured, in the account just given of the
relations of thought and sense, to emphasize the view
which I take of the Critique, that it is an exposition
of the constituent elements which we may logically
distinguish in knowledge, not an account of the order
in which our knowledge is developed in time. In every
recognition of an external object as an extensive or
intensive quantity, we bring into operation the cate-
gories of quantity and quality respectively, and this
we do in the act by which we successively combine
the particulars of sense. In our actual knowledge of a
given substance, a given connection of events, or given
objects as mutually influencing each other, we connect
the manifold of sense under the silent guidance of the
categories of substance, cause, and reciprocity, and
connect them according to their respective schemata.
And when we express what is implied in any of these
actual cognitions, we are able to state the principle
in a universal form, because the categories, as belong-
ing to the very nature of our thinking intelligence,
necessarily combine the manifold always in the same
way. The principles of judgment are therefore at once
philosophical propositions and ultimate laws of nature.
v.J THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDGMENT. 165
Just as a mathematical judgment is a proposition
belonging to the science of mathematics, and at the
same time a law manifested in the particular object to
which the proposition refers ; just as any scientific
proposition goes to form the body of the science to
which it belongs, and yet formulates a law to which
all facts of a certain kind must conform ; so the philo-
sophical judgment that " all precepts are extensive
quanta" or that " in all changes of phenomena sub-
stance is permanent," is not only a proposition belong-
ing to the science of philosophy, but a law or principle
manifested in our actual knowledge. When Kant
speaks of bringing phenomena under a rule of the
understanding, he does not mean that we first know
the phenomena in question, and then bring them under
the rule, but he means that, unless they were brought
under the rule in the act of knowing them, they could
not be known as real in the particular way which at
the time we have under consideration. When, indeed,
we reflect upon our knowledge, we express the act by
which thought unites the manifold of sense in the form
of a rule or proposition ; but our reflection does not
create the rule, but only recognizes it. Had not the
rule been silently employed in the actual process of
knowing the real object or connection, we should never
discover it. Did Kant really mean to say that we
first know real facts by sense, and afterwards subsume
them under conceptions, his polemic against dogmatism
would be a huge ignoratio elenchi ; for, on this inter-
pretation of his theory, the facts known by sense fall
completely apart from the conceptions supposed to
reduce them to unity, and the possibility of real judg-
ments becomes inexplicable. So miserable a failure in
his explanation of knowledge I refuse to attribute to
166 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
Kant. His real view is that thinking intelligence
either constitutes objects as such, or connects objects
with each other, by operating upon the detached mani-
fold of sense. In the apprehension of a house, e. g., I
must have not only the separate impressions coming
to me as my eye runs over it, but I must put together
its spatial parts in the act of generating them : and, as
the parts are put together under the guidance of the
category of quantity, in apprehending the house I at
the same time know it as an extensive quantum.
Kant makes no attempt to connect together the
various principles of judgment; on the contrary, he
regards each as independent and complete in itself.
And it is easy to understand why he takes this view.
Starting as he does from the notion of knowledge as
completed, and embodied more especially in the mathe -
matical and physical sciences, he naturally seeks only
to demonstrate that such knowledge is inconceivable,
if we persist in making an absolute separation of intelli-
gence and nature, instead of conceiving of nature as
constituted in its universal aspect by necessary forms
of perception and of thought. In seeking to explain
the demonstrative certainty of mathematical proposi-
tions, and their application to individual objects, and
in seeking to show what are the universal laws of
nature, he simply takes up one aspect of knowledge
after another and points out the intellectual elements
involved in it. Dealing, not with the temporal
origin of knowledge, but with the logical constituents
involved in it, he sets the various elements of know-
ledge apart by themselves, and combines them in a
system, the form of which is chiefly due to his own
external reflection. But while Kant does not so much
render the " very form and pressure " of thought, as
v.] THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDGMENT. 167
simply place its elements side by side ; and while he
is very far from tracing out, in all its delicate com-
pleteness, "the diamond -net" with which intelligence
envelops the particulars of sense, his presentation of
the various principles of judgment half unconsciously
follows the natural order of logical evolution. It is
well also to observe that although he speaks of those
principles as the highest laws of knowledge, and
therefore of nature as a whole, Kant really concen
trates his attention on external nature ; in fact, he
has expressly pointed out that the rules of the under-
standing are verifiable only in relation to objects
in space. On the other hand, he virtually assumes
space to be already determined, and only seeks to show
how its parts can become known to us successively.
In the first principle, formulating the axioms of per-
ception, he abstracts from all the concrete wealth of
the universe, and from all the connections of things,
and limits himself to the question as to how space
and objects in space are known as in time. And the
answer he gives naturally is, that every individual
object of perception is an extensive quantum, known
to us in the successive addition of units, as guided by
the unseen influence of the category of quantity. In
what other way the external object may be determined,
Kant does not here inquire, but confines himself to the
proof of the proposition, that no external object is
knowable at all without being known as an extensive
quantum. His next step is to ask whether in the
knowledge of external objects there is any universal
and necessary characteristic; and he finds that while
we cannot anticipate the special properties of things,
since these are perpetually changing on us, we can
anticipate that all objects capable of being known at all
168 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS.
must have intensive quantity or degree. So far the
question has not been raised as to what constitutes the
reality, the connection and the mutual influence of
objects. But this question is forced upon us the
moment we make affirmations in regard to the relations
of objects. We can no longer refer to our perceptions
in proof of the reality of our knowledge. We have
therefore to show by what right we assume objects to
be permanent and actually connected. In the three
Analogies of Experience this question is taken up, and
it is proved, first, that the knowledge of real objects
involves the application of the category of substance
to the manifold of sense through the schema of the
permanent; secondly, that the knowledge of real
sequences can only be explained, if we presuppose
the schema of order in time, as limiting the category
to the particular determinations of sensible perception;
and lastly, that the knowledge of real external objects,
as mutually influencing each other, implies the schema
of co-existence in time, as standing under the category
of reciprocity. In the Postulates of Empirical Thought,
Kant, having now considered external objects as such,
and external objects as related to each other, raises the
question as to the relation of external things to our
thought of them. And the subjective criteria of know-
ledge he finds to lie in the possibility, the actuality
and the necessity of our ideas. The final result of
the whole investigation is to reverse completely the
ordinary conception of the relations of intelligence
and nature. The world of real things is not an
independent congeries of real things externally taken
up into our minds, but a system of objects constituted
for us by the activity of our intelligence as acting on
the particulars of sense.
169
CHAPTER VI.
PROOF OF THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDGMENT.
I. TTNDEE, the title of Axioms of Perception, the
V^ first of the two mathematical principles of
judgment, Kant shows how the schematized category
of quantity, when applied to the manifold of sense,
determines all possible objects of knowledge as exten-
sive quanta.1 The proof is of the simplest character,
being in fact almost explicitly stated in the explana-
tion of the schema of number.2 An extensive quantum,
as Kant says, is one in which we proceed from part to
part in the construction of a whole. Thus a line is
generated by producing it part by part, beginning with
a point, and at the same time putting together the
parts thus successively generated. So every time,
however short it may be, is produced by generating in
succession one moment after another, and at the same
time conjoining the moments in a whole. Now, no
object can possibly be known to us except as informed
by space or time, or by both. But space and time are
forms of our perception which become objects of know-
ledge only by being determined to individual spaces
and times. It is evident therefore that all possible
objects of perception must be extensive quanta. They
1 Kritik, pp. 155-8. a Ibid., p. 144.
170 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
are not things in themselves but phenomena, and must
therefore conform to the condition under which space
and time are determined in the apprehension of any
object in space or time. The same synthetical process
by which space and time are determined to the unity
of individual spaces and times is presupposed in the
determination of concrete objects as in space and time,
and therefore all perceptions are extensive quanta.
This constitutes the whole of Kant's proof of the
proposition that all perceptions are extensive quanta,
but some remarks are added for the purpose of show-
ing (l) that this principle affords the only ultimate
explanation of mathematical axioms and numerical
formulae, and (2) that it alone justifies us in saying
that mathematics is applicable to all possible objects
of experience. (1) That there are axioms in geometry,
as the science of pure extension, arises from the nature
of the pure imagination, which by its schema of number
generates figures in space by successively adding part
to part. The propositions, " between two points only
one straight line is possible," and " two straight lines
cannot enclose a space," are axioms, because they are
universal and yet rest upon a synthesis of pure
perceptions. Numerical formulae, again, are syntheti-
cal and a priori, but as they are not universal but
individual propositions they do not attain to the rank of
axioms. In the proposition 7 + 5 = 12, I am com-
pelled to go to pure perception in order to pass from
subject to predicate, and hence the judgment is
synthetical and a priori ; but on the other hand, it is
not universal but individual, because the synthesis of
units making up 12 can only take place in one way,
although no doubt the use of the numbers is afterwards
universal. In the construction of a triangle I am not
vi.] PROOF OF THE PRINCIPLES. 171
tied down to any one way of producing it, but
may construct the lines and angles as I please, pro-
vided I conform to the schema of a triangle, whereas
7, 5 and 12 are individual numbers which can be
produced by the productive imagination only in one
way. Again the propositions, " if equals be added to
equals the wholes are equal," and " if equals be taken
from equals the remainders are equal," are not axioms,
because they are not obtained by a synthesis of pure
perceptions. In the very conception of the relation of
equals as expressed in the subject of each of these pro-
positions, there is implicit a conception of the equality
expressed in the predicate, and hence the propositions
are not synthetical but analytical. (2) The applica-
bility of mathematics to phenomena at once arises from
the principle, that all perceptions are extensive quanta,
and can be established in no other way. So long as it
was supposed that real objects are things in themselves,
it was impossible to avoid falling into contradiction and
confusion when an explanation was attempted of the
relation of mathematical judgments to concrete things.
Thus it was maintained that the mathematical principle
of the infinite divisibility of lines and angles is only
true of geometrical figures, not of things themselves.
When, however, we see that things as known are not
independent of our perceptive faculty, it is at once
evident that what is true of space and time will be
equally true of objects in space and time. For as no
object is knowable at all except as determined in space
and time by the synthesis of the productive imagina-
tion, objects as known must necessarily conform to the
nature of space and time as determinate. To deny that
mathematics is applicable to objects is to make objects
things in themselves, and so to destroy the possibility
172 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
of mathematics itself. Unless space and time are
forms of our perception, mathematical judgments can-
not be at once synthetical and a priori ; and if they are
forms of perception, known objects cannot be things in
themselves, and there is therefore no reason whatever
for denying the applicability to them of mathematical
judgments.
It is important to observe that Kant does not here
mean to affirm that perception first gives us a know-
ledge of individual objects, which are afterwards brought
under the category of quantity. " "What quantity sub-
sumes," says Dr. Stirling, " is a series [of crude sense-
presentations] in time, like part succeeding like part in
pure contingency of sequence till the category acts." l
This way of stating the matter converts Kant's meta-
physical theory of the elements implied in real know-
ledge into an account of the transition from our ordinary
to our reflective consciousness of things. The " crude
sense-presentations" which form the particular element
in our knowledge of determinate objects are but a de-
tached manifold of sense, completely wanting in unity
and universality. Strictly speaking, the " manifold "
is not even a series, for time is determined by the
synthetic imagination, which is itself ruled and guided
by the category. Apart from the category of quantity,
there can be no knowledge of an object as a whole
made up of parts. It is therefore not correct to say,
that like part succeeds like part in pure contingency
till the category acts. How can there be any con-
sciousness of a series of like parts except by a deter-
mination of time through the productive imagination ?
How again can there be any consciousness of a unity
of like parts except by application of the category of
1 Journal of Speculative Philosophy, xiv. 76.
vi.] PROOF OF THE PRINCIPLES. 173
quantity to the schema of the imagination ? The
various elements of knowledge, as Kant himself says,
constitute a " closed sphere " in which each exists only
in relation to the others. The true view, therefore, is,
not that we first have a knowledge of objects in space
and time and then apply to them the category of quan-
tity, but that in our knowledge of such objects the
application of the category is presupposed. That we
do not, in our ordinary consciousness, set the category
of quantity distinctly before our minds is nothing to
the point ; it is enough if it can be shown that, in
reasoning back from our ordinary knowledge, we are
compelled to suppose that besides the sensuous mani-
fold there are implied those other elements of know-
ledge which act in combination, although they are
logically separable from each other.
II. The conclusion to which the first principle of judg-
ment leads is that, looking at objects of knowledge,
simply as objects, i.e., apart from their connection with
each other, we do determine them as extensive quanta,
and that this is consistent, and alone consistent, with
what has been shown in the Esthetic, viz., that space
and time are forms of perception. Kant, of course,
does not prove that space and time are extensive
quanta, but simply draws attention to the fact that
they are so : what he proves is that every possible
object of our perception must be an extensive quantum,
because it could not be known as an object, unless we
had the forms of space and time as belonging to our
perceptive faculty. As space and time are forms of
our perception, we cannot get rid of them, and cannot
perceive without them, and therefore, however the
special objects of perception may vary in their proper-
1 Prolegomena, § 39, p. 111.
174 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
ties, they must be extensive quanta. So far nothing
has been determined as to the special nature of the
manifold of sense, considered in itself. Abstracting
from everything in objects except their existence in
space and time, it has been shown that to be known as
in space and time, they must be brought under the
category of quantity, schematized as number. The
next step is to show that the manifold of sense, con-
sidered in its separate units, must be brought under
the category of quality, schematized as degree. The
proof of this proposition is given in the Anticipations
of Observation. l
In all observations of real things there is implied,
besides the pure perceptions of space and time, a par-
ticular element contributed by sense which constitutes
the real in our knowledge of objects. Now this real,
inasmuch as it is not obtained by the successive addition
of like units, but is given in a single moment of time,
cannot have extensive quantity. At the same time,
each sensation or part of the manifold has a certain
intensity, since it may be represented as capable of a
gradual decrease to zero, and of a gradual increase from
zero upwards. And this is intensive quantity or
degree, which may be defined as a unity in which
multiplicity is apprehended, not by the aggregation of
parts, but by approximation to zero. Any given mani-
fold of sense has, therefore, a degree, intermediate
between which and zero there is always a series of
possible realities. Every colour and every temperature
has a degree, which as real is never the least possible ;
in other words, the real in every phenomenon has in-
tensive quantity or degree.
After showing that the real in known objects neces-
1 Kritlk, pp. 158-165.
vi.] PROOF OF THE PRINCIPLES. 175
sarily has degree, Kant adds one or two general
remarks. (1) The title Anticipations of Observation
is employed to suggest, that we can tell beforehand
that any specific impression whatever must have an
intensive quantity, which, however small it may be, is
always greater than zero. This is a very remarkable
fact, inasmuch as sensation is exactly that element in
knowledge in relation to which we are purely receptive.
The explanation is, that we are here dealing, not with
a particular quality, which is always empirical, but
with the quantity of that quality : hence we are con-
cerned with one of the essential conditions of knowable
existence. (2) It is further to be observed that all
quantities, whether extensive or intensive, are con-
tinuous. l Space and time are not composed of separate
parts which are put together to make up space or time
as a unity, for space and time are only limited by
themselves ; in other words, the so-called limitations
of space and time really continue them. Such quan-
tities may also be called flowing^ because the synthesis
of the productive imagination in generating them is a
continuous progress in time. When this synthesis is
interrupted, or alternately stopped and renewed, we
have indeed an aggregate of several objects. Thus
thirteen shillings, as so many coins, is not a quantum,
but an aggregate or sum ; but each unit in this sum, as
divisible to infinity, is a quantum. (3) That this prin-
ciple is of great importance in its applications may
easily be shown, even without anticipating what belongs
to pure physics. If the real in a knowable object
must always have a degree, it is evident that we can
1 This, of course, although it is set down under the head of the Anticipa-
tions, is a general remark on the relation of the two mathematical principles, as
is also the remark immediately following.
176 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
never have experience of a space or time which is abso-
lutely empty. For as every affection of sense has a
degree, and every knowable object contains an element
contributed by sense, apart from the determination of
the manifold of sense by the schema of degree, no
object can be known to us at all. Moreover, as the
real may pass through an infinite number of degrees,
but can never reach absolute zero, the degree of a phe-
nomenon may be indefinitely decreased, while the space
which it occupies remains exactly the same. The heat
in a room, e.g., may pass through an infinite number
of degrees without leaving any part of the room un-
occupied. This is indeed denied by almost all natural
philosophers. Any diminution of degree in the same
volume or extension of matter, implies, according to
them, a decrease of extensive quantity. It is argued
that as the quantity of matter in different bodies of
equal volume is unequal, there must be empty spaces
between the particles of every body. But this reason-
ing rests upon the metaphysical assumption, that the
real in space is determined purely by the number of
parts existing side by side, and that each part has
exactly the same degree of intensity. It is overlooked
that equal spaces may be completely filled by infinitely
various degrees of reality. Decrease in intensive quan-
tity does not necessarily imply decrease in extensive
quantity. There is nothing to prevent us from sup-
posing that the former changes, while the latter re-
mains the same. We cannot, of course, say a priori
what the degree of reality in any given case will be ;
but we can say that every phenomenon must have
some degree of reality, and that no part of knowable
space can be perfectly empty.1
1 It will be observed that Kant virtually asserts the logical priority of the
vi.] PROOF Of THE PRINCIPLES. Ill
III. Having shown what is implied in the knowledge
that individual objects are extensive and intensive
quanta, Kant passes in the Analogies of Experience, to
a consideration of the various ways in which those
objects are connected together.1 As this part of the
Critical philosophy has provoked a good deal of adverse
criticism, it will be advisable to give a somewhat
detailed statement of it.
1. The First Analogy r2 is that of the permanence of
substance, and is thus formulated : " In all alternation
of phenomena substance is permanent, and its quantum
in nature neither increases nor diminishes." The proof
is as follows : — It is evident that in our ordinary and
scientific consciousness we distinguish between real
objects and the transient states which occur in the
individual mind. A real object is one that we regard
as permanent. Can we then explain from the nature
of our knowledge how, from the conception of the
permanent, we are entitled to ascribe permanence to
objects ? With the real sequences of events and
the real co-existences of objects we are not here
concerned, but only with the permanence which we
attribute to substances. Granting, then, that there are
objects in space and time, can we justify the assump-
tion that these objects are permanent ? Now we are
dealing here purely with phenomena, i. e., with objects
in space and time, not with things in themselves exist-
ing independently of our knowledge. How then can
it be shown that these objects do not pass away with
the moment but persist through time ?
category of quality to that of quantity : in the determination of real objects
as extensive quanta their determination as intensive quanta is implicit. This
agrees with what was said above in Chap. v. as to the relation of the various
principles of judgment.
1 KrUOt, pp. 165-192. 2 Ibid, pp. 169-173.
M
178 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
If we look merely at the succession of our own
mental states, i. e.. our feelings as they occur in time,
we are unable to show that there are real objects
distinct from them, which do not perpetually change
upon us from moment to moment. If our knowledge
were reducible to a mere series of feelings, instead of
saying that objects are permanent we should rather
say, granting that we could make any judgments at
all, that all known objects are in perpetual flux. " In
mere sequences," as Kant says,1 " existences always
vanish and reappear, and have never the least quan-
tity." Abstract from everything in knowledge but
a succession of mental states, and we have simply a
series of feelings having no temporal duration or
quantity ; and from such a mere series any knowledge
of real objects having a temporal duration or quantity
cannot possibly be extracted. There must, then, be
some mental element distinct from a mere series of
feelings, which enables us to affirm, that there are real
objects which are permanent. Can we point out what
that element is ?
Now all objects of perception are of course in time;
for time, as the Esthetic has proved, is the necessary
condition without which we could have no perception of
objects at all. Time we must regard either as a mere
potential form, belonging to our perceptive faculty but
not entering into our actual perceptions except in relation
to known objects, or as determined to individual mom-
ents, each of which follows upon the preceding and is
over before the succeeding moment begins. It is im-
possible therefore to account for the permanence of real
objects simply from time. In itself time is simply a form
of perception, and therefore nothing for knowledge.
1 Krilik, p. 170.
vi.J PROOF OF THE PRINCIPLES. 179
Time, again, in its several moments cannot be identified
with the duration of objects, because duration is not a
succession of moments, but a succession which, so to
speak, stands still. When we say that an object is
permanent, we mean that it endures while the
moments of time pass away, and as the moments
of time do not themselves endure, but are perpetu-
ally arising and disappearing, the knowledge of
things as permanent cannot be obtained either from
time in itself, or from time in its separate moments.
Still, the permanence of things must imply some
relation between the manifold of sense and time. The
three possible relations of objects in time are perman-
ence, sequence, and co-existence. Time itself neither
endures nor passes away; nor again does it co-exist ;
but objects or events may endure, succeed, or co-exist.
Hence the permanence of objects can be accounted for
only by bringing them into relation with time. It is
therefore in the relation of the manifold to time, that
we must seek for the explanation of substance as per-
manent. That there is a permanent in our knowledge
we are compelled to suppose, unless we are prepared
to deny all perception of change. And even if we
deny all change in the properties of objects, we must
at least admit that we have a consciousness of our
own feelings as successive. But such a consciousness
evidently implies, that there is in knowledge an
element which cannot be identified with the mere
sequence of our feelings. Apart from the conception
of the permanent as contributed by the understanding,
there could be no consciousness of objects as per-
manent. Without the permanent, in short, we could
have no time -relations. " To use an expression
which seems rather paradoxical, only the permanent
180 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
changes, and the transitory can undergo no change."
The permanent, then, which is the schematized cate-
gory of substance, must be presupposed in order to
account for our knowledge of any real object as dis-
tinguished from the mere series of our feelings. The
principle of substance thus shows us how we are
entitled to make the synthetical a priori judgment,
that in all alteration of phenomena substance is per-
manent. Apart from the category of substance,
schematized as the permanent, we could have no know-
ledge of any changes whatever, and therefore no
knowledge even of our feelings as changing. Every
object that is determined as real is necessarily brought
under the schema of the permanent ; in fact, real
existence and permanence are identical conceptions.
And as all real objects are necessarily permanent, the
changes which they undergo cannot effect their reality;
and hence the quantum of substance can neither be
increased nor diminished.
Our knowledge, then, of real objects presupposes the
schema of the permanent. Unless all changes of
phenomena were connected together, there could be no
unity in our experience, and unity in experience implies
unity of events in time. This may be shown indirectly.
Suppose, says Kant, that an absolutely new object
should come within our knowledge, i.e., an object not
known to us by the changes observed to take place in
it. Such an object must either (1) be known as a
change relatively to the permanent, in which case it is
not a newly originated object, but only a change in
that which already exists; or (2) we must suppose that
our experience is split in two. (1) An absolutely new
substance is one that previously did not exist in time,
and, therefore, is not capable of being known as existing
vi.] PROOF OF THE PRINCIPLES. 181
in time. Now we can have no experience of pure
time, but only of events in time. Hence, if we are to
know this new object as coming into existence at a
certain moment of time, we must be able to fix the
moment of its origination by a reference to that which
is already known as existing in time. But to perceive
that a new object has emerged in time is to recognise
that a change has taken place in our knowledge of
objects, and such recognition is possible only if the new
object is brought into the same time with that previ-
ously existing; in other words, the new object is
known as a change, and change is nothing apart from
the permanent, in contrast to which it becomes known.
The object supposed newly to originate cannot, there-
fore, be known as originating. (2) If, on the other
hand, the new object is not brought into relation with
the old, then our experience must be divided into two
halves, having no connection with each other. And,
as all experience implies time, the new object must be
in one time and the old object in another time. But
it is absurd to say that there are two times, existing
side by side ; and hence there cannot possibly be any
experience of an absolutely new object. All experi-
ence of real objects is, therefore, simply an experience
of change in that which is permanent.
Kant's proof of the principle of substance may be
shortly summarised as follows. There can be no know-
ledge of objects as real, if we suppose known objects to
be things in themselves lying beyond consciousness ;
for, on this supposition, our knowledge must be ob-
tained from a mere series of feelings, or must rest on
the mere conception of substance. But a mere series
of feelings is but an alternation of feelings, revealing
no object that persists beyond the moment; and a
182 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
mere conception does not entitle us to make any
affirmation about real existences. Nor, again, can it
be said that the permanence of existences, which is
essential to their reality, may be explained by saying
that time is permanent, and, therefore, feelings in time
may be known as permanent by relation to time. For
time, as a mere form, is no object of knowledge, and
time, as individual moments, has no unity in it. The
reality of things is, therefore, made possible only by
the relation of the manifold of sense to the schema of
the permanent, as guided by the category of substance,
which again stands under the supreme unity of self-
consciousness.1
To this proof of the principle of substance Kant
adds some remarks, which are intended to show that
it has been tacitly assumed, even by those who were
unaware of the method by which it may be proved.
The principle of the permanence of substance has been
taken for granted by the unphilosophical mind, al-
though, of course, it has not been brought into explicit
consciousness. It has also been assumed by the philo-
sopher, in the form that " in all changes in the world
substance remains, and only its accidents vary." But
while it has been assumed, no one has attempted to
prove it. It has, in fact, been accepted as a self-evi-
dent proposition, and has, therefore, virtually been
supposed to be a merely analytical judgment, resting
upon the bare conception of substance. To say that
" substance is permanent," is simply to express in the
predicate what is already implied in the subject. By
1 Here again it should be noted, that just as quantity logically presupposes
quality, so both presuppose substance, since no actual object, and therefore no
determination of an actual object, is knowable apart from the schema of the
permanent.
VL] PROOF OF THE PRINCIPLES. 183
an analysis of the conception of substance, we can, of
course, obtain the judgment, "substance is permanent,"
for in the conception of substance we already have im-
plicitly the attribute of permanence. l But it is one
thing to show that we have the conception of sub-
stance, and another thing to demonstrate that this con-
ception is applicable to real objects. Now this is just
what no dogmatic philosophy can possibly establish.
The only proof admissible is a transcendental one, and
that proof we have supplied by showing that, apart
from the conception of permanence, there can be no
knowledge of an object as real. The analytical judg-
ment, "substance is permanent," therefore pre-supposes
the synthetical judgment that in all phenomena there
is something permanent, of which all changes are but
modes. Now we can see why the permanence of sub-
stance has been so commonly assumed. The conditions
of knowledge are such that no object can be known at
all without being determined as permanent, and hence
it is easy, by mere analysis of our knowledge, to obtain
the analytical proposition, that substance is permanent.
As we have ourselves contributed the element of
permanence to objects, an analysis of our knowledge
must, of course, bring it to light.
Other cases in which the principle of substance is
virtually assumed may be given. The natural philo-
sopher lays down the principle, that " matter is inde-
structible," and this is evidently only another form of
the principle that substance does not change, but only
its accidents. So the ancient sayings, Gigni de nihilo
nihil and In nihilum nil posse reverti, presuppose the
same principle. These propositions, however, are not
true of things in themselves, but only of things in
1 Cf. Prokyomena, §§ 3, 47, and 48.
184 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
space and time or phenomena. That they rest on the
synthetical a priori principle of substance, is evident
from the fact that they apply to the past and the
future as well as to the present, and, therefore, affirm
absolutely and without any limitation, that all changes
are modes of the permanent.
2. Kant has now shown that to have an experience
of objects in space and time, we must be capable of
determining objects as extensive quanta, and as inten-
sive quanta ; and that to know them as real, we must
determine objects as permanent, notwithstanding the
changes they undergo. Thus, experience of real objects
is shown to depend upon the constitution of our intel-
lect, in so far as we determine objects as extensive
quantity, as having a degree in regard to their proper-
ties, and as being individually considered permanent
or persisting through successive moments of time. He
now goes on to consider what is implied in the changes
which objects undergo : in other words, to show that a
real sequence of events implies the intellectual schema
of necessary sequence or irreversible order in time.
The Second Analogy of Experience, in which the proof
of the causal connection of events is set forth,1 is, as
Dr. Stirling remarks, one of the most confused passages
in the whole of Kant's writings. It may, however, be
reduced to a moderate compass by the rejection of the
first two paragraphs, which were added in the second
edition, and which simply give an outline of the general
argument as contained in the first edition ; and by the
elimination of the reply to the objection that there are
causal connections which are not successive, but simul-
taneous, and of the remarks on the conception of force,
which properly belong to the metaphysic of nature,
1 Kritik, pp. 173-187.
vi.] PROOF OF THE PRINCIPLES. 185
and will be considered in their proper place. The
discussion, thus brought within moderate limits, may
be divided into three sections (not explicitly distin-
guished by Kant), containing respectively a statement
of the facts admitted by every one, a criticism of the
ordinary explanation of causality, and a proof of Kant's
own theory.
(1.) The special topic under consideration is whether
we can account, from the nature of our knowledge, for
the real sequence of events, and whether we are entitled
to assert, universally and necessarily, that events are
connected together in causal relations to each other.
Kant, as usual, starts from the facts of experience, as
they are held by us all. Those facts, as far as we are
concerned with them in dealing with the question of
causality, are these, (a) We do, as a matter of fact,
distinguish between the arbitrary sequence of our own
mental states and the orderly sequence of events, just
as we distinguish between the arbitrary sequence of
our feelings and the co-existence of the quantitative
parts of individual objects. Thus, to take an illustra-
tion of the second case, we observe the parts of a house
in succession, but every one knows that those parts are
really co-existent, and not successive. (6) What we
ordinarily mean by a real sequence is equally obvious.
We do not suppose that the parts of a house are suc-
cessive, although we observe them in succession, but we
do suppose that a boat drifting down a stream is an in-
stance of a real sequence. It is quite obvious that the
parts of the stream successively occupied by the boat
must be passed through in order, and the sequence we,
therefore, regard as real.
(2.) These, then, are the facts to be explained : the
distinction between an arbitrary sequence in the order
186 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
of our perceptions, and an orderly sequence in real
events. What, then, is a real sequence ? and what is
the explanation usually offered in proof of the assump-
tion that every real event is connected with events
going before it ?
Now (a] a real sequence, if there be such, cannot,
as is ordinarily supposed, be contrasted with the arbit-
rary sequence of our individual mental states, as changes
taking place in things in themselves with the mere
succession of those states. Kant does not here enter
into any proof that we cannot know things in them-
selves, but contents himself with remarking that, as in
this view, changes are supposed to occur in objects
lying beyond the sphere of our knowledge, we are un-
able to say anything whatever as to real sequences ;
the only sequences we can possibly know are sequences
within consciousness, and real sequences are ex hypo-
thesi beyond consciousness, and, therefore, unknowable.
We are, in fact, as Hume pointed out, compelled to
reduce real sequences to certain individual sequences
of our mental states, only arbitrarily associated toge-
ther, and not known as really connected. Instead of
a knowledge of real sequences, we are reduced to a
mere play of ideas.
(b) In accordance with the false supposition that
known objects exist independently of consciousness,
the dogmatist supposes causality to be known by mere
observation. We observe or perceive, it is said, that
two events — say fire and heat — are conjoined in this
way, that the fire as cause first exists, and then is fol-
lowed by the heat as effect; and we find, by com-
parison of the perceptions which we make at different
times, that fire always goes first, and heat comes
second. Similarly, we discover, by a comparison of
vi.] PROOF OF THE PRINCIPLES. 187
perceptions made at various times, that there are
many events connected in a definite order, as, e.g.,
snow and cold, sun and heat, etc. From the compari-
son of these various instances of the orderly sequence
of events on each other, we abstract the universal rule,
that all events have a cause. Now, there are two
objections to this view. It is supposed by it that we
not only observe real events, but that we observe real
sequences in events. But (a) this explanation of
orderly sequence makes the principle of causality a
merely analytical or tautological proposition. Of
course, granting that we have somehow obtained the
conception of causality, i.e., of the orderly sequence of
events on each other, we can, by a mere analysis of
our conception, obtain the proposition: " Every event
has a cause." But we only obtain it because we have
assumed it beforehand. We are supposed to observe
real sequences in particular cases, and to combine these
in a general proposition by an act of reflection. But
this overlooks the all-important point, that an analytical
judgment cannot add anything to our knowledge, but
can only express what is already implicit in it. In
other words, the ordinary view does not explain the
origin of the principle of causality, but merely assumes
it, and assumes it in defiance of the fact that from a
mere conception we cannot pass over to reality. Hence
the fact that by analysis we can bring the principle of
causal relation into logical clearness, presupposes, as in
all other cases, that that principle is based upon a prior
synthesis. We are able to prove the analytical pro-
position, " Every event has a cause," only because we
have previously by a synthetical process made the
sequence of real events possible. Thus, we do not
obtain the conception of cause by reflecting on real
188 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
sequences, but, on the contrary, the conception or cate-
gory of cause is the condition of there being for us any
real sequences, (b) Even granting that from observa-
tion we obtain a knowledge of certain real sequences,
we are not entitled to affirm that all events must have
a cause. Induction or generalization cannot take us
beyond the facts on which the induction or generaliza-
tion is founded. Now, all that we can have observed
is that, within our limited observation, certain events
always follow certain other events. The proper form,
therefore, of the principle of causality should be : So
far as I have observed, every event has a cause. But
this is only a general, not a universal proposition, and
hence it falls short of the true principle of causality.
(3.) We are now in a position to appreciate Kant's
own proof of the principle of the causal relation of
events. It contains three steps : (a) a mere sequence
of feelings or ideas, gives no criterion for distinguishing
an orderly sequence of events from an arbitrary sequence
of individual feelings or ideas; (6) real sequence cannot
be obtained by an observation of separate events as in
time ; (c) real sequences can, therefore, only be ex-
plained on the supposition that the understanding,
acting through the schema of order in time, makes the
knowledge of real sequences possible.
(a) We saw above that the mere sequence of mental
states cannot be contrasted with the real sequence of
events, as mere ideas in the mind with real changes
going on beyond the mind. For this supposes real
events to lie beyond the sphere of our knowledge, and
hence to be ex hypothesi unknown. The real sequences
we have to explain, if there are such, must be sequences
not without, but within consciousness : in other words,
they are changes taking place in real objects existing
vi.] PROOF OF THE PRINCIPLES. 189
in space and time, as distinguished from our feelings
or ideas, which exist only in time. Thus both our
feelings and real events are alike in consciousness, or
can exist only as they are known to exist. Both are
alike objects of consciousness — using the term "objects"
in the most general sense, as anything present to our
consciousness. Now, the difficulty we have to resolve
is this : if all objects alike are in consciousness, how
does it come that we distinguish the sequence of our
feelings from the sequence of real events'? Manifestly,
it cannot be because our feelings are successive, while
events are not, for both are alike successive. As real
events are in consciousness, they can only be present
to our consciousness in succession. How, then, do we
come to distinguish subjective sequences from objective
sequences ? The old distinction, that subjective se-
quences are in the mind and objective sequences with-
out the mind, is not tenable ; and we must, therefore,
find in the nature of our knowledge the explanation of
the undoubted contrast we draw between these two
kinds of sequence. Objectivity of sequence must have
a different meaning from the ordinary one : every
sequence of real events must be a combination of
determinations existing only for consciousness. Now,
it is at once evident that we need not seek for the
distinction in the content of the real object or real
event, for this content can be nothing more than ideas
of some kind, which by a process of thought have
become contrasted with mere ideas, existing only as
subjective states. In other words, the distinction must
lie in some mental form being applied in the case of the
objective sequence, which is not brought into play in the
case of the subjective sequence. There must be a rule or
law of thought, accounting for the difference between the
190 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
two kinds of sequence ; and it is the presence of this
rule or law of thought which makes the sequence of
what we call real events objective. An objective
sequence, in other words, is simply a sequence, which,
as irreversible, is necessary and universal. We have,
then, to explain how we come to distinguish the ob-
jective sequences of events from the subjective sequences
of our feelings, and to do so while recognising that
both sequences are alike in consciousness. Now, it is
manifest that knowledge of any real event can be ob-
tained only if we distinguish it from an event, different
in content, going before it ; for (as we saw before in
the proof of substance) a single event, or rather deter-
mination, is not capable of being known, any more than
empty time itself. In order, therefore, to have a
knowledge of a real sequence, a transition from one
object of consciousness to another must take place.
But evidently this alone is not sufficient to account for
a knowledge of real sequences. For all objects of con-
sciousness occur to us in succession, and hence in all
there is a transition from one state to another different
from it. The parts of a house, e.g., I observe succes-
sively, and hence in my consciousness there is a transi-
tion from one state to another, and a transition which
implies sequence in time. No one, however, supposes
that the parts of the house are successive, although
they present themselves successively to iny conscious-
ness. On the other hand, the presentation in my con-
sciousness of the successive occupancy of the parts of
a stream by a drifting boat, is also successive ; but
here we do not, as in the case of the house, suppose
that the boat occupies the parts of the stream co-exist-
ently, but, on the contrary, we regard it as occupying
them only in succession. How, then, are we to account
vi.] PROOF OF THE PRINCIPLES. 191
for the fact that, while all consciousness implies a tran-
sition from one state to another, we nevertheless dis-
tinguish between a real succession of events and a mere
succession of individual feelings. Now, if we look at
the instances already given, we see that, while the ob-
jects are in both presented successively, we do, as a
matter of fact, regard the two successions as essentially
different. And the difference lies, not in the fact that
the manifold is in the one case presented to ourconscious-
ness in succession and not in the other, but that the
manifold of the house is presented to our consciousness
in any order, while the manifold of the boat is only
presented in one invariable order. The explanation of
the difference must, therefore, be sought, not in any
difference in objects of consciousness as such — as if
some were co-existent and others sequent — nor in any
contrast of ideas within the mind and objects without
the mind, but in a difference in the nature of the
sequence. That there are real sequences of events,
just as there are co-existing parts of individual objects
as extensive quanta, no one doubts ; the point is to
explain how, consistently with the fact that all objects
are alike objects of consciousness, we come to mark off
subjective from objective successions. The explanation
must be sought in the nature of thought itself; for, as
has been said, all objects are objects of consciousness,
and so far on the same level. There must be a rule or
law of thought, which accounts for the fact that we
determine a certain manifold of sense to an invariable
order in time. Apart from such a rule, we should
never distinguish objective from subjective sequences
at all ; at the most we should have but a " play of
representations," coming and going, but giving us no
knowledge of objects as connected in time. We could
192 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
not say : This event follows another, but only : This
state of consciousness follows another.
(6) It may, perhaps, be said that the sequence of real
events as objects of consciousness can be proved from the
fact that objects of consciousness are always successive.
But such an explanation is at once precluded by the
consideration that objects of consciousness are not cap-
able of being fixed in an invariable order by a simple
reference to time. For time per se is not capable of
being known; it is not something that can be observed,
as outside of us, but a mere potential form, that comes
into knowledge only in relation to known objects.
But, if all objects, internal as well as external, are
relative to consciousness, we come back to the difficulty
of explaining why we distinguish objective from sub-
jective sequences ; and this shows that, to explain how
a knowledge of real events is possible, we must pre-
suppose the schema of orderly succession as a rule of
thought. That there is an order in known events every
one admits. This order in time is not, however, capable
of being accounted for by saying that we^observe certain
states of objects, and determine them to an order by
reference to time. For such states, if we abstract from
the order in which they occur, are separate from each
other, and a separate state is not capable of being as-
signed any order, even by reference to time. For time
is not itself observable ; it is not a real object in which
the states of the phenomena can be observed; taken by
itself it is a mere form of perception. A single event,
in short, has no determinate place in time, and there-
fore no order in time. Order in time can therefore
only be known by the relation of states to each other
as actually sequent.
(c) As then, all objects are relative to consciousness,
vi.] PROOF OF THE PRINCIPLES. 193
and are successively presented in consciousness, and
as no distinction of sequences from co -existences can
be found in time itself, the rule by which an ob-
jective sequence is distinguished from a subjective se-
quence must be found in the Understanding. It is a
common fallacy to suppose that the Understanding has
no function but that of analysing or bringing into
clearness what is already given in our knowledge of
real objects. The real fact is that Understanding, so
far. from simply analysing our knowledge of real ob-
jects, or, in other words, our perceptions, first makes
such knowledge possible. There could be no percep-
tion or experience of a real sequence were it not that
Understanding reduces a certain manifold of sense to
order, and so makes an experience of real sequences
possible. In the present case, Understanding, having
Causality as its category or function of unity, pre-
scribes a law or rule to the manifold, by means of the
schema of order in time, and so makes an invariable
sequence in time possible. The orderly sequence of
objects of consciousness is therefore due to Understand-
ing. And, of course, like every law of thought, the
sequence is necessary and universal : as there can be no
knowledge of a real sequence apart from the activity of
the Understanding acting through the schema of order
in time, we can affirm universally and necessarily, that
all changes must conform to the law of causal con-
nection. We can therefore say that all the changes in
nature are subject to this law. In other words, all real
sequences stand under the synthetical unity of self-
consciousness, without which there would be for us
no unity in nature, and therefore no nature at all.1
1 Kant adds to this proof the remark that Causality presupposes Substan-
tiality, since every effect as a real change is relative to a permanent subject,
N
194 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
3. The Third Analogy of Experience? which need
not detain us long, is intended to show that " all sub-
stances, in so far as they can be observed as co-existing
in space, are in complete reciprocity. In the First
Analogy Kant showed that, while our perceptions
always come to us in succession, they can be known
as successive only in contrast to that which is not
successive but permanent. In the Second Analogy it
has been shown that there are irreversible sequences
in knowledge which cannot be accounted for from a
mere sequence of perceptions, since perceptions are not
irreversible in the order of their occurrence. Now he
goes on to show that, while our perceptions are always
successive, we nevertheless have a knowledge of real
co-existences, which are distinguishable at once from
the arbitrary sequence of our perceptions, and from the
necessary sequences of real events. In proving that sub-
stances mutually influence each other, Kant therefore
presupposes both the conception of substance and the
conception of causality.
Substances we ordinarily regard as co-existing when
they are in one and the same time. Real events, on
the other hand, we regard as coming after one another,
or existing only in successive times. Now, that which
is actually successive cannot be apprehended in any
order but one, and hence, when we find that our appre-
hension may proceed either from A through B, C, and
D to E, or inversely from E, through D, C, and B to
A, we regard that which is apprehended as not sequent
but co-existent. This, then, is the fact to be explained.
Now, granting that substances are in the same space,
The converse truth, that Substantiality presupposes Causality, is indicated in
the "Metaphysio of Nature," where Matter and Force are shown mutually to
imply each other. See below, Chap. viii.
' Kritlk, pp. 187-190.
vi.] PROOF OF THE PRINCIPLES. 195
we must either say that they mutually influence each
other, or that they are completely isolated from each
other in space. If we adopt the latter supposition, we
must suppose them to exist in absolutely empty space.
But if they are so completely separated from each
other, it would be impossible to determine that they
coexist in one time. For, granting that we may ap-
prehend first one and then another in succession, still
we could not in any way connect the objects thus
separately apprehended ; and being unable to bring
them into relation with each other, we should not be
able to say whether they were coexistent or successive.
Our perceptions would no doubt be successive, but as
all perceptions are successive, we could not say whether
the objects perceived were successive or co-existent.
We must therefore suppose substances not to be iso-
lated from each other, but to be mutually connected.
And as a substance can only be related to another
substance through its states, the states of all co-existing
substances must be the product of their mutual influ-
ence on each other. But that without which there can
be no real knowledge is necessary, being implied in the
constitution of our intelligence ; and hence all know-
able objects are constituted as co-existent by the activity
of thought which determines them in relation to time by
the schema of coexistence.
IV. The Postulates of Empirical Thought,1 which
complete the consideration of the Principles of Judg-
ment, simply state explicitly what are the conditions
under which real knowledge is possible, and contain
nothing that is not implied in the explanation of what
those conditions are. (1) The First Postulate is, that
" that which harmonises with the formal conditions of
1 Kritik, pp. 192-197.
196 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
experience is possible." The formal conditions of ex-
perience are, as we know, space and time, and the
categories as mediated by the schemata. Now, if we
take any determination of space, such as a triangle, it
seems at first sight as if the mere fact, that the concep-
tion is given in the act by which the triangle is
constructed, were enough to show that an object cor-
responding to it may be found ; in other words, it
seems to be possible to show by the dogmatic method
that mathematics is applicable to real things. But
this, as a critical examination of real knowledge has
made abundantly clear, is a mistake. Could it not be
shown that the conditions which make the determina-
tion of the pure form of space possible are also the
conditions without which no real objects could be
known by us, we should not be able to show that the
a priori constructions of geometry are more than pro-
ducts of the imagination. This, however, is what has
been established ; and hence we are entitled to affirm
that the mathematical determinations of space and
time are at the same time possible determinations of
real objects. All quantitative determinations, in fact,
as conditioned by the categories in relation to space
and time, are determinations of things as to their pos-
sibility. Harmony with the a priori conditions of
knowledge may therefore be employed as a test of the
possibility of real things. (2) In order, however, to
know that an object is not only possible but actual,
something more is required than non-violation of the
formal conditions of knowledge. An actual object can
be known only when sense supplies a manifold which
can be related to the category through the schema.
The mere conception of a thing, however complete it
may be, cannot be identified with actual knowledge of
vi.] PROOF OF THE PRINCIPLES. 197
a thing ; for the latter, sense must co-operate with
thought. Still, even before actual experience takes
place, we are able to tell what is capable of being ex-
perienced, in those cases in which we can bring into
play the Analogies of Experience, which are conditions
of the connection of things. We cannot have a direct
perception of magnetic particles, but we are entitled to
infer their existence in all bodies from their effects ;
and, guided by the analogies of experience, we know
that, were our senses finer, we should have a direct
perception of them. The Second Postulate of Empiri-
cal Thought, therefore, is, that "that which coheres
with the material conditions of experience is actual."
(3) Lastly, "that the connection of which with the actual
is determined according to universal conditions of ex-
perience, is necessary." The necessity in question is not
the merely logical necessity which depends upon the
law of contradiction, but the necessity of actual exist-
ences. Now, the connection of one knowable object
with another cannot be shown from mere perceptions,
but only from the relation of perceptions. Nor, again,
can it be based upon the pure conception of substance,
because substances are connected together only by
their states. Hence the criterion of necessity rests
upon the principle of causality. When certain causes
in nature are given, we are enabled to know what their
effects must be ; but apart from the principle of caus-
ality there could be no nature, and therefore no science
of nature.
198
CHAPTER VII.
OBJECTIONS TO KANT.'s PROOFS OF SUBSTANTIALITY AND
CAUSALITY EXAMINED.
A N examination of the objections of Mr. Balfour
and Dr. Stirling to what they regard as the
critical method of proving the Principles of Judgment,
will perhaps help to bring Kant's doctrine into bolder
relief, and to make the force of the reasoning by which
it is established better felt.
I shall first consider Mr. Balfour's criticism of the
First Analogy.
" The first difficulty," he says, " which occurs to me,
and which perhaps others may feel, refers to that
' transcendental necessity ' which is the very pith and
marrow of the whole demonstration, both in the Refut-
ation and in the First Analogy. Is it really true that
change is nothing to us as thinking beings except we
conceive it as in relation to a permanent and unchanging
substance ? For iny part, however much I try to
bring the matter into clear consciousness, I feel myself
bound by no such necessity. For though change is,
doubtless, unthinkable, except for what Mr. Green
calls a combining and therefore, to a certain extent, a
persistent consciousness, and though it may have no
meaning out of relation to that which is not change,
vii.] OBJECTIONS TO KANT'S PROOFS. 199
this not-change by no means implies permanent sub-
stance. On the contrary, the smallest recognizable
persistence through time would seem enough to make
change in time intelligible by contrast ; and I cannot
help thinking that the opposite opinion derives its chief
plausibility from the fact that in ordinary language
permanence is the antithesis to change ; whence it is
rashly assumed that they are correlatives which imply
each other in the system of nature. It has to be noted
also, that Kant, in his proof of the ' First Analogy,'
makes a remark (quoted and approved by Mr. Caird)
which almost seems to concede this very point, for he
says (Crit., p. 140) : ' Only the permanent is subject to
change : the mutable suffers no change, but rather
alternation; that is, when certain determinations cease,
others begin.' Now, there can be no objection, of
course, from a philosophical point of view, to an
author defining a word in any sense he pleases ; what
is not permissible is to make such a definition the basis
of an argument as to matters of fact ; yet the above
passage suggests the idea that Kant's proof of the
permanence of substance is not altogether free from
this vice. If (by definition) change can only occur in
the permanent, the facb that there is change is no
doubt a conclusive proof that there is a 'permanent.'
But the question then arises, Is there change in this
sense ? How do we know that there is anything more
than alternation which (by definition) can take place in
the mutable ? All Transcendentalists convince by
threats. ' Allow my conclusion,' they say, ' or I will
prove to you that you must surrender one of your own
cherished beliefs.' But in this case the threat is hardly
calculated to frighten the most timid philosopher.
There must be a permanent, say the Transcendentalists,
200 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
or there can be no change ; but this surely is no very
serious calamity if we are allowed to keep alternation,
which seems to me, I confess, a very good substitute,
and one with which the ordinary man may very well
content himself." *
It is objected by Mr. Balfour, to take the last point
first, that Kant himself grants that we can have a
knowledge of alternation, as distinguished from change,
and that, as alternation will not prove absolute per-
manence but only persistence through a limited time,
the proof of substance is defective on the very face of
it. The concession, however, which Kant is supposed
to make is not really made by him. Mr. Balfour has
simply misunderstood what " alternation," in the words
quoted, is intended to signify. When Kant says that
the " mutable undergoes no change but only alterna-
tion," so far from granting that the mutable can be
known, his argument is, on the contrary, that it cannot
be known, and therefore is useless to account for the
permanence of real objects. Knowledge of a real ob-
ject, as distinguished from a series of transient feelings,
is a knowledge of that which does not pass away with
the moment, but persists through successive moments
of time. But if we eliminate from our explanation of
knowable reality this conception of persistence through
time, we are left with a number of isolated differences,
that are not changes, but simply an alternation of the
mutable, i.e., a succession of differences perfectly desti-
tute of unity. The " mutable," in other words, is a
term signifying what I have elsewhere called detached
points of impression, as " alternation " is the mere suc-
cession of such impressions, not even knowable as a
succession. Kant could not admit that the mutable is
1 Mind> xii., p. 493.
VIL] OBJECTIONS TO KANT'S PROOFS. 201
knowable without committing himself to the absurdity
of granting that a mere element of knowledge is know-
able in itself. As a matter of fact, he holds nothing so
absurd. All consciousness of change, he argues, is the
consciousness of a transition from one determination of
an object to another, and such consciousness is incon-
ceivable if each determination is separated from every
other. But unless thought has a function by which it
brings the several determinations of things into rela-
tion with each other, there can be no consciousness of
change. Mere alternation, or the successive rise and
disappearance of such determinations, is nothing for
consciousness, and hence all change presupposes per-
manence. Mr. Balfour has so completely missed the
point of the argument, that he converts Kant's proof
of the impossibility of a knowledge of mere alternation
or mutation into an admission of its reality.
When we clearly see Kant's reason for distinguishing
between change and alternation, the positive objection
brought by Mr. Balfour against the proof of the per-
manence of substances loses much of its plausibility.
The objection is, that in order to have a knowledge of
change it is not necessary "to conceive it in relation to
a permanent and unchanging substance ; " it is enough
to have a knowledge of something which persists
through even the smallest amount of time. Now, I
think it is quite evident, from the form of this objec-
tion, that Mr. Balfour here borrows the weapons of the
dogmatist, as the philosophical sceptic is very prone to
do. The objection at once strikes one as an echo of
Hume's account of identity as "a succession of inter-
rupted perceptions." ' I perceive an object as now and
here, and so long as I keep my eyes upon it I know it
1 Cf. Green's Hume, vol. i., p. 256.
202 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
to exist ; but when I turn my eyes upon another object,
and no longer perceive the first, how can I say that it
exists ? All that I am entitled to say is that I perceive
an object to exist through a limited time ; I am not
entitled to say that it must persist through all time.
Kant, according to Mr. Balfour, argues that I cannot
have any knowledge of change without presupposing
the absolute permanence of substance ; but he forgets
that the persistence of an object through the smallest
amount of time is "enough to make change in time
intelligible by contrast." Now, it is vain to deny that
this objection goes on the supposition that objects exist
independently of consciousness, and are passively appre-
hended by sense, without any aid from the constitutive
power of thought. Apart from the assumption that
we are entitled to affirm the reality of an object so long
only as it is perceived, I do not see that it has any
weight whatever. To give a complete answer to this
objection it would be necessary to go over again the
whole of the course by which we have already come.
As this would be rather tedious, I shall simply indicate
the line of reply that Kant's system suggests. A series
of impressions — occupying say a minute — is enough,
Mr. Balfour would say, to give us the consciousness of
change. And no doubt this is true, if by impressions
we mean impressions that are referred to a single self
as the necessary condition of any unity whatever. If,
on the other hand, by a series of impressions is to be
understood an unrelated manifold of sense, it must be
said that such a series, continued for ever, would never
yield the consciousness of change. Now, unless we are
to assume that the object said to be known as persisting
for a minute is a thing in itself, having an independent
reality apart from all relation to our intelligence, the
vii.] OBJECTIONS TO KANT'S PROOFS. 203
consciousness of change must be accounted for from the
nature of thought, as combining the impressions of
sense successively presented to the mind. And such a
consciousness of change must be at the same time a
consciousness of the impressions as occurring in succes-
sive moments. The consciousness of a change of im-
pressions as relative to time must therefore involve the
consciousness of a something which endures, in contrast
to which the passing moments of time are recognized.
And this permanent must be supplied by thought,
unless we suppose it to attach to an object independent
of consciousness ; for apart from the impressions of
sense and the successive moments of time, there is no
other source of the permanent. It is objected, how-
ever, that this does not prove absolute permanence.
The answer is, that, as there are no things except those
which are constituted by the activity of thought in
relation to the impressions of sense, all change must be
equally a relation of a manifold of sense in time to
thought ; and hence no change whatever can take place
apart from relation to the one time in which all impres-
sions occur. On any other supposition our knowledge
would have no continuity, but would be broken up into
fragments. The very same reasoning, therefore, by
which the knowledge of something as persisting through
a limited time is explained, also establishes the know-
ledge of something absolutely permanent, i.e., existing
through all time'. We can therefore say, universally
and necessarily, that every knowable object is per-
manent, because the condition of an object being known
at all is its relation to a permanent self. Unless Mr.
Balfour denies the unity of experience and the unity of
time, I do not see how he can refuse to admit that all
change is relative to the conception of the permanent :
204 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
and the permanent as changing is substance. Part of
the difficulty Mr. Balfour feels in accepting Kant's
proof of the permanence of substance seems to arise
from the fact that he supposes objects to be not only
independent of all relation to intelligence, but also
independent of each other. Accordingly, it seems as
if we might pass from one to the other and recognise
each in turn as existing during the time it is perceived.
But if it be admitted that all impressions are related
to a single self, which is present to each as it arises, it
is manifest that what we call individual substances owe
their individuality to the distinguishing power of in-
telligence, and hence that the distinction of one object
from another is merely relative. A substance is simply
a certain sum of properties gathered together into a
unity and fixed as permanent by relation to intelligence.
If, therefore, the properties are real at all, the act by
which they are constituted into a unity fixes them as
permanent for all time. Kant, it should be observed,
makes no attempt to prove the reality of the properties ;
these he assumes to be real or given to us, and he
directs his attention to the task of explaining what is
implied in their real existence ; in other words, he
endeavours to show that, unless on supposition of the
constitutive power of intelligence, there could be no
real knowledge at all. Substance is, therefore, simply
the product of that function of thought by which real
properties are united in relation to time ; and hence
the knowledge of existence implies the unity of self-
consciousness, as determined by the category of sub-
stance.
That Mr. Balfour is really criticizing Kant from the
dogmatic point of view, according to which known
objects are conceived to be independent of all relation
VIL] OBJECTIONS TO KANT'S PROOFS. 205
to intelligence, seems to be shown beyond doubt by the
second difficulty he raises against the acceptance of the
proof of substance. " Let us grant for the sake of
argument," he says, " that change in general, or the
succession of our mental states in particular, can
only be perceived in relation to a permanent some-
thing, then I ask (and this is the most obvious objec-
tion) why, in order to obtain the permanent something,
should we go to external matter? As the reader is
aware, the 'pure ego of apperception' supplies, on the
Kantian system, the unity in reference to which alone
the unorganized multiplicity of perception becomes a
possible experience ; and it seems hard to understand
why that which supplies unity to multiplicity, may not
also supply permanence to succession. Kant has,
indeed, anticipated this objection and replied to it ;
but as I understand the objection much better than I
do the reply, I will content myself with giving the
latter, without comment, in Kant's own words : ' We
find/ he says, ' that we possess nothing permanent that
can correspond and be submitted to the conception of a
substance as intuition, except matter. ... In the
representation 7, the consciousness of myself is not an
intuition, but a merely intellectual representation pro-
duced by the spontaneous activity of a thinking subject.
It follows that this J has not any predicate of intuition,
which, in its character of permanence, could serve as
correlate to the determination of time in the internal
sense — in the same way as impenetrability is the cor-
relate of matter as an empirical intuition.' — (Critique,
p. 168.) Though I do not profess altogether to under-
stand the reasoning, it is, at all events, clear from it,
that ' the permanent ' whose existence is demonstrated,
must be an object of perception. . . . "We may, I
206 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
think, assume from the whole tenor of Kant's argu-
ment, as well as from his categorical assertions, that the
substance of which he speaks is a phenomenal thing.
But if it be perceived, and if it be a phenomenon, where
is it to be found ? In the perpetual flux of nature,
where objects do indeed persist for a time, but where
(to all appearance) nothing is eternal, who has had ex-
perience of this unchanging existence ? By a dialecti-
cal process, probably familiar to the reader, we may
with much plausibility reduce what we perceive in an
object to a collection of related attributes, not one of
which is the object itself, but all of which are the
changing attributes or accidents of the object. But if
this process be legitimate, the 'substratum' of these
accidents is either never perceived at all, or at all
events is only known as a relation. In neither case
can it be the permanent of which Kant speaks, since in
the first case it is not an object of immediate perception ;
in the second it can hardly be regarded as an object
at all."1
Mr. Balfour first asks why the " pure ego of apper-
ception," which " supplies unity to multiplicity, may
not also supply permanence to succession." Now, as
we saw in our examination of the Refutation of Idealism,
and again in considering the Deduction of the Cate-
gories, the pure " I," taken in abstraction from the
other elements of knowledge, is regarded as a mere
abstraction, and hence as devoid of all determination.
It is only when it is brought into relation with the
multiplicity of sense that it is seen to be the supreme
condition of synthesis. From Kant's point of view, the
" I " and the manifold of sense are but the extreme
poles of knowledge, between which other elements of
1 Mind, xii., 494.
VIL] OBJECTIONS TO KANT'S PROOFS. 207
knowledge lie, which are not less essential to the con-
stitution of known reality. The pure " I," taken by
itself, is simply the abstraction of relation to conscious-
ness, and hence it is incapable of being brought into
relation with the mere difference of sense, without the
intermediation of more concrete forms of intelligence.
Relation to consciousness is simply the most general ex-
pression of what is implied in any knowledge whatever.
But actual knowledge is not knowledge in general, but
concrete or specific knowledge. Hence it must be
shown what are the specific ways in which the manifold
is related to the "I," before an explanation can be
given of knowledge as we actually have it. These
specific ways of relating the manifold to the " I " are
the categories, which as functions producing unity in
certain definite ways at once specify the " I," and uni-
versalize the manifold by combining it under the deter-
minate universals, which we call the categories. The
manifold, again, cannot be directly referred to the " I,"
even by the aid of the categories, because the latter do
not contain any time-element, or any space-element, and
knowable objects must be determined as in time or in
both space and time. In other words, the "I" is the
most abstract element of knowledge at the one extreme,
as the manifold is the most abstract element at the
other; and the two extremes must be mediated by
elements more concrete than either. When, therefore,
Mr. Balfour asks why the " I," which " supplies unity
to multiplicity, may not also supply permanence to suc-
cession," the answer is (1) that the " I" does not "sup-
ply unity to multiplicity," and (2) that that which is
conceived as out of time, cannot relate anything to
itself in time. (1) It is no doubt true that the " I " is
said by Kant to- be the supreme condition of the unity
208 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
of the differences of sense, but it is not of itself capable
of introducing unity. In explaining the possibility of
knowledge our success depends upon the thoroughness
with which we detect and relate to each other all the
elements of knowledge. But to say that the " I " of
itself " supplies unity to multiplicity," is to suppose
that two elements of knowledge which even in combin-
ation are nothing apart from other elements equally
essential, may of themselves constitute knowledge. It
is the " I " as thinking in relation to the manifold of
sense as brought under the general determination of
time, which " supplies unity to multiplicity," not the
" I " in itself. No doubt Kant expresses himself some-
times in a way which suggests that the " I " is a real
thing existing apart from its determinations ; but such
passages as that quoted by Mr. Balfour, in which it is
pointed out that the " I think" is merely the abstrac-
tion of relation to consciousness, serve to correct those
in which the "I" seems to be regarded as an indepen-
dent substance. (2) It should now be manifest why
it is not possible for Kant to derive permanence from
the " pure ego of apperception." Permanence can only
be explained as the relation of the manifold to the " I,"
by intermediation of the categories and the schemata.
The " permanent " signifies neither time alone, nor the
manifold alone, but the relation of the manifold to time,
as conditioned by the functions of unity belonging to
the understanding. From the bare " I," as the mere
abstraction of thinking in general, no ingenuity can
extract the idea of an object as relative to a determin-
ate time. Nor again can the "I," viewed as the subject
of transient states of consciousness, be regarded as the
source of the permanent, because, from Kant's point of
view, mental states are in themselves a mere manifold,
vii.] OBJECTIONS TO KANTS PROOFS. 209
incessantly coming and going, and therefore having no
permanent correlate. Accordingly, he holds that it is
only in relation to an external object, as constituted by
that function of synthesis which we call substance, that
we can have any knowledge of the permanent. An
external object, it must be remembered, is not a thing
in itself, but a thing in space ; and hence it is the pro-
duct of thought as relating the spatial manifold to time
as a whole. Kant, therefore, in deriving the permanent
from the outer object and not from inner feelings, is
simply maintaining in another way that knowledge
must be explained by reference to all its elements.
Separate perceptions from all relation to objects in
space, and there remains but an alternation or mutation
of feelings, of which we cannot become conscious, be-
cause we can neither know them as in time, nor in
their distinction from each other. The " pure ego of
apperception " is therefore powerless to recognise merely
transient states of feeling, because the element of time,
and the element of permanent relation, are by hypo-
thesis absent.
Mr. Balfour, however, seems to be so uncertain as to
what Kant's view of the " pure ego of apperception "
is, that he does not very strongly insist upon the
objection that the pure " I " ought to be sufficient to
" supply permanence to succession," but immediately
goes on to raise what he evidently regards as a more
formidable objection. To be known at all, the "per-
manent" of Kant, he argues, must be an object of
perception, or phenomenal thing. Now, such an object
cannot, it would seem, be perceived in itself, but only
in its changing attributes or accidents. The permanent
must therefore be a substratum underlying the acci-
dents. Hence either (1) it is not an object of percep-
210 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
tion, or (2) it is a mere relation, and therefore not an
object at all.
This objection rests upon a false separation of an
object from its relations. " Either a perceived object
is a mere substratum, or it is a mere relation." But
what if it is neither the one nor the other, but both in
one \ This at least is Kant's view, and hence Mr.
Balfour's dilemma shares the common fate of dilemmas
in being by no means exhaustive. (1) The permanent,
it is said, may be held by Kant to be a " substratum "
of changing attributes or accidents. Here, again, Mr.
Balfour cannot get rid of the parallax of dogmatism.
First setting up the fiction of a material thing lying
beyond consciousness, and yet inconsistently supposed
to be capable of being apprehended, we go on to ask
what a thing is for a mind standing apart from it.
One by one the attributes of this supposed object are
transferred to consciousness, and there is left at last
simply an abstract "substratum" supposed to underlie
the attributes apprehended. What we perceive in an
object is thus reduced, in Mr. Balfour's words, to " a
collection of related attributes, not one of which is the
object itself." Now, it seems almost superfluous to say
that, although Kant speaks of substance as a substra-
tum of accidents, he has no thought of asserting the
existence of a substratum such as Mr. Balfour speaks
of. As we have repeatedly seen, Kant is quite famil-
iar with the " dialectical process " here referred to, but
he employs it for the purpose of showing that the
dogmatic explanation of knowledge is essentially
vicious, resting as it does upon the assumption that
known objects are things in themselves. What Mr.
Balfour calls " a collection of related attributes," Kant
terms the " manifold of sense " ; and just because such
VIL] OBJECTIONS TO KANT'S PROOFS. 211
a "manifold" is nothing for knowledge, he holds that
we are compelled to introduce other elements which
are essential to the constitution of reality. Accord-
ingly, Kant would at once demur to the phrase " col-
lection of related attributes," on the ground that
relation does not belong to sense, but to thought — or
rather to thought, as determined by schemata of the
productive imagination. Instead of saying that be-
neath or behind the known attributes of things there
is an unperceived " substratum," Kant maintains that
there is a " permanent " supplied by the pure imagina-
tion under control of the category. The fiction of a
thing in itself is therefore nothing whatever for know-
ledge, and hence Kant is not called upon to show how
a " substratum" may be perceived. His "substratum"
is a general form of intelligence required to account for
the perception of objects, not something underlying
an object independent of consciousness. Persistence
through time, or the relation of the manifold to time
as a whole, is the only substratum he can allow, and
not any ghost of abstraction remaining after elimina-
tion of all the definite properties of independent
realities. The permanent is thus simply another name
for the capacity of relating all modes of perception to
a single time. When Kant calls this permanent a
" substratum," he is probably looking at the matter
from the point of view of the data from which philoso-
phy starts in its explanation of knowledge. From this
point of view it is natural to say that under all the
changing attributes of real objects there is something
which does not change. But when we pass to the
critical point of view, it is more correct to say that the
substratum overlies those attributes, than that it under-
lies them, although it may be said to underlie the
212 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
categories and the "pure ego of apperception." (2)
As the permanent of Kant is not a " substratum," in
Mr. Balfour's sense of the term, so neither is it a mere
relation. Here, again, it must be observed that Mr.
Balfour is under the influence of that dualism of sub-
ject and object which is the characteristic mark of
dogmatism. An object lying beyond consciousness is
presupposed, and it is then supposed to be reduced to
"a collection of related attributes." If now we abstract
from the attributes, and concentrate our attention upon
their relation to each other, we get the conception of a
mere relation ; and this we may call the permanent,
because it is implied in the consciousness by which
each attribute is related in turn to another. But such
an abstract relation cannot be identified with a per-
manent object. Now, it is evident that just as Mr.
Balfour in reducing substance to a mere substratum
abstracts from all the relations of intelligence to an
object, so here he abstracts from all the differences
which are essential to the constitution of the individu-
ality of an object. But this is exactly what Kant
refuses to do. The mere abstraction of relation to con-
sciousness is just the pure " I think," which, as Kant
points out, cannot of itself explain how a knowledge of
objects is possible. No doubt the manifold of sense,
or the particular element in knowledge, must be related
to the one single and identical self, but this relation is
not of itself the same as a known object. The particu-
lar is as necessary to the constitution of a substance
as the universal. Moreover, the universal form of
thought, as standing under the " I," must be brought
into relation with time as a unity before the knowledge
of an object as permanent can be accounted for. Nor
am I aware that any follower of Kant, any more than
VIL] OBJECTIONS TO KANTS PROOFS. 213
Kant himself, reduces an object to mere relations.
There is no mysterious process by which the concrete
element in knowledge may be reduced to abstract
relations. It is one thing to say that all the real
differences of things are relative to intelligence, and
quite a different thing to say that all reality is reduc-
ible to abstract relations. The special properties of
things are not to be conjured out of existence, charm
we with ever so wonderful subtlety : but this is not
inconsistent with the philosophical principle, that those
properties do not belong to things in themselves. To
deny the knowability of that which is virtually de-
fined as the unknowable is at once good sense and
good philosophy ; to deny the reality of the specific
differences of objects is mere nonsense. While he
could not without palpable absurdity make substance
an object independent of intelligence, or an abstract
relation to consciousness, Kant is surely right in saying
that every real object exists for us only because we
have by the constitution of our intelligence the ca-
pacity of relating the specific differences of things to a
single universal self, and determining them in relation
to time as a unity.
It should not be difficult, after these considerations,
to show that substance is not a perception, or phe-
nomenal thing, as Mr. Balfour strangely supposes
Kant to be compelled to affirm. A substance is
neither a mere substratum, nor a mere relation, but the
unity of the manifold of sense as related to the schema
of the permanent, which again is relative to the cate-
gory of substance, one of the functions of thought.
Perception, in the critical sense of the term, is not the
apprehension of an independent object, but the consti-
tution of that object as a known reality. A schema-
2H KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
tized category cannot be identified with a mere feeling
or perception, but is the condition without which there
could be no perception whatever. In perception as
the knowledge of a real object, there is implied the
co-operation of sense, imagination, and thought. The
whole Critical philosophy in its positive aspect leads up
to the conclusion, that an object existing independently
of our intelligence cannot possibly be known. Sub-
stance is therefore not a perception, in the sense of a
simple apprehension, but a condition or law of percep-
tion, The manifold of sense must be combined in one
time, and as it is in itself a mere sequence it must be
related to that which is not merely sequent but per-
manent. Thus the " permanent " is implied in the fact
that we have perception, but it is not itself a percep-
tion. A perception is for Kant always a particular,
and the particular, as supplied by the special senses, is
detached in its parts, and therefore requires to be united
in specific ways. In the present instance the unity of
the manifold consists in the relation of it to that which
is not evanescent but permanent. Substance can only
be said to be an object because it is the universal con-
dition of there being an object for us ; it is a relation,
because it implies the reference of the changing to that
which does not change. To call substance an object
or a relation is to take one element of knowledge in
abstraction from another, without which it is merely
a logical abstraction ; only in the relation of the par-
ticulars of sense to the universal of thought, and of
both to time as a unity, can we obtain an explanation
of what we mean by the permanence or reality of a
known object.
Let us now look at Mr. Balfour's criticism of Kant's
proof of the principle of Causality. To this proof two
VIL] OBJECTIONS TO KANT'S PROOFS. 215
objections are made. (1) If it can be said to prove
that sequence in the object is " according to a rule," it
is only by showing in the first instance that sequence
in the subject is arbitrary ; so that the causation proved
is at all events not universal. (2) It does not prove,
or attempt to prove, that there is actually an objective
sequence according to a necessary rule, but only that if
there is an objective sequence it must be according
to a necessary rule, because otherwise it could not
be distinguished from the subjective sequence. Now,
these are very different propositions ; and the second
or conditional one might be admitted to its full
extent without admitting the truth of the first or un-
conditional one, which is for purposes of ^science the
supposition of which proof is required.1
(1) Mr. Balfour's first objection is that Kant, while
pretending to prove that all sequences are causal, only
proves at the most that some sequences are causal ;
and hence the conclusion is inconsistent with one of
the premises. Now, without at present enquiring
whether Kant is justified in opposing the arbitrary-
sequence of our perceptions to the necessary sequence
of events, it has to be said that he does not, in the
proof of causality, make any attempt to show that all
sequences are causal. The sequences of which he is
speaking are sequences of real events as occurring in
the external world. His argument is that, unless in-
telligence supplied the schema of order in time, under
guidance of the category of causality, we could never
have experience of an invariable sequence of events in
the world of nature. The principle of causality is not
" universal," in the sense of being presupposed in any
sequence whatever, but only in the sense that it is the
, xii, p. 600
216 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
universal condition of all those sequences which we
regard as objective, and distinguish from the subjective
sequence of our feelings. As I have already said,
Kant begins his proof by pointing out that, as a mat-
ter of fact, we do draw a strong contrast in our ordinary
consciousness between a mere sequence of feelings and
a real sequence of events. The former we regard as
arbitrary, the latter as invariable. Adopting this dis-
tinction, Kant goes on to show that the dogmatist, by
virtually reducing both kinds of successions to mere
series of feelings, abolishes the distinction between
them, and therefore is unable to account for objective
successions at all. And observe that the procedure
of the dogmatist is not to convert subjective sequences
into objective, but, on the contrary, to reduce objective
sequences to subjective. But, objects Kant, if we
eliminate all objective successions we cannot be con-
scious even of our perceptions as a series, since there
is no longer any reason for contrasting the one with
the other. From the dogmatic point of view, therefore,
we have as material for the explanation of real events
nothing but a " mere play of representations." This
argument depends for its force upon the contrast be-
tween the dualistic and the critical method of conceiv-
ing of the relation between knowledge and reality.
Just as Kant argues, in the Refutation of Idealism,
that when we start from the assumption that real
objects are things in themselves, existing apart from
our consciousness of them, we cannot even explain
how we come to have a consciousness of our own feel-
ings as in time, since a mere series of feelings has
no permanent correlate, making it knowable by con-
trast ; so, in the proof of causality, his reasoning is,
that the dogmatic assumption of the independence of
VIL] OBJECTIONS TO KANT'S PROOFS. 217
real objects leaves us with nothing but an arbitrary
sequence of feelings, having in them no order or con-
nection, a sequence which cannot even be known to be
arbitrary, since there is nothing invariable with which it
can be contrasted. While, therefore, Kant does not
deny that a series of feelings, taken by itself, is
arbitrary, he yet maintains that if we suppose all our
knowledge to be reduced to such a series, it is impos-
sible that we could ever have had a knowledge of se-
quences that are not arbitrary but invariable. It
will be observed that Kant does not make any attempt
to show that we do have a consciousness of invariable,
as distinguished from variable sequences. Any such
attempt would in fact be utterly inconsistent with his
method of proof, which in all cases consists in reason-
ing back from the facts of experience to the conditions
of knowledge. And surely it would be a very super-
fluous and absurd proceeding to attempt a proof of the
fact that a boat in drifting down a stream occupies
each part of the stream in succession. Assuming it to
be a fact that we distinguish between such invariable
sequences and those which are variable, he asks
how this fact is to be accounted for, consistently with
the nature of knowledge. It cannot be explained, he
maintains, on the supposition that real successions are
changes of things in themselves; for the dualism of
subject and object leads to the reduction of our
knowledge of events to a mere series of feel-
ings, which cannot possibly be identified with an
orderly succession of real events. Even granting,
therefore, that we could have a consciousness of succes-
sive feelings, without bringing them into relation with
changes that are not merely successive but invariable,
we should still not be able to explain how we
218 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
come to have an experience of objective sequences.
But such a consciousness is impossible, for only in
contrast to that which is not arbitrary but in-
variable can we have the consciousness of our feelings
as variable. The gist of the argument against the
dogmatic explanation of causality lies in pointing out
that the latter overlooks the correlativity of invariable
and variable successions. Just as a feeling is knowable
only in contrast to the permanent, so an arbitrary
sequence of feelings is knowable only in contrast to
order in time. Having thus disposed of the ordinary
explanation of causality, by taking advantage, as it will
be observed, of Hume's reduction of knowledge to a
mere association or arbitrary succession of feelings,
Kant goes on to show how, from the critical point
of view, the experience of an invariable or objective
sequence of events may be accounted for. The con-
trast is no longer, as with the dogmatist, between a
succession of feelings in the individual mind, and
a series of events without the mind, but between
two distinct kinds of sequence both of which occur
within consciousness. It is not correct to contrast,
without explanation, "sequence in the object," with
"sequence in the subject." In one sense all sequences
as in the subject may be called " subjective." But
in the sense in which Kant here uses the term a
"subjective sequence" means one that belongs to
the individual as such, and therefore one that is
not true universally or for all men. And Kant's
criterion for distinguishing a "subjective" from an
" objective " sequence is that the former is variable
and arbitrary, while the latter is invariable and there-
fore necessary. Mr. Balfour seems to identify " sub-
jective" with "in the mind of the individual," and
VIL] OBJECTIONS TO KANT S PROOFS. 219
"objective" with "in the object external to the mind
of the individual." But Kant, as I have shown above,
expressly cautions us against this mistake. We are
not to suppose, he says, that the question is as to
things in themselves, i.e.. objects without the mind ; we
are to observe that the question is purely in regard to
events capable of coming into relation with our con-
sciousness. Now it is difficult to see how the fact that
there are subjective, i.e. arbitrary, sequences can in
any way invalidate the proof that there are objective
or invariable sequences, made necessary and universal
by relation to the understanding. Mr. Balfour seems
to think that because causality is said to be universal
it must be applicable to all possible successions. This
however is not what Kant attempts to show. His
object is to prove that all real sequences — all those
which we distinguish as changes in the object or in
nature — are necessary, and hence that we can say
of the principle of causality, that it is applicable to
every possible change in real objects. That there are
sequences which are not changes in real objects, Kant
would say, no more invalidates the proof of causality,
than the fact that there are permanent or co-existent
objects. The principle is necessary and universal in so
far as it is applicable. This Kant shows by starting
from the admitted fact that we do distinguish be-
tween real events and the sequence of our individual
feelings. And his contention is, that unless we pre-
suppose a rule of thought making the former possible,
we should be compelled to reduce both to a mere series
of feelings — in other words, we should never distinguish
invariable from arbitrary sequence at all. Kant there-
fore asks (1) what meaning this invariable sequence has
for us on the supposition that all objects have an exis-
220 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
tence only in relation to consciousness, and (2) what is
the justification, if it can be justified, of the affirmation
of necessity according to causality of every possible
succession of real events. That objects exist only for
consciousness he regards as proved in the ^Esthetic,
but he adds here that, on any other supposition, we
can have no knowledge of anything real whatever.
The affirmation of necessity in the way of caus-
ality he justifies by showing that there can be
no knowledge of any real sequence, unless we
suppose that Understanding, as distinguished from
Perception, constitutes order in time. For as there
could be no order in time, and therefore no real changes
apart from Intelligence as synthetic, it follows that,
abstracting from the content of any particular succes-
sion, we can say: Every possible real sequence is nec-
essary and universal. In other words, in each cognition
of a real change there are involved two elements (1)
the special content of the sequence, and (2) the uni-
versal form, i.e. order in time, the schematized category
of causality. As therefore the particular is not know-
able as an event or real sequence except by the aid of
the form of thought, it follows that order in time is
the condition of any knowledge of a real or invariable
sequence. For a form of thought cannot be put off or
on at will : it belongs to the essential constitution of
intelligence, and hence intelligence can only come into
operation in the specific way of determining order in
time, in relation to a manifold of perception. There is
therefore no inconsistency between Kant's premises
and the conclusion he reaches. What he seeks to
establish is that our knowledge of real or invariable
sequences can be explained only on the supposition
that intelligence brings the mere manifold of sense under
vii.] OBJECTIONS TO KANT'S PROOFS. 221
the schema of order in time, and not otherwise we should
have at the most a mere association of feelings, desti-
tute of all order and connection. The contrast of feel-
ings and events is but one phase of the general contrast
between objects in space and time, and feelings as
passing in time alone.
(2) The second objection advanced by Mr. Balfour
is that Kant does not prove, but simply assumes, that
there are objective sequences, since he only shows that
"if there is an objective sequence it must be according
to a rule." The answer I should be disposed to make
to this criticism has been anticipated in what has just
been said. I do not think that Mr. Balfour has pro-
perly realized what Kant here means by " objective."
Judging from the general tenor of Mr. Balfour's remarks,
I should think that by an objective sequence he figures
to himself an actual change in a world, the consti-
tution of which is independent of all relation to
intelligence. From this point of view, a " subjective "
succession is one which occurs within the mind of an
individual subject, who is the recipient of feelings pro-
duced by the action of a world supposed to exist in
independence of all consciousness of it ; and an " ob-
jective " succession will be one that takes place in the
world thus imagined to lie beyond the confines of
knowledge. As the series of feelings is assumed to be
completely independent of the series of events in the
real world, the objection naturally arises, that from the
former we cannot obtain any knowledge of the latter.
How then, it may be asked, is the sequence of events
in an objective world, a world that, as defined, is
beyond knowledge, to become known at all ? Only, it
would seem, if we assume it to be " objective." In
other words, it is not possible to show that there is
222 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
any objective sequence except that which we ourselves
imagine.
I am compelled to suppose that it is in some such
way as this that Mr. Balfour regards Kant's view
of causality, because I cannot otherwise understand
how he should raise the objection, that Kant does not
prove but simply assumes the objectivity of real suc-
cessions. Mr. Balfour can hardly mean to say, that
Kant should have proved that as a matter of fact we
distinguish sequences that are invariable from those
that are arbitrary. Kant, like everybody else, takes
this for granted. The point in dispute is not as to the
fact of such a distinction being made, but as to the
philosophical explanation of that fact. Let us suppose
it, then, to be granted, that in our ordinary conscious-
ness we distinguish between the succession of real
events and the succession of our feelings, and that we
regard the former as invariable and the latter as vari-
able. Now we may oppose the one to the other
as a change in objects without the mind as com-
pared with a change of feelings within the mind,
and the one change we may call " objective," while
the other we may call " subjective." This is the
dogmatic or psychological view, and, unless I entirely
misunderstand him, it is the view which Mr. Balfour
attributes to Kant. Accordingly it is objected that to
contrast an " objective " with a " subjective " sequence
as the invariable or necessary to the variable or con-
tingent, is only to make the tautological judgment :
" An objective sequence must be according to a neces-
sary rule." The objection is undoubtedly pertinent, if
Kant opposes objective and subjective, not only as
invariable and variable, but as a sequence without
the mind to one within the mind. For as a philo-
vii.] OBJECTIONS TO RANTS PROOFS. 223
sophical theory is by its very nature an explanation
of the possibility of knowledge, we are not entitled
to assume that which, explicitly or implicitly, denies
the possibility of knowledge. But, if we are con-
fined in our knowledge to our own mental states,
it is vain to attempt any explanation of the way
in which we come to have a knowledge of an
"objective" sequence. By definition all objects and
all changes of objects are beyond knowledge, and that
which is beyond knowledge cannot, of course, be known.
The distinction, therefore, between the two kinds of
succession must be purely imaginary ; or at any rate we
can never show it not to be imaginary : it is really a
distinction between different states of our own mind,
not one between states of our own mind and events
lying beyond them. Of what use is it, we may there-
fore ask, to show that " objective " sequences are
invariable in their succession while our feelings are
variable so long as the former are only supposed to be
" objective ? " We can, of course, suppose anything
we please, but " for purposes of science " we have
proved nothing. The sequences with which science
deals are not an invariable succession of feelings, but
changes in real objects, and prove what we may of the
former, we determine nothing whatever in regard to
the latter.
Now, the criticism which I have here supposed Mr.
Balfour to direct against Kant is thoroughly endorsed
by Kant himself. Any one who has followed me so
far will at once see that it is just one way of stat-
ing the ever-recurring charge that dogmatism, as
limited to a mere series of feelings, cannot account
for reality at all. The objection of Mr. Balfour is
therefore no objection to Kant, but an endorsement so
224 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
far of the critical position. I say " so far," because the
positive aspect of Kant's system is persistently ne-
glected in all Mr. Balfour's criticisms. So far as Kant
accepts Hume's demonstration of the impossibility of
a knowledge of real objects or real changes, on the
dogmatic assumption that thought and reality are
abstract opposites, Mr. Balfour is able to follow him ;
but he loses the thread so soon as Kant goes on to substi-
tute criticism for dogmatism. It is easy to show that
it is so in the present instance. To begin with, an
" objective " sequence is not distinguished by Kant
from a " subjective " sequence as a series of feelings in
the individual mind from a series of events in a world
lying beyond the mind. This opposition of intelligence
and nature Kant summarily rejects, as meaningless and
self-contradictory ; and not only does he do so in gene-
ral, but he distinctly does so in the very proof of
causality which Mr. Balfour is considering. We are
not, he says, to look upon the sequence of real events
as a change going on in things in themselves, but as a
change in phenomena.1 Could the ordinary opposition
of "subjective" and "objective" be more explicitly
denied 1 Now this denial carries very important con-
sequences with it. Although the ordinary contrast of
"objective" and "subjective" must be rejected, there
is no reason for rejecting the ordinary distinction of
invariable from variable successions ; in fact, this is
the distinction upon which we must now fix our atten-
tion. For as all sequences are alike in consciousness,
it is absurd to contrast a series of feelings with real
events as the mental with the extra-mental. The
1 ' ' Were phenomena things in themselves, no man could possibly guess, from
the sequence of his ideas, how the manifold may be connected in the object,
SLC." Kritik, p. 175. Cf. Prolegomena, § 27, p. 87.
VIL] OBJECTIONS TO KANTS PROOFS. 225
question therefore is how the contrast of arbitrary and
invariable sequences is to be accounted for. Now it is
useless to attempt any identification of a variable
series of feelings with an invariable succession of
events, for feeling of itself is a mere "manifold," having
no unity in itself, and therefore incapable of knowing
itself as a series. It is only, in fact, in the contrast of
feelings as variable in their succession with events as
invariable, that we can have a consciousness of a series
of feelings at all. Order in time must therefore be due
to our intelligence on its intellectual side. A function
of the understanding combining the mere difference of
sense in a unity must be supposed. And this function
can act only in relation to time, for all sequences are in
time. It is therefore only in relation to intelligence as
bringing the manifold of sense under the schematized
category of order in time, that the knowledge of an
invariable succession is possible for us. Every real
sequence is therefore ipso facto a universal and neces-
sary one. For if it is true that before we could have
a knowledge of any real change intelligence must
have been silently operating, we are entitled to say,
that no sequence has been or can be known to be in-
variable which is not brought under the category of
causality. The ordinary objection to the universality
and necessity of the principle of causality falls to the
ground, when it is shown that even a single invariable
succession of one event on another tacitly involves the
connection with each other of all events that can ever
possibly be experienced. It can no longer be said, as
the empiricist does say, that we cannot go beoynd the
general proposition, that all the events we have known
were uniformly sequent ; for as no sequence could have
been known as uniform apart from the activity of intel-
226 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
ligence, so none ever can be known as uniform except
in relation to the same activity. A uniform sequence,
in short, is one which is necessary and universal.
Hence, even prior to the definite experience of par-
ticular events, we are entitled to say, that when we do
have such experience, it must be of events connected
according to the principle of causality. We cannot of
course anticipate what those events may be, but we
can affirm, universally and necessarily, that no change
in knowable objects can take place which is not condi-
tioned by a prior change.
The rest of Mr. Balfour's criticism is directed against
what he calls Kant's second proof, which goes on the
supposition that all sequences are causal, and attempts
to show that, in Mr. Caird's words, " the judgment of
sequence cannot be made without presupposition of the
judgment of causality." l I shall not examine Mr.
Balfour's objections to this argument, for, after the
most careful examination of Kant's words, I am unable
to see that it is really contained in the proof of the
Second Analogy. For the supposition that it is, Mr.
Balfour, of course, is not responsible, and he even hints
that " some doubt might perhaps be thrown on whether
Kant intended formally to put it forward as a proof at
all." In this particular case, I think that Mr. Caird's
desire to make Kant consistent with himself has led
him to find what does not really exist. Inconsistent
as it is with his general theory of knowledge, there is
little doubt that Kant does hold that we can have a
consciousness of a mere series of feelings, although only
in contrast to the objective sequence of events. This,
as Mr. Caird himself points out, is one of the instances
in which Kant has insufficiently liberated himself from
l, xii., p. 501. Cf. Caird's Philosophy of Kant, pp. 454 ff.
vir.] OBJECTIONS TO RANTS PROOFS. 227
the psychological point of view. For, however true it
may be that, looking at the temporal phases of our
knowledge, we seem to have a mere series of feelings,
detached from all relation to real objects and events,
it is not true that any mere series of feelings can be
known apart from the relations by which the world is
constituted for us as real. Kant, however, undoubtedly
distinguishes between our perceptions as occurring in
an arbitrary order, and real sequences as occurring in a
fixed or unchanging order, and this distinction he makes
the starting-point of his proof of the principle of caus-
ality. He does not, therefore, attempt to show that
all sequences are causal, but only that those are causal
which we ordinarily regard as occurring in an invariable
order. Mr. Caird does not, perhaps, sufficiently dis-
tinguish between Kant's facts and his philosophical
proof. Thus, it is plain that in contrasting the case of
a boat drifting down stream with the perception of a
house, Kant is simply referring to the way in which
we ordinarily distinguish an invariable or causal se-
quence from a variable or arbitrary one. Both are
perceptions or apprehensions, in the ordinary sense
of the term, and both, when viewed from the critical
point of view, involve categories : the one the category
of causality, and the other the category of quantity. So
far as perception goes, both are merely arbitrary, and
therefore subjective, but the former involves the cate-
gory of causality, while the latter does not. Limiting his
attention entirely to the question of real sequences,
Kant asks how these are to be accounted for,
consistently with the nature of our intelligence ; and
he answers that we should never in our ordinary
consciousness distinguish between objective and sub-
jective sequences, were it not that we apply in the
228 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
former case the category of causality while in the latter
we do not. He does not, therefore, say that we can
have no knowledge of any sequences except those that
are causal, but merely that we should never distin-
guish fixed from variable sequences, but for the
reference of that manifold of sense, which we find by
an analysis of the knowledge of real changes, to the
one supreme self as applying the function of causality
by the aid of the schema of order in time. This he
regards as a sufficient answer to Hume, because
Hume's denial of real sequences rests upon the suppo-
sition that all changes in the world occur in things in
themselves lying beyond consciousness. No doubt it
is only in keeping with Kant's general system to say
that in the observation of a house there is a causal
sequence implied in the movement of the eye. But
such a sequence, it must be observed, is just as
much in the object known as the drifting of a boat
down stream, since the eye as moving is a material
thing in space, and therefore distinct from the series of
feelings of which it is the organic condition. The real
difficulty in Kant's discussion of causality lies in the
assumption that there can be in consciousness a mere
series of feelings, and, as Mr. Caird points out, in the
separation of causality from substantiality. The former
imperfection arises from the intrusion of a psychological
consideration into a purely critical or metaphysical
investigation ; the latter, from Kant's method of taking
up one phase of knowledge after another, and consider-
ing it by itself ; but both are instances of the imperfect
development of Kant's thought, and cannot be got rid
of except by a remodelling of his system.
Although I cannot accept, without modification, Mr.
Caird's view of the proof of causality, I entirely agree
VIL] OBJECTIONS TO KANT'S PROOFS. 229
with him in holding that that proof goes on the principle
that no real sequence can be known at all unless we
suppose thought, in conjunction with the schema, to co-
operate with sense. And hence I am compelled to reject
unreservedly Dr. Stirling's explanation and criticism of
the proof of causality. That criticism is very much
the same as Mr. Balfour's, and rests, as it seems to
me, on a like misapprehension of what Kant's theory
really is. According to Dr. Stirling, Kant has two
ways of satisfying himself that the principle of caus-
ality is a necessary and universal truth ; or rather, he
has a less and a more explicit statement of his proof,
the former being contained in the Critique, the latter in
the Prolegomena. Both in the Second Analogy and
in the Prolegomena, he argues that the connection of
antecedent and consequent is a rule of judgment which
the understanding applies to certain objects given inde-
pendently by perception. In other words, Kant holds
that we first have by perception the knowledge of
events simply as events, and only afterwards proceed
to apply to these the category of causality schematized
as order in time. Thus, we have by perception a
knowledge of the fact that a stone grows hot, and we
have also a knowledge of the fact that the sun shines
on it. This knowledge perception gives us before
understanding, in this special case, has come into
operation at all. But having a perception of these
two facts, and having in our minds the category of
causality, we recognise that here is a case in which
that category is applicable, and so we judge, universally
and necessarily, that the sun warms the stone. The
first judgment, which precedes in time (and not merely
logically) the second, is a judgment of perception ; the
other is a judgment of experience or understanding.
230 KANT AND HJS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
Kant in the Second Analogy does not distinctly say
this, because he had not got his theory into a perfectly
clear form before his own mind ; in fact, he was evi-
dently, as the prolix and confused proof of the Second
Analogy shows, not satisfied himself with his proof;
but at last in the Prolegomena he had, after long medi-
tation and perplexity, got the thing into .a clear form,
and settled down in contentment with his distinction
of the judgment of perception and the judgment of
experience.
Now to this proof of causality, Dr. Stirling objects
that it is no proof at all, but a pure assumption. For
how are we to know when to apply the principle of
causality ? If there is no necessary sequence in the
perception of the facts or events connected, what right
have we to say that they are connected ? The sun
warms the stone, but for aught we can show to the
contrary, the stone might warm the sun. Unless, in
short, we had in perception the knowledge of real
sequences, we should not be entitled to say that there
is any causa nexus. "Did not sense itself, namely,
offer material irreversible sequences, the category of
cause and effect would be null and void ; it would never
be called into play at all ; for it is only on reception of
an irreversible first and second that the logical function
of antecedent and consequent will consent to act — will,
on plea of analogy, consent to receive such first and
second into its own necessary nexus."1
I should like preliminarily to remark here, that Dr.
Stirling's reconstruction of Kant's psychological state
in writing the Second Analogy and the Prolegomena,
I regard rather as complimentary to Dr. Stirling's
power of imagination, than as based upon any real
1 Journal of Speculative Philosophy, xiv. 78.
vii.] OBJECTIONS TO KANTS PROOFS. 231
evidence. As a matter of fact Kant is so far from
having any doubt of the validity of his proof of
causality as given in the Critique, that he expressly
draws attention to the proof of the analogies of experi-
ence as an evidence of the triumph of the transcendental
method.1 Dr. Stirling here attributes to Kant a feeling
of dissatisfaction felt only by himself. As to the main
issue, I should feel compelled to endorse Dr. Stirling's
criticism of the proof of causality, were it not that I
believe it to rest upon a misconception. I do not
believe that Kant regards perception, when understood
in the critical sense, as giving a knowledge of separate
events, which are afterwards externally brought under
the rule of causality. So far from this being Kant's
view, it seems to me to be exactly the view which he
wrote the Critique to expose. For, the category, when
separated absolutely from the perception or experience
of events, becomes merely a conception in the mind.
On the one side we have a perception of real objects,
on the other side a category, but there is no reason
whatever why the one should ever come into connec-
tion with the other. Now Kant argues, over and over
again, that out of a mere conception we can get nothing
but an analytical proposition, a proposition that cannot
be shown to have any application to real objects or
events at all. His view, as I have tried to state it
above, is not that perception gives a knowledge of real
events as separated from each other and not perceived
to be in any order, but that, if we say perception is the
sole source of knowledge we cannot account for our
experience of real sequences at all. Dr. Stirling,
although he elsewhere almost fiercely insists upon it,
does not here take into account the fact that Kant
1 Prolegomena, § 27, p. 86. Cf. § 28, p. 88.
232 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
always presupposes the facts of ordinary knowledge,
and merely endeavours to point out the elements
implied in them. The relation between the under-
standing and perception, so far as the critical point of
view is concerned, is a relation of logically distinguish-
able, but really inseparable, elements of knowledge,
not of two different kinds of knowledge. "It is
universally admitted," says Kant in effect, "that we
have experience of the real sequence of particular
events. This I assume as a fact, and proceed to
account for it. Now I deny that we can know any
objects except those coming within consciousness,
and referred to a single self. But if we seek to
account for real sequences from mental states
coming one after the other, without seeking any aid
from a universal and necessary form of thought, we
must prove order in events or real sequences simply
from the succession of those states. There is, then,
no sequence except a purely arbitrary one ; for our
mental states, apart from a combining or synthetical
self-consciousness, have no order in them. In other
words, we cannot, unless we presuppose a necessary
and universal form of thought, explain how we could
ever have had the experience of a real or invariable
sequence." So far therefore from holding that percep-
tion gives us a knowledge of real events, which are
afterwards connected by the understanding, Kant
argues that we should never have any knowledge of
events as real at all unless the understanding had been
at work — although in the first instance only blindly
or unreflectively — in constituting the connection of
events. Deny the activity of the understanding, and
we should not have an experience of change at all.
Dr. Stirling, in other words, has converted Kant's
vii.] OBJECTIONS TO KANT'S PROOFS. 233
distinction of the logical elements involved in the
knowledge of real sequences into a temporal succes-
sion of two independent judgments. It is of course
true, that from the phenomenal point of view, we do
have an experience of real changes, before we, by
analysis, express what is involved in that experi-
ence in the form of a reflective judgment. Hence we
may say, that we first have a perception or experi-
ence of events as separate, and then discover the rule
under which these are subsumed. But, as Kant
expressly says, the analytical judgment presupposes
the synthetical : we could not by analysis find the
judgment of causality, were it not that, from the con-
stitution of our knowing faculties, we had previously
put it there.
Dr. Stirling would perhaps reply by pointing out
that we have experience of real successions that are
not causal. That of course is true in a sense, and
it was hardly necessary for Dr. Stirling to display
so much erudition in proving it. But a real succession
means for Kant a sequence of events following each
other in an invariable order. Day and night certainly
follow each other, and yet they are not causally con-
nected. But Kant nowhere attempts to prove, as Dr.
Stirling himself admits, why we in special cases distin-
guish one sequence as invariable and another as vari-
able : he simply accepts the fact. And what he says
is, that such a sequence as day and night is not a real
change in the sense that we suppose the one to follow
from the other : we can in fact easily see that here the
order is only in our perceptions, and hence it is arbi-
trary or subjective. No doubt the succession of night
and day implies that there is a causal sequence some-
where, but it is not such that night is the cause of day.
234 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
That supposition is at once nullified by the fact that if
night follows day, so also day follows night, whereas in
every causal succession event A must go first and
event B must come second. The problem is : granting
that there are real sequences, how are we to account
for them philosophically ? Kant's reply is that to
know events as really sequent is to know them as
already under a rule of the understanding, because
otherwise they would not be real, but arbitrary or sub-
jective. But a purely arbitrary succession can never
account for any real change whatever ; and as no one
doubts that there are real changes, this supposition
leads to absurdity.
As Dr. Stirling interprets Kant's doctrine of caus-
ality by the rule of contrary, his criticism must be
regarded not as overthrowing but as supporting it.
" Did not sense itself," he says, " offer material irrever-
sible sequences, the category of cause and effect would
be null and void : it would never be called into play at
all." Sense, in other words, does not give us merely
an arbitrary succession of events, but implies the order-
ing of events under the category of causality. Now if
we take "sense," as used by Dr. Stirling, to mean
what Kant calls " experience," the view here expressed
is identical with that which it is supposed to overthrow.
For, any experience of a real sequence involves at once
the category and the manifold to which it is applied.
There can therefore be no knowledge of a real sequence
apart from the activity by which thought combines
events in an irreversible order. Reasoning back from
any instance of an irreversible series of events, we are
compelled to grant that the knowledge of such a series
presupposes the category of causality, i.e. the combina-
tion of events in one invariable order. The perception
OBJECTIONS TO KANT'S PROOFS. 235
of change, like all other perceptions, is a judgment,
although it need not be an explicit judgment; and
it is because a judgment is presupposed in it that
we can by philosophical analysis show it to be there.
If Dr. Stirling should still object that even on the
interpretation of his theory which I have given, Kant
after all assumes an irreversible sequence, I can only
answer, in the first place, that so also does Kant's critic,
when he tells us, that sense " offers material irreversible
sequences," and, in the second place, that philosophy,
as I understand it, does not seek to originate facts,
but only to give a self-consistent explanation of them.
236
CHAPTEK VIII.
THE METAPHYSIC OF NATURE.
TX^TITH the Principles of Judgment ends the purely
positive part of the Critique, as consisting of a
systematic discussion of the a priori conditions of
knowledge, or, what is the same thing, of the pure
elements of knowable objects. The universal relations
of subject and object, as presupposed in all knowledge
of reality, have been brought to the light and con-
sidered in their connection with each other. The
various elements implied in knowledge are, as we have
seen, at the one extreme the " I," as the supreme con-
dition of any knowledge whatever, and at the other
extreme the manifold of sense, supplying the concrete
differences of things ; while intermediate between these
extremes are the categories as specifications of intelli-
gence, in so far as it is capable of reducing the particu-
lars of sense to unity, and the schemata as universal
ways of bringing those particulars, in relation to time,
under guidance of the categories. The synthetic pro-
cess by which intelligence constructs for itself a world
of objects by operating upon the manifold of sense, has
been explained generally in the principles of judgment.
So far, however, subject and object, intelligence and
nature, have been considered in their most general
viii.] THE METAPHYSIC OF NATURE. 237
aspects, or, otherwise stated, "nature" has been re-
garded as a system of universal laws un/lerlying and
making possible the world of nature as a whole, not
as nature in the more specific meaning of the universal
laws of matter presupposed in the totality of material
or corporeal objects. Kant, however, has a special
treatise l in which he sets forth the metaphysical prin-
ciples of the science of nature, showing how intelli-
gence, as operating upon the manifold of sense, gives
rise to the world of matter. The manifold of sense is
now specified as the manifold of matter, or rather as
the sensible " material," by operating upon which
material objects become known. The Metaphysic' of
Nature, then, contains those principles which are the
product of the schematized categories, as applied to a
definite manifold of sense, the material world. The
schematized categories are the condition of any know-
ledge whatever ; but these, when brought to bear upon
material objects in space, give rise to a special branch
of metaphysic, a sort of applied metaphysic, bearing
some such relation to pure metaphysic as applied logic is
usually supposed to bear to pure formal logic. In this
applied metaphysic we do not indeed concern ourselves
with the special laws of science, or the definite pro-
perties of things ; but neither do we concentrate our
attention solely upon the conditions of knowledge.
Taking external objects in their universal or abstract
relations, we set forth the universal laws which under
lie them. Here, as always, the Categories supply the
guiding thread, by following which, as we may be sure,
no aspect of the world of nature will be overlooked.
Matter must therefore, in accordance with the four
1 Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Naturwissenschaft, Werke IV. pp. 357-
462 (ed. Hartenstein, 1867).
238 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
classes of categories, be considered in respect of (1)
quantity, (2) quality, (3) relation, and (4) modality.
Now, matter, looked at in its simplest aspect, is defin-
able as that which is capable of motion in space ; de-
fined more specifically, it is that which occupies space ;
still more determinately, it is that which in moving pos-
sesses moving force ; and, lastly, in relation to the know-
ing subject, it is that which, as capable of motion, may
be an object of experience. The Metaphysic of Nature
thus divides up into four parts : — (1) Phoronomy, the
metaphysic of motion ; (2) Dynamics, the metaphysic
of matter ; (3) Mechanics, the metaphysic of force ;
and (4) Phenomenology, the metaphysic of external
experience. I propose to give the substance of this
Metaphysic of Nature, both because it is practically
the concrete for the abstract of the Critique, and be-
cause I desire to compare it with the views of matter,
motion, and force held by Mr. Spencer, whose theory
may be taken as representative of all that is most val-
uable in the empirical philosophy of nature of the day.
The progress of physical science, and especially of biol-
ogy, has brought us to that point at which the relations
of the various branches of knowledge to each other de-
mand to be settled, and has re-opened the problem as
to the ultimate principles on which the special sciences
rest. A comparison of the conclusions reached by such
a writer as Kant, at once a specialist in natural philo-
sophy and one of the greatest philosophers of any age,
with those of a writer like Mr. Spencer, who has a firm
grasp of the special principles of science as well as of the
philosophy which he represents, ought to be instruc-
tive, and will at least bring out into greater clearness
the points of difference between criticism and empiri-
cism.
viii.] THE METAPHYSIC OF NATURE. 239
1. Matter determined in its simplest aspect as "that
which is capable of motion in space," is the object of
Phoronomy. It need hardly be said that the specific
properties or relations of the various kinds of material
bodies — solid, liquid, and gaseous — do not fall under
consideration of any branch of metaphysic, but are
dealt with by the special sciences. In Phoronomy,
however, we abstract not only from these properties,
but from the causal connection of bodies in relation to
each other, and even from the quantity of matter as
such, i.e., from mass, and concentrate our attention on
the motion of a body, as a property belonging to it in
virtue of its mere existence in space. Matter may
therefore so far be treated as if it were simply a point,
endowed with the capacity of marking out a given
space in a given time. And the sole determinations of
a moveable point, as abstracted from the mutual action
of forces on each other and from mass, are velocity and
direction. The task of Phoronomy, therefore, is to
determine the universal relations of motion as specified
in velocity and direction — in other words, to construct
the quantitative relations of motion as such. Now, the
category of quantity is schematized as number, or the
successive addition of homogeneous units ; and as
nothing is homogeneous with motion but motion, the
purely quantitative consideration of matter yields
simply the composition of motions in respect of velocity
and direction.
Matter, then, in its simplest aspect, is defined
as that which is capable of motion in space. Space,
however, must be distinguished on the one hand as
relative or material, and, on the other hand, as absolute
or pure. There is no question here as to the relation
of space to our faculty of knowledge. It may, how-
240 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
ever, be repeated that space is not a thing in itself, or
any relation of things in themselves, but is a form be-
longing to our faculty of perception. Here, however,
we look at space, not in relation to our intelligence,
but as an object of knowledge, and hence as a form of
the external or material world. When, therefore, we
speak of absolute space, it must not be supposed that
we refer to a space in itself, a space independent of our
knowledge, and therefore not capable of being experi-
enced. Absolute space is simply pure or indeterminate
space, conceived of as that in which relative or deter-
minate spaces are contained. Any determinate space
marked out by the presence of material bodies, is a
space, which is conceived of relatively to a wider space
embracing and containing it. This second space may
again be conceived of as embraced by a still wider
space, and so on to infinity.
These considerations have an important bearing on
the conception of motion. A space taken in abstrac-
tion from a wider space embracing it is not knowable
at all ; and hence it can neither be said to be at
rest nor to be in motion. But the motion of matter
is a motion which is capable of being known; and
hence motion can take place only in empirical or
relative space. Now, if we take any given space,
and bring it into relation with a wider space embrac-
ing it, we can see that motion is purely relative.
Thus, a body which moves relatively to the space
in which it is perceived must be regarded as at
rest, if we suppose this space to move in a wider
space, with the same velocity as the body, but in a
contrary direction. Space in itself, or motion in itself,
is therefore an absurdity. Absolute space is just the
negation of a determinate space. We can always con-
VIIL] THE METAPHYSIC OF NATURE. 241
ceive a space beyond a given space without end, but to
suppose that pure or indeterminate space is an actual
thing is to confuse logical universality with physical
universality. So motion in itself is a contradiction in
terms, since motion is always relative to the space
in which it occurs. Motion must, therefore, be
defined as "the change of the external relations of a
thing to a given space." The common definition of
motion as " change of place " is too narrow, and holds
good only of the motion of a physical point. The
"place" of a body is in the point constituting its
centre, and this may remain at rest while the body
itself moves, as when the earth turns on its axis. The
definition of motion, however, as the change of rela-
tions to external space, is consistent with all the
motions of bodies, and emphasizes the fact that all
motion is relative. Rest, again, must be defined as
"permanent presence in the same place." It is not
correct to say that rest is simply absence of motion ;
for the negation of motion as = 0 does not admit of
mathematical construction, whereas rest, when regarded
as permanent presence in the same place, may be taken
as a motion with infinitely small velocity, and therefore
as a quantity.
As motion is relative to the space in which it is
observed, it is a matter of indifference whether we
regard a body as moving in a space which is at rest, or
the space as moving while the body remains at rest.
When we limit our attention to the space in relation to
which a body is regarded as in motion, without view-
ing it as encircled by a wider space, we naturally look
upon the body as moving and the space as at rest ;
when, on the other hand, we bring the space in which
the body is observed into relation with a wider space,
Q
242 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
we may look upon the space as moving and the body
as at rest. And as each space is either in motion or
at rest, according to our point of view, we may in all
cases of motion, or rather of motion in a straight line,
regard the body as moving in a space which is at rest,
or the space as moving in an opposite direction from
the body, and with equal velocity. Moreover, it is
quite legitimate to divide the total motion into two
parts, and to suppose the body to have one part and
the space to have the other part — although, of course,
in a contrary direction.
The quantity of motions viewed in regard to their
velocity and direction, is constructed under the guid-
ance of the category of quantity, and the combination
of any number of motions may be reduced to the com-
bination of two motions, since every synthesis of homo-
geneous units is a successive addition of part to part.
The three modes of quantity are unity, plurality, and
totality ; and these as pure forms of the understanding
must be brought into play in determining the quantity
of motion. Hence there are three possible cases. (1)
Two motions either of equal or of unequal velocity may
take place at the same time in the same direction, the
product being a motion compounded of both ; (2) two
motions, whose velocity is either equal or unequal
may take place in contrary directions, while their
combination gives rise to a third motion in the
same line ; (3) two motions, whose velocities are
either equal or unequal, may take place in different
lines, forming an angle, and their composition will
result in a third motion in a line different from
either. Thus we have (1) unity of line and direc-
tion, (2) plurality of direction in the same line,
and (3) totality both of directions and lines — the
viii.] THE METAPHYSIC OF NATURE. 243
three possible ways in which motion is determined
as a quantum.
2. Assuming matter to be determined in regard to
its motion by the category of quantity, we have now
to consider how it is still further determined in
Dynamics, by being brought under the category of
quality, as that which occupies space. In so far
as it occupies space, matter may be shown to imply
two opposite forces of attraction and repulsion, as
essential to its very constitution. But while we have
here to consider matter as constituted out of these two
forces, we yet regard it only as imparting motion in
virtue of its inherent forces, not as itself moving and
communicating motion. In the language of Mr. Lewes,
Dynamics, in the Kantian sense of the term, is the
science of matter "in its statical aspect," as distin-
guished from Mechanics, which treats of matter " in its
dynamical aspect."
The mere conception of the existence of matter in space
does not account for the occupancy of space by matter.
A material body can be conceived of as occupying space
only when it is regarded as resisting the entrance of
any other body, and therefore as endowed with a mov-
ing force of its own. A body can enter, or strive to en-
ter, a given part of space, only in so far as it moves.
Now nothing can diminish or destroy motion, but
motion in a contrary direction ; and hence the entrance
of one body into the space occupied by another can-
not be prevented unless the latter has a moving force,
which acts in a direction contrary to the motion of the
former. It is only therefore by the possession of a
moving force, that a body can occupy space at all.
This moving force is a force of repulsion, which may
be regarded indifferently as that by which a material
244 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP..
body separates another body from itself, or as that by
which it resists the approach of another body to itself.
And each part of matter must possess a repulsive force,
because otherwise matter would not occupy the whole
of the space in which it exists, but would only enclose
it. As belonging to an extended body in all its parts,
repulsion is a force of extension, expansion, or elasti-
city. And this expansive force necessarily has a finite
degree or intensive quality ; for a force incapable of
increase in intensity, would be one in which an infinite
space might be traversed in a finite time, while a
force incapable of decrease would be one from which
no motion in a finite time could arise, even if it were
multiplied by itself to infinity. The expansive force of
any material body can therefore be conceived of as
increasing or decreasing in intensity to infinity.
An inference from this is, that the space occupied by
any material body may always be diminished, since a
contrary force can always be conceived, capable of pre-
venting it from expanding itself as much as it would
otherwise do. This contrary force may be called a
force of compression. Now as a force of compression
greater than the force of expansion possessed by a given
material body can always be conceived, matter is com-
pressible to infinity. On the other hand, however great
it may be, the force of compression must have a finite
degree of intensity, and hence matter although infinitely
compressible, is yet impenetrable — i.e., its occupancy of
space cannot be absolutely destroyed. Moreover, as
the essence of matter consists in the possession of an
expansive force proceeding from each point in all direc-
tions, the smaller the space into which a body is com-
pressed, the greater must be the force by which it
strives to expand itself. The impenetrability here
VIIL] THE METAPHYSIC OF NATURE. 245
spoken of, which always increases in proportion to the
degree of compression, may be called relative impene-
trability, and the occupancy of space which it presup-
poses may be called the dynamical occupancy of space.
Absolute impenetrability rests upon the presupposition
that matter is absolutely incompressible, and the occu-
pancy of space corresponding to it may be called the
mathematical occupancy of space. The mathematical
conception of impenetrability goes on the supposition
that matter is in its ultimate nature not only impene-
trable, but incompressible. It is argued that only in so
far as there are empty spaces between its parts is a
material body compressible at all ; and hence impene-
trability is explained by supposing each atom of matter
to be absolutely impenetrable, i.e.t incompressible. 1
Such absolute impenetrability Kant regards as a
qualitas occulta. No cause is assigned of impenetra-
bility, but it is virtually asserted that matter is impene-
trable just because it is so ; in other words, the absolute
impenetrability of matter is a pure assumption, resting
upon an abstraction from that moving force without
which matter cannot be conceived as occupying space
at all.
The conception of matter as possessing by its own
nature a repulsive force, is free from this objection ;
for although we can give no reason why such a force
should exist, we can yet explain by it why a material
body offers a certain degree of resistance to any other
material body which tries to displace it. When we see
that matter is compressible to infinity, inasmuch as we
can always conceive of a greater contrary force as
brought to bear upon it, we also see that by the occupancy
1 Matter, in other words, is composed of ultimate atoms — the "hard" atoms
of the physicist.
246 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
of space we must understand a relative, and not an ab-
solute, impenetrability.
"We have seen that impenetrability arises from the
fact that each part of a material body is endowed with
an expansive force, by which it is able to repel or
remove to a distance the parts of any other material
body. Now, the space occupied by matter is mathe-
matically divisible to infinity, although its parts are
not really separable. Each part of matter occupying
space, on the other hand, is moveable or separable in
virtue of the repulsive force with which it repels all
other material parts, and is in turn repelled by
them. As each part of space is divisible to infinity,
so also is each part of matter which occupies space.
And the divisibility of matter means the physical
divisibility of its parts. Each part of matter may
therefore be regarded, like each material body, as
a material substance divisible to infinity; for a mate-
rial substance is definable as that which is moveable
in itself.
This proof of the infinite divisibility of matter over-
throws the theory of the monadists, who suppose mat-
ter to be composed of indivisible points, and to occupy
space purely in virtue of its repulsive force. On this
view, while space and the sphere of activity of a sub-
stance is divisible, the substance itself, which occupies
space and manifests force, is not divisible. But, as has
been shown, there is no point in an occupied space
which is not capable of being regarded as a material
substance endowed with repulsive force, and as itself
moveable, because capable of being acted upon by other
repulsive forces. This may be still further shown in
the following way. If we suppose any monad, with
a given sphere of activity, to be placed at a certain
viii.] THE METAPHYSIC OF NATURE. 247
point; then, as space is divisible to infinity, we can
suppose an infinity of monads to occupy a position
between the first monad and the point to which its
resistance extends. Each of these, as possessed of a
force of repulsion of its own, and as repelled by the
other, must be moveable ; and hence there is no part
of space occupied by matter which is not moveable —
in other words, each part of matter is a substance en-
dowed with a moving force. Matter, therefore, is not
indivisible, as the monadist supposes, but infinitely
divisible.
Observe, however, that when matter is said to be
divisible to infinity, it is not meant that it is made up
of an infinite number of parts, as the dogmatic philoso-
pher maintains. Divisibility is not identical with
dividedness. If space and matter were things in them-
selves, we should indeed have to admit either that
matter is composed of a finite number of parts, or that
we have no knowledge of it. But when we see
that matter in space is not a thing in itself but a
phenomenon, we can also understand how it may be
divisible to infinity, and yet may not be composed of an
infinite number of parts. A phenomenon exists only
in relation to our thought of it, and hence matter is
divided just in so far as we have carried the division.
The mere fact, therefore, that we can carry on the
division to infinity, does not show that there is in a
material body actually an infinite number of parts.
Nor can we affirm that the parts of matter are simple,
because these parts, as existing only in relation to our
consciousness of them, are given only in the process by
which they are divided or mentally distinguished.
Matter, therefore, is not composed of parts which
exist as simple in a thing external to knowledge, but
248 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
of parts determined as such in the process by which
matter is known as divisible.
It has been shown that without impenetrability there
could be no occupation of space at all, and that impenetra-
bility is just the capacity by which matter, in virtue of a
moving force, extends itself in all directions. A force of
extension, however, cannot of itself account for the ex-
istence of matter as having a definite quantity. In the
first place, there is no absolute limit to extension in such
a force itself; and, in the second place, there is nothing
in the nature of space to prevent the infinite expansion
of matter ; for the intensity of the force of extension,
while it will no doubt decrease as the volume of matter
expands, can never sink down to zero. Apart, there-
fore, from a force of compression acting contrary to
the force of repulsion, matter could have no finite
quantity in a given space, but would disperse itself to
infinity. Nor can the limiting force of one material
body be found in the repulsive force of another material
body, since the latter also requires a force of compres-
sion to determine it to a finite quantity. Besides the
repulsive force with which a body is endowed, we must
therefore suppose it to have a force acting in the op-
posite direction — i.e., a force of attraction. And this
force, as essential to the very possibility of matter, can
not be peculiar to a certain kind of material body, but
must be universal. Both the force of repulsion and the
force of attraction are therefore essential ; for while by
the former matter would disperse itself to infinity, by the
latter it would vanish in a mathematical point. If
merely a force of attraction were to act, the distance
between each part of matter would be gradually
lessened until it disappeared altogether, since one
moving force can only be limited by a moving force
VIIL] THE METAPHYSIC OF NATURE. 249
contrary to it. These, it may be added, are the only
ultimate forces; for as matter, apart from its mass,
may be considered as a point, any two material bodies
must either separate from, or approach to, one another
in the straight line lying between them ; and the motion
of separation is due to repulsion, the motion of approxi-
mation to attraction.
Matter, then, is constituted by the two opposite
forces of repulsion and attraction. There is, however,
an important distinction between the mode of operation
of these forces. Repulsion acts only by physical con-
tact, attraction only at a distance. (1) Physical con-
tact must be carefully distinguished from mathematical
contact. The latter is presupposed in the former, but
the one cannot be identified with the other. Contact,
in the mathematical sense, is simply the limit between
any two parts of space, a limit which is not contained
in either of the parts. Two straight lines cannot in
themselves be in contact with each other ; but if they
cut each other they meet in a point which constitutes
the common limit between them. So a line is the
limit between two surfaces, and a surface the limit
between two solids. Physical contact, on the other
hand, is the mutual action of two repulsive forces in
the common limit of two material bodies, or the
reciprocal action constituting impenetrability. (2)
Attraction never acts by physical contact, but is always
actio in distans, or action through empty space. For,
as has been shown, a force of attraction is essential to
the determination of any given material body as to
intensive quantity, and this force must act independ-
ently of the physical contact of bodies — i.e., through
empty space. To the conception of attraction as action
at a distance, it is commonly objected that matter can-
250 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
not act where it is not. How, it may be asked, can the
earth immediately attract the moon, which is thousands
of miles distant from it ? To this Kant replies that
matter cannot act ivhere it is, on- any hypothesis
we may adopt, since each part of it is necessarily
outside of every other. Even if the earth and the
moon were in physical contact, their point of contact
would lie in the limit between the two parts touching
each other, and therefore each part, to act on the
other, must act where it is not. The objection, there-
fore, comes to this — that one body can only act on
another when each repels the other. But this makes
attraction absolutely dependent on repulsion, if it does
not abolish attraction altogether — a supposition for
which there is no ground whatever. Attraction and
repulsion are completely independent of one another,
and are alike necessary to the constitution of a material
body.
As the forces of repulsion and attraction act respec-
tively by physical contact and through empty space,
they may be further distinguished as superficial and
penetrative. (1) Each part of a body, as occupying
space, is endowed with a force of repulsion, by which
it repels and is itself repelled. The parts are in physi-
cal contact, and each sets a limit to the expansion of
the other in space, and is itself in turn limited by the
other. It is therefore impossible for one part of mat-
ter to repel another, unless the two are in immediate
physical contact. Hence repulsion acts only at the
surface of matter. (2) The force of attraction, again,
does not act by physical contact, but at a distance.
By the possession of attraction a body does not occupy
space, but simply exists in space, without limiting any
other body to a definite part of space. Accordingly,
VIIL] THE METAPHVSIC OF NATURE. 251
attraction is not affected by the interposition of any num-
ber of bodies ; in other words, it is a penetrative force,
which is always proportional to the quantity of matter.
It follows from this that the force of attraction extends
through the spaces of the world to infinity. For as
attraction is essential to the constitution of matter, each
part of matter acts invariably at a distance. If we
suppose that there is a definite limit beyond which
attraction ceases to act, we must account for this
limitation either from the nature of the matter lying
within this sphere of activity, or from the nature of
space. The former supposition is inadmissible, for
attraction is not affected by the interposition of any
number of material bodies. The latter supposition is
equally inadmissible; for distance in space, while it
decreases the intensity of attraction in inverse ratio,
cannot reduce it to zero. There is therefore nothing
to hinder attraction from extending through space to
infinity.
In conclusion, the relation of the dynamical concep-
tion of matter to the categories of quality, under which
it stands, may be pointed out. The various modes of
quality are reality, negation, and limitation. (1) The
real in space is matter, as occupying space through its
impenetrability or repulsive force. (2) The force of
attraction, which, if acting by itself, would reduce
matter to a mathematical point, or, in other words,
absolutely destroy it, comes under the category of
negation. (3) The reflection of attraction on repulsion,
by which the quantity of matter is determined to a
finite degree, is the subsumption of matter as occupying
space under the category of limitation.
3. The final determination of matter is made in
Mechanics, in which matter is defined as " that which
252 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
has moving force, in so far as it is itself moveable."
In Dynamics abstraction is made from the actual
motion of a material body, and no properties of matter
are brought under consideration except those which are
implied in the occupation of space by moving forces.
This conception of matter, as originally endowed with
the forces of attraction and repulsion, is necessarily
presupposed in the more concrete conception of matter
as actually in motion. For, manifestly, a material
body could have no power of communicating motion to
another body, were it not itself possessed of original
forces : a body could not impress another body, lying
in the line of its motion, with a motion equal to its
own, did not both possess originally a force of repulsion ;
nor could one body cause another to move towards it
were not both originally endowed with a force of at-
traction. In Mechanics (in the metaphysical sense) the
determination of matter as that which is moveable, in
virtue of its original forces of attraction and repulsion,
is presupposed, and the further determination of mat-
ter as itself moving and communicating motion is made.
And as in this final determination of matter the relation
of one material body to another in so far as they are
contemplated as actually moving is set forth, matter,
mechanically considered, is brought under the category
of relation, in its three phases of substantiality, caus-
ality, and reciprocity.
Now, when matter is regarded as itself moving and
communicating motion, we can no longer, as in Phor-
onomy, regard it merely as that which has velocity
and direction ; nor can we confine our attention to the
original forces which determine it to the occupa-
tion of space ; but we must ask what is the relation
between the quantity of matter and the quantity of
VIIL] THE METAPHYSIC OF NATURE. 253
motion. By the quantity of matter is meant the sum
of the parts of a body as moveable in a given space.
According to the monadists, matter is not composed of
moveable parts, but is resolvable into mathematical points,
having in their relation to each other a certain degree
of moving force, in no way dependent upon the number
of parts lying side by side, or out of each other. This
separation of the degree of moving force from the
quantity of matter as a sum of moveable parts is quite
inadmissible ; for matter has no quantity except in so
far as it consists of an aggregate of parts, each outside
of the others. These parts, regarded as all moving or
acting together, are the mass of a body, and a body is
said to act in mass when its parts move together in one
direction and at the same time put forth their moving
forces. The quantity of matter must be distinguished
from mass. The former is simply any combination of
moveable parts ; the latter is a combination of move-
able parts regarded as acting together in a body. A
fluid, e.g., may either act by the motion of all its parts
at once, or by the motion of its several parts in succes-
sion. In a water-hammer, or in water enclosed in a
vessel, and pressing by its weight on a balance, water
acts in mass ; whereas the water of a mill-stream does
not act on the float-board of an undershot wheel with
all its parts at once, but with one part after another.
To determine the quantity of matter in the latter case,
we must therefore find out the quantity of the whole
body of water — i.e., that quantity of matter which, in
acting with a certain velocity, would produce the same
effect. Lastly, the quantity of motion is in Mechanics
the quantity of matter, or the mass, multiplied by the
velocity ; not, as in Phoronomy, merely the degree of
velocity. Now, it is easy to show that the only
254 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
measure of the quantity of matter in one body as com-
pared with any other, is the quantity of motion with
given velocity. As matter is divisible to infinity, and
therefore is not made up of a number of simple parts,
we cannot determine the quantity of a body by the
direct summation of its parts. It is true that in two
homogeneous bodies the quantity of matter is pro-
portional to the quantity of volume ; but the former
can only be measured by a comparison of either body
with others specifically different, and this, again, can
only be done by taking the velocity of the bodies
compared as equal, and so determining the quantity of
motion in each.
When it is said, on the one hand, that the quantity
of matter can only be measured by the quantity of
motion with given velocity, and, on the other hand,
that the quantity of motion with given velocity, is
measured by the quantity of matter moved, we seem
to fall into a vicious circle, and to leave both concep-
tions quite indefinite. The reasoning is not, however,
really circular, because the conception of the quantity
of matter is not identical with the conception of the
quantity of motion. In the one case, we regard matter
simply as a sum of moveable parts ; in the other, we
consider this totality of parts as manifesting itself in
motion. The quantity of matter is not the quantity of
repulsion or attraction, but the quantity of substance,
definable as the moveable. Alter this quantity, with-
out altering the velocity, and we must also alter the
quantity of motion ; hence the quantity of motion de-
pends upon the quantity of matter. A substance is
that which cannot exist as a predicate, but is conceiv-
able only as a subject ; and matter, as occupying space,
is a subject which cannot be determined as the predi-
viii.] THE METAPHYSIC OF NATURE. 255
cate of anything else. A material body is defined by
its actual motion, not by the quantity of its original
forces. Even in the attraction of matter, as the cause
of universal gravitation, the attracting body imparts to
itself a velocity of its own, which in like external con-
ditions is exactly proportional to the number of its
parts, and hence the quantity of matter, although
directly measured by the force of attraction, is indirectly
determined by the quantity of motion of the attracting
body.
We are now in a position to lay down the laws which
apply to matter as considered in Mechanics. These
laws are three in number, corresponding to the three
categories of relation, viz., substance, causality, and
reciprocity.
(1) " In all changes of corporeal nature, the quantity
of matter remains the same on the whole, being neither
increased nor diminished." In the First Analogy of
Experience, it was proved that no new substance can
possibly come into existence or go out of existence ;
what has here to be shown is merely what constitutes
the substance of matter. Now every material body,
and every part of a material body, that can exist in
space, is the last subject of all the properties pertain-
ing to matter. And the quantity of material substance
is the sum of its moveable parts, as existing in space,
or lying outside of one another. Unless, therefore, a
new substance could originate, or be destroyed, the sum
of the parts of matter constituting its quantity can
neither be increased nor diminished. But in all the
changes of nature substance neither originates nor is
destroyed, and hence the quantity of matter is fixed
and unchangeable. This or that material body may
change in quantity by an addition or separation of
256 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
parts ; but the sum of those parts cannot be altered,
and hence the quantity on the whole is always the
same.
(2) The second law of Mechanics is that " all changes
in material bodies are due to an external cause, or,
that every body persists in its state of rest or motion in
the same direction and with the same velocity, unless
it is compelled to alter its state by an external cause."
In the Second Analogy of Experience it was proved
that every change must have a cause ; here it has to
be shown that every change of matter must have an
external cause. Now the only determinations of matter
are those which imply relations to space, and hence all
changes of matter are changes of motion. Either one
motion alternates with another, or motion with rest, or
rest with motion ; and of each of these changes there
must be a cause. But matter has no internal deter-
minations, and hence every change of matter is due to
an external cause. This mechanical law should alone
be called the law of inertia (lex inertiae); The law that
action and reaction are equal and opposite expresses a
positive attribute of matter, and is therefore improperly
called a law of inertia. When matter is said to be
inert, all that is implied is that it has in itself no life,
and therefore no capacity of self-determination. Hence
inertia is not a positive effort of matter to maintain its
state, but simply the impossibility of change except on
condition of the action of an external cause.
(3) The third law of Mechanics is that " action and
reaction are always equal to each other." In the
Third Analogy of Experience it was proved that all
external action in the world is mutual. Here our
object is to show that this mutual action (actio mtitua)
is at the same time reaction (reactio). In estab-
VIIL] THE METAPHYSIC OF NATURE. 257
lishing this proposition, Kaut makes use of the con-
ception that the motion of a body in relative space is
the same thing as the motion of another body, together
with the space in which it exists, in a contrary direc-
tion. As all motion is relative, to say that a body A
moves towards a body B is the same thing as saying
that B together with its space moves towards A. If,
therefore, A strikes B, we must, to determine the
quantity of motion of each after impact, divide the
velocity between A and B in the inverse ratio of
their mass. In this way Kant seeks to prove the
mechanical law that reaction is always equal to action,1
but his proof need not be given here.
These three laws of general Mechanics might be
called respectively the law of subsistence (lex subsisten-
tice), the law of inertia (lex inertice), and the law of
reaction (lex antagonismi). That they exactly corres-
pond to the categories of substance, cause, and recipro-
city is self-evident.
4. In Phenomenology matter is considered simply
in its relation to the knowing subject, and hence it is
now defined as that which can be an object of experi-
ence. What has here to be shown are the conditions
under which it may be determined as a knowable
object by the predicate of motion. Following the
clue of the categories, we must therefore bring matter
as moveable under the categories of modality.
(1) "The motion in a straight line of a material
body relatively to empirical space, as distinguished
from the contrary motion of the space, is possible.
Absolute motion, on the other hand, is impossible."
Whether we say that a body moves in a space which
is at rest, or that the space moves in a contrary direc-
. Anfanr/. d. Natur., pp. 441-2.
R
258 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
tion and with equal velocity, in no way alters the
character of the object, but is merely a question as to
the point of view of the knowing subject. Now, when
only an alternative, as distinguished from a disjunc-
tive judgment, can be made in regard to an object, it
is left undetermined which of two contrary predicates
really applies to it. Hence the motion of matter in
a straight line in empirical space, as distinguished
from the contrary and equal motion of the space,
is merely a possible predicate. Again, as motion
is a relation, both of its correlates must be known
before there can be any real knowledge ; and hence
motion in a straight line, apart from all relation to an
object which moves, and which may be known as
moving, is absolutely impossible. Absolute motion, in
other wrords, cannot possibly be known.
(2) " The circular motion of a material body, in
distinction from the contrary motion of space, is
actual ; whereas the contrary motion of a relative
space is not an actual motion of a body, but a mere
illusion." In circular motion there is a continual
change of motion from the straight line, and therefore
a continual origination of newT motion. Now, by the
law of inertia no motion can originate without an
external cause ; and by the same law a body continu-
ally strives to go on in the straight line touching the
circle, and is only hindered from doing so by the con-
trary action of an external cause. A body which
moves in a circle therefore shows itself to be possessed
of a moving force. The motion of space, on the
other hand, cannot be due to any moving force. Now,
the judgment that either a body moves or that its space
moves in a contrary direction, is a disjunctive judgment,
in which either alternative excludes the other. The
vni.] THE METAPHYSIC OF NATURE. 259
circular motion of the body is therefore actual, and
the contrary motion of relative space, as it is incon-
sistent with the connection of knowable objects, is a
mere illusion.
(3) " When one body sets another in motion, an
equal and opposite motion of the latter is necessary."
This proposition follows directly from the third law of
Mechanics. In all communication of motion reaction
is equal to action. The motion of the body which is
said to be acted upon is as actual as the motion of the
body which is said to act. And as the actuality of
this motion does not merely rest upon an external
force, but follows immediately and necessarily from
the relation of moveable bodies in space to each other,
the motion of the body moved is necessai*y.
These three propositions, it will be observed, corres-
pond respectively to matter as the moveable, as the
moveable which occupies space, and as the moveable
which in virtue of its motion has moving force ; in
other words, to matter as determined by Phoronomy,
by Dynamics, and by Mechanics respectively. It is
also self-evident that they bring matter under the cate-
gories of possibility, actuality, and necessity — the three
categories of Modality.
2GO
CHAPTER IX.
COMPARISON OF THE CRITICAL AND EMPIRICAL CONCEPTIONS
OF NATURE.
HHHE statement of the main positions in Kant's
Metaphysic of Nature, given in last chapter, will
enable us to see how the critical conception of the
material world differs from the empirical, or, as Kant
would call it, the dogmatic conception of it. The
world of external nature, like nature in general, is
regarded, not as existing independently of intelligence,
but as constituted for us by the activity of intelligence
as acting upon the external manifold of sense. With
this critical explanation of nature, I now propose to
contrast the empirical explanation of it as given by
Mr. Spencer.
1. It is evident, in the first place, that in determin-
ing the various elements which make up our knowledge
of the material world, Kant is guided, more or less
consciously, by the principle that the true method of
knowledge consists in a progress from the less to the
more concrete, not in a progress from the more to the
less concrete. Absolute space he regards not as more
real than empirical or relative space, but simply as a
mere "logical universality," an abstraction from any
given determinate space. Absolute motion, again, as
ix.] MR. SPENCER'S VIEW OF NATURE. 261
he shows, cannot be an object of knowledge; the
only motion we can possibly know is that "which is
relative or determinate. Accordingly, matter is suc-
cessively determined as that which is capable of motion
— as that which occupies space by the forces of repul-
sion and attraction — as that which in moving com-
O
municates motion — and lastly, as that which exists
only in relation to our intelligence. That Kant does
not always clearly separate between the method of
abstraction and the method of determination by more
and more concrete elements is no doubt true, as I shall
afterwards try to show ; but it is equally evident that
he emphatically rejects the reduction of concrete know-
ledge to such thin and impalpable abstractions as space
in itself, motion in itself, matter in itself, or force in
itself. The world of nature he accordingly conceives
as a system of determinate relations, or a " closed
sphere," in which each element of reality exists only
in relation to the other elements. Space, motion,
matter, and force preserve their distinctness, and yet
they are not separated from each other by a process of
unreal abstraction, but are so connected together as to
combine in a concrete universe, in which each element
is not only relative to every other, but is likewise
relative to intelligence.
Now, the method of Mr. Spencer, unlike that of
Kant, is a method of abstraction, although at times
the opposite method of determination is followed. The
contrast between Kant and Mr. Spencer in this re-
spect is, that while the former only drops into the
method of abstraction from want of a sufficiently
firm grasp of his own principles, the latter deliberately
adopts the method of abstraction, and is only inadvert-
ently betrayed into making use of the method of deter-
262 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
mination. In attempting to justify this charge I shall
confine myself mainly to the third chapter of the second
part of Mr. Spencer's First Principles, which, speaking
generally, corresponds to Kant's Plioronomy. It does
not require very much reflection upon the statements
in that chapter to make it apparent that, all through,
Mr. Spencer assumes that there is a real universe
existing in its completeness in absolute independence
of all relation to intelligence. Now, there is no rea-
son to deny that common sense and natural science,
in one aspect of them, seem to give the strongest
support for this supposition. The ordinary atti-
tude of the plain man is that of a spectator who
observes directly before him certain real things and
persons that he seems to apprehend as they exist full-
formed and complete in themselves. His doubts as to
reality, if he have any, do not concern the possible
illusiveness of existing things, but only the possibility
of misapprehension on his own part. In like manner
it is a presupposition of the observations and experi-
ments of the scientific man that the world exists com-
plete in itself, and lies there ready for apprehension.
He knows that effort on his own part is the condition
of the knowledge of things, but he never supposes that
the presence or absence of such knowledge has any-
thing to do with the reality of existence. A philoso-
pher, therefore, who appeals to common sense and to
science in support of his assumption that the world is
independent of conscious intelligence, has the apparent
support of both. But the support is only apparent.
Ask the man of common sense, or the scientific man
who is innocent of philosophical theory, whether the
world he regards as real is not, after all, a world of
mere appearances — a world which seems, but is not —
ix.J MR. SPENCER'S VIEW OF NATURE. 263
and he can only be made to understand the question
by a series of explanations that take him beyond his
ordinary point of view, and awaken him, as by a
shock, to an elementary conception of the problem of
philosophy. Prior to this, he had taken for granted
that knowledge and reality are one, and hence it is just
as easy to show, by an appeal to common sense and
science, that reality is bound up with intelligence, as
to show that it is independent of intelligence. The
separation of thought and nature — knowledge and
reality — does not present itself to ordinary conscious-
ness at all ; and hence the empiricist and the idealist
may with equal confidence appeal to it, secure of an
apparent support. But this simply shows the absurd-
ity of the appeal. Philosophy begins by discerning
the possibility of a breach between knowledge and
reality, and its task is to show either that they coincide
or that they do not. It is therefore utterly unpardon-
able in a philosopher to begin with the assumption of
the independence of reality on intelligence, for such
an assumption just means that so far he has not got to
the philosophical point of view. Nor is this all, for
such a supposition is not only unjustifiable, but it leads
to a perverted view of the relation between knowledge
and reality, as will appear from an examination of Mr.
Spencer's procedure.
Between the first view of the world as a congeries of
individual objects connected together by the superficial
unity of space and time, and the scientific view of that
world as a system of forces, there lies a wide interval
during which intelligence has been becoming more and
more active — on the one hand observing the infinite
complexity of the determinations of things, and on the
other hand finding them united by higher and closer
264 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
bonds of unity. But, as the process by which intelli-
gence developes itself is looked upon by the scientific
man, not less than by the man of common sense,
simply as a process by which the properties and the
relations of objects in a world independent of conscious-
ness are discovered by the individual observer, the
correlative evolution of intelligence is neglected.
Science finds it necessary to systematize its knowledge
by means of the conceptions of matter, motion, and
force, but these conceptions are looked upon as purely
objective, or independent of thought. In this assump-
tion, science, as such, is perfectly justified, since its
task is to point out what are the properties and the
relations of things to each other — not to inquire into
the relations of knowledge and reality. But he who
constructs a philosophical theory may not take up from
the special sciences, without criticism, the conceptions
they are compelled to use, and proceed to explain
knowledge on the assumption of the complete deter-
mination of objects independently of intelligence. This,
however, is what Mr. Spencer, in the present instance,
does. The order his exposition ostensibly follows is to
treat first of space and time, then to go on to matter and
motion, and to end with force, " the ultimate of ulti-
mates," as he calls it. The real order of his thought,
however, is to start from the conception of force, next
to go on to motion and matter as presupposed in force,
and finally to come to time and space as implied in
motion and matter. Now, this just means that he
assumes the independent reality of the world as it
exists for science, and then proceeds by analysis to get
back to the simplest and most abstract elements of that
world. The true order is exactly the reverse. The
world, as absolutely unthinkable apart from intelli-
ix.] MR. SPENCER'S VIEW OF NATURE. 265
gence, presupposes the putting together of more and
more concrete elements, so that while space, as the
mere abstraction of external individuality, is in the
order of thought and of the evolution of intelligence,
the abstractest and simplest element of all, force, as
comprehending in a more concrete unity time, matter,
and motion, is the last and highest conception. The
process of abstraction or analysis by which Mr.
Spencer gets his results is merely a process by which
the intelligible character of the universe is denied, just
because it is tacitly assumed.
The next step of Mr. Spencer is to explain how a
world already assumed to be known gets into the indi-
vidual consciousness. The method of explanation is
exceedingly simple. It consists in plausibly explaining
how a world already known communicates itself to the
individual through his senses. The senses are said
immediately to reveal objects as resisting, and the feel-
ing of resistance is identified with force. As the con-
ception of force already presupposes the whole process
by which it has been arrived at, we thus get, by an act
seemingly of the simplest kind, the materials from
which motion, matter, etc., may be apparently obtained
by analysis, without any synthetic activity of thought
whatever. All the elements needed to constitute
reality are thus secured beforehand, and we have
only to take, at each fresh stage of our progress, as
much from the intelligible world as we find con-
venient. Thus the dependence of real existence
upon intelligence is got rid of by the convenient
method of assuming beforehand what we pretend
to derive by a process of immediate apprehension.
Nothing could be simpler, and nothing more use-
less and delusive, than a method such as this, which,
266 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
while it pretends to describe the process by which
the knowledge of reality is obtained, simply sets
forth that which has been tacitly assumed at the
outset.
The derivation given by Mr. Spencer of space and
time, preparatory to his reduction of all phenomena to
force, is, briefly, as follows : " Of those relations which
are the form of all thought there are two orders — rela-
tions of sequence and relations of co-existence, the
former being original and the latter derivative. The
relation of sequence is given in every change of con-
sciousness. The relation of co-existence, which cannot
be originally given in a consciousness of which the
states are serial, becomes distinguished only when it is
found that certain relations of sequence have their
terms presented in consciousness in either order with
equal facility ; while the others are presented only in
one order. Relations of which the terms are not
reversible become recognized as sequences proper, while
relations of which the terms occur indifferently in both
directions become recognized as co-existences. By
endless experiences an abstract conception of each is
generated. The abstract of all sequences is time. The
abstract of all co-existences is space. Our conceptions
of time and space, then, are generated, as other ab-
stracts are generated from other concretes ; the only
difference being that the organization of experience
has, in these cases, been going on throughout the
entire evolution of intelligence. The experiences out
of which the abstract of co-existence has been gener-
ated are the experiences of individual positions as
ascertained by touch, and each of such experiences
involves the resistance of an object touched, and the
muscular tension which measures this resistance. By
ix. J MR. SPENCER'S VIEW OF NATURE. 267
countless unlike muscular adjustments different posi-
tions are disclosed ; but since, under other circumstan-
ces, the same muscular adjustments do not produce
contact with resisting positions, there result the same
states of consciousness, minus the resistance, and from
a building up of these results space. Similarly in
regard to time, the abstract of all sequences." l
This passage contains an admirable illustration of
that mixture of common-sense realism and individual-
istic sensationalism which runs through the whole of
Mr. Spencer's philosophy, and, indeed, through all
empirical psychology. It is really an attempt to com-
bine two discordant views that are not capable of
union, and which, therefore, are simply applied to each
other without being united, as the surfaces of two
chiselled stones may be brought into close contact with-
out being joined together. In our unreflective experi-
ence of the world we are as far as possible from
supposing that the objects we know can be resolved into
our own passing feelings; on the contrary, we tacitly
assume that the world we know is the world as it
really is — the world as known by everybody else. It
is no doubt true that we look upon ourselves and others
as independent individuals, and that this assumption,
when made explicit, leads to the view of sensationalism
that the only way in which things are known is
through our subjective feelings. We may, therefore,
say that common consciousness assumes, indifferently,
that the known world is objective and intelligible, and
that it is subjective and sensuous ; unreflective con-
sciousness, in short, is, implicitly, at once idealistic and
sensationalistic, although, explicitly, it is neither the
one nor the other. Mr. Spencer's procedure is to
1 First Principles, pp. 163-165, § 47.
268 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
accept both the realism — i.e., the tacit idealism of
common sense — and its contradictory sensationalism.
Accordingly, he does not scruple to speak of relations
of sequence and relations of co-existence as if they were
given in complete independence of intelligence ; and
hence the only question, as he puts it, is how the indi-
vidual comes gradually to appropriate objects through
his own particular and perpetually-changing feelings.
From, this way of stating the question the absurdity of
trying to build up a stable universe out of evanescent
sensations is concealed both from Mr. Spencer himself
and from the unwary reader ; because, having an intel-
ligible universe always before their consciousness, they
overlook the fact that individual feelings, as unrelated,
are in the most absolute sense unintelligible. It is not
seen to be a contradiction to identify successive feelings
of touch and of muscular sensation with " relations of
sequence," and even with " relations of co-existence,"
although it seems plain enough the moment it is stated
that feelings, as such, cannot be " relations " of any
kind whatever. Proof of this charge of self-contradic-
tion is so important in itself, and has so decisive a
bearing upon the doctrine of force as conceived by
empirical psychologists, that a detailed examination of
Mr. Spencer's derivation of the conceptions of space
and time may be excused.
The " relation of sequence" is primary, because
" given in every change of consciousness ; " the " re-
lation of co-existence" is secondary, because it "cannot
be originally given in a consciousness of which the
states are serial." How, then, does the consciousness
of co-existence arise ? From the fact that " certain
relations of sequence have their terms presented in
consciousness, in either order, with equal facility,
ix.] MR. SPENCER'S VIEW OF NATURE. 269
while the others are presented only in one order."
Here it is quite evident that Mr. Spencer is trying
to explain how we come to experience a world of
co-existent and successive objects, conceived in the
first place as independent of consciousness. Now, a
world in which events are " presented only in one
order" is, in other words, a wrorld in which the
events are connected in an irreversible or uniform
order, i.e., in which they are connected together as
cause and effect. Such a world, therefore, is already
constituted by universal forms of thought, involving,
not only intelligence, but intelligence that has devel-
oped itself by very complex relations. And a neces-
sary and uniform sequence of events is very different
from the supposed sequence of feelings, as they occur in
" a consciousness of which the states are serial." No
doubt there is a point of view from which it can be
shown that the serial states of consciousness imply a
uniform sequence in the way of causality, but such a
point of view can be attained only by a philosophy
which sets forth, in systematic order, the different ele-
ments that conspire to produce a rational universe — a
universe that, apart from reason, is nothing ; not by a
philosophy which assumes the existence of a ready-
made universe independent of reason. That Mr.
Spencer is committed to the latter standpoint is evident
from his attempt to account for relations of co-existence
by relations of sequence ; and it is still more apparent
from the fact that he afterwards explains co-existence
as a compound of feelings of touch and muscular sen-
sation. His method, then, is to identify " relations of
sequence " with the mere sequence of feelings, in a
"consciousness of which the states can only be serial;"
and, having thus assumed uniform relations of sequence,
270 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
the only thing requiring explanation seems to be, how
these give rise to relations of co-existence. But a
sequence of feelings conceived to occur in a purely
individual consciousness is as far as possible from being
identical with the objective sequence of real events in
an intelligible world. The former is, ex hypotliesi, riot
irreversible, but arbitrary; not objective, but subjec-
tive. The latter is uniform, necessary, and unchang-
ing, and involves the actual relation of objects as
identical in the midst of change, and as necessarily
connected with each other. The one excludes all rela-
tions, the other involves a complexity of relations. It
is, therefore, utterly impossible to extract from the
sequence of states, in a purely individual consciousness,
any objective order of events ; and there is no reason
whatever for deriving co-existence from sequence, ex-
cept the unwarrantable confusion between the causal
sequence of events and the arbitrary sequence of indi-
vidual feelings. And this brings us to remark, sec-
ondly, that "relations of co-existence" are not separable
from " relations of sequence " in the way assumed by
Mr. Spencer. We may distinguish the causal connec-
tion of events from the reciprocal influence of co-exist-
ing substances, but the intelligent experience of
reality involves both. It is not possible to be con-
scious of events as uniformly sequent, without being
conscious of substances as dependent upon and in-
fluencing each other ; or, to take experience at an
earlier stage, it is not possible to think of events
as following upon each other in time, apart from the
thought of things as co-existing in space. The experi-
ence of the one implies the experience of the other ;
and hence any attempt to get the one without the
other is an attempt to apprehend one element of the
ix.] MR. SPENCER'S VIEW OF NATURE. 271
real world apart from another element that is necessary
to make it real. We may certainly ideally distinguish
the elements, but in our analysis we must be careful to
leave room for such a synthesis as shall exclude all
actual separation.
Having plausibly derived relations of co-existence
from relations of sequence, Mr. Spencer tries to show
that space and time are " generated as other abstracts
are generated." The same paralogism of individual
feelings and relations of thought again presents itself.
We start from the world as given in ordinary con-
sciousness— the world as implicitly rational — and ask
how, supposing we have a knowledge of co-existent
and successive objects, abstract space and time are
produced ? There can be no difficulty in giving an
apparently satisfactory explanation, because in our
datum we already have implicitly that which is to be
established. Things as co-existent and successive are
spatial and temporal, and by simply analysing what is
contained in our ordinary knowledge, and abstracting
from all the differences of objects, we easily get space
and time as residue. Mr. Spencer, in other words,
when he speaks here of space, has before his mind
space as the object of the mathematical sciences.
Now, mathematics does not find it necessary to inquire
into the relation of space to intelligence ; as a special
science it is sufficient for it to assume its object as
ready-made, and to examine the various ideal limitations
of it from the phenomenal point of view. Mr. Spencer,
therefore, has, in his conception of space as the " ab-
stract of all co-existences " — an abstract that is sup-
posed to be obtained by mere analysis of a pre-existent
material — a ready means of emptying intelligence of its
universal relations. Just as, when he has to account for
272 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
co-existent objects, he first identifies the mere sequence
of feelings with the necessary or objective sequence of
events, and is thus able apparently to extract from feel-
ing the conception of permanent substances ; so here he
assumes that objects as offering resistance are given in
feelings of touch, and hence he easily derives empty space
from muscular tensions unassociated with feelings of
resistance. It is hardly necessary to repeat that indi-
vidual feelings, however numerous, cannot possibly
account for the knowledge of extended things or of
extension, since such feelings are assumed to be desti-
tute of that universality which is the condition of any
knowledge whatever. Mr. Spencer seems to suppose
that, by throwing the supposed experience back into
the haze of the past, and imagining a vast period of
time to have elapsed, during which the race has been
accumulating knowledge, the intellectual elements of
experience may be resolved into felt elements. But
this is an utterly untenable position. The very be-
ginning of intelligent experience, whether in the indi-
vidual or in the race, must contain the elements
necessary to such experience, and these elements can-
not be reduced to lower terms than a synthesis of
subject and object, of the universal and the particular.
A purely feeling consciousness, assumed to exist for an
infinite period of time, is still a feeling consciousness :
unless a transition can be made from this unintelligent
state, by means of a primary act of abstraction at once
separating and uniting the object and the subject, there
can be no experience of the world at all, and therefore no
experience of the world as spatial. Mr. Spencer really
confuses the unreflective consciousness, which does not
sharply separate subject and object, or things and
space, with a merely feeling consciousness which, as
ix.] MR. SPENCER'S VIEW OF NATURE. 273
such, is the negation of that separation. But in the
former the two terms are really present, and although
their contrast is seldom explicitly perceived, it is still
there, ready to be brought out by reflective analysis ;
in fact, were it not implicitly there, no amount of
reflection could extract it. It is, therefore, a manifest
liysteron proteron to account for space as due to mere
feelings of muscular tension. In intelligent experience
space and time are not posterior, but prior, to co-exist-
ing and successive objects, as undifferentiated space
is prior to positions — i.e., limitations of space. Mr.
Spencer first identifies feelings of muscular tension
with co-existing positions — which, as involving rela-
tions to each other, are more than feelings — and next
assumes that a synthesis of these positions generates
space. But position already involves the relation of
the parts of space to each other, and hence cannot
account for space. In short, just as the co-existence of
objects presupposes their relation to each other in
space, and therefore different positions, so position pre-
supposes a universal space, which is ideally limited.
Space, as Kant says, is not a collection of particular
spaces, but a universal space differentiating itself in the
particular.
Having found that Mr. Spencer ostensibly derives
space and time from mere feelings of resistance, which
lie unwarrantably identifies with the conception of
force, we may expect that in accounting for matter and
motion the same fallacious method will be adopted.
His account of matter is, briefly, as follows : — " Our
conception of matter, reduced to its simplest shape, is
that of co-existent positions that offer resistance. We
think of body as bounded by surfaces that resist, and
as made up throughout of parts that resist. . . . And
274 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
since the group of co-existing positions constituting a
portion of matter is uniformly capable of giving us
impressions of resistance in combination with various
muscular adjustments, according as we touch its near,
its remote, its right or left side, it results that, as dif-
ferent muscular adjustments habitually indicate differ-
ent co-existences, we are obliged to conceive every
portion of matter as containing more than one resistant
position. . . . The resistance- attribute of matter must
be regarded as primordial, and the space-attribute as
derivative. ... It thus becomes manifest that our
experience of force is that out of which the idea of
matter is built." l
Here again we have an illustration of that method
of accounting for the intelligible world by ignoring
intelligence which Mr. Spencer carries on with great
self-complacency, and apparently without the least
perception of the real nature of his procedure. " Our
conception of matter, reduced to its simplest shape,"
simply means the real world after we have eliminated
by abstraction those prominent elements in it which
presuppose an elaborate process of construction by
thought. The world as it exists for the scientific man,
the world as composed of objects bound together by
the law of gravitation, and manifesting physical, chemi-
cal, and vital forces, is stripped of all its differentiating
relations, and reduced to a congeries of extended and
solid atoms, preparatory to the reverse process by which
the relations abstracted from shall be surreptitiously
brought back and attributed to independent feelings.
But, even when nature has been thus attenuated to a
ghost of its former self, the attempted derivation of it
from feeling is easily seen to be inadmissible. The
1 First Principles, pp. 166, 167, § 48.
ix.] MR. SPENCER'S VIEW OF NATURE. 275
passage from individual feelings to " co-existent posi-
tions that offer resistance," however apparently easy,
cannot really be made. We are told of " impres-
sions of resistance," and of " muscular adjustments."
Now, an impression of resistance is not a mere
feeling, but the conception of an object as resisting,
and such a conception involves a construction of
reality by relations of thought. Similarly, "muscu-
lar adjustments" presuppose a knowledge of the mus-
cular system, or, at least, of the body as it exists for
common consciousness, and, here again, relations of
thought are inconsistently attributed to mere feeling.
If we exclude all that is involved in the relations of
a resisting object to the organism as the medium of
muscular sensibility, we are reduced to mere feelings
which can by no possibility give a knowledge of anything
real and external to themselves. Hence the absurdity
of assuming that a mere feeling is in itself a theory of
matter as the manifestation of force ; hence, also, the
absurdity of regarding force as the simplest, instead of
the most complex, element of the real world as it exists
for the scientific man.
From what has been said it is easy to see why Mr.
Spencer regards the " resistance-attribute of matter as
primordial, the space-attribute as derivative." It must,
at first sight, seem strange that " co-existing positions
that offer resistance" should be held to be prior to "co-
existing positions " themselves. In the apprehension
of resisting positions there is, surely, already implied
space. Mr. Spencer, however, identifies his own theory,
that resistant positions are revealed by muscular sensa-
tions, with the common-sense apprehension of objects,
which, like all knowledge, really involves the reduc-
tion of particulars to the unity of thought. Hence
276 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
space, although it is involved in the ordinary appre-
hension of objects in the same sense in which resistance
is involved in it, is assumed by Mr. Spencer not to
exist for consciousness at all, because it has not yet
been made an object of the abstract understanding.
Accordingly, the resistance is abstracted from, and
there is left pure space, as it exists for the mathema-
tician. Here the purely analytical procedure of the
empirical psychologist is apparent. The world of
objects in space is supposed to be given apart from
thought, or rather by means of mere "impressions of
resistance," and by a further extension of this purely
sensible process, the knowledge of space is supposed
to be given by feeling, when in reality it is got by a
process of abstraction that presupposes the manifold
relations of intelligence by which the world has been
put together. Mr. Spencer has not asked himself the
proper question of philosophy, How is the real world
related to intelligence ? but, instead, has put a question
that presupposes a false abstraction of reality from in-
telligence, viz., How does the individual man apprehend
by his sensations the real world 1 The true answer to
his question is that, by mere sensation, no reality what-
ever can be apprehended, and the illusion of such
apprehension simply arises from confounding sensation
as the first unreflected form of knowledge with sensa-
tion as a mere abstraction of one element of knowledge.
If it be replied that Mr. Spencer does not base know-
ledge upon mere feelings, but upon " relations," the
answer is that the "relations" do not on his view con-
stitute reality, but are only the modes by which the
individual consciousness gradually fills itself up with
the pre-existent elements of a supposed real world ; and
hence, that, notwithstanding the use of terms implying
ix.] MR. SPENCER'S VIEW OF NATURE. 277
more than feeling, mere feelings are, after all, assumed
to account for reality.
Mr. Spencer's account of motion is similar in nature
to the account of space, of time, and of matter. " The
conception of motion, as presented, or represented, in
the developed consciousness, involves the conceptions
of space, of time, and of matter. A something that
moves ; a series of positions united in thought with the
successive ones — these are the constituents of the idea.
. . . Movements of different parts of the organism in
relation to each other are first presented in conscious-
ness. These, produced by the action of the muscles,
necessitate reactions upon consciousness in the shape of
muscular tension. Consequently, each stretching-out
or dra wing-in of a limb is originally known as a series
of muscular tensions, varying in intensity as the posi-
tion of the limb changes. . . . Motion, as we know it,
is thus traceable to experiences of force."1
In treating of matter, Mr. Spencer betook himself
to the conception of the world as it exists for the
scientific man, and, neglecting the manifold relations
which form the real wealth of the sciences, he fixed his
attention exclusively upon body, conceived as extended
and resistant. Now he refers again to his scientific
conception of the world, and, fetching therefrom the
conception of motion, adds it to the elements he has
thus far sought to explain. In this way he gets the
credit of explaining the origin of motion without any
synthetic activity of thought, while in reality that
conception is assumed, and only seems to the uncritical
reader to be derived, because immediate feelings and
intelligible objects are blended together in the confused
medium of popular language.
1 First Principle*, pp. 167, 168, § 49.
278 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
Motion is to be explained by feeling, and, for the
purpose in hand, muscular tensions are most easily
manipulated. "Movements of different parts of the
organism," we are told, " are first presented in con-
sciousness." This is an exceedingly facile way of
accounting for our knowledge of motion. The " organ-
ism" is assumed, and that means that we are already,
at the beginning of knowledge, supposed to have such a
knowledge of it as is possessed by the scientific physio-
logist. Hence the manifold relations of real objects to
each other, and the differentiation of the human organ-
ism from other organisms, and from inorganic bodies,
are taken for granted at the very start. That being so,
there can be no great difficulty in accounting for the
movements of the organism; seeing that these are
already implied in our knowledge of the organism
itself. These movements, we are next informed,
" necessitate reactions upon consciousness." No doubt
they do ; but the question is whether such " reactions "
can possibly be known by consciousness as reactions,
supposing consciousness to be identical with feeling.
The assumption that this is really the case derives its
apparent force from confusing the mere feeling of
muscular tension, which is incapable of giving the
knowledge of any reality whatever, with the conception
of muscular tension as related to a real intelligible
world. Hence it seems as if feelings of muscular
tension, " known as a series," account for motion in the
form of " movements of different parts of the organism."
But "muscular tensions," as feelings, can only be sup-
posed to give a knowledge of the movements of the
organism," because the conception of such movements,
and of motion in general, is taken up without criticism
from the special sciences. When we make a real effort
ix.] MR. SPENCER'S VIEW OF NATURE. 279
to explain motion, we find that it is utterly unin-
telligible, apart from the other elements to which
in an intellectual synthesis it is related.
After what has already been said, it cannot be
necessary to show at length that " experiences of force "
do not, as Mr. Spencer would have us believe, precede
experiences of motion, but, on the contrary, presuppose
those experiences. It is only by unwarrantably con-
fusing mere feelings of muscular tension with the
muscular tensions themselves, as they exist in a real
world, which is, at the same time, an intelligible world,
that any one could fall into the mistake of setting down
as primary and simple that which involves a long and
very complex process of differentiation. Force is, no
doubt, presupposed in motion, as motion is presupposed
in matter, and matter in time, and time in space;
but the implications of the first and simplest form of
knowledge are not at first discerned, and, hence, force
is the last element in the scientific conception of the
world which emerges into explicit consciousness.1
2. It will help to emphasize the contrast between
Criticism and Empiricism, to compare Kant's proofs of
the three laws of Mechanics with Mr. Spencer's way of
establishing the indestructibility of matter, the persist-
ence of force, and the continuity of motion.
In the first law of Mechanics, viz., that " the quantity
of matter cannot be either increased or diminished,"
Kant refers back to the proof of the First Analogy of
Experience, as given in the Critique, where it is proved
that in all changes of phenomena substance is per-
manent, and its quantum neither increases nor dimin-
1The above remarks on the third chapter of First Principles originally
appeared, with a few verbal differences, in the Journal of Speculative Philos-
ophy, xii., 125-136. The rest of the chapter is almost entirely new.
280 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
islies ; and he only seeks to apply the conclusion there
reached to substance specialized as matter. Now, as
we have seen, the proof of the First Analogy of Experi-
ence is purely transcendental, i.e., it shows that apart
from the reflection of a manifold of sense on the " I "
as the supreme condition of synthesis, there could be
no knowledge of objects as permanent. According to
Kant, therefore, the indestructibility of matter can be
proved only by showing that it is implied in the very
possibility of knowledge. The manifold of external
sense is no doubt given to intelligence, but the fixing
of this manifold as permanent is due to the very con-
stitution of the human intelligence. Any attempt to
account for the indestructibility of matter by a reference
to observation, is, for Kant, an attempt to explain how
matter as a thing in itself may be apprehended as per-
manent, the logical issue of which can only be a denial
of all knowledge of matter. From a mere observation
of external objects existing apart from all relation to
intelligence, the most that can be said . is, that so far
as we have observed, -matter is indestructible. But this
is very different from the unqualified affirmation that
matter is indestructible.
Mr. Spencer endeavours to show that matter is in-
destructible in two ways; first, by "induction," and
secondly, by " deduction." Both of these proofs involve
the contradictory assertions, that matter is imme-
diately known, and that it is known to be permanent
or indestructible. (1) The inductive proof is briefly
this : Take any substance and find out by weighing it,
the number of its constituent atoms ; then let it undergo
a chemical or physical process of change, and it will be
found that the number of constituent atoms is still
exactly the same as before. Here we start from the
ix.] MR. SPENCER'S VIEW OF NATURE. 281
ordinary empirical assumption that a thing, as variously
qualified, is given in purely passive observation. The
induction itself is further supposed to be a process of
passive observation. But, if that be the case, how can
we legitimately pass from our particular observations
of individual substances to the universal affirmation
that matter as a whole is indestructible ? As Hume
has shown, the mere observation of facts does not
entitle us to make any universal judgment; we are
confined to the judgment, "This substance, so long as
I observe it, remains the same in quantity." But this
is not all. For, if the substances supposed to be
directly observed, are regarded as existing indepen-
dently of the relations by which intelligence constitutes
them as knowable objects, they cannot even be known
to persist through a limited number of moments of
time, unless thought combines the scattered impres-
sions they are supposed to excite in us. Apart from
such relations of thought, there could be no object
at all for us. Now, an object which is known not only
as something in general, but as a determinate object,
having the attribute of weight, must not only be known
as enduring through successive moments of time, but
must be determined by the complex relations involved
in the conception of it as a gravitating body, whose
weight is proportional to its mass. And this takes
us far beyond the perception of the moment, to the
complex relations involved in the connexion of material
bodies with each other. It is only by assuming to
start with the permanence of matter as known, and the
permanence of its quantitative relations, that Mr.
Spencer apparently accounts for the indestructibility of
matter from induction or pure observation. (2) The
" deductive " proof simply repeats the fallacy of the
282 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
inductive proof. We may conceive matter to be com-
pressed, it is said, to any finite extent, but we can
never conceive it to be compressed into nothing. Now,
as Kant points out, there is no difficulty in conceiving
— i.e., imagining — any given unit of mass to be reduced
in size, so long as we contemplate the mass per se,
without introducing the conception of weight or force
impressed. In like manner, it is perfectly easy to
imagine the decrease of the given weight of any mass,
so long as we abstract from the mass and look only at
the weight. What, then, is inconceivable ? Mani-
festly, the conception of a mass that is not proportional
to weight, or of weight that is not proportional to
mass. We cannot conceive matter compressed into
nothing, because we cannot conceive the compression
of nothing. The deductive proof, therefore, asserts
universally that mass and weight are correlative and
proportional. But, while there is no difficulty in
understanding how this proportionality of weight and
mass may be known, when we regard these as deter-
minations of objects existing only in relation to intelli-
gence, it is utterly inconceivable how objects which
are defined as beyond intelligence, should be known to
have these or any other properties. Mr. Spencer
therefore, can only assume that these relations are
somehow known, and then proceed to " deduce " them.
The deduction cannot present any great difficulty,
since it is merely a restatement of that which is taken
for granted, and taken for granted in defiance of a
theory of knowledge that is really a theory of igno-
rance.
Kant's second law of Mechanics is that all changes
in matter are due to an external cause ; and in proving
this proposition he refers back to the proof of Causality,
ix.] MR. SPENCER'S VIEW OF NATURE. 283
as given in the Second Analogy of Experience. Kant,
therefore, recognizes that the conception of force is
simply a special application of the conception of causal-
ity, and hence that the persistence of force can only be
proved by showing that it presupposes the relation of a
special manifold of sense to intelligence. He also
shows that force and matter are related as cause
and substance, and that the conception which con-
nects the one with the other is motion, which at
once determines the changes of matter, and manifests
the forces without which no changes in the material
world could take place. Thus the indestructibility of
matter and the persistence of force are correlative con-
ceptions, neither of which is conceivable apart from the
other.
Mr. Spencer, after his usual method, endeavours to
reduce the conception of force to the feeling of muscu-
lar resistance, and, naturally failing to account for the
persistence of force from that which is not persistent,
but momentary, he strangely concludes, not that his
explanation is imperfect, but that there is an inherent
weakness in the human mind, which precludes it from
grasping the nature of force as it is "behind the veil."
It is especially unfortunate that Mr. Spencer should
be driven to this conclusion, because, as he clearly sees,
the indestructibility of matter and the continuity of
motion cannot be proved unless it can be shown that
force is persistent. " The validity of the proofs given,"
he says, " that matter is indestructible and motion con-
tinuous, really depends upon the validity of the proof
that force is persistent." ] And yet Mr. Spencer holds
that " the persistence of force is an ultimate truth, of
which no inductive proof is possible."1 "Inductively,
1 First Principles, § 58, p. 185. a Ibid., § 59, p. 188.
284 KAN2" AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
we can allege no evidence except such as is presented
to us throughout the world of sensible phenomena. No
force, however, save that of which we are conscious
during our own muscular efforts, is immediately known
to us. All other force is mediately known through the
changes we attribute to it. Since, then, we cannot in-
fer the persistence of force from our own sensation of it,
which does not persist; we must infer it, if it is inferred
at all, from the continuity of motion, and the undirnin-
ished ability of matter to produce certain effects. But
to reason thus is manifestly to reason in a circle. It is
absurd to allege the indestructibility of matter, because
we find experimentally that under whatever changes of
form a given mass of matter exhibits the same gravita-
tion, and then afterwards to argue that gravitation is
constant because a given mass of matter exhibits always
the same quantity of it. We cannot prove the contin-
uity of motion by assuming that force is persistent, and
then prove the persistence of force by assuming that
motion is continuous" l Now if " the .validity of the
proofs that matter is indestructible and motion con-
tinuous really depends upon the validity of the
proof that force is persistent," while of the persist-
ence of force no proof is possible, one would naturally
conclude that all three are pure assumptions. Mr.
Spencer would, of course, reply that here we reach
a "principle, which, as being the basis of science,
cannot be established by science." It is always easy
to maintain that we have cprne down to an ultimate
principle ; there is nothing to prevent us, when we
find a problem impervious to our method of ex-
planation, from saying that we cannot explain it
because it is inexplicable. In a similar way Mr. Mill2
1 First Principles, p. 186. - Examination of Hamilton, p. 213.
ix.] MR. SPENCER'S VIEW OF NATURE. 285
makes the consciousness of the identity of self a " final
inexplicability," when he finds it impossible to explain
how a self, defined as an evanescent series of feelings,
should yet know itself to be evanescent. It may safely
be said that, to a philosophy which has discovered the
secret of the explanation of knowledge, there are no
" ultimate principles," in the sense of principles which
are absolutely inexplicable. The workmanship of the
mind in the constitution of knowledge cannot be
beyond the ken of knowledge, if only we do not seek
for intelligibility in that which by definition is unintel-
ligible. It may very well be conceded that force, con-
ceived of as " some power which transcends our know-
ledge and conception," 1 cannot be understood, and it
may yet be held that the persistence of force is capable
of being proved. Mr. Spencer's difficulty in regard to
the proof of the persistence of force is really an uncon-
scious admission of the inherent viciousness of his
philosophical method. Separate the conception of
force from intelligence on the one hand, and from the
correlative conception of matter on the other hand, and
there is little wonder that its "persistence" should
seem incapable of proof. Force, abstracted from its
relations to intelligence, is nothing at all ; it is simply
the negation of every determinate or knowable attribute
of matter. On the other hand force, as it is actually
manifested in the known world, may be shown to be per-
sistent from the very nature of that world. It is of course
impossible to prove, simply from an examination of the
nature of knowledge, anything in regard to the specific
objects of knowledge, and therefore anything in regard
to the specific forces which constitute the changes in
the world. But, starting from the special forces of
1 First Principles, § 60, p. 189.
286 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
nature, it may be shown that the knowledge of change
is impossible except to an intelligence that connects
the particular element in known objects as sequences in
time. And this is the nature of the proof which Kant
gives of the persistence of force. The changes of matter
are changes of that which is distinguishable as having
parts that are all outside of each other, and the changes
of such parts are of course motions. But a motion,
taken by itself, is only conceivable as mere velocity, or
the relation of space traversed to time elapsed ; and
hence from mere motion no explanation can be given of
any change in motion. The actual fact that there are
changes of matter cannot of course be proved, but what
is involved in the knowledge of such changes may be
set forth. Mere motion, then, does not imply change.
But neither does matter, which may be defined simply
as that which occupies space, without changing its
relations to space. To explain the changes of matter —
in other words, the change from one rate of motion to
another, or from motion to rest — we require to intro-
duce the conception of something causing the change.
Now the conception of cause is implied in every real
sequence ; and the latter can be shown to be knowable
only on presupposition that intelligence combines the
separate determinations of change in relation to time.
In the conception of force, therefore, there is implied the
relation of all possible changes of motion to a combin-
ing intelligence ; and as such changes actually are
known, force, as presupposing cause, is bound up with
the very nature of intelligence as knowing, and hence
the knowledge of a single change is virtually a demon-
stration that no change can possibly occur in nature
which is not a manifestation of force. The persistence
of force is therefore simply a special case of the univer-
ix.] MR. SPENCER'S VIEW OF NATURE. 287
sality of the law of causation ; or, what is the same
thing, of the uniformity of nature as manifested in
special laws. Mr. Spencer's assertion that the persist-
ence of force is unprovable is only true of a theory
which assumes nature, and therefore the changes of
nature, to be independent of all intellectual relations.
Certainly the persistence of force cannot be proved
"inductively;" for no number of successive feelings of
" muscular effort," apart from the synthetic activity of
thought, could ever give us a knowledge even of these
feelings as changes, much less of the necessity of all
changes in the world of nature. Again, force taken in
abstraction from matter and motion is of course un-
knowable, because it is only in motion that force mani-
fests itself at all, and motion necessarily implies the
moveable, i.e., matter. It is perfectly true that, to
prove the indestructibility of matter and the continuity
of motion, we must introduce the conception of force ;
but this does not show either that force is identical
with matter or motion, or that it is the mere negation
of matter and motion. It is not identical, because, as
Kant points out, that which occupies space is dis-
tinguishable, although not separable, from the relations
of that which occupies space, and mere motion is dis-
tinguishable from change of motion. It is not the mere
negation of matter and motion, because substance is
essentially relative to its determinations, and these
determinations as changes are relative to the force pro-
ducing them. We have therefore only to recognise the
correlativity of the conceptions of matter and force, in
order to understand why the indestructibility of matter
is bound up with the persistence of force. The prin-
ciple of both is that no change in nature can possibly
be known as a destruction or creation of that which is
288 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS.
actual, since every change presupposes permanence.
To say that matter may be destroyed, is to say that
that which is only knowable as permanent may yet be
known as changing ; to say that force is not persistent,
is to say that that which is only knowable as change
may yet be known as the negation of change. Matter
and force are, in short, correlative conceptions, and
neither is thinkable apart from the other.
Mr. Spencer's proof of the continuity of motion, as
corresponding to Kant's third law of Mechanics, it will
not be necessary to consider, as it consists in reducing
motion to force, and declaring the latter to be an ulti-
mate conception — a point that has already been dealt
with.
289
CHAPTER X.
THE DISTINCTION OF NOUMENA AND PHENOMENA IN
KANT AND SPENCER.
FT is popularly supposed that the Critical distinction
of phenomena and noumena is in all essential
respects identical with the distinction of the relative
and absolute, the knowable and unknowable, based
upon the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge,—
i. e., which is maintained by Mr. Spencer and which
was first made known to the English public by Sir
William Hamilton. The use of the terms phenomena
and noumena by Mr. Spencer, and the superficial re-
semblance of the two views, are no doubt responsible
for the identification of doctrines that, taken in con-
nexion with the system to which each belongs, are not
only different, but diametrically opposite. To complete
that differentiation of Criticism and Empiricism, which
it has been my aim to effect in what has already been
said, it will be necessary now to consider Kant's theory
of knowledge, in so far as it is a theory of the limita-
tions of knowledge, and an exposure of the illusions
into which we inevitably fall in attempting to go
beyond the boundaries of the world of experience.
This negative side .of the Critical philosophy I do not
propose to enter into at all minutely. It will be
enough to consider how Kant is led to distinguish
290 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
between phenomena and noumena, and to show wherein
his view differs from that of Mr. Spencer.
In the development of his own theory, as we have
already seen, Kant draws a strong contrast between
the dogmatic and the critical point of view. The great
vice of previous philosophy lies in the assumption that
determinate objects in their manifold relations exist
altogether apart from the forms of perception and of
thought. Kant, therefore, holds that things in them-
selves, as ordinarily understood, are not knowable at all.
The objects we actually know are constituted for us
in the reflection of the manifold of sense upon the
forms of the mind. And the legitimate inference from
this would seem to be that, as all knowable objects
exist only in relation to our intelligence, the existence
of things in themselves apart from such relations is a
contradiction in terms. Kant, however, does not draw
this inference. Denying in the most absolute way that
concrete objects are anything at all except as informed
by the pure perceptions of space and time, and by the
categories, he is not prepared to say that there are not
things in themselves, as distinguished from the things
which constitute the actual world for us. In the
Aesthetic the distinction between phenomena and things
in themselves is made to rest upon the subjective
character of space and time, which as forms of percep-
tion belong to us merely as sensuous beings. If space
and time are peculiar to us as men, or at least belong
only to beings who like us obtain knowledge by the
reflection of sense on thought, we are shut out, as it
would seem, from the apprehension of things as they
are in themselves. As the objects -which we know are
always relative to the constitution of our perceptive
faculty, the knowledge of things in themselves, suppos-
x.] NOUMENA AND PHENOMENA. 291
ing such things to exist at all, must always be im-
possible for us. It must be observed, however, that
Kant does not affirm dogmatically that there are things
in themselves ; all that he says is that, if there are
things in themselves, the conditions of our perceptive
intelligence are such that we can never know them as
they are. Whether other thinking beings are bound
down by the same limitations as we are in their know-
ledge of individual things, we have no means of know-
ing.1 While space and time are the conditions without
which we can have no knowledge of objects, there may
be intelligences to whom such restrictions are unknown.
And Kant, in evident adaptation to the ordinary point
of view, even suggests that to God real things must be
known as freed from the limitations of space and time.2
Taken literally, this is a manifest affirmation, not only
that we cannot assert without qualification that the
objects we know are identical with objects as they
really exist, but even that there are things in them-
selves, capable of being known by an Intelligence
higher than ours, and untrammelled by the sensuous
limitations from which we cannot possibly free ourselves
without ceasing to be men. But as Kant has yet to
determine whether such a Being as the God of Natural
Theology can be shown to exist at all, we cannot take
his remark as to the freedom of such a Being from the
forms of space and time as more than an argumentum
ad hominem. If God can be shown to exist, and He
is such a being as the dogmatist describes, He cannot
have a sensuous nature, and hence He cannot be
limited by the sensuous forms of space and time :
things as known by Him must therefore be things as
they are behind the veil of sense. We cannot of
1 KritUn, § 3, p. 62. 8 Jbul., § 8, p. 79.
292 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
course say what such extra-sensible things may be in
their real nature, but we can at least say that they are
not identical with things as we know them. Kant,
however, is perfectly well aware that here he is assum-
ing an idea that strictly speaking he has no right to
assume ; and he must be held in the Esthetic, to say
no more than this, that things in themselves, as distin-
guished from things as we know them, must, if they
exist at all, be altogether different from the phenomenal
objects we actually know. Kant, in other words, does
not, like Mr. Spencer, affirm dogmatically, that there
are things in themselves, but only that, granting the
existence of such things in themselves, we cannot
possibly know them as they are, but only as they are
in relation to our perceptive faculty.
It is only, however, after the complete development
of his positive theory of knowledge that Kant is able
to enter in a satisfactory way upon the problem as to
the limitations of knowledge. Accordingly, at the
close of the Analytic, the distinction of phenomena
and noumena, which had been so far kept in the back-
ground, is expressly considered under the title — " On
the ground of the distinction of phenomena and nou-
mena." l The substance of the discussion is as follows.
It has been shown in the Analytic that the pure con-
ceptions or categories are simply special functions of
synthesis, belonging to the constitution of the under-
standing, but incapable of being brought into play
except in relation to the manifold of sense. It has
also been shown that the process by which the mani-
fold of sense is reflected on the categories may be
formulated in certain ultimate principles, which com-
bine the particulars of sense under the categories
1 Krif-it, pp. 209-224.
x.] NOUMENA AND PHENOMENA. 293
by the intermediation of the schemata of the pure
imagination, and in relation to the supreme unity of self-
consciousness. But what is thus explained is the
conditions under which concrete objects, or objects
capable of being experienced, are known. Whether the
categories and principles of the pure understanding
have any application apart from the manifold of sense,
schematized by the pure imagination as in time —
whether, in other words, they are applicable not only
to phenomena, but to things in themselves — is a totally
different question.
Now, it is easy to see that even if there are things
in themselves, at least the categories cannot be legiti-
mately employed to determine them. For, apart from
the manifold of sense, which gives to us the concrete
element of our knowledge, there is nothing for the
categories to operate upon. No doubt any perceptive
or concrete element would be sufficient to give filling
to a pure conception ; but. as for us there is no per-
ception that is not sensuous, this mere possibility in no
way enables us to know any objects except those which
are revealed to us in actual experience. We cannot
even say that the categories, in conjunction with the
pure forms of perception, make the knowledge of real
objects possible ; for the latter are in themselves
merely the potentiality of spatial and temporal rela-
tions, as the forms are merely the potentiality of deter-
minate objects. It may easily be shown that not one
of the categories or principles can be made intelligible,
apart from the sensuous conditions in relation to which
known objects are constituted and connected. Isolate
a category, and it is a mere form of thought, requiring
to be determined to a knowab]e object by being
brought in relation to a special manifold of sense by
294 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
the intermediation of the schema proper to it. The
category of quantity has meaning and significance only
when we take a unit a certain number of times, or suc-
cessively add it to itself. The category of reality im-
plies the determination of time as filled by sensation ;
the category of negation the determination of time as
empty of sensation. Eliminate the idea of permanence
or relation to time as a whole, and the category of sub-
stance is merely the logical notion of a subject that is
never a predicate. So the logical possibility of con-
ceptions determines nothing as to the possibility of real
things. In short, if we abstract from the special sen-
suous conditions under which objects are knowable by
us, we have merely the empty conception or thought
of a thing, telling us nothing as to the actual nature of
the thing in itself. On a mere conception, as has so
often been said, only an analytic, and not a synthetic
judgment, can be based.
There is, however, a natural illusion which arises
here, from the peculiar character of -the categories.
Space and time are manifestly limited in their applica-
tion to sensible objects, and hence we at once recognize
that they are not applicable beyond the boundaries of
the world of objects which we actually know as deter-
minate. It is otherwise with the categories, which
belong not to sense but to thought, and therefore
naturally seem to have an application to objects con-
structed purely by thought. This supposed extension
of the categories beyond experience is, however, as it
need hardly be said, an illusion, for, apart from the
concrete filling which they obtain from the imagin-
ation as determining the manifold of sense in time,
the categories have nothing to operate upon. At
the same time, the very fact that we limit their
x] NOUMENA AND PHENOMENA. 295
application to sensuous existences or phenomena,
inevitably suggests that there are non-sensuous or
intelligible existences, which, as the product of intel-
ligence unaided by sense, may properly be called nou-
mena. If objects as known are relative to our faculty
of perception, it is impossible to avoid imagining the
existence of an object not relative to that faculty, and
equally impossible to avoid the supposition that it is
determinable by the categories. Thus, the self as
known is always in some determinate state, and there-
fore is perceived as in time ; but with this self as in
time we naturally contrast the self as existing in its
own nature apart from its determinate relations. It is
easy to see, however, that the noumenal object is
simply the conception of an object in general — i.e., of
an object which cannot be known to exist in any deter-
minate relation; and that it cannot be really consti-
tuted as an actual object by the application of the
categories to it, since these can only act in relation
to an object which is capable of being known as in
time.
We must therefore clearly distinguish between a
noumenon in the negative sense and a noumenon in the
positive sense. (1) In the negative sense a noumenon
is that which is not an object of perception. The con-
ception of such an object is implied in the limitation of
real knowledge by the forms of perception. As we
only know that which is relative to our faculty of per-
ception, whatever is out of relation to that faculty is
unknown. The contrast of a noumenon, defined simply
as that which is not within the limits of our actual
knowledge, and a phenomenon as that which is within
those limits, is one that arises from the very nature of
our intelligence. That there may be such a transcend-
296 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
ental object is not a self-contradictory proposition. We
are not entitled to affirm that the concrete element
required to give determination to a conception can only
be supplied by sensibility of some kind : it may be
that there are intelligences which originate the partic-
ular and the universal element of knowledge by the
understanding alone. As, however, our understanding
has no concreteness in it, the conception of a noumenon
is merely a problematic conception, marking off the
limits of our actual knowledge, but in no way enabling
us to go beyond objects capable of being experienced.
Accordingly, the categories cannot be employed to
determine such a noumenon. As our understanding is
dependent upon perception for the particular element
implied in any possible knowledge of a positive object,
the conception of a thing in itself merely serves to
mark the limit of our knowledge in perceptible ob-
jects, without enabling us to know a noumenon actu-
ally existing beyond that limit. (2) The conception
of a noumenon, in the positive sense, as an object
of a non-sensuous perception, is a mere thing of the
mind, arising from the confusion of a bare conception
— with an actual object. From the conception of a
thing in itself, an unwarrantable transition is made to
the affirmation of the reality for knowledge of that
which is conceived. But this is the old fallacy of
basing real knowledge upon a purely analytical judg-
ment. There is no logical contradiction in the concep-
tion of a thing in itself, distinct from the things we
know, for the law of contradiction is satisfied when
the predicate is not inconsistent with the subject.
But the absence of logical contradiction in a judgment
does not establish the existence for knowledge of that
which is judged about ; and hence we have no right
x.] NOUMENA AND PHENOMENA. 297
to say that there is a thing in itself corresponding
to our conception. And as a noumenon is for us
simply the idea of a limit to our actual knowledge,
we cannot determine it by the categories. Only if we
had a non-sensuous or intellectual perception, should
we be entitled to affirm positively that there is a
noumenal object ; and as we have no such perception,
the categories are not applicable in the determination
of noumena at all. So far is it from being true that
our understanding is perceptive, that we cannot in the
least understand how there can be an understanding
not dependent for the concrete element of knowledge
on sensible perception. The proper conception of a
noumenon is therefore merely that of a noumenon, in
the negative sense, as that which is not for us an object
of possible perception.
It will help to illustrate what has just been said if
we consider shortly Kant's criticism of the dogmatic
view, which he contrasts with his own, the view that
noumena are positively known. The fallacy here
arises from overlooking the limits of our knowledge,
and applying the categories to the determination of
mere limitative conceptions, or from failing to recog-
nize that the objects we know are not things in them-
selves, but phenomena. Let us first look at the fal-
lacy which underlies rational psychology, the doctrine
of the soul conceived of as actually existing beyond the
limits of experience.1 (1) The soul, it is said, is a sub-
stance, because there must be a substratum underlying
all the particular modes in which we are conscious of it.
(2) As the condition of any unity in knowledge, it
must also be simple, and therefore in itself devoid of
all difference. (3) That it is identical, or the same
1 Kritik, pp. 273-289.
298 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP,
with itself in different times, is implied in the fact that
our various experiences are all connected together.
(4) Lastly, it stands in relation to all possible objects
in space, because otherwise it could not be thought of
as distinct from objects in space.
Now (1) the self is here supposed to be known as a
thing in itself, capable of being determined by the
application to it of the categories of substance, unity,
&c. ; in other words, it is supposed to be a noumenon,
in the positive sense, as an object of a non-sensuous, or
intellectual perception. But this confuses a logical
element in knowledge with an actual object existing
beyond knowledge. It is perfectly true that the self
is the subject of all mental states, but so conceived
it is simply the abstraction of relation to conscious-
ness, the "I think " implied in every determinate act
of knowledge. First to hypostatize this abstraction,
and then to determine it by the category of sub-
stance, is a perfectly unwarrantable proceeding. The
pure " I " does not admit of determination by the
category of substance, because, as abstracted from all
its relations, it has no concreteness in it. Nay, even
the " I " as known cannot be determined as a sub-
stance, because the schema of "permanence" applies
only to objects in space. (2) The same paralogism is
implied in saying that the self is simple. No doubt
we can only be conscious of self as a unity, but this
consciousness is necessarily relative to the conscious-
ness of knowable objects as involving multiplicity.
To affirm that the self is one in itself is going beyond
the limits of knowledge. (3) Nor again can we
argue from the identity of the self for consciousness
to the identity of the self as existing out of conscious-
ness. (4) And lastly, the fact that the self as known
x.] NOUMENA AND PHENOMENA. 299
stands in relation to all objects that are capable of
being known as external, does not entitle us to say that
there is a noumenal self, existing apart from conscious-
ness, and determinable as an actual object. The self
as known by us is the subject of feelings which exist
only in time, as distinguished from objects in space
and time ; but although the former is distinguishable
from the latter, both exist only in consciousness, and
therefore only in relation to each other. To determine
self as a noumenal object is to confuse the logical dis-
tinction of self and not-self with their real separation.
The second noumenal object" is the world regarded as
a whole.1 The illusion of rational cosmology does not
arise, as in the case of rational psychology, from the
confusion of an abstract element of knowledge with a
thing in itself regarded as an actual existence, but from
the assumption that the world as known to us is a
thing in itself, independent of all relation to our facul-
ties of knowledge. For when we ask whether the
world is a complete unity, we may give one of two con-
tradictory answers, according as our general mode of
thought leads us to emphasize the infinite or the finite
side of things. Hence we find that reason here gives
rise to antinomies or conceptions mutually exclusive of
each other. There are, as we see from following the
guiding-thread of the categories, four and only four of
these antinomies, which we may group into two classes,
the mathematical and the dynamical.
(l) The mathematical antinomies are concerned
respectively with the infinite extensibility of the world
in space and time, and with the infinite divisibility
of matter. Supposing known objects to be things in
themselves, it can be proved with equal cogency, on the
lKritik, pp. 301-356.
300 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
one hand that the world is limited in time and space,
and that matter is finitely divisible ; and on the other
hand, that the world is unlimited in time and space, and
that matter is infinitely divisible. (2) In the dynamical
antinomies it is shown that a free causality and a
necessary causality may be alike proved ; and that a
necessary being belonging to the world, either as its
part or its cause, is no more capable of being established
than the contradictory proposition, that there is no
necessary being either in the world or out of it.
Now here we seem to be brought to the conclusion
that two contradictory conceptions are equally capable
of being proved to be true. But if this were really the
case, reason would be in contradiction with itself, and
we should be incapable of justifying even the possibil-
ity of real knowledge. There must therefore be some
radical flaw underlying these antinomies. That flaw
certainly does not exist in the mere form of the proof,
which is in each case perfectly correct. Wherein, then,
does it consist ? It consists, Kant answers, in the con-
fusion of knowable objects with things in themselves.
We have seen that all concrete objects are relative to
the forms of space and time, and therefore that of things
in themselves we can have no possible knowledge. But
if this is so, it is absurd to say either that the world is
finite in extent or infinite in extent; that matter is
finitely divisible or infinitely divisible. The world, as
a thing in itself, is not in space and time at all, and
therefore does not admit of being determined by
spatial or temporal relations. The world, as in space
and time, again, exists only in relation to our per-
ceptive faculty ; and hence it is neither finitely nor
infinitely extended, but infinitely extensible. So matter
is neither finitely nor infinitely divided, but infinitely
x.] NO U MEN A AND PHENOMENA. 301
divisible. There is no limit to the determination of
space and time, either as extensive or as intensive
quantities, because these are forms belonging to our
perceptive faculty, and hence admit of indefinite de-
termination. As to the dynamical antinomies, both
alternatives are false when they are supposed to refer
to the world of experience ; but both may be true
when the theses are taken as referring to the nou-
menal world, and the antitheses as referring to the
phenomenal world. There is no contradiction in say-
ing that there is a free cause arid a necessary being
independent of the phenomenal world, while yet, in the
phenomenal world, there is no free cause and no neces-
sary being. This, of course, does not prove the truth
of the theses, as interpreted in this way, but it leaves
the way open for a proof based on the nature of man as
a moral being.
The mere statement of Kant's distinction of nouinena
and phenomena is almost enough to show that, so far
from being identical, his theory is strongly contrasted
with that of Mr. Spencer. And the contrast extends
to the aim of the theory, the general doctrine of
which it forms a part, and the method by which it is
established. Kant's object in drawing a distinction
between phenomena and noumena is not to degrade
the former at the expense of the latter, but, on the
contrary, to show that the latter are mere ideas to
which no real object can be known to correspond. Mr.
Spencer, on the other hand, maintains that noumena
are the true realities, and phenomena merely the
appearances they present to us. Kant's theory of
knowledge, again, goes on the principle that no concrete
object can be known to exist independently of intelli-
gence ; and hence that the objects we know are necess-
302 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
arily constituted by relations of thought. On the other
hand, it belongs to the very essence of Mr. Spencer's
system to assume the existence of objects constituted
independently of intelligence ; and the doctrine of the
" unknowable " is therefore in his hands the inevitable
result of the dualistic conception of intelligence and
nature from which he starts. Lastly, Kant maintains
that to noumena the conceptions of substance, unity,
&c., and the determinations of space and time, are not
applicable, and hence he gets rid of the false abstraction
of a self that is beyond consciousness and of a world
that exists apart from the real relations by which it is
constituted, by insisting upon the relation of all know-
able objects to the subject knowing them. Mr. Spencer,
on the contrary, can see in the antinomies of reason
only a proof of the imbecility of the human mind,
and hence he has no solution to give of the apparent
contradictions involved in our fundamental conceptions
of the universe. The opposition of the critical view of
the relativity of knowledge to the dogmatic view of
Mr. Spencer is therefore radical. It is true that the
two views approximate in the denial of all definite
knowledge of supersensible realities ; but this is after
all only an external resemblance ; for Kant never for
a moment supposes, as Mr. Spencer does, that a demon-
stration of the absolute unknowability of things in
themselves is tantamount to an assertion that they are
the only realities. Had Kant not believed that by the
practical reason he could prove the actual existence of
the soul, the world, and God, as supersensible realities,
he would have denied that we are entitled to affirm
that there are such realities ; at least one may safely
say that he would not have consented to degrade the
realities we know in favour of realities that are affirmed
x.] NOUMENA AND PHENOMENA. 303
not to be knowable at all. It may also be added that
a consistent development of the principles established
by Kant in the positive part of his system leads to
the conclusion that there are supersensible realities,
capable of being known by us, whereas a development
of the principles upon which Mr. Spencer's doctrine
rests must lead to the denial of any knowledge whatever.
Leaving the development of the Critical philosophy to
another chapter, I shall now endeavour to show more
particularly how marked is the contrast between the
philosophy of Kant and the philosophy of Mr. Spencer,
as to aim, principle, and method.
1. Kant does not say that there are nournenal reali-
ties, but that the question of such existence cannot be
established by theoretical reason, in consistency with
the conditions of knowledge. All knowledge implies a
relation of subject and object ; or, more particularly,
objects are constituted only by the reflection of percep-
tion on thought. Kant, therefore, denies the knowledge
of noumena because our knowledge is relative, or rather
is a knowledge of relations. Mr. Spencer, on the other
hand, maintains that there are noumenal realities, or a
noumenal reality, existing out of all relation to our
knowledge ; and yet he strangely asserts that this
noumenal reality can be known. Like Kant, he holds
that known realities are relative to knowledge ; but,
unlike Kant, he supposes this to be a proof of the
existence of the absolute. Kant's reason against the
existence for knowledge of noumena is Mr. Spencer's
reason for that existence.
There are two distinct senses among others in which
we may speak of the " relative." Mr. Spencer uses
the term in both senses, without carefully distinguish-
ing between them, and by this confusion of thought
304 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
and expression the inconclusiveness of his reasoning is
partially concealed. In the first place, by the relative
may be understood that which as an object of thought
involves a relation or series of relations to thought.
The condition of any consciousness whatever being the
opposition of subject and object, and the condition of
definite thinking being the apprehension, identification
and classification of differences in the object, knowledge
is always a knowledge of relations. The relative as
thus understood does not necessitate the assumption
of an absolute or non-relative beyond consciousness :
all that is required to constitute the relation is an
object having more or fewer differences, and a sub-
ject which is more or less determinate ; and when
these two correlatives are taken together the law that
contraries imply each other is satisfied. Secondly,
the relative may mean that which is known, as 'distin-
guished from the absolute which exists beyond know-
ledge. The relative in this sense of the term evi-
dently presupposes the independent existence of the
absolute ; for if there is no absolute beyond the
bounds of knowledge, there will be no relative within
the bounds of knowledge. The relative is in fact
simply the non-absolute, the absolute the non-relative.
Take away the absolute, and the relative as relative
disappears; take away the relative and there is no
longer an absolute.
Examining Mr. Spencer's arguments in the light of
the distinction here pointed out, it will be found that
all of them receive their apparent force from a con-
fusion between the relative as implied in the very
nature of consciousness, and the fictitious relative that
results from the assumption of the independent existence
of a non-relative beyond consciousness. But so far
x.] NOUMENA AND PHENOMENA. 305
from the one relative implying the other, it is evident
that just in proportion as the one is established the
reality of the other becomes precarious. The more
stringently it is proved that knowledge is in all cases a
knowledge of relations — in other words, that only that
which is an object of thought can be known at all — the
more apparent it becomes that a relative which has
no meaning except in contrast with an unknowable
non- relative or absolute, is itself unknowable and in-
credible. It is apparently from a confused apprehen-
sion that he is guilty of this ignoratio elenchi, that Mr.
Spencer, after laboriously removing the ground from
under his own feet by enforcing in a variety of ways
the proposition that the non-relative cannot be known,
attempts to regain some sort of footing by distinguishing
between a knowledge of the absolute and a " conscious-
ness " of it — as if there were a kind of consciousness
that excluded knowledge.
" Human intelligence is incapable of absolute know-
ledge. The relativity of our knowledge is demonstrable
analytically. The induction drawn from general and
special experiences, may be confirmed by a deduction
from the nature of our intelligence. Two ways of
reaching such a deduction exist. Proof that our cogni-
tions are not, and never can be, absolute, is obtainable
by analyzing either the product of thought, or the
process of thought."1
This statement of the general doctrine, clear as it
seems, really confounds together the two meanings of
the relative, discriminated above. When it is said
that the human mind is not capable of " absolute know-
ledge," but only of relative knowledge, it is implied
that that which is known is connected with an abso-
» First Principle*, § 22, pp. 68-69.
U
306 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
lute lying beyond knowledge, and related to it as
reality to appearance. But this evidently is true
only if there exist such a reality : for if there is no
reality outside of consciousness, knowledge will not be
of appearances, but of reality. If Mr. Spencer had
said, as he ought to have done to be strictly accurate,
not that there can be no " absolute knowledge," but
that there can be no knowledge of the Absolute (a very
different thing) it would have been at once apparent
that to prove the "relativity of knowledge," in the
sense that knowledge always implies relations of an
object to a subject, does not carry with it the implica-
tion of the existence of an absolute beyond conscious-
ness, but on the contrary is the negation of that
existence. If there is no knowledge of the absolute,
we have no right to predicate its existence ; and if
all knowledge involves relations, the absolute, as de-
void of all relations — as, in other words, not an object
of thought — cannot be known to exist. A confusion
between the knowledge of relations and the relativity of
knowledge being thus made at the very threshold, it
is only to be expected that the same confusion will
vitiate the reasonings that follow it. And this is
actually the case.
" Reason," we are told, " leads to the conclusion
that the sphere of reason is limited. This conclusion
expresses the result of mental analysis, which shows us
that the product of thought is in all cases a relation,
identified as such and such ; that therefore being in
o
itself, out of relation, is unthinkable, as not admitting
of being brought within the form of thought."1
A little reflection will suffice to bring out into clear-
ness the paralogism implicit in this reasoning. On the
1 Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative, vol. iii., new ed., p. 258.
x.] NOUMENA AND PHENOMENA. 307
surface, all that seems to be maintained is that, as the
product of thought is always a relation, the absolute
being out of relation is not thought at all. Thus far
nothing is asserted but the identical proposition ; That
which is out of relation to thought is not in relation to
thought. But the natural inference from this proposi-
tion surely is that no such absolute exists, or, if it does,
that at least it cannot be known to exist. If every at-
tempt to think " being out of relation " results in failure,
why not give up the attempt, and conclude that there
is no " being out of relation " to think ? Any effort to
make that an object of thought which is assumed
not to be an object of thought must result in failure,
since intelligence will not surrender the very law of
its existence at our bidding. This conclusion, how-
ever, is not the one to which Mr. Spencer comes ; on
the contrary, he infers that "being in itself, out of
relation " exists because it cannot be known. To say
that "the sphere of reason is limited" is, he maintains,
to say, in other words, that beyond that sphere there
exists " being in itself, out of relation." As the only
reason given for this assumption is that " being in
itself, out of relation " is not, and cannot, be known, it
follows that " being in itself, out of relation " is proved
to exist for the sole reason that it cannot be known.
I see no way of escape from the dilemma : if " being
in itself" is beyond thought, it cannot be known to
exist ; if it is within thought, and so known to exist,
it is no longer " being in itself."
The contradiction here evolved is manifestly but a
special instance of the general contradiction arising
from an interchange of the two antithetical meanings of
the relative already distinguished. The product of
thought is in all cases a relation, and hence knowledge
308 KAN2 AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
may correctly enough be said to be knowledge of the
relative. But with the relative as thus understood is
identified the relative in the sense of that which is the
negation of the absolute, and which as such implies a
relation to the absolute — the relation of dependence or
phenomenal manifestation. For knowledge of the
relative is substituted relative knowledge, and thus it
is secretly assumed that there is no absolute knowledge
because there is no knowledge of the absolute. But as
knowledge is in all cases a relation, the true inference
is that that which is out of all relation is unknowable, for
the very sufficient reason that to define it as that which
is out of relation is tacitly to assert its unknowableness.
Knowledge is relative or phenomenal, in the sense re-
quired for Mr. Spencer's argument only, upon the sup-
position that the absolute exists beyond knowledge ;
and to assert that the absolute is beyond knowledge is
to take away the only ground upon wrhich knowledge
can be shown to be phenomenal, and therefore to
establish its absoluteness. If there is no absolute
beyond the sphere of consciousness, knowledge is not
phenomenal but real; if there is an absolute beyond
the sphere of consciousness, knowledge can never be
known not to be real; so that in either case the
phenomenal character of knowledge can never be
proved.
The negation of the absolute, defined as Mr. Spencer
defines it, is the only legitimate conclusion to be drawn
from the fact that thinking is in all cases relating. An
attempt is however made to avoid this conclusion by
distinguishing between the " definite consciousness of
which logic formulates the laws/' and an " indefinite
consciousness which cannot be formulated." Although
It cannot be apprehended by definite thinking, the ab-
x.] NOUMENA AND PHENOMENA. 309
solute, it is held, is yet given in a consciousness which
though undefined is not negative but positive. " Observe,
that every one of the arguments by which the relativity
of our knowledge is demonstrated, distinctly postulates
the positive existence of something beyond the relative.
To say that we cannot know the absolute is, by impli-
cation, to affirm that there is an absolute. In the
very denial of our power to learn what the absolute
is, there lies hidden the assumption that it is ; and the
making of this assumption proves that the absolute
has been present to the mind, not as a nothing, but as
a something. Clearly, then, the very demonstration
that a definite consciousness of the absolute is im-
possible to us, unavoidably presupposes an indefinite
consciousness of it."
We have here evidently our old enemy under a
new disguise. The proof of the " relativity of know-
ledge," it is said, implies that the absolute exists.
But that manifestly depends upon what is meant by
the phrase " the relativity of our knowledge." If it
means, as alone has been proved, that thinking involves
relations, the existence of an absolute beyond the limits
of thought, so far from being established, is incapable
of being established, unless thought can belie its
very nature, and have an object at once in relation to
it and out of relation to it. If, on the other hand, by
the expression "relativity of our knowledge," we are to
understand that knowledge is not of the real but of the
phenomenal, the absolute is no doubt " postulated,"
but it is postulated in defiance of "every one of the
arguments by which the relativity of our knowledge is
demonstrated." If the " absolute has been present to
the mind, not as a nothing, but as a something " — as a
1 First Principles, §26, p. 88.
310 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
real existence, that is, and not as an abstraction — it
follows either that thought has violated its own laws,
according to which it can only think under relations,
or that the absolute is not devoid of all relations. In
the former case, the products of thought are necessarily
worthless ; in the latter, the absolute must be sought
within, and not without consciousness ; and thus the
Spencerian doctrine of the relativity of knowledge
breaks down, either because it is founded upon false-
hood or because of its inadequacy. Thus far there
seems to be no ground for the assertion of a conscious-
ness of the Absolute, but very strong grounds for its
denial. We must, however, consider the nature of
that "indefinite" consciousness which is somehow to
preserve the existence of an Absolute lying beyond the
confines of thought.
"Thinking being relationing, no thought can ever
express more than relations. What now must happen
if thought, having this law, occupies itself with the
final mystery ? Always implying terms in relation,
thought implies that both terms shall be more or less
defined ; and as fast as one of them becomes indefinite,
the relation also becomes indefinite, and thought
becomes indistinct. What must happen if one term of
the relation is not only quantitatively but also quali-
tatively unrepresentable ? Clearly in this case the
relation does not cease to be thinkable except as a
relation of a certain class, but it lapses completely.
That is to say, the law of thought that contradictories
can be known only in relation to each other, no longer
holds when thought attempts to transcend the relative;
and yet, when it attempts to transcend the relative, it
must make the attempt in conformity with its law-
must in some dim mode of consciousness posit a non-
x.] NOUMENA AND PHENOMENA. 311
relative, and, in some similarly dim mode of conscious-
ness, a relation between it and the relative." :
The first part of this argument is : Given two
concrete objects of thought with definite relations of
quantity and quality to each other: take away the
quantity of one, and the quantitative relations of the two
disappear ; take away the qualities left, and there is no
relation whatever between them. The conclusion here
reached is undoubtedly correct : between two objects
from which all inter-relations have been removed, there
is no relation whatever, for if there were, all the inter-
relations would not have been removed : correlative
terms are no longer correlative, when the relation
between them is eliminated. True : but when the
relation between them is destroyed, although they are
no longer thought of as correlatives, each may still be
an object of thought. The term which has been purified
of all relations to its correlative term, is no longer
thought of^ as a correlative of that term, but it may
still be in consciousness as an object — indefinite of
course, but still an object. This is clearly implied in
the application made of the argument. What Mr.
Spencer has to show is that the absolute, while de-
void of all relations, is yet known in a " dim mode of
consciousness " ; and however dim the consciousness
may be, there must be an object of it, or there will be
no consciousness. "There is," says Mr. Spencer, "some-
thing which alike forms the raw material of definite
thought and remains after the definiteness which think-
ing gave to it has been destroyed." 2 That is to say,
the elimination of all relations of one object to another
still leaves each object as an object of consciousness ;
the thing that has been deprived of all its definiteness,
1 Spencer's Essays, vol. iii., p. 293 ff. 2 First Principles, § 26, p. 90.
312 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
and so taken out of relation to the thing with which it
was at first correlated, does not vanish altogether, but
remains as an indefinite " something," we know not
what. Now when it is remembered that the Absolute,
the existence of which Mr. Spencer is trying to prove,
is Being in itself, out of all relation, and therefore out
of relation to consciousness, the essential weakness of
the argument is at once apparent. What has been
shown is that a thing from which all the properties are
removed is not thought of as in relation to any other
thing ; but from the very nature of the argument it is
implied that this indefinite " something " is an object
of consciousness. But as an object of consciousness, it
is in relation to the subject conscious of it. Its rela-
tions to the object with which it was at first connected
have been taken away, but not its relation to the self
by which it is known. If then the absolute is in
relation to a conscious self, it cannot be identified with
" Being in itself out of relation," and therefore is no
longer an absolute but a relative. The* same con-
clusion of course follows if, without taking advantage
of the admission that the elimination of all definiteness
may still leave, as an object of consciousness, an in-
definite something that is not anything in particular,
we suppose that upon the removal of all relations to
another object, there remains no object of consciousness
whatever, but a pure blank, the negation of all con-
sciousness. For upon this supposition, the absolute
is not brought within consciousness at all, but is to
consciousness pure nothing, and therefore cannot be
shown to exist. Thus again we come round to the
dilemma : if the Absolute is an object of consciousness,
it does not exist ; if it does exist, it is not an object of
consciousness.
x.] NOUMENA AND PHENOMENA. 313
It may perhaps be thought that the second part of
the argument cited above affords a way of escape from
this dilemma. The reasoning seems to be that it is
not necessary to suppose that the absolute itself is
actually an object of consciousness ; all that is required
is a "dim mode of consciousness," which represents or
is symbolical of the absolute, and which thus gives assur-
ance of the existence of the absolute, while keeping it
outside of consciousness. That this is the correct inter-
pretation of the reasoning is confirmed by the remark
immediately following the passage quoted : " Just as
when we try to pass beyond phenomenal manifestations
to the ultimate reality manifested, we have to symbolize
it out of such materials as the phenomenal manifesta-
tions give us ; so we have simultaneously to symbolize
the connection between this ultimate reality and its
manifestations, as somehow allied to the connections
among the phenomenal manifestations themselves."1
Assuming, then, that the "dim mode of consciousness "
has as its object an indefinite " something," which is
not the " ultimate reality," but is merely representative
of it ; it is evident that this supposition creates more
difficulties than it resolves. If the " something " in
consciousness is representative of the unknown reality,
we must suppose that there is some kind of pre-
established harmony between the something in con-
sciousness and the something beyond consciousness.
But there must be a consciousness of the representative
or symbolical character of the one, or there can be no
consciousness of the other. This, however, is but ano-
ther way of saying that there is a relation between that
which is and that which is not known, and hence the
unknown something is not out of relation to conscious-
1 Essays, vol. iii., p. 295.
314 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
ness, but is brought into relation with it, and is no
longer an absolute but a relative. Otherwise stated, a
mode of consciousness cannot be known to be represent-
ative of something else unless a comparison is made
between that which is represented and that which is
representative ; but comparison implies relation ; and
therefore both terms of the relation must be in con-
sciousness. The absolute, then, to be given in a mode
of consciousness representative of it, must itself be in
consciousness ; in which case it ceases to be absolute.
Or again, taking the other side of the dilemma, a mode
of consciousness is representative of a reality beyond
consciousness, only if such a reality exists. But the
existence of it is the very point in dispute, and must
not be assumed. It is a manifest see-saw to argue that
the unknown reality exists because a certain mode of
consciousness is known to be representative of it, when
this mode can be known to be representative only if the
unknown reality exists.
2. The principle underlying Kant's conception of
noumena is diametrically opposite to that which under-
lies the philosophy of Mr. Spencer. Kant shows that
concrete objects exist only in relation to intelligence,
and hence for the ordinary dualism of ideas in the mind
and objects without the mind he substitutes the logical
distinction of feelings in time and known objects in
space. Mr. Spencer, on the other hand, starting from
the absolute opposition of object and subject, supposes
the former to come into relation with the latter by
means of immediate feelings. As, therefore, we only
know the objective world by the intermediation of
these feelings, the world is gradually stripped of its
determinate properties, and survives only as a thing in
itself. Enough has already been said in regard to the
x.] NOUMENA AND PHENOMENA. 315
Critical conception of the relation of subject and object,
but it may not be unprofitable to follow with some care
the logical process by which Mr. Spencer reaches the
conception of an unknowable reality.
In his First Principles, Mr. Spencer tells us that
before stirring a step towards its goal, philosophy has
to assume the validity of certain primary data of con-
ciousness, and that of these data the most fundamental
is the conception of subject and object as " antithetically
opposed divisions of the entire assemblage " of things.
And in his Psychology an attempt is made to establish
the proposition, that "when the two modes of being
which we distinguish as subject and object have been
severally reduced to their lowest terms, any further
comprehension .... is negatived by the very
distinction of subject and object, which is itself the
consciousness of a difference transcending all other
differences." ] This dualistic conception of things Mr.
Spencer supports by a "negative" and a "positive"
justification. By the former is meant a proof that
Realism " rests on evidence having a greater validity
than the evidence on which any counter-hypothesis
rests." 2 Tested by the criteria of priority, simplicity,
and distinctness, Realism is found to be superior to
Idealism, the latter being based upon the assumption that
" we are primarily conscious only of our sensations."
People are conscious of external existence long before
they frame the hypothesis that the knowledge of
external existence is obtained mediately through sensa-
tion. "Neither the subject nor the predicate of the
proposition — ' I have a sensation/ can be separately
framed by a child, much less put together." The
realistic belief is therefore not only prior in time, but
1 Spencer's Principles of Psychology, vol. i., § 62. 2 Ibid., vol. ii., § 402.
316 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
it is the condition of the construction of the idealistic
hypothesis. Realism is also superior to Idealism in
simplicity. For, in the first place, Idealism always
begins by showing that Realism is inferential, and to
make good this assertion it has to employ many infer-
ences in place of one; and, in the second place, the
supposed proof of Idealism involves in addition a
number of new inferences. " Hence, if the one
mediate act of Realism is to be invalidated by the
multitudinous acts of Idealism, it must be on the sup-
position . . . that if there is doubtfulness in a
single step of a given kind, there is less doubtfulness
in many steps of the same kind." And not only is
Idealism subsequent in time to Realism, and supported
by elaborate inferential reasoning, but it is expressed
in " terms of the extremest indistinctness," while Real-
ism is expressed in " terms of the highest possible
distinctness." 1
These arguments Mr. Spencer enforces with the
greatest earnestness, and with every appearance of
conviction ; nor do I for a moment suppose that he is
guilty of any conscious disingenuousness, though the
tedious length at which he sets them forth suggests
that he has himself some suspicion of their cogency.
To me they seem mainly significant of their framer's
method of seeking for real knowledge by the elimination
of all definite relations to thought. This is what the
setting up of priority, simplicity, and distinctness really
amounts to. Moreover, as the tests by which Idealism
is shown to be inferior in evidence to Realism, would, if
valid, establish the superiority of the primary, simple and
distinct preconceptions of the unscientific mind over the
infinitely more complex and more indistinct conceptions
1 Psychology, vol. ii., §§404, 412.
x.] NOUMENA AND PHENOMENA. 317
of physical science, we may safely leave Mr. Spencer to
fight out his battle with other antagonists and upon
another arena. The only other remark that seems
called for here is that, even granting the validity of the
criteria, the question is not fairly argued : for on the
one hand the philosophical theory of Realism is identi-
fied with the common-sense belief in an external world,
and is thus assumed to possess a priority, simplicity, and
distinctness not justly its due ; and on the other hand
Idealism is confused with Sensationalism, in which
alone the knowledge of the external world is sought in
"sensations" or " subjective states." For these if for
no other reasons, the " multitudinous mediate acts " by
which Mr. Spencer tries to show that all mediate acts
destroy knowledge, are mere shooting in the air.
Idealism has been weighed successively in the
balances of priority, simplicity and distinctness, and has
been found wanting. But we must make sure that we
have cut off every possible way of escape. "It is not
enough to be clear that a doctrine is erroneous : it is
not enough even to disentangle the error from its
disguises : it is further requisite that we should trace
down the error to its simplest form and find its root."
What we want evidently is some universal criterion of
truth, to which even the Idealist must assent, and by
which he may be convicted out of his own mouth.
This absolute criterion or " universal postulate " Mr.
Spencer believes he has found in the formula, that "the
inconceivableness of its negation is that which shows a
cognition to possess the highest rank." An " inconceiv-
able " proposition, it must be noted, is not simply a
proposition that is " unbelievable," but one " of which
the terms cannot by any effort be brought before con-
sciousness in that relation which the proposition asserts
318 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
between them." Thus the negation of the proposition,
" whatever resists has extension," is not only unbeliev-
able but unthinkable, for the subject and the predicate
cannot be thought of together. J
The " universal postulate " of Mr. Spencer is simply
the well-known logical law of identity. An examina-
tion of the instance cited by Mr. Spencer in illustration
of it places this supposition beyond dispute. The pro-
position, "whatever resists has extension," when fully ex-
pressed becomes, I presume, "the material thing which
resists has extension." Now that a " material thing,"
i.e., an extended thing, " has extension " is certainly
a proposition of which the terms cannot by any possi-
bility be separated in thought, for the simple reason
that they are identical. We may frame as many pro-
positions of this type as we please, and all of them will
conform to the " universal postulate." The proposition,
" a hippogrifi' is an imagined object," is one which bears
the test of the postulate without flinching, since it is a
proposition the negation of which is not only " unbeliev-
able" but "unthinkable." It is therefore difficult to
see how the "Idealist" is to be brought to his senses
by so innocent a device as that of asking him to admit
that what is in consciousness is in consciousness. The
mere analysis of a conception, as Kant has once for all
pointed out, only results in an explicit statement of
what the conception means ; it does not carry us beyond
itself to objective truth.
It is quite possible that Mr. Spencer would reply that
the proposition, "whatever resists has extension," asserts
not only that " an extended thing is extended," but that
" resistance " and " extension " cannot be separated in
thought and therefore exist together in reality. And
1 Psychology, vol. ii., §§414, 426, 427.
x.] NOUMENA AND PHENOMENA. 319
no doubt this is so : but it is because " resistance " and
"extension" are correlative conceptions that involve
manifold relations to thought, whereas the " universal
postulate " is expressly brought forward to prove tha
truth of a proposition immediately. The conjunction of
these conceptions in our knowledge is the result of a
long process of mediation, and the justification of their
connection can only be found in the truth of each step in
that process. In the language of Kant, the proposition
"whatever resists has extension," is a " synthetical "
judgment, obtained by a reference to experience. The
question therefore comes to this : either the " universal
postulate " only calls upon us to state explicitly what
is in our consciousness, and thus affords no criterion of
objective truth, or it admits that immediate knowledge
has no objective validity. As the latter alternative is
exactly what Mr. Spencer is trying to disprove, we are
compelled to adopt the former.
That the " universal postulate " is merely a law of
formal thought is further implied in the setting up of a
new criterion to help out the imperfection of the old.
It is not to every proposition, Mr. Spencer admits, that
the postulate is applicable, but only to those that are
" simple " or " undecomposable." i Now, in the first
place, it is evident that if we go on analyzing or " de-
composing" a proposition into its elements, we shall
only have completed the process when we have got
back to the very beginning of knowledge. The
absolutely primary judgment can alone be called
" undecomposable " in any strict use of terms : and
when we have got this proposition, the virtue of the
postulate has evaporated. Into the proposition, "some-
thing is in my consciousness," as the simplest, and
1 Psychology, vol. ii., §428.
320 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
therefore as the only " undecomposable " judgment
that can be framed, any proposition that we choose to
name must ultimately be analysed, and to this pro-
position alone the "universal postulate" can be applied.
In other words, the criterion of truth set up by Mr.
Spencer is but the logical law of identity, which simply
formulates the condition of knowledge, that conscious-
ness postulates itself, but is utterly useless as a test of
objective truth. But, in the second place, there is no
absolutely simple proposition embodying any real
knowledge. Even the simplest judgment that can be
conceived, " something is a real object to me," involves
the relation of subject and object, and is therefore so
far complex, although in relation to all other judgments
it may be called simple. The only proposition which
is not complex is one in which subject and predicate
are identical, and such a proposition is merely verbal.
And in point of fact this is the only proposition to
which the " universal postulate " properly applies, if as
is supposed it is a test of no knowledge except that
which excludes all relation to thought. The postulate
is therefore not only practically useless, but it falsifies
even the initial judgment of knowledge, wnich is not
immediate but mediate.
That the supposed criterion of truth is really de-
structive of real knowledge, becomes apparent the
moment an attempt is made to apply it in support of
Realism. The application is made at great length, but
in the end it amounts to this : the immediate deliver-
ance of consciousness is that the object is independent
of the subject, and this proposition alone conforms to
the " universal postulate." l But this is simply to say
that the postulate only allows of the verbal or identical
JSee especially Psychology, vol. ii., §438.
x.] NOUMENA AND PHENOMENA. 321
propositions: "the subject is the subject," and "the
object is the object." Bring the object into relation
with the subject, and the mutual independence of each
at once disappears. On the other hand, as the very
existence of knowledge implies the relation of the
object to a conscious self, the immediate deliverance of
consciousness, i.e. of the unreflective consciousness, and
the postulate which endorses it, destroy the very possi-
bility of knowledge. The attempt to find reality in
the absence of all relation has once again, as it must
ever do, resulted in the complete negation of reality ;
and Mr. Spencer, in his attempt to cover the Idealist
with confusion, has only succeeded in demonstrating the
instability of his own position. It is really curious to
find any one maintaining that subject and object are in
absolute independence of each other because they are
given in relation to each other : that what is IN relation
to consciousness is OUT OF relation to consciousness.
Such a self-contradictory position must necessarily lead
its advocate into innumerable incoherencies of thought.
The main incoherence I shall now try to point out.
The arguments hitherto employed by Mr. Spencer
derive whatever apparent force they have from the
tacit identification of Realism with the common-sense
belief that objects exist simply as they are known.
But as in the endeavour to preserve the assumed im-
rnediateness of knowledge a criterion is proclaimed
which is applicable only to "simple" propositions, or
propositions that exclude all relation, I am not surprised
that for the ordinary view which assumes that the
object as completely qualified is directly apprehended,
there should be substituted the very different view that
the object as known is absolutely unqualified ; but I
am surprised that Mr. Spencer should not have marked
322 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
his divergence from common sense by deleting all the
reasoning which presupposes agreement with it. We
are now told that the Realism which can be established
is not the " crude Realism " of common sense, but a
more refined theory to which the name of " trans-
figured Realism " is given. The object is known to us
through subjective affections or relations, and no rela-
tion to consciousness can " resemble, or be in any way
akin to," its source beyond consciousness. Nevertheless,
there exist " beyond consciousness conditions of ob-
jective manifestation which are symbolized by relations
as we conceive them." Our knowledge of the object
as it really exists is thus limited to a direct apprehension
of its bare existence.1
Here we see, going on before our eyes, the dialectic
by which the common sense assumption of the inde-
pendence of the object converts itself into a denial of
all definite knowledge. When Mr. Spencer speaks of
the distinction of subject and object as the " conscious-
ness of a difference transcending all other differences,"
he does not see that he is really affirming the non-
independence of the object ; but he does see that as all
definite knowledge is constituted by relation to con-
sciousness, the unqualified object is not known at all."
Hence he tries to combine Idealism and Realism by
maintaining at once that the object is independent of
consciousness, and that it is in relation to consciousness;
the result being the compromise called " transfigured
Realism," which carries over the concreteness of the
object into thought, and yet maintains the independ-
ence of the purely abstract substratum that alone
remains. Two absolutely incongruous theories of
knowledge are thus combined, or rather set side by
1 Psychology, vol. ii., §§473-4.
x.] NOUMENA AND PHENOMENA. 323
side : the one that knowledge is mediate or made up
of relations to consciousness, and the other that it is
absolutely immediate or free from relation. Here
then we have the doctrine of relativity as applied to
the nature of the object. Its validity evidently de-
pends upon the possibility of an independent object
being known in a purely immediate consciousness.
Now the object, as assumed to be independent, is
altogether beyond the sphere of consciousness, and
therefore cannot be known to exist. To say that it is
independent of consciousness and to say that it is unre-
lated to consciousness is for knowledge exactly the
same thing. And, on the other hand, to speak of a
consciousness that is absolutely immediate, is equivalent
to a denial that consciousness has any object before it;
for an object, as Mr. Spencer admits, is only given in
distinction from a subject. In the attempt to preserve
its independence, the object has been reduced to the
maximum of indefiniteness and the subject to the
minimum of relation, and after all, the definiteness im-
plied in the bare relation of an unqualified thing to a
pure subject has to be assumed under the disguise of
immediate knowledge, or subject and object alike
disappear. The unknowable of Mr. Spencer, in other
words, is simply the knowable, deprived of its concrete
relations and suspended in vacuo by the imagination.
The dualistic opposition of intelligence and nature has
accomplished its destiny in the negation of all real
knowledge.1
3. How strongly Kant's conception of noumena is
contrasted with that of Mr. Spencer becomes evident
when we look at the view taken in each of the ultimate
1 The criticism of Mr. Spencer contained in sections 1 and 2 first appeared iu
the Jour. Spec. Phil, for January, 1877.
324 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
nature of the mind and the world. The essence of
Kant's criticism of rational psychology is, that a
noumenal self, existing beyond knowledge as a sub-
stance, is the product of a confusion between the mere
abstraction of relation to consciousness and a thing
beyond consciousness. Mr. Spencer, on the other hand,
adopts, without suspicion of the paralogism implied in
it, the dogmatic view that there must be an unknown
substance, of which all mental states are passing mani-
festations. Kant, again, deals with the apparent con-
tradiction involved in the idea of the world as a whole
and of matter as divisible, as well as in the ideas of
causality and of a necessary being ; but he refuses to
believe that reason can be in absolute antagonism
with itself, and hence after stating the antinomies he
goes on to solve them. Mr. Spencer dwells at great
length upon " alternative impossibilities of thought ";
but believing the logical puzzles he has brought to-
gether to be absolutely insoluble, he concludes to the
thorough-going imbecility of the human mind. Let us
look at the contrast indicated more in detail.
(1) "If by the phrase 'substance of mind/" says
Mr. Spencer, "is to be understood mind as qualitatively
differentiated in each portion that is separable by in-
trospection, but seems homogeneous and undecompos-
able, then we do know something about the substance
of mind, and may eventually know more. . . . But
if the phrase is taken to mean the underlying something
of which these are modifications, then we know nothing
about it, and never can know anything about it. ...
Let us yield to the necessity of regarding impressions
and ideas as forms or modes of a continually existing
something. . . . Existence means nothing more
than persistence ; and hence in mind that which
x.] NOUMENA AND PHENOMENA. 325
persists in spite of all changes, and maintains the unity
of the aggregate in defiance of all attempts to divide it,
is that of which existence in the full sense of the word
must be predicated — that which we must postulate as
the substance of mind in contradistinction to the vary-
ing form which it assumes. But if so, the impossibility
of knowing the substance of mind is manifest.
If every state of mind is some modification of this
substance of mind, there can be no state of mind in
which the unmodified substance of mind is present." !
Mind, as is evident from these extracts, is conceived
of as a " substratum " or " underlying something,"
which, as existing apart from its modifications, is un-
knowable. At the same time we are compelled to
" postulate " it ; in other words, although unknowable,
it nevertheless exists. Now, in the first place, it is
evident that Mr. Spencer is here guilty of that con-
fusion between a noumenon in the positive sense, and
a noumenon in the negative sense, which Kant has so
clearly pointed out. Apart from its " multitudinous
modifications," mind is not a real object capable of
being known to exist, but merely the negation of actual
knowledge. The only legitimate inference, therefore,
from Mr. Spencer's proof of the unknowability of mind
as a thing in itself, is that mind as so conceived is a
mere fiction of abstraction. The determination of
this pure negation by the conception of " substance "
is, as Kant would say, an illegitimate application of a
category to a mere idea. Mind in itself is neither a
" substance :' nor the mode of a substance : it is simply
nothing at all. That " there can be no state of mind
in which the unmodified substance of mind is present,"
is the best proof that this " unmodified substance " is
1 Psychology, vol. i., §§ 58, 59.
326 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
but an element of reality, abstracted from the relations
which give it meaning. In the second place, Mr.
Spencer is guilty of the paralogism which Kant shows
to be implied in the dogmatic conception of mind as a
substance. Although the " substance " of mind is
affirmed to be unknowable, it yet " persists in spite of
all changes, and maintains the unity of the aggregate
in defiance of all attempts to divide it." In other
words, mind implies the consciousness of self as a unity,
and as identical with itself in all its changes. Here
the transition is made from mind as a ".substratum "
to mind as the self to which all mental changes are
relative. At the same time, mind is still regarded as
unknowable in itself, inasmuch as it cannot be pre-
sented in consciousness. That is to say, the self as
existing for consciousness is confused with the unknown
" substance " of mind, and the unity and identity pre-
dicable of the former alone is unwarrantably transferred
to the latter. In this way the self as a mere negation,
by borrowing the positive determinations of the self as
it exists for knowledge, seems to be known as perman-
ent and identical with itself. The paralogism is almost
too evident to need pointing out.
(2) Mr. Spencer allows himself to be entangled not
only in the paralogisms of rational psychology, but in
the antinomies of rational cosmology. He gathers
together with infinite pains all the logical puzzles in
regard to the divisibility of matter, the change of
velocity, &c., which be can discover or invent, and
affirming them to be incapable of solution, he concludes
that our " ultimate scientific ideas " are all self-contra-
dictory. Were it so, reason, as Kant remarks, must
be in irremediable conflict with itself, the only legiti-
mate conclusion from which would be absolute scepti-
x.] NOUMENA AND PHENOMENA. 327
cisrn. I shall not enter into any detailed consideration
of Mr. Spencer's antinomies. All of them, as it seems
to me, yield to Kant's mode of solution. Space, for
example, is neither finitely divided nor infinitely
divided, but is infinitely divisible. The infinite divisi-
bility of space, in fact, arises from its very nature.
For any part of space is necessarily continuous, and
therefore admits of divisibility to infinity. Only by
negating the very idea of space, and reducing it to a
mere point, which, as Kant remarks, is not a part
of space at all, but simply" the limit between two
spaces, can we get rid of its divisibility. The question
of the finite divisibility or infinite divisibility of matter,
as well as the puzzle in regard to its solidity or non-
solidity, is also, as it seems to me, virtually solved by
the method of Kant. As shown in the Metaphysic of
Nature, an account of which has been given above,
matter is necessarily divisible to infinity, because any
distinguishable part of it, as occupying space, is divi-
sible to infinity. So also the infinite compressibility
of matter is implied in the intensive quantity of
any given force. The conception therefore of an
ultimate atom, i.e. a part of matter which is absolutely
incompressible, is a contradiction. This, however, is in
no way inconsistent with the solidity or impenetrability
of any given material substance, since solidity exists in
virtue of the relation between two finite forces. While
therefore an indivisible and incompressible atom is a
contradiction in terms, an undivided and impenetrable
atom is not. To assert the one is to contradict the
conception of matter as occupying space ; to assert
the other is to contradict the conception of force as
intensive quantity. But there is no real incompati-
bility between the conception of matter as infinitely
328 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS.
divisible and compressible, and the admission that as a
matter of fact there is a definite limit to the separation
of the parts of any given material body, a limit which
is determined by the equilibrium of two contrary finite
forces. It need hardly be added that a confusion be-
tween the infinite divisibility of motion conceived of as
a pure or abstract quantity, and the finite quantity of
any given motion, underlies the puzzle in regard to the
possibility of increase or decrease of velocity. The
contradictions which Mr. Spencer finds in our ultimate
ideas are the product of an illegitimate abstraction from
the actual relations of the knowable world. When it is
recognised that to a finite body the conception of infinity
is necessarily inapplicable, the apparent contradictions
in our knowledge of the real world disappear.
329
CHAPTER XI.
IMPERFECT DEVELOPMENT OF KANT's THEORY OF
KNOWLEDGE.
TN what has gone before an attempt has been made
to exhibit, with as much freedom as is com-
patible with accuracy of statement, the nature of
the problem which the Critique of Pure Reason was
intended to solve, and to show how the various parts
of the theory of knowledge contained in it are joined
together in the unity of a single system. In what
remains to be said I shall endeavour to point out
generally wherein that theory seems to require further
development, in order to make it complete and self-
consistent.
1. In defending the method of Kant against the
animadversions of Mr. Balfour, I had occasion to
contend that philosophy cannot be asked to prove the
reliability of special facts or laws, and must fall into
mere logomachy if it attempts to do so. The universal
conditions presupposed in the knowledge of those facts
and laws may be arrived at by reflection upon know-
ledge as it exists for common consciousness and the
special sciences, but no amount of reflection upon the
contents of our knowledge can enable us to discover a
single new fact or law. Not only is this recognized by
330 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
Kant, but as I believe even by Hegel, who is popularly
supposed to be the very high-priest of the a priori
method. Now, if philosophy has nothing to say to the
truth of our ordinary knowledge, it is evident that any
true theory of knowledge must in some sense start
from the world as already constituted for us, or, as
Kant would say, " given to us." Unless, however, we
carefully observe what is " given," and what has to be
discovered, we shall fall into a mistake that must be
fatal to the philosophical theory which we are interested
in establishing. As philosophy starts from ordinary
and scientific knowledge, it is compelled so far to
proceed by a method of abstraction, or rather it is
compelled to represent the concrete wealth of the
universe in an abstract symbol. Such a symbol is the
Kantian "manifold," which, as I have attempted to
show, is a term of great comprehensiveness, and, there-
fore, one which fluctuates in its meaning according to
our point of view at the time. And if this term is
taken, as Kant undoubtedly does take it at times, as
standing for the special facts or objects contained in
our ordinary and scientific knowledge, the " manifold "
will naturally be spoken of as "given," meaning by
this that it is not created by philosophy, but taken for
granted as a datum. To such a contrast of the " mani-
fold " as " given " in our ordinary knowledge, with the
propositions of philosophy which are only discovered
by special reflection there can be no possible objection.
But a misunderstanding is apt to grow up from con-
fusing the " manifold " as thus understood with the
" manifold " as the supposed object of sense. From
the fact that philosophy is an account of the conditions
of knowledge in general, it is difficult to avoid this
identification. Ordinary knowledge is contrasted with
XL] IMPERFECTION OF KANT >S THEORY. 331
philosophical knowledge, as that which seems to be
" given " with that which is the product of reflection ;
and hence the two propositions, that the " manifold " is
"given" to philosophy as a datum, and that the
"manifold" is "given" immediately in perception,
have the look of being merely various statements of
the same thing. And when we have identified the two
senses of the manifold, it is only a step to the contrast
of sense as a faculty receptive of the " manifold," with
thought or reflection as a faculty which acts spontane-
ously or by origination ; and it is but another step to
the contrast of the " manifold " as the given " matter "
of knowledge belonging to the object, with thought as
the principle originative of the " form " by which that
matter is universalized. It is in this way, as I think,
that Kant is led to draw a distinction between the
" manifold of sense " as " given," and the " forms " of
the mind as spontaneously originated in knowledge,
Now, this contrast of the "manifold" as given and
the " forms " as originated — or, what is the same thing
when we look at knowledge from the side of the
subject, of sense as receptive, and thought as spon-
taneous— has not only no proper justification, but it is
inconsistent with the spirit of the Critical philosophy
itself. We may, as I have said, speak of the mani-
fold as " given " to philosophy to be explained, but
this is quite a different thing from saying that the
manifold is "given" to sense. In the one case, we are
looking at two stages in the temporal development of
our knowledge, the scientific and the philosophical ; in
the other, as we are speaking of two logical elements
in knowledge, we have nothing to do with the ques-
tion as to which is first recognized by us and which
second. It is perfectly true that objects must be
332 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
known as objects, before our knowledge of them can be
philosophically accounted for ; but this does not justify
us in speaking of one element in knowledge as given,
and the other as originated. That such a contrast is
inconsistent with the final result of Kant's own theory
may be easily shown. The central idea of the Critique
is that knowable objects exist only in relation to
intelligence. Philosophical reflection, operating upon
the data "given " to it by ordinary and scientific know-
ledge, brings this truth to light, and in so doing, it
compels us to go back over the data as given, and to
interpret them in the light of our theory. Accordingly
the concrete objects which are correctly enough said to
be given to us as we reflect upon the conditions of
knowledge, break up into two distinguishable elements,
the element of the particular or manifold, and the
element of the universal or form. But as every act of
real knowledge is now seen to imply the reflection of
each element on the other, we cannot contrast the
one as given with the other as originated. That which
is properly said to be given in ordinary knowledge is
not a mere element of knowledge, but a concrete object,
comprehending both elements now distinguished by
philosophy. While, therefore, concrete objects may be
said to be given to the individual thinker, we cannot
say that the particular element is given, and the
universal element produced by reflection. From the
phenomenal point of view both elements are given ;
from the philosophical both may be said to be produced.
If, as Kant maintains, the objects which we know are
relative to our consciousness of them, the knowledge
of objects and the objects known are but different
aspects of the same concrete reality, and there is no
longer any valid reason for opposing one element of
XL] IMPERFECTION OF KANT'S THEORY. 333
knowledge to another. The world as known is the
world as it exists, and the supposition that there may
possibly be a world in itself, distinct from that which
is knowable, is a mere product of abstraction.
2. It is but another phase of the same imperfection
that Kant opposes the a posteriori element of know-
ledge to the a priori element. As the " manifold "
has two quite distinct senses, so a double contrast is
drawn between the formal or a priori element of know-
ledge, and the material or a posteriori element, (l)
Examining ordinary or scientific knowledge, without
inquiring into its relations to intelligence, we may
distinguish between particular facts, and the general
laws or principles which govern them. The principles
of mathematics enable us to anticipate the spatial and
temporal relations of objects; and the principles of
pure physics enable us to tell beforehand the condi-
tions to which all possible objects must conform.
Special facts or objects we may therefore distinguish
from the laws underlying them as the a posteriori from
the a priori. (2) When we ask how it is that we can
anticipate the universal conditions of objects, while we
cannot anticipate objects themselves, we find the
answer to be, that the former depend upon the
essential constitution of our intelligence, while the
latter do not. By the a priori is therefore here meant
that which belongs to the mind as distinguished from
that which belongs to the object.
The distinction of a priori from a posteriori know-
ledge, as stated by Kant, is one that can at beat be
regarded as only provisional. A priori knowledge is
that knowledge which, as universal and necessary, is
presupposed in all specific knowledge, and may there-
fore be anticipated. It is universal and necessary
334 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
because it belongs to the constitution of our intelligence,
and therefore is implied in the activity of our intelli-
gence, when it comes to operate in specific ways, i.e.,
to be actually employed in the definite knowing of
concrete objects. A posteriori knowledge, on the
other hand, does not belong to the constitution
of our intelligence, but is obtained by the specific
apprehension or recognition of the concrete element
in knowledge. This a posteriori element in know-
ledge, Kant therefore regards as in a sense con-
tingent. Why so ? Because our intelligence is in
reference to it passive, and has to wait for the presen-
tation of the concrete element to get something to
operate upon.
Now, while this account of the relation of our
intelligence to nature has the great merit of recogniz-
ing that nature is not completely independent of
intelligence, and hence of pointing out that there is
both a particular and a universal element in know-
ledge, and therefore in known objects, the separation
of the universal from the particular cannot be
regarded as justifiable. The concrete element in
knowledge is no more contingent than the universal
element. If it is true, e.g., that the category of
cause is essential to the explanation of the real con-
nexion of events, it is not the less true that the events
connected are real, and therefore necessary. All
knowledge, as distinguished from mere opinion, is
necessary. Kant does indeed recognize this in his own
way, but he regards the necessity as communicated to
the a posteriori element by the a priori. But as the
knowable world is, on his own showing, nothing apart
from its relations to intelligence, it seems manifest
that we cannot attribute the particular element of
xi.J IMPERFECTION OF KANT 'S THEORY. - 335
knowledge to the object any more than to the subject,
or the universal element to intelligence any more than
to nature. Only if we suppose nature to be in some
way constituted independently of thought, can we say
that the mind is receptive in respect of the particulars
of its knowledge. Kant, however, while insisting
in the strongest way on the correlativity of object
and subject, particular and universal, yet conceives
of the subject with its universal forms as in a sense
isolated from the object. Somewhat after the man-
ner of Butler, he supposes the mind to have an
independent constitution or structure of its own.
Here there clearly is some confusion between the
metaphysical and the phenomenal points of view.
As we have already seen, it is not incorrect to say that
the concrete world is " given " to the individual thinker
to be philosophically explained. But the result of
Kant's own explanation is to show that in that which
is given there already is implied the reflection of the
particular on the universal — or of the a posteriori on
the a priori, if we still are to use these terms. And as
the distinction of the two elements of knowledge is
the product of philosophical reflection, although it
correctly represents what is implied in every act of real
knowledge, it must follow that neither element can be
said to be " given " in contrast to the other. Both are
given to the individual who reflects upon knowledge,
but all knowledge, as the comprehension of particulars
under the unity of self-consciousness, is a recognition of
that which belongs to the essential nature of intelli-
gence. Accordingly, it must be denied that there is
even a possibility of the existence of a thing in itself
incapable of ever being known by us on account of the
limitation of our faculties. We cannot rid ourselves,
336 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
according to Kant, of the peculiar conditions under
which knowledge is possible for us, and hence we can
say nothing about things in themselves. How the
world would appear to a being of a different mental
constitution, we are unable to say. A being, for
example, who was not dependent for the particular
element of his knowledge upon the special experiences
coming to him from time to time, might perceive all
things at a glance ; but he would have before him a
totally different world from ours, and what that world
would be, we cannot possibly tell. We can say that he
would not perceive things as under the forms of space
and time, that his knowledge would not come to him
piecemeal, that he would not get a knowledge of
things by means of conceptions and inferences ; but we
can form no apprehension of what the world before
him would be, or what would be the nature of his
intelligence. Of such a being, of course, we could not
say, that part of his knowledge belonged to the consti-
tution of his intelligence, and part was due to his
capacity for being passively affected from without ; for
all things as revealing themselves to him by immediate
contemplation or intuition, would be alike, necessary and
universal. Man, however, is not a being of that kind,
and must be contented with a world of objects such
as his nature permits him to know. Now, it is un-
doubtedly important to emphasise the fact, that know-
ledge comes to us by instalments, and hence that we
are limited by this condition of our knowledge. But
this is quite a different thing from saying that the
particular element of knowledge is "given" to us, while
the universal element belongs to our mental constitu-
tion. For, while objects present themselves to us in
part, each part is itself concrete, involving as it does
xr.J IMPERFECTION OF KANTS THEORY. 337
the reflection of the particular on the universal. We
do not, e.g., first know the particular properties of an
object, and then bring them under the unity of self-
consciousness, but the properties are known only in
being referred to a universal self. This is but one of
the instances in which Kant has not perfectly freed
himself from the dogmatic or psychological point of
view, against which he so valiantly, and on the whole,
successfully contends. For, if the world we actually
know exists only in relation to our human intelligence,
we cannot be said to have real knowledge, but only
knowledge true for us as men. But relative knowledge
is not knowledge at all, in any proper sense, though it
may be all the knowledge we are capable of having. If
the observations peculiar to men as individuals, are un-
worthy of the name of knowledge, the observations
common to all men, which they vainly suppose to be
knowledge, must likewise be counted unworthy of it.
If all men were madmen, it would matter little to
them that there was a method in their madness. If the
best of our knowledge is only that which we cannot
help having, but which with different faculties we
should not have, why should we pin our faith to it ?
But while the opposition of a priori and a posteriori
knowledge, when pressed home, undoubtedly leads, as
has often been pointed out, to this sceptical conclusion,
the substantial merit of what Kant has done towards
the construction of a true theory of knowledge cannot
be denied without blindness or perversity. He was
the first in modern times to insist upon the correlativity
of intelligence and nature ; and while the letter of his
theory makes knowledge after all only a coherent
system of semblances, the spirit of it leads to a much
more hopeful result. Kant, however, never quite
338 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
liberated himself from the dogmatic separation of in-
telligence and nature. Even to the end the world
loomed up before him as a thing apart, which by some
means got transferred to human intelligence. Insist
as he will on the correlation of the outer and the inner
world, he still thinks of the self and the object as
somehow separate, and as requiring to be brought ex-
ternally into connection. And the secret of this is, that
he never clearly separates the proposition, that in the
knowledge of each of us one part of nature after
another comes before our consciousness, from the pro-
position that nature is for us nothing at all apart
from its relations to our intelligence. In other
words, the limits which hem us in as individual
men are supposed to be in some way limits to our
intelligence itself. But it may be easily shown
that, while the first proposition is undeniable, the
second has no proper foundation. Unless there were
in us a capacity for apprehending that which truly
is, we could not know that what we. do apprehend is
only relative to our intelligence as men. Granting, as
we must do, that the world of nature, as the men of
this generation know it, is in some respects different
from the world that will present itself before the men
of the next, we still cannot, without committing
logical suicide, distinguish the world as revealed to
human intelligence from the world as revealed to any
other intelligence. For this other world, as Kant
himself was half aware, would be for us nothing but a
creation of the mind, formed by the facile process of
abstracting from the fullness and concreteness of the
world we know, and very absurdly calling the atten-
uated remainder a higher world. When Kant speaks
of the world as it may appear to a higher intelligence,
XL J IMPERFECTION OF KANT'S THEOR Y. 339
he forgets that the conception of such an intelligence is
for us only what we make it to be, and that if we were
really capable of conceiving a kind of intelligence
quite unlike our own, we should by that very fact be
already beyond the limits of our human intelligence.
The kind of intelligence which Kant vaguely sup-
poses to be higher than human, is really below it.
Seeing all things as out of space and time, it makes
no logical distinctions between things, but only
looks into them. But why should space and time
be simply means of hiding realities from us ? They
are so, only if we suppose that realities are not in space
and time ; in other words, if behind the veil of the
phenomenal world there is a noumenal world, know-
able only as that which is for us unknowable. The
genesis of this fiction is very easily traceable. Ab-
stract from the world we know all its known re-
lations, and call the remainder the thing in itself,
and the thing is done. We must then discard the
assumption that the nature of our intelligence unfits
us for knowing reality, as a mere unresolved remain-
der left behind in Kant's mind by that dogmat-
ism from which, as we see, he was not thoroughly
aroused.
As, then, there is no valid reason for separating the
real world from the world as known to us as men, the
opposition of a priori and a posteriori must take another
meaning. If the concrete element is as essential to
the known world as the abstract — if each is in fact but
a logical distinction made by our reflection, although a
distinction necessary to explain what the nature of the
world is — the one element is necessary not less than
the other. Moreover there is no longer any proper
reason for opposing the a priori to the a posteriori as
340 KANT AND HTS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
that which belongs to the constitution of intelligence,
and in which the mind is active, to that which belongs
to the thing in itself and is passively received. In so
far as our intelligence reveals reality, that which is
revealed is that which is, and the particular element is
equally real and necessary with the universal element.
It is in fact only because Kant thinks of the mind as a
kind of mental structure possessed by all men in
common, that he opposes a priori and a posteriori,
universal and particular. I as an individual man, he
thinks, am dependent on sense for the concrete
element of my knowledge ; while the universal ele-
ment is added by my mind. From this point of
view, the forms of sense and thought are still
regarded as belonging to me as an individual,
although they are the same in me as in other men.
Hence each individual is apart from every other, and
we have all the same world before us in its essential
outlines only because we have all the same mental
forms. Thus the dualism which Kant got rid of so far
as the opposition of things in space to ideas in the
mind is concerned, returns in another form. Each
human intelligence, having like mental forms, has in-
deed a similar world before it, but still for each the world
is different, because while the particulars and the
forms are similar, the world as known is yet not the
world as it is, but only as it appears to be. Hence
the real world is again thrust beyond knowledge,
and is distinguished from that which we know as
noumenon from phenomenon. The only way out of
this difficulty is to deny the subjectivity of human
intelligence. The noumenal world of Kant must
be regarded as the product of a mere abstraction
from relation to intelligence. Distinguish between
xi.] IMPERFECTION OF KAN2"S THEORY. 341
the view of man as a part of the world he knows,
and man as an intelligence comprehending the world,
and we cannot any longer speak of any element
of knowledge as passively communicated. Speaking
from the point of view of individuality, the mental
forms must be regarded as received, not less than the
particulars to which the forms are applied ; speaking
from the point of view of man as an intelligence,
the particular is not less dependent on intelligence
than the universal. Intelligence raises man above his
mere individuality : the world consists of relations to
intelligence, and intelligence itself is simply the world
contemplated in its ideal aspect as spiritual.
3. In developing his own theory, as we have seen,
Kant is continually coming back to the point that the
dualism of knowledge and reality is the root of all evil
in philosophy ; and hence he is mainly interested in
showing that the knowable world could not exist for us
were it not that our intelligence supplies the universal
element by which objects are constituted and connected.
Bat, bravely as Kant sets his face against the separa-
tion of subject and object, the influence of the old
dogmatic or dualistic point of view makes itself felt in
the exposition of his theory. That this was inevitable
may easily be understood from what has just been said
in regard to the distinction of the a priori and the
a posteriori elements of knowledge. Accordingly, we
find that the different parts of Kant's system are not
connected so intimately as they ought to be. The
great imperfection in his theory, or rather in his way
of presenting it, is his want of the idea of development ;
by which I do not mean, that he overlooks the evolu-
tion of one living being from another, but that he
isolates the various elements of knowledge from each
342 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
other and is obliged to connect them in an external
way. For when the whole task of philosophy is
summed up in a demonstration of the dependence of
the objective world upon the forms of intelligence, the
connection of the various elements which go to form
knowable objects cannot be represented otherwise than
as external or superficial. Kant accordingly neglects
what may, after Cornte, be called the dynamical aspect
of the world. Starting from knowledge as already
given in its completeness, he is contented to point out
the various distinguishable elements which it implies.
And not only does he not attempt to connect those
elements by any inner law, but he denies that any such
law can be found. Thus he represents space and time
as two separate forms which as a matter of fact belong
to the constitution of our intelligence on its perceptive
side, but of which we can give no further account. So
the various categories are functions of unity, armed
with which thought is able to connect the manifold of
sense supplied to it; but each category is regarded as
complete and separate in itself. And even the "I,"
as the supreme unity implied in all knowledge, is spoken
of as if it were independent of the other elements which
it combines together. It must be observed, however,
that even in spite of himself, Kant recognizes a sort of
logical development of knowledge. In setting forth
one after another the principles which formulate the
various concrete acts of knowledge by which the world
is made intelligible for us, he follows, half-unconsciously,
the natural evolution of intelligence, beginning with
the mathematical or quantitative principles, and going
on to the dynamical or regulative principles. But the
want of development in his theory of knowledge can-
not help imparting to it an imperfection in form and
xi.] IMPERFECTION OF KANT S THEORY. 343
even in substance that detracts from its conclusive-
ness. For the ultimate proof of the idealistic view
of the world lies in the impossibility of separating
any single element of knowledge from the rest with-
out destroying the unity of the whole. When,
however, there are numerous lacunae in a system,
its constituent elements seem to be detached and arbi-
trary. This is the reason, for example, why Kant's
proofs of the principles of substance, causality and
reciprocity have an air of incompleteness about them.
Contenting himself with showing that each involves
relations to self-consciousness, he seems to make up
knowledge out of detached fragments. Only when
substance is seen to involve causality, and both in
unity to yield reciprocity, do we feel that we cannot
deny one principle without denying the others. And
the same remark applies to the interconnection of the
categories of quantity, quality and modality, and to the
continuous development of each of the more concrete
categories from that which is next to it in concreteness.
In making these remarks I have no intention of sug-
gesting that the mere contemplation of a category com-
pels us to see in it one more concrete than itself. From
any given category nothing can be evolved but itself.
The interconnection of which I speak is obtainable by
viewing a category in its connection with the concrete
objects to which it is applicable. The process by which
the categories are isolated from the particular element
of knowledge which gives them, in Kant's language,
meaning and significance, is a process of abstraction,
which needs to be corrected by a process of synthesis.
Viewing the categories in their relation to objects,
it may be shown that until we bring the world under
the highest category of all, the category of self-con-
344 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
sciousness, we have not adequately characterized it.
In this sense alone, as I should say, is thought "dialecti-
cal." The characterization, for example, of existence
by the mere category of " being " is so utterly inade-
quate as to compel us, when we reflect upon its inade-
quacy, to see that for it must be substituted ever more
concrete categories, until at last we have reached the
highest category of all in "self-consciousness." Ab-
stract and scholastic as such a logical evolution of
categories may seem to be, its importance cannot be
overrated. Had Mr. Spencer, for example, seen that
his " Unknowable " is simply existence characterized
as "being," the emptiest of all the determinations
recognized by intelligence to be implied in knowable
objects, he would have hesitated to elevate the
Unknowable above the Knowable. Nay, had Kant
himself seen that his thing-in-itself is only determin-
able by this simplest of all categories, he might have
escaped the danger of setting up the reality of such an
empty abstraction as even possible. The systematic
connexion, therefore, of the various categories or rela-
tions to thought can alone assure us that we are, in any
given case, characterizing a special aspect of the uni-
verse adequately, and it is the absence of such con-
nexion which gives the appearance of inconclusiveness
to Kant's reasoning. It may be added that the rigid
front which in the Critique the different categories
present to each other, inevitably suggests that they
are mere things of the mind, or abstractions. For,
unless we see that each lower category is but a more
or less inadequate form of reflection, by which we try
to raise our knowledge to the height of real existence,
the continuity of intellectual development must seem
to be arrested in exclusive points. When, on the other
xi.] IMPERFECTION OF KANT'S THEORY. 345
hand, it is recognized that it is only in the comprehen-
sion of all the ideal elements conspiring to constitute
the universe as a whole, that we can attain to complete-
ness of philosophical knowledge, it becomes appar-
ent that the categories, although real determinations
of existence so far as they go, are separated from each
other only in so far as by reflection we separate them :
in other words, that the advance of knowledge is con-
tinually showing the inadequacy of each given way of
looking at things. Knowledge is thus viewed as a
process by which the human mind recognizes the im-
perfection of a conception, and feels compelled to
seek for one more perfect. The history of human
thought, as embodied more or less adequately in the
succession of philosophical systems, is thus a valuable
aid in the discovery of the order of logical evolu-
tion of the categories by which the various wealth
of knowledge is systematized and developed. But in
truth there is no single aspect of human knowledge
from which the determinations of reality may be dis-
covered ; nor is there any royal road to that discovery ;
only by the insight of philosophical genius operating
upon actual knowledge in all its aspects can anything
like a complete system of philosophy be constructed.
4. I shall not attempt to show how all the categories
of Kant's table may be connected with each other : but,
in illustration of what has just been said, a few words
on the interconnection of the categories of substance,
cause and reciprocity, may not be out of place.
In the determination of the real world by the con-
ception of substance, the more simple determination of
it as " something real " is presupposed ; for when we
speak of a substance we are thinking of something as
a complex of various properties or relations without
346 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
which it would lose its reality. The accidental or
superficial attributes of a thing may be absent without
detriment to its reality, but not the essential attributes
which constitute its nature. Thus in the notion of
substance there is implied the permanence of certain
essential properties, notwithstanding the fugitiveness
of accidental properties. But in thinking of an object
as a .substance, we accentuate the permanence rather
than the capability of change, although both elements
are involved in the conception. This is the point of
view from which Kant, in the first analogy of experi-
ence, treats of substance, and hence he remarks that
substance is one of the categories of relation rather
because it is the condition of relation than because it
of itself implies relation. Hence he speaks of the re-
lations of an object as if they were superficial accidents
of it, belonging rather to our apprehension than to the
object. This separation of a thing from its relations,
or of the permanent from change, arises from the sup -
position that the particular element of knowledge is
somehow " given " in sense, while the universal element
belongs to thought ; or, as we may also say, from the
assumption that time belongs purely to our perceptive
faculty. Kidding ourselves of this false contrast, we
can see that the relations of an object are as essential
as that to which they are related, and the conception
of change as the conception of permanence. In fact,
if we abstract from all the relations by which an object
is constituted as real, we drop back into the mere con-
ception of " something we know not what," which is
the mere potentiality of an object. Substance, there-
fore, implies the correlation of identity and difference,
permanence and change.
In the conception of cause, again, we emphasize the
XL] IMPERFECTION O* KANT 'S THEORY. 347
relations or changes of things, rather than the identity
or permanence of things. As Kant himself points out,
every real change is an instance of causal relation, and all
change implies permanence. The relations by which a
thing is constituted as substance, or the changes which
a substance undergoes, therefore imply the conception
of causality. To see this, we must be careful to note
that in saying that substance is permanent, it is not
meant that every individual object is permanent. An
individual or sensible object is simply a certain sum of
properties connoted by a name, and no object so con-
ceived is permanent, as we all know. In other words,
substance is ultimately a term for nature itself as a
unity constituted by intelligence. Hence there is a
distinction between the conception of an individual
thing — a " substance " as we usually call it — and the
conception of substance in the strict sense of the term.
This distinction is responsible in large measure for
the isolation of substance from causality. Kant, for
example, gives as an instance of causality the judg-
ment: "The sun warms the stone," while he regards
the judgment : " When the sun shines the stone grows
warm," as not including the conception of causality.
On the one side we have the sun, on the other side the
stone, and each is independent of the other. Arid, of
course, this is true enough in a sense ; but it must be
observed that the sun and the stone, when isolated in
this way, are not only not instances of causality, but
they are not even instances of substantiality. Each is
assumed as immediately given, and hence the relations
implied in each are overlooked. The moment, however,
we ask what is meant by the terms "sun " and " stone"
the relations to other objects implied in each as real
come to light. One of these relations is expressed
348 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
in the judgment: "The sun warms the stone;" for
part of the connotation of " sun " is its heat-producing
power, and part of the connotation of "stone" is its
heat-receiving power. But only part of the connota-
tion of each is expressed in that judgment, i.e., only
one of the relations into which these two objects may
enter. And this is what gives rise to the separation
of the two conceptions of substance and causality.
Every individual object is a sum of relations, and hence
the complete nature of any given object is never ex-
hausted in a particular relation. And the matter is
made still more complicated by the fact that some
objects are capable of entering into an infinity of par-
ticular relations, while others are only capable of en-
tering into a small number of relations. The sun,
e.g., warms not only this object, the stone, but an
infinity of other objects ; whereas the stone is only
capable of being warmed in a limited number of ways.
Besides this particular relation of heat, the term
"sun" connotes many other relations of a different
kind. At the same time, the sun has no properties
except those involved in its relations to other objects ;
and hence, not only does the property of producing
heat imply causality, but all the other properties
belonging to it. Only, then, in relation to the stone
or some other object is the sun heat-producing at
all. If, therefore, we suppose the sun, for the sake
of simplicity, to have only the property of producing
heat in this particular stone, we must say that it is
a substance in virtue of its causality. Apart from
this property it is only conceivable as "something,
we know not what." Similarly, except as capable
of being heated by the sun, the stone is likewise
" something, we know not what." Thus we have two
XL] IMPERFECTION OF RANTS THEOR Y. 349
" somethings " which in themselves are indistinguish-
able ; the distinction falling between them as a certain
relation or change. And there is but one relation or
change : the heat of the sun is the same as the heat of
the stone. Each instance of causality is thus simply
one of the relations or changes of a substance considered
apart from the other relations or changes which deter-
mine it. Thus causality is reality contemplated as
changing in its relations, as substance is reality con-
templated as permanent; and as permanence and change
are correlatives implying each other, substance and
causality are correlative conceptions, logically distin-
guishable but really inseparable.
Finally, the category of reciprocity is just the synthe-
sis of the correlative conceptions of substance and caus-
ality. The sun warms the stone, but the stone must have
the capacity of being warmed or the sun could not act.
Each object is considered in the first place as indepen-
dent, and then as brought into relation with the other.
As we have seen, however, the objects are not independ-
ent in so far they are considered as causally connected :
change is relative to substance, and there are not two
changes, but only one. Substance is real because of its
relations ; each of these relations implies a causal con-
nection or change ; and each change is the product of
a relation between two objects which only exist as
causal in that relation. Thus substance implies cause,
and reciprocity comprehends both.
5. When we discard the opposition of a priori and
a posteriori, form and matter, intelligence and nature,
the separation of pure from mixed categories is at once
seen to be untenable. Assuming that there is a fixed
number of categories belonging to the constitution of
the understanding, Kant is led to speak of the primary
350 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
conceptions involved in the system of external nature as
derivative, and in a sense empirical. The conceptions of
matter, motion, force, and reciprocal action, presuppose
the categories of quantity, quality, relation, and modal-
ity, but they merely borrow from the latter their a
priori character, while in themselves they are empirical.
When, however, it is seen that there is no ground for
such a contrast of a priori and empirical, the concep-
tions presupposed in external nature can no longer be
placed on a different level from those presupposed in
nature in general. Both classes of conceptions are
abstract or a priori, when viewed apart from the con-
crete element of knowledge ; both are conditions of
real knowledge, and therefore equally constitutive of
reality. Nay, it may even be said that the conceptions
of matter, motion, and the other categories employed
in Physics are more real, because more concrete,
than the correspondent categories supposed to be in
a peculiar sense constitutive of real knowledge. The
former can be said to be "derived" from the latter,
only in so far as the more concrete conception logic-
ally presupposes the less concrete. In a systematic
presentation of the pure conceptions involved in know-
ledge, speaking generally, we must put the categories
of Kant's table, as less perfect definitions of real exis-
tence, earlier than those signalized in the Metaphysic
of Nature. Thus the conception of substance will
precede that of matter, causality that of force, recip-
rocity that of reciprocal action. In this way we
get rid of the illusion, suggested by the language
of the Critique, and partly shared in by Kant
himself, that the pure categories are somehow origi-
nated by the understanding itself, while the cate-
gories of nature are obtained by going beyond the
XL] IMPERFECTION OF KANT'S THEORY. 351
understanding to the perceptions of sense. All
categories, as Kant himself virtually admits, are dis-
covered only by reflection upon actual or concrete
knowledge, and hence there is no proper reason for
distinguishing one class as pure and original from
another class supposed to be mixed and derivative.
And this simplification allows us to bring philosophy
and the special sciences into closer connection with
each other ; for while no advance of science can pos-
sibly bring to light knowledge which is free of relation
to intelligence, that is no reason why the development
of scientific knowledge should not teach us to systema-
tize our knowledge by more and more perfect concep-
tions. As a matter of fact, philosophy always has
been, and always must be, more or less dependent upon
the progress of the physical sciences, as the latter have
been dependent upon philosophy. The earlier philoso-
phers endeavoured to systematize knowledge by cate-
gories which were necessarily meagre and inadequate,
just because the special branches of knowledge were in
their infancy. On Kant's view we cannot explain why
they should have been entirely destitute, as they show
themselves to have been, of such conceptions as cause
and force ; whereas, in recognizing that philosophy
formulates the relations to intelligence manifested in
knowledge as it has so far been developed at the time,-
we at once retain the spirituality of the universe and
allow for the process by which new ways of determin-
ing it are gradually discovered.
352
CHAPTER XII.
EXAMINATION OF KANT's DISTINCTION OF SENSE, IMAGINATION,
AND UNDERSTANDING.
general remarks in last chapter on the incom-
plete development of Kant's theory of knowledge
will perhaps become more intelligible by a considera-
tion of each of the elements of knowledge distinguished
in the Critique. These elements may be roughly
characterized as those due to sense, to imagination,
and to understanding; or, looking at the elements
themselves instead of their source, the manifold of
sense, the forms of perception, the schemata of im-
agination, the categories of the understanding, and
pure self-consciousness. These I shall take up in their
order, endeavouring to point out wherein Kant, in
departing from the critical point of view, mars the
unity and completeness of his system.
1. The manifold of sense is attributed by Kant to
the sensibility, as a purely receptive faculty. This
naturally suggests that sense is an independent faculty,
giving to us one special kind of knowledge, as imagina-
tion and understanding give other special kinds of
knowledge. The product of sense, however, is held by
Kant, notwithstanding the apparently psychological
distinction of different faculties, to be merely an ele-
xii.] SENSE AND UNDERSTANDING. 353
ment in knowledge, not a particular kind of knowledge.
At the same time one cannot employ imperfect forms
of thought without being more or less the victim of
them ; and hence, Kant is led to admit that a series of
subjective sensations constitutes the real element in our
inner life. Had he clearly distinguished the different
senses in which we may speak of sensation, this incon-
sistent admission might have been avoided. By sensa-
tion may be meant (1) a series of animal affections,
(2) the immediate apprehension of a real object, (3) a
series of individual feelings in consciousness, (4) the
particular element in real knowledge. A few words
on each of these meanings may help to make clear the
confusion in Kant's theory to which I have referred.
(1.) From the point of view of purely animal life,
sensation is simply a number of affections of the indi-
vidual animal, or changes in the animal organism pro-
duced by its reaction on external stimuli. This is the
point of view from which Fechner and his followers
distinguish the two " aspects " of the organism as ner-
vous excitation and sensation. And of course the
main question which has here to be discussed is the
physical conditions under which different sensations
arise, and especially the relations of the nervous struc-
ture to external stimuli, on the one hand, and to the
function of sensation on the other ; to which may be
added an enquiry into the way in which a given type
of organism has in course of time been gradually
developed, and has become better adapted to be the
instrument of such sensations.
(2.) From the phenomenal point of view sensation
is the apprehension of a reality regarded as immedi-
ately presenting itself to us. It is in fact but another
name for ordinary observation, as distinguished from
354 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
scientific generalization. In this sense of the term
sensation is regarded as dealing with external things
assumed to be directly revealed to us without inference
or mediation of any kind. The distinction of external
objects from the individual who apprehends them by
his senses is here taken for granted. Objects are
therefore supposed to exist as determined in them-
selves, and sensation to consist in the direct apprehen-
sion of them as individual.
(3.) Sensation is regarded by ordinary psychology as
the medium by which we come in contact with real
things existing independently of our sensations. Each
individual thing or event is supposed to be revealed
through an immediate feeling in consciousness. Thus
sensation is endowed with two opposite and mutually
exclusive characteristics. On the one hand it is an
immediate apprehension of real individual objects and
events, and on the other hand, it is a number of feelings
coming and going perpetually in consciousness.
(4.) Sensation in the strict critical, meaning is, from
the side of the object, the particular element known,
and from the side of the subject, the particular element
in knowledge. The particular must be carefully dis-
tinguished from the individual. The former is merely
an element in knowledge, the latter a concrete act or
product of knowledge. The separate properties of a
thing, e.g., are particular ; the thing as a union of these
properties is individual.
Of the various meanings of sensation just dis-
tinguished it is evident that only the last can have any
proper place in a theory of knowledge, the object of
which is to formulate the elements that combine to
produce actual knowledge. (1) A series of organic affec-
tions may indeed be considered as taken into considera-
XIL] SENSE AND UNDERSTANDING. 355
tion in a naetaphysic, but only in so far as metaphysic
deals with the conception of the organic as distinguished
from the conception of the inorganic world, or as
it deals with the organic beings comprehended in the
universe of objects which exist in relation to intelli-
gence. But, in so far as animal sensation is viewed
relatively to the possibility of knowledge, an investiga-
tion into its nature belongs to empirical psychology,
not to metaphysic : being taken as a datum given in
observation, no enquiry is made as to its relation to con-
sciousness. Sensation is therefore so far regarded as
a series of feelings running parallel with a series of
nervous excitations, which again are dependent upon
external stimuli. There is simply a given series of
changes that are independent of consciousness in the
same sense in which the motions of matter, or the
vibrations of the nervous system are independent of it.
The distinction of subject and object is here quite out
of place, since that distinction involves the relation of
a knowing subject to a known object. (2) Sensation,
as the observation or apprehension of concrete objects,
is spoken of by Kant in various passages ; but in these,
as I understand him, he is referring to the data on
which a philosophical explanation of knowledge must be
based. In the Prolegomena, for example, he speaks of
the sun and of a stone as objects of sense, here employ-
ing the term sensation in its ordinary, every-day accepta-
tion. (3) When we pass to the third meaning of sensation
we enter the region of the Critique. Kant indeed re-
fuses to admit that by sensation any knowledge of real
individual objects can be obtained ; for no mere series
of feelings, as he contends, can give us a knowledge of
objects, or of their connections. The force of his main
argument against psychological Idealism or dogmatism
356 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
rests upon the consideration that, from a continually
changing succession of impressions, — which would be
for us the only representative of objects, if objects were
things in themselves, — no actual knowledge can be
derived. But while he denies that a series of sen-
sations is capable of accounting for our knowledge of
objects, he does not deny that a series of sensations
exists in consciousness, but only that it can be
known except in contrast to permanent objects in
space. Now while Kant's criticism of psychological
Idealism seems to me valid, the correctness of his view
that our inner life may be characterized as a series
of feelings in time I am compelled to deny. Had
Kant simply said that there are feelings which do
not belong to the extra-organic world, but exist only
in relation to the organism, no objection could be made
to the remark, except on the ground of its irrelevancy
to a theory setting forth the conditions of knowledge
in general. But he does much more than this. Even
when speaking of those feelings which are supposed to
stand in direct relation to external objects, he supposes
that we may legitimately contrast the inner with the
outer life as a succession of feelings in time with per-
manent objects in space. But, when we have denied
that external objects are independent of consciousness,
there can no longer be any reason for opposing percep-
tions to objects perceived. A perception and a percept
are, on Kant's own showing, simply the same thing
viewed, in the one case from the side of the subject,
and in the other case from the side of the object.
Apart from the relation of the knowing self to the
object known, there is neither perception nor percept ;
in the relation of subject and object, perception and
percept are two aspects of the same concrete unity. It
xii.] SENSE AND UNDERSTANDING. 357
is only from the dualistic point of view that we can
oppose the one to the other : from the critical point of
view, there is merely a logical distinction between
them. Even if Kant in the Critique were explaining
the conditions of knowledge in the individual man, it
would still be true that a mere series of sensations is
nothing for us as intelligent beings. Subject and
object being correlative, perception and percept are
mere abstractions when taken in isolation from each
other. The source of Kant's mistake has been already
indicated in the remarks on the two-fold meaning of
the "manifold of sense." Distinguishing between
observation as the initial stage in knowledge, and
sensation as an element in the known world, Kant
yet allows himself to apply to sensation, in the latter
sense, attributes that are true of it only in the former
sense. As observation, sensation is taken to be an appre-
hension of real external objects. Hence the individual
man is regarded as passively apprehending individual
things as they lie before him. Even when he has
shown that the known world is not independent of con-
sciousness, Kant is still influenced by the idea that
sensation is purely receptive. On sensation, as he
thinks, we are dependent for the concrete filling or
"matter" of the categories, and accordingly, while
thought is active or spontaneous, sense is passive or
receptive. But if the Critique, as I have tried to show,
is, in spite of its imperfections, a systematic treatment
of the elements in real knowledge, or, what is the same
thing, in the real world as known, there is no propriety
in speaking of sense as receptive. Receptive it can be
only if there is a world lying beyond intelligence, which
acts upon a separate mind, and so calls up one feeling
after another. But such an unknowable world has no
358 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
reason for existence, if the world is really relative to
intelligence. It is true, of course, that each of us as
an individual man, obtains his knowledge in successive
parts, and from this point of view we may be said to
be receptive ; but from no point of view can we be
said to be receptive of mere feelings. The knowledge
which comes to me in fragments is not the less con-
crete : it is, in Kant's language, not a mere " manifold"
but a manifold reflected on a unity; it is not pure sen-
sation but sensation informed by thought. Sensation as
a logical element in knowledge is implied in ordinary
observation, but it cannot be identified with it. When
we come to explain what the first stage of knowledge
means for us as conscious beings, we are compelled to see
that, in real knowledge, there is not a passive apprehen-
sion of a detached manifold, but a real comprehension of
a manifold in unity. If I observe an object as a concrete
thing, I at once know it as one and as many. If I
perceive a congeries of objects in space, I comprehend
them all in the unity of a single consciousness. I can-
not apprehend a mere manifold of sense, because real
apprehension is not possible except as the combined
action of intelligence by which the universal " I "
relates to itself a real concrete. Thus ordinary know-
ledge, and much more scientific knowledge, manifests
the action of intelligence in the formation for me of a
real universe. While seeking to rid himself entirely of
dualism by carrying over nature into intelligence, Kant
yet confuses the abstract element of the manifold or
particular, with the concrete object revealed in percep-
tion. He does not mean to do so, and he shows us
how we are to escape from doing so, but in his view of
sense as receptive, he shows that he has not entirely
freed himself from the trammels of the false philosophy
XIL] SENSE AND UNDERSTANDING. 359
against which he turns all his strength. It is only in
consequence of the mistaken attribution of passivity to
sense, that Kant contrasts the series of internal feelings
with external things, even while he is at great pains
to show that known objects are not external to con-
sciousness. The fact that our knowledge of objects
comes to us in succession does not imply that we have
a knowledge of mere feelings as contrasted with a
knowledge of objects. It is only from a confusion
between sensation as an element in known objects, and
sensation as vaguely identified with ordinary observa-
tion, that we seem entitled to oppose the inner series
of feelings to outer things in space. When, in our
ordinary knowledge, we regard things outside of us as
immediately apprehended, it is of course natural to say,
that turning our thoughts inward on our apprehen-
sions we find that there is a series of ideas distinct
from the objects apprehended. But Kant himself
points out that this series of states is only known
in relation to external things. His mistake is to
allow that, notwithstanding the relation of the sensa-
tions to the objects, we must still regard the two as
separate and distinct objects of consciousness. In what
are they separated ? I have an apprehension of a bril-
liant object, but the apprehension is not separate from
the object ; it is in fact simply the object viewed from
the side of the subject. Hence apprehensions are not
a distinct series of feelings in time, as distinguished
from the objects apprehended which are at once in
space and in time. On the contrary, the apprehension
is only a logically distinguishable element in the object,
as the object is a logically distinguishable element in
the apprehension. Perception is thus, taken as a
whole, not an element in knowledge, but the know-
360 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
ledge of a concrete object. Kant recognizes this
relativity of internal and external so far; but he is
unable to liberate himself from the notion that objects
are somehow, in his own language, "given" to us.
They may indeed be said to be " given" to us as indi-
viduals, since knowledge is real only when it is not
a mere arbitrary creation, but a comprehension of
a concrete object in its real relations. But they are
not so " given " that there is, on the one side, a series
of feelings in time, and on the other side, a number of
objects in space. Kant, therefore, makes the mistake
of allowing the mere series of feelings to survive, even
after he has shown that all real objects are relative to
our knowledge of them. And this he does, because he
confuses sensation as a term for the particular element
in known objects and in knowledge with sensation as a
series of particular feelings coming and going in the in-
dividual mind. He denies, indeed, that individual
objects are given, but he fails to recognize that, with
the transference of objects as determinate to conscious-
ness, there is no longer any propriety in saying that
anything is " given." Or, at least, if we are to speak
of anything as given, it must be, not from the critical
point of view, in which the elements of real knowledge
are contemplated, but from the psychological point of
view, in which we look at the process by which know-
ledge grows up for us as individual men, limited by a
particular animal nature.
(4) Ridding ourselves, then, of this remnant of
dogmatism, by which Kant has allowed himself to
be confused, we may accept the view that sensa-
tion, in the strict critical sense, supplies the particular
element in knowledge. It would perhaps be better
in this connection, although, to discard the mis-
xii.] SENSE AND UNDERSTANDING. 361
leading term sensation altogether. Nothing is more
important than to recognize the concrete unity im-
plied in every act of knowledge, and in every known
object, and this is all the more important, that it
brings out the essential relativity of the elements of
real knowledge. For, when we clearly realise that
every real object is concrete, distinguishable in one
aspect as a multitude of particulars or abstract deter-
minations, the way is prepared for the comprehension
of the particular and the universal elements as together
combining in the individual. Thus we get rid of the
fiction of a universe existing apart from intelligence,
while at the same time we take due note of the fact
that the individual man no more constructs the world
than he constructs himself.
2. I have already hinted that Kant's conception of
space and time, as forms of perception, supremely
important as it is in its ultimate issues, cannot be
accepted without modification. To limit space and
time to human intelligence as perceptive, or at least
to all possible intelligences which are dependent for
the particular element of knowledge on the constitu-
tion of their perceptive faculty, is to make a restriction
which is at once untenable and inconsistent with the
spirit of Kant's own theory of knowledge. Space and
time are held to belong to our intelligence, because
they are a priori, or independent of observation, and
they are held to be perceptions because they are not
abstract uniyersals but individuals.
Now (1) the fact that space and time are independent
of special observations, only shows that they are very
abstract elements of the real world. As space is, in
the language of Mr. Spencer, the " abstract of all
relations of co-existence," and time u the abstract of
362 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
all relations of succession," both are necessarily pre-
supposed in any knowledge of concrete things. All
parts of space being homogeneous, a determination
of one part is virtually a determination of every other.
But what this shows is not that space and time belong
to intelligence, while individual objects do not, but
merely that their parts as absolutely simple admit of
no variation or difference. When we contemplate
knowledge as in process of formation, it is no doubt
true that spatial and temporal relations may be an-
ticipated, while more specific relations do not admit
of anticipation. But the reason of this is not that
the former belong to the constitution of our percep-
tive faculty, while concrete things belong to nature.
No doubt it is in virtue of our intelligence that we
can determine the relations of space and time, and
so form a science of mathematics, but it is equally in
virtue of intelligence that we are capable of knowing
the objects which fill them. The contrast of forms
of perception and objects perceived rests upon the
supposition that while intelligence is in a sense mani-
fested in nature as a whole, its special work is shown
only in the a priori or universal side of knowledge, as
distinguished from the a posteriori or particular side of
knowledge, which belongs to nature itself. But in
this view two conceptions are set side by side which
cannot be made to harmonise with each other. Seeing
that a knowable world, virtually assumed to be un-
knowable, is a contradiction in terms, Kant rightly
holds that all real objects are relative to our conscious-
ness of them. As however the particular element in
knowledge is still said to be " given," intelligence in
perception is supposed to be receptive. But it soon
appears that this explanation is not quite satisfactory
xii.] SENSE AND UNDERSTANDING. 363
when applied to space and time, since their deter-
minations, as independent of special apprehension,
cannot properly be said to be " given." Kant,
however, misled by the confusion of the receptiv-
ity for knowledge of the individual man with the
receptivity of intelligence in relation to a particular
manifold of sense, separates between space and time
as forms and particular spaces and times, supposing
the former to belong to intelligence and the latter
to be in some sense given to intelligence. But as even
the determinations of space and time are prior to
determinate objects, both the forms of perception and
the determination of those forms are held to belong to
intelligence, but only to intelligence in so far as it is
receptive. Such a conception conjoins incompatible at-
tributes. The assumption that space and time are mere
forms of perception evidently rests on the preconception
that to intelligence in itself there can belong only an
abstract universal. But there is no proper reason for
such a restriction. Space and time conceived of as
unities are mere abstract elements in knowledge, and
therefore mere potentialities of determinate spaces
and times. The distinction of potential and actual,
universal and particular, necessary as it is to the dis-
crimination of the elements of knowledge, must not be
taken to carry with it any opposition of intelligence in
itself and nature in itself. Hence, space and time, as
forms, must be brought into the closest relation with
space and time as determinate. A pure universal is
no real object of knowledge : neither is a mere deter-
rninateness. This Kant clearly sees, but as he is still
under the fascination of the idea that only the abstract
universal belongs to intelligence, he separates space and
time as forms from their determinations. But if the
364: KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
task of philosophy is to point out the elements implied
in any real act of knowledge, it seems evident that we
must not suppose one element in knowledge to belong
exclusively to intelligence, and another element to be
externally revealed to intelligence. Each space is a
unity in difference, a universal reflected in a particular.
A point, as Kant himself remarks, is simply the ter-
mination of a line, and hence any number of points
is a number of nothings ; a line is th etermination of
a surface, but no number of lines will make a surface ;
a surface is the boundary of a solid, but a solid cannot
be formed out of surfaces. Each part of space im-
plies a limit that is nothing apart from that which
is limited. The particular units of space are units,
in fact, only when they are related to the unity
in which they coalesce. Space and time are only
forms when they are regarded as pure unities ; and
pure unities are not real objects of knowledge, but
merely the universal aspect of a real object, taken by
itself.
It is evident, then, that space and time are not to be
regarded as mere forms, but as relatively abstract
relations of the real world. They are just the simplest
point of view from which the real world or real know-
ledge can be contemplated, \vhen we are determining
the elements implied in actual knowledge. But when
we have got rid of the arbitrary opposition of that
which belongs to intelligence, and that which is exter-
nally added to intelligence ; and when we see that the
question is not as to the conditions of knowledge in the
individual man, but as to the conditions of knowledge
in general ; we also see that Kant's view of space and
time as forms of human intelligence is inconsistent with
his own theory when developed to its true issue. This
xn.] SENSE AND UNDERSTANDING. 365
becomes still more manifest when we consider space
and time as perceptions.
(2) Space and time are held to be perceptions,
because they are not abstract conceptions, but individual
concretes. Attention has already been called to the
fact that they are individual only when we regard them
as determined to particular spaces and times. As
forms, they are not perceptions, but only the potentiality
of perceptions. An individual is a unity of the universal
and the particular, and hence space and time can only
be said to be individual when as unities they are so
reflected in particular parts as to form individuals.
Kant, however, still holds that as perceptions they are
somehow " given." Although he maintains that they
are constructions based upon pure or a priori percep-
tions, he yet supposes them to be receptively appre-
hended when they are viewed in relation to the concrete
things to which they apply. As informing the manifold
of sense, itself supposed to be "given" to us, they
belong to the^concrete side of knowledge, if not in them-
selves, at least in their application to real concretes.
The forms of space and time are called out and deter-
mined only on occasion of the presentation of a given
manifold, and therefore they belong to the receptive
side of intelligence. If they were not so called out,
they would slumber for ever in the mind as mere
potentialities. Now this is manifestly only true
if we look at them as forms belonging to each
individual's intelligence. The world of objects as
informed by space and time has then to be separated
from the real world not so informed, and the latter be-
comes unknowable. The assumption underlying this
view of space and time as perceptions somehow given
to us virtually prevents us from explaining how we can
366 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
know that which truly is. There is no justification for
such an assumption : nature, and space and time as
simple determinations of nature, are real because they
are relative to intelligence. If every object is relative
to consciousness, as Kant himself tells us, why should
we imagine a world not relative to consciousness
at all ?
While we cannot be too grateful to Kant for setting
us on the right track, when he points out that space
and time, and therefore the concrete objects filling
them, do not exist apart from our intelligence, we must
go on to the end of the path he has entered upon, by
carrying over into intelligence the determinations of
space and time along with space and time as unities.
And this gives a simplicity to our view of mathematical
truth, which Kant's theory does not possess. If we
suppose that only space and time as abstract unities or
forms belong to intelligence, how are we to be sure
that their determinations are universally and neces-
sarily true ? Kant, of course, would say that, as
belonging to our perceptive intelligence, and con-
structed by us, they must be necessary and universal.
But the necessity and universality do not, on his own
showing, belong to the determinations, but to the forms,
or at least the determinations only borrow their abso-
luteness from the forms. When, however, we see that
the forms are merely one aspect of the individual spaces
and times which alone we actually know, we discover
that the universality of the propositions of mathematics
arises from the fact that all real relations of things, and
therefore mathematical relations among the rest, are
necessary relations. Doubt is possible in regard to the
absoluteness of mathematical propositions only so long
as it seems allowable to suppose another universe com-
XIL] SENSE AND UNDERSTANDING. 367
pletely different in its constitution from ours ; and when
it is seen that such a universe is a mere fiction of
abstraction, since it is only definable as the unknowable,
the doubt at once vanishes.
The examination of Kant's theory of knowledge so
far leads to the conclusion that its essence consists in
the proposition that the universal reflected on the
particular alone gives real knowledge. The manifold
of sense, when conceived from the purely critical point
of view, is definable as the particular element in know-
ledge as contrasted with the universal element. The
opposition of space and time as forms of perception to
space and time as perceptions, which we have seen to
be implicit in the ^Esthetic of Kant, disappears with
the recognition of the thorough-going correlation of
subject and object, and leaves as residue the concrete
unity of intelligence as shown in the knowledge of
individual spaces and times, uniting the universal and
the particular. We have now to consider the rela-
tion of imagination with its schemata to the elements
already considered, as well as to those yet to be con-
sidered.
3. That imperfect liberation from the dogmatic or
psychological point of view, which is seen in the
doctrine that the manifold of sense is " given," and
that space and time are merely forms of human intelli-
gence, is also shown in the doctrine of the schematism
as to the activity of the pure imagination. Kant cer-
tainly draws a distinction between the reproductive and
the productive imagination, making it perfectly plain
that the latter is no mere repetition of given percep-
tions ; but, at the same time, he is compelled to regard
the pure imagination as characteristic only of human
intelligence.
368 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
Pure imagination, as Kant conceives of it, is limited
to the general determination of time, to the exclusion
of space. Why so ? Because it is one of the condi-
tions of our intelligence that knowledge comes to us
in successive acts. Now of course it is plain enough
that as individuals, limited by our animal organism
to a particular place and a particular time, we know
only in part, and must pass from one object of con-
templation to another. But while this is true of us
as individuals, it is not the less true, on Kant's own
showing, that in our intelligence must be sought that
which makes possible the knowledge of ourselves, as
so limited by space and time. Pure imagination, as
described by Kant, is quite distinct from imagination
as limited by temporal conditions, inasmuch as it
enables us to determine concrete objects by universal
relations of time. Kant does not mean to say that
we first have the perception of individual things and
events as in a particular time, and that we then by
pure imagination bring those things under general
relations of time ; but he means, that only in the de-
termination of them in certain universal ways we are
capable of knowing things as in time. Looking at
the phenomenal stages of our knowledge, we must
rather say that we first have the apprehension or
perception of individual things and events, which
we then reproduce by imagination, and finally bring
under conceptions; and that only when these
stages are completed, we discover by reflection that
things come under schemata and categories. But,
from the critical point of view, the order of the so-
called faculties of sense, imagination and thought is
a relation not of succession at all, but of logical
dependence. It will be as well to distinguish the
xii.] SENSE AND UNDERSTANDING. 369
different meanings of imagination, as we have distin-
guished the different meanings of sensation.
(1.) By imagination may be meant simply the oc-
currence of feelings in the animal, when external
stimuli are not present. Taking imagination in this
sense, we may enquire into the relation between the
condition of the nervous system, and especially of the
brain, and the imagined feeling which accompanies it.
Here we are treating imagination simply as we treat
any other object capable of being observed. The en-
quiry belongs to that sphere of physiological psychology
which has recently received so much attention. And
no doubt it can be shown that the correspondence be-
tween the molecular movement in the nervous system
and the imagined feeling is thorough-going, so that no
change in the one can take place without a correspond-
ing change in the other. But the enquiry lies beyond
the range of metaphysic proper, because the distinction
of subject and object, intelligence and nature, is not
even brought under consideration. The imagined
feeling and the molecular movement are regarded as
known, but no enquiry is made into the conditions
under which such knowledge is alone possible.
(2.) Imagination, again, may be regarded as the second
phase in the temporal development of knowledge. The
observation of facts is followed by the imaginative con-
templation of them, as lifted above the immediate time
and place in which they are observed and so idealized.
In this case also there is no room for an enquiry into
the dependence of reality upon intelligence : real things
are assumed to be given to us, and in exercising our
imagination upon them we abstract from the mere details
of their existence, and contemplate them under vague
and general aspects. The poetic imagination is simply
2 A
370 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
this common faculty raised to its highest perfection ;
for all intelligent beings have the capacity of repre-
senting reality in images that fuse together the
separate features of existence in a new unity.
(3.) In ordinary psychology imagination is a term
for the capacity of having ideas that are not, like sen-
sations, supposed to stand in direct relation to external
objects. The stream of feelings that constitutes the
inner life is separated from the realities lying outside
of the mind. The images in the rnind are supposed
to refer to real things, but only mediately, and in
so far as they are correct copies of sensations
originally experienced. Thus in the stream of inner
feelings, perpetually coming and going, there are
sensations directly confronting external things, and
images referring directly to sensations, and so mediately
to external things. And this mere succession of in-
dividual images, like the succession of individual sen-
sations, is treated as purely subjective.
(4.) Lastly, imagination, in the strict critical sense,
is the faculty of determining the particular element of
knowledge to certain general relations of time, such
as permanence, order, and co-existence. It is at
once universal and particular — universal in itself and
particular in its application. Imagination, as thus
understood, is no mere reproduction of individual per-
ceptions, but the process by which universal concep-
tions or categories are brought into relation with the
manifold of sense, which is thus determined to universal
relations of time.
Of these various meanings of imagination only the
last is properly in place in metaphysic. Kant, how-
ever, does not keep the reproductive imagination abso-
lutely distinct from the productive imagination, and
xii.] SENSE AND UNDERSTANDING. 371
hence he will be found attributing to the latter attri-
butes only true of the former.
Imagination as a mere affection of the animal, which
may go on without any recognition of self by the
animal, is of course excluded. Kant, indeed, has a
summary way of disposing of the "mere animal," which
reminds us that he lived before the doctrine of evolu-
tion had taken such hold upon the scientific imagination
as it has recently done. This is no doubt an imperfec-
tion, for the enquiry into the natural history of the
whole animal creation has great importance within its
own sphere. But Kant was not wrong in eliminating
from his critical enquiry all considerations as to the
natural evolution of the animal, since, as he shows, the
animal, like the other parts of nature, is one of the
objects of knowledge, and therefore only falls to be
considered in so far as the general relation of subject
and object comes under investigation.
Kant, again, shows his appreciation of the distinction
between imagination as a phase in the temporal evolu-
tion of knowledge, and imagination in the critical sense,
although he has not marked off the one from the other
so clearly as we could wish. Imagination, he remarks
in one place, is " a faculty of representing an object
when it is not present in perception." l Now, as
Kant has pointed out that known objects are not
independent existences, he cannot of course regard
imagination in the critical sense as a reproduction
of objects immediately known as they exist, apart
from our intelligence. His analysis of knowledge has
led him to regard sense as giving us the " manifold " ;
but it is a manifold of particulars, not of concrete
things. A reproduction of the " manifold " is an
1 Krifik, p. 127.
372 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP-
absurdity ; for the manifold is not of itself an object of
knowledge at all, but simply an element in knowledge.
Kant, therefore, does not regard imagination as repro-
ductive, but as productive. It acts on the form of
time, and by so doing determines it in general ways.
Thus it does not come after the presentation of indi-
vidual things to sense, copying their general features,
but is logically prior to our knowledge of the things of
sense. But, just as he accepts the ordinary view that
the " matter " of sense is given, even when so altering
the account of the relation of intelligence and nature as to
make the supposition meaningless, so he figures imagin-
ation to himself not as simply the logical determination
of intelligence in relation to nature, but as a process
taking place in time. Now it seems plain enough that
imagination cannot properly be at once that which de-
termines time, and that which is itself limited by the
very determinations which it is itself conceived of as
originating. If the actual knowledge of real things can
only be explained by supposing a process by which the
manifold of sense is determined in time in certain general
ways, it is absurd to say that imagination is itself under
limits of time, and irrelevant to say that all our know-
ledge comes to us in succession. We cannot know our-
selves as individuals to be under limitations of time in
knowing, except in so far as the imagination determines
us to those limits. To point out that our mental life is
conditioned by the form of time as determinate, is true
enough, but it is a remark from the point of view of
the individual, not a remark in place in a theory of
the conditions of intelligence as such. Here again
Kant is misled by the influence of that psychological
Idealism from which he struggles so hard to be free.
Having first conceived of time as a mere form of our
xii.] SEiVSE AND UNDERSTANDING. 373
sensibility, and the "manifold" as somehow "given"
to us, or passively received, he is compelled to bring
the manifold and the form into connection by a device
that savours too much of an afterthought. The form
lies ready in the mind, or rather the mind exists apart
from nature with its form of time, and the manifold of
sense is then given from without. The internal form
and the external manifold must, however, be brought
into relation in some way. But a mere universal form,
and a mere manifold of sense, cannot come together
except through a process of synthesis in time. The
form of time must be determined, and the manifold of
sense is no determination of it, but only of the external
reality. It is to explain this determination that the
imagination is introduced. Having the form of time
as potential, and receiving the manifold of sense, we go
through the parts of the manifold one after the other,
and so determine them. Without this successive
synthesis, therefore, the form cannot be brought into
relation with the manifold.
There is here manifestly an intermixture of the
critical and the psychological points of view. And it is
not difficult to see that two heterogeneous elements
are mechanically conjoined without being really fused
into one. Looking at imagination as a phase in the
phenomenal evolution of knowledge, it is of course
correct to say that it implies a synthesis of individual
images, just as perception implies a synthesis of indi-
vidual objects. But when we attempt philosophically to
explain what is implied in this phase of our knowledge,
we must recognize that it involves the concrete unity
of the universal and the particular, whether we look at
the object imagined or at the imagination of the object.
There are of course imaginations that are merely arbi-
374 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
traiy combinations of incongruous elements of per-
ception ; but an examination of the distinction of real
from fictitious imagination belongs to psychology, not
to metaphysic. Imagination, as an actual phase of
knowledge, therefore implies the essential correlativity
of intelligence and its object. On the other hand,
imagination, in the critical sense, does not deal with
concrete objects, but merely with an element in con-
crete objects. Finding that every individual object
exists only in relation to intelligence, we are compelled
to recognize that there is in every real act of knowledge
a particular element and a universal element. The
particular element, as we have seen, Kant attributes to
sense, the universal element to thought. The mere
name is of no consequence, but it is of great importance
to recognize that the particular element is not less
necessary to knowledge and to known objects than the
universal element. But if this is so, we must not only
take note of the particular and of the universal, but of
the relation between them. Now, air this is implied in
imagination as a phase of knowledge, as it is implied in
every act of intelligence whatever. Hence Kant is not
entitled to say that the pure imagination is conditioned
by time. Separating in thought the particular element
from the universal element, we must yet take note of their
relation. Imagination is simply in effect this relation
of the two elements of knowledge. Kant, however,
conceives of it as a faculty or process distinct from
thought. But if all real knowledge implies a union of
particular and universal to form the individual, there
is no propriety in bringing in a special faculty to ex-
plain what is already explained. Whether, therefore,
we are determining relations of space or time ; whether
we are connecting concrete properties in the unity of
xii.] SEiVSE AND UNDERSTANDING. 375
individual things ; or whether we are considering
material bodies as moving, as manifesting force, and as
acting and re-acting ; in all these cases we must
recognize the necessary relativity of the particular and
the universal in the individual.
Lastly, Kant, so far mixing up the phenomenal with
the metaphysical point of view, is naturally under the
influence of the psychological conception of imagination
as a separate faculty of knowledge. Imagination, as
Kant with great shrewdness points out, is at once a
universalizing and an individualizing faculty. It uni-
versalizes by drawing a sort of monogram of an indi-
vidual thing, which as an outline or sketch applies to
all objects of the same species; it individualizes because
it enables us to realize our conceptions sufficiently to
see that they are applicable to real things. Thus it is
a sort of mediator between conception and perception.
Imagination, then, is not merely the faculty by which
images of individual things are presented to us, but
the faculty by which images are stripped of their
peculiar features, and reduced to schemata. These
schemata of individual things are however different
from the transcendental schemata. The points of
agreement are mainly these. In the first place, the
empirical schema reduces individual perceptions to
general outlines or pictures ; the transcendental schema
determines the manifold of sense to universal modes of
time. In the second place, the empirical schema as a
general outline of an individual thing, gives definiteness
to an abstract conception ; the transcendental schema
determines the category or form of thought to uni-
versal modes of time, which combine with the manifold
of sense to constitute known objects. The differences
between them are however not less marked. In the
376 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
first place, the empirical schema is an outline of an
individual thing regarded as given in apprehension ;
the transcendental schema is a universal determination
of the form of time, and therefore known individual
things presuppose it. In the second place, the em-
pirical schema is a realizing in a general outline of an
abstract conception lying ready made in the mind ; the
transcendental schema is a determining of a primary
conception or category which belongs to the constitution
of thought, but is in itself merely an element in know-
ledge or in known objects. Lastly, the empirical
schema comes after perception of individual things;
the transcendental schema logically precedes the per-
ception of individual things. To sum up these differ-
ences in a word, the empirical schema has reference to
individual concretes, which it presupposes ; the trans-
cendental schema has reference to individual concretes
presupposing it. Thus while the empirical schema
really supposes knowledge of individuals to be already
possessed, the transcendental schema explains how such
knowledge is possible.
Now as the transcendental schema ought to be
simply one of the elements in knowledge or known
objects, we must discard the resemblances of the two
kinds of schema as superficial. Kant, however,
attempts to assimilate them. And the point of abso-
lute agreement to his mind is, that in both we give
determination of a general kind to conceptions, and
to both the sensible element is ''given." But the
determinateness in each is of quite a different kind, and
the sensible element is also different. In the one
case, it is a determinate element, in the other, a
determinate representation ; in the one, the sensible
is the 'particular element in knowledge, in the other, it
xii.] SENSE AND UNDERSTANDING. 377
is sensible or concrete individuals. Now an element
in knowledge has no reality apart from the other
elements which go to constitute knowledge, whereas a
determinate representation is already the representa-
tion of reality. Moreover, the particular element in
knowledge is nothing apart from the other elements of
knowledge, while a concrete individual already implies
the combination of the different elements of knowledge.
In determining the elements of knowledge we must
therefore start from ordinary knowledge as completed,
and hence we have nothing to do with the conditions
under which knowledge is possible for the individual
man. Accordingly, imagination can only be taken as
a term for the process of relating the elements of
knowledge to each other. Whether that knowledge
comes to the individual in instalments or all at once,
does not' alter the character of the knowledge itself ;
and hence we must discard considerations connected
with the way in which knowledge is obtained by us as
individuals, and confine our attention to the nature of
the knowledge so obtained. In short, imagination, in
the true critical sense, is simply a term for the relation
between subject and object, the universal and the
particular. The determination of time is therefore but
one instance of the activity by which intelligence
surrounds itself with a world of its own construction.
The same elements are implied in the determination
of space, in the determination of matter, of motion, of
force, nay, in the simplest determination of an external
object as a congeries of properties. Everywhere, and
in all known objects, the same process of referring the
particular to the universal is implied. Kant is pre-
vented from taking this view, because he cannot get
rid of the idea that time is a mere form of the human
378 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS, [CHAP.
intelligence, and that the manifold of sense (the
particular) is somehow " given " or comes to intelli-
gence from without. But time, like space, is, as 1
have tried to show, one of the simplest determinations
of the real world ; and hence the supposition that
space and time have any more claim to be referred
to intelligence than other objects of perception is
untenable.
4. We have seen that, when interpreted from
the point of view which the Critique first made
possible, the manifold of sense is properly a term for
the particular element in knowledge, that the distinc-
tion of space and time as forms from individual spaces
and times implies the reflection of the universal on the
particular, and that imagination is virtually the process
by which the particular in its various modes is related
to the universal. We have now to consider Kant's
account of the understanding as a faculty of combining
conceptions into judgments. It will be advisable to
look first at conceptions. The following are the senses
in which the term " conception " may be employed.
(1) In the development of knowledge in time the
conceptual view of the world succeeds the imagina-
tive, as the latter is preceded by the perceptive or
observational. Conception in this sense is distin-
guished from imagination, as abstract from figurate
representation. At the stage of conception individual
facts are run up under universal laws. The changes
in the material universe, for example, are brought
under the conception of gravitation, by means of
which they are all combined in the unity of a single law.
This law may be called abstract, not because it is a
mere general or abstract conception, obtained by
elimination of all the differences of material bodies,
xii.] SZNSE AND UNDERSTANDING. 379
but because it formulates only certain select aspects
of nature, to the exclusion of other aspects equally
real. The law of gravitation tells us nothing in regard
to the chemical, physiological or psychological relations
of existences, but picking out the motions of bodies
relatively to each other, it combines them all under a
single conception. Hence there is a multiplicity of
conceptions or laws, corresponding to the varied aspects
of the real universe. (2) By conception, again,
empirical psychology means a general idea, the pro-
duct of a process of abstraction by which the points
of difference in a given number of individual objects
are gradually eliminated, and their points of agree-
ment gathered together into a unity. It is in this
sense that formal logic speaks of conception. By
immediate perception, as it is supposed, concrete
objects existing independently of consciousness are
given to thought, and are then worked up into con-
ceptions, which include under them all the individual
things having common attributes. (3) Pure concep-
tions or categories are universal forms belonging to the
constitution of the understanding, by means of which
the manifold of sense is individualized and reduced to
the unity of known objects and connexions of objects.
These pure conceptions agree with abstract conceptions
in the following points. In the first place, an abstract
conception combines individual objects or conceptions
less abstract than itself; a pure conception combines a
manifold of sense. In the second place, an abstract
conception reduces individuals or species to the unity
of a general idea ; a pure conception reduces a mani-
fold of sense to the unity of a concrete object. The
points of difference, again, are these. In the first
place, an abstract conception comprehends the attri-
380 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
butes common to a number of individuals or species ;
a pure conception constitutes an individual object as
such. In the second place, an abstract conception is
formed from individual objects given to thought ; a
pure conception belongs to the very constitution of
thought. Thirdly, an abstract conception follows the
perception of individual things ; a pure conception
logically precedes and conditions the perception of
individual things.
It does not require much reflection to see that only
the last of these meanings is consistent with the critical
explanation of knowledge. (1) Conception, in the first
of the senses just distinguished, is spoken of in many
parts of Kant's writings, and especially in the more
popular statements of his theory ; in the Prolegomena,
for example, where a distinction is drawn between
judgments of perception and judgments of experience.
But as the special facts and laws of ordinary knowledge,
as I have so often insisted, are not by Kant sought to
be proved, but are assumed as data requiring only to
be brought into relation with intelligence, an investiga-
tion into the special conditions under which such con-
ceptions or laws are formed belongs to the organon of
the special sciences, not to the critical investigation of
the primary conditions of knowledge. A few remarks
however, on the nature of scientific conceptions may
not be out of place.
The advance from simple apprehension to scientific
conception, or from facts to laws, is in one sense an
advance to the more concrete, and in another sense an
advance to the more abstract. Every science has its
first beginnings in what may be called, from the pheno-
menal point of view, the immediate perception of facts.
And this holds true of the mathematical, not less than
xii.] SENSE AND UNDERSTANDING. 381
of the physical sciences. Numbers seemed at first
sensible existences ; geometry arose from the rough
measurement of the length and breadth of sensible
things. Hence, the first step towards the constitution
of a science consists in abstraction from the immediate
or superficial properties of objects, and concentration on
a single aspect of reality. A certain relation has to be
endowed with a sort of fictitious independence, and con-
templated as if it existed independently and purely
for itself. A clear conception of the spatial and tem-
poral relations of things is essential to the progress of
the physical sciences, and upon the relations thus
artificially isolated rests the science of mathematics.
Physics, again, must be blind to all aspects of the real
world except those connoted by the term " matter," if
the changes which take place in external things are to
be formulated clearly in a system. Each science, there-
fore, ignores the sensible properties of things given in
ordinary apprehension, as well as the relations fixed
upon by the other sciences. It is of course impossible
absolutely to separate the sphere of one science from
the spheres of the others, for, as all deal with the
relations of objects as such, they may be said together
to form a single complex science of nature ; but at least
the aim of each science — and this becomes more and
more true as time goes on — is to deal exclusively with
a single aspect of existence. Specialization of function
here, as in economical and social life, is the prevailing
tendency. Nor is this analytical tendency merely
accidental and superficial ; it is the necessary condition
of progress. The vague and confused perceptions of
common observation cannot be developed into the
definite and exact laws of science, until each aspect
of the world has received that peculiar illumination
382 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS, [CHAP.
which arises from isolation amidst surrounding darkness.
To know an object in the complexity of its relations,
it is first necessary to concentrate attention upon each
of those relations, and this may be called a process of
abstraction. The first immediate unity of things has
to be broken up by reflective analysis, before a concrete
object can properly be said to exist for knowledge.
The various sciences are therefore in a sense based
upon abstraction or analysis. On the other hand,
abstraction is at the same time concretion, for it is
impossible to separate one aspect of reality from others
without by that very fact advancing to a more definite
knowledge of reality in general. And if we arrange
the sciences in the order of their complexity, we may
say that all the sciences taken together imply a gradual
advance from the relative abstractness of common
knowledge to the relative concreteness of scientific
knowledge. Each science, dealing with a given set of
relations, leaves a residuum to be resolved by the science
next to it in complexity. When we have set forth as
fully as possible the quantitative relations of things and
systematized our knowledge of them in the science of
mathematics, we have next to deal with the motions of
things and with their changes, as considered by dynamics
and physics. A new effort to comprehend things in
their completeness gives rise to chemistry, as dealing
with the composition and decomposition of material
elements. Next we pass to biology and lastly to
psychology. The whole of the special sciences taken
together may therefore be said to constitute a syste-
matic knowledge of the various aspects of the universe.
In formulating the process by which scientific con-
ceptions are obtained, it is of the utmost importance to
overlook neither the analytic nor the synthetic side of
xii.] S£NS£ AND UNDERSTANDING. 383
knowledge. There is a sense in which it may be said
that all knowledge is based upon abstraction or analysis.
The comprehension of one property in pure isolation is
a feat that can be performed by no conceivable in-
telligence, since every property exists only in relation
to another property ; but in the advance of knowledge,
by successive differentiation, it naturally comes about
that a greater degree of interest attaches to one term
of a relation than to another. Hence one property, or
one set of properties, is looked upon as positive, in
contrast to the other or others, which are regarded as
negative. The distinction is itself a purely arbitrary
one, for the term from one point of view called positive
may from another point of view be termed negative.
But this predominant interest in one term of a relation,
while it does not convert the isolated term into an in-
dependent reality, yet prepares the way for the illusion
that it does so. And hence, at a later stage of thought,
the positive properties — the properties in which an excess
of interest is felt — are classed together as the essence,
or definition of a thing, while the negative properties
are vaguely passed over as unessential. But essential
and unessential, like positive and negative, are purely
relative distinctions ; what from a special interest is con-
ceived as essential, is again rejected as unessential. It
must, therefore, never be forgotten that when we speak
of the essence of a thing, we do not thereby limit
reality for all time to the special group of properties
we have in view for the time being. When matter is
said to be defined by the property of solidity, as its
essence, it is a tremendous perversion of the truth to
suppose that by such a limitation we have, as by a
magical incantation, caused all the other relations of
the universe to disappear. Those properties classed as
384 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
essential, fixed in a definition, and marked by a common
name, are real ; but they are not all that is real. The
conception of matter as a congeries of indivisible units
of mass is not intrinsically truer or more valuable than
the conception of matter as defined in the totality of
chemical relations. Intrinsically, the one is as im-
portant as the other ; relatively, the one or the other
is more important, according to the special point of
view ; absolutely, i.e., as a formulation of existence in
its completeness, the more complex conception is the
more important of the two. The term matter, like all
other common names, is simply a short-hand method
of designating one aspect of real existence ; it is no
mystic spell to conjure all other relations into nonen-
tity. To say that knowledge is gained by an analy-
tical process is only a way of drawing attention to
the fact that the mind's interest in a special set of
properties overrides its interest in another set, so that
the negative term of a relation is passed over as
unessential, and only the positive term is regarded.
In reality, as has been shown, analysis is not a single
process, but only one aspect of a single process ; just
because one property is only an element in reality, and,
therefore, in itself an abstraction, every act of know-
ledge is synthetic not less than analytic.
We may, therefore, say that knowledge proceeds from
the less to the more concrete, from the more to the
less abstract, from the less to the more known. Hence
common knowledge is more abstract, or less concrete,
than scientific knowledge. Here, again, it is important
to notice that, from the mind's predominant interest in
some terms over others, certain properties are classed
as essential, others as unessential. Thus, existence
gets separated into groups of positive attributes, while
xii.] SENSE AND UNDERSTANDING. 385
the other attributes are vaguely merged in the general
conception of negation. From this point of view
common knowledge may be said to be analytic, not
because analysis is possible apart from synthesis, but
because the mind's interest in the positive attributes
gives them a fictitious excess of reality for the time.
Thus the way is made easy for that formulation of
common sense which, overlooking the negative move-
ment involved in the process of knowledge, conceives of
existence as made up of a number of individual things
or substances having purely positive attributes. Hence
a double illusion : the illusion that a substance has
reality, apart from its relations to other substances, and
that it has reality out of relation to intelligence. Just
as the negative factor implied in every form of reality is
passed over as if it were not, because of the almost
exclusive interest taken for the time being in the
affirmative factor, so the still less manifest relation of
the properties to intelligence is overlooked or misin-
terpreted. Accordingly, we find the empiricist, who
formulates the common-sense conception of reality,
speaking in language which implies the threefold
fiction of "something" apart from its properties, of
positive attributes in isolation from negative, and of a
concrete reality independent of intelligence. Recog-
nizing the analytic or affirmative side of knowledge,
and passing over the synthetic or negative side, he is
led to separate real existence from that which is the
necessary condition of its reality. The same imperfect
comprehension of the elements of knowledge and of
reality which leads him to raise the positive or
relatively essential properties to the "bad eminence"
of independent sovereignty also suggests to him to
separate matter, as defined by one set of properties,
2 B
386 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
from intelligence, as defined by another set, and to
claim for each a reality of its own. He passes from
the one to the other in turn, and fails to see that, as
the negative aspect of reality has also a positive
side, a real world apart from a universalizing intel-
ligence to make it real, is as much a fiction as a
circumference without a centre.
The development of common into scientific know-
ledge involves a great increase in that double process
of differentiation and integration which is implied in
the simplest conception of reality. The universe in-
creases immensely in complexity, but at the same time
it coalesces into a more perfect unity. Here, also,
countenance is given to the false conception of real
knowledge as a process of analysis or abstraction. The
empiricist is not content merely to separate thought
and matter as abstract opposites of each other. He
applies the same process of abstraction to the various
aspects in which nature itself is contemplated by the
scientific mind in its different moods. . Common know-
ledge really grows up by means of a dialectical process,
in which there is a perpetual equilibrium of the positive
and the negative aspects of reality. But as the indi-
vidual mind interests itself temporarily only in the
attributes it conceives as positive or essential, the
negative or unessential attributes are passed over with
a hasty glance and forgotten. Thus the equilibrium is
destroyed. The same dialectical process, and the same
predominance of interest in certain select relations of
existence, is manifested in the procedure of the special
sciences, but with this difference — that each tendency is
carried out to its extreme. The scientific man breaks
up the first immediate unity of things, which is
sufficient to satisfy the languid interest of common
xii.] SENSE AND UNDERSTANDING. 387
sense, and in this analysis he vastly extends the
synthesis essential to all experience, increasing a
thousandfold the complexity of the known universe.
But as his interest centres, not in the easily accessible
relations alone regarded by common sense, but in those
hidden away from its superficial gaze, he naturally
treats the sensible properties of things as unimportant
and unessential.
" It is important," says Mr. Lewes, " to bear in mind
that all our scientific conceptions are analytical, and, at
the best, only approximative. They are analytical,
because science is ' seeing with other eyes/ and looks
away from the synthetic fact of experience to see what
is not visible there. They are approximations, because
they are generalities."1 The contrast here drawn
between common knowledge as synthetic and scientific
knowledge as analytic is utterly fallacious. There are
not two discrepant processes of knowledge, but all
knowledge is developed in the same way, by a differen-
tiation that is at the same time integration — an analysis
that includes synthesis. The unity of the process of
knowledge is just as perfect as the unity of existence
and the unity of intelligent experience. Common
knowledge is more remote from reality than science,
and hence it is more "general," or abstract. When
science, to use one of Mr. Lewes's illustrations, resolves
light into undulations of ether acting upon the retina,
it does not pass from fact to abstraction, from synthesis
to analysis. The point of view is changed ; but in the
change there is an actual increase in differentiation and
integf ration, an advance from the more to the less
O '
general, the less to the more concrete. By breaking
up the phenomenon of light into its factors, the undula-
1 Problems of Life and M'ni'l, vol. ii., p. 255.
388 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
tions of an elastic medium and the sensibility of the
retina, the phenomenon is more exactly defined; the
analysis is, at the same time, a new synthesis. And
this is but a single instance of the general procedure of
science. It is true that, if we attend solely to its
analytic aspect, as Mr. Lewes does, and attempt to
build an exhaustive theory of the process of knowledge
upon that alone, we may contrast the fulness of reality,
characteristic of common knowledge, with the extreme
tenuity of scientific knowledge ; but to do so is simply
to misinterpret the one kind of knowledge as well as
the other. Both alike proceed, and must proceed, by a
dialectic process that is neither analytic nor synthetic,
but both in one ; and both alike distinguish the essen-
tial from the unessential, the positive from the negative.
Common sense attends only to those relations that
rouse its interest, and all others it dismisses as unim-
portant. And as the attributes so selected are simply
the most superficial, the knowledge of common sense is
necessarily more " general " than the knowledge of
science. What by the plain man is regarded as essen-
tial, is passed over as unessential by the scientific man;
the interest of the latter lies in the more recondite
properties of things, and hence those commonly known
are taken for granted and lightly passed over. Science,
as such, however, does not deny the reality of the
ordinary relations ; that is left for the empirical philo-
sopher, who plumes himself upon the exclusive accuracy
with which he formulates scientific procedure. When
you know that 7 + 5 = 12, you cannot be forever re-
peating the slow process of adding unit to unit. So,
when the common properties of things are once known,
they are as a matter of course taken for granted, and
henceforth treated as = x. Hence the seeming abstract-
xii.] SENSE AND UNDERSTANDING. 389
ness of scientific knowledge, as compared with ordinary
knowledge. But the abstractness is only seeming; we
cannot be always going back to the very beginning of
knowledge, but must take something for granted,
and start afresh. Thus, science, without denying
established relations, widens the area of existence, and
increases the complexity of knowledge. It is by a
reciprocal analysis and synthesis that science comes to
classify one set of relations as essential and another
set as unessential. But, as no real properties are un-
essential in the last resort, the distinction is an artifice
of science, not one determining the nature of real exist-
ence itself. Mr. Lewes's mistake is that of all em-
piricists ; he takes the real world, in the plenitude of
its known relations, and this he supposes to be known
by a "synthesis of sensibles." That is to say, the
presentations of sense reveal existence as it truly is ;
and hence science, as contemplating only special
aspects of existence, stands in unfavourable contrast to
the knowledge of common sense. But, in the first
place, sense does not give real objects, for it gives of
itself nothing at all ; and, secondly, supposing it did,
it would be " synthetic " only by including scientific
knowledge as a part of universal knowledge. On the
first point, nothing more needs to be added. The
second point brings out the fallacious procedure of
empiricism into especial prominence. Mr. Lewes con-
templates the real world after the completion of the
long process by which it has been manifested to intelli-
gence, or, more correctly, after intelligence has mani-
fested itself in it ; and attending only to a part
of that process at a time, he plausibly tells us that
science deals only with " generalities." Most assuredly
it does, if we contemplate the intelligible world as a
390 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
whole ; most assuredly it does not, if we are speaking
of it as compared with ordinary knowledge. As the
part is always less than the whole, and therefore more
abstract, to say that the world as it interests science
is partial or abstract, compared with the world in the
plenitude of its relations, is no doubt a true, if not a
very instructive remark ; but to maintain that scientific
knowledge is more abstract than that common-sense
knowledge from which it starts, and which it is its one
object to extend, is an utter perversion of the truth.
The opposition of induction and deduction is but an-
other aspect of the false separation of synthesis and
analysis. There is a real justification, from the point
of view of scientific knowledge, in separating the one
aspect from the other, and there is no practical harm
done in regarding each as a separate process. For
science rests upon an unformulated abstraction from
intelligence, and rightly regards its task as complete
when it has set forth those relations that in their
totality express the realm of Nature; It is otherwise
with philosophy, which proposes to itself the more
ambitious task of formulating existence as a whole, and
therefore essays to show the ultimate relations of
nature and intelligence. Science, as has been reiter-
ated, perhaps to weariness, is interested only in certain
aspects of reality, and hence it takes for granted the
relations of things familiar to common sense. Things,
as partially qualified, are its points of departure, and
its own peculiar procedure consists in extending and
widening common knowledge. Thus it may rightly
enough be said to proceed " from the known to the
unknown," or, as I should prefer' to say, from the less
to the more known. This is what science knows as
induction.
xji.] SENSE AND UNDERSTANDING. 391
It is rightly held that no advance in knowledge is
possible by what syllogistic logic calls deduction, since
by a mere restatement of that which is already
assumed to be known no advance to the "unknown"
can possibly be made. We cannot, therefore, wonder
at the contempt of science for " mere conceptions."
The contempt is a healthy one. The man of science
knows that to gain any real knowledge he must begin
where common sense leaves off; that to know more
about existence he must go out beyond ordinary con-
ceptions of existence. Empirical logic, here following
scientific thought, also asserts that knowledge is gained
by a discovery of new relations of things ; and, so far,
it is correct. But, as it falsely asserts that our common
knowledge of things is acquired by passive observation,
it takes for granted that individual things, or particular
" facts," are discerned without any constructive activity
of intelligence. Hence, the discovery of new relations
is supposed still to leave individual things in their
isolation. The only change in things is in their greater
complexity. The real world is now supposed to have,
independently of intelligence, all the properties revealed
by science, as well as those known in ordinary know-
ledge. Induction now assumes quite a different
aspect. It consists in the separation, one by one, of
properties already assumed to be known, and hence
it is no longer a progress from "the known to the
unknown," but a regress from the more to the less
known. By abstraction, it is supposed, a general law
is discovered ; and this law, once discovered, may be
shown to apply to the particular facts from which it
was abstracted. The process of reasoning down from
the general law to the particular facts is deduction.
Now here we have a confusion between a universal as a
392 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
law of nature and a universal as an abstract conception.
If nature is already known in the fulness of its rela-
tions, what possible sense is there in seeking for laws
of nature, which are but special groups of relations con-
sidered apart ? If everything is known already, there
is no need either of induction or deduction. By a bare
intuition we may comprehend all things, and any pro-
cess of knowledge is not only useless, but impossible.
Thus, the measure of truth which empirical logic had
attained to in the judgment that knowledge proceeds
"from the known to the unknown" is again lost in a
theory of deduction, that, assuming a perfectly known
world to begin with, can only explain the process of
knowledge as a retreat from the better known to the
less known. If we take the first, and relatively correct
notion of induction as a progress from the less to the
more known, wre may easily give it a form that will
correctly embody the true process of knowledge. Every
advance in knowledge is the discovery of a new rela-
tion, and every new relation is, from its connection
with intelligence, necessary and universal. Thus scien-
tific knowledge does not first reveal a number of
disconnected particulars, and then proceed to combine
them into a general law. The law is discerned in the
discernment of the particulars. A law is neither more
nor less than a complex of relations, and all relations
are ipso facto universal and necessary. The distinction
between " fact" and " law" is a purely relative one. A
fact is not by itself regarded as a law, but it contains
the universal element which is characteristic of law.
In speaking of facts, we are looking rather at the
particular than the universal aspect of relations ; in
speaking of a law, we contemplate the universal rather
than the particular aspect. But there is no real sepa-
xii.] S£NS£ AND UNDERSTANDING. 393
ration in reality or in knowledge. That which is real
is necessarily universal, and there is no universality
apart from reality. Induction emphasizes the particu-
lar aspect of reality. Deduction emphasizes the
universal. In the one, it is said, we go from the
particular to the universal ; in the other, from the
universal to the particular. Correctly stated, there is
no " going" from the one to the other at all, for each
exists only in and through the other. If the particular
did not imply the universal, no combination of particu-
lars would be possible, and hence there could be no
universal law ; the universal separated from the par-
ticular is no law, but a barren abstraction. The true
process of knowledge is, therefore, one combining these
two aspects of knowledge in one indivisible act. There
is not pure induction or pure deduction, but both ; and
the separation of the one aspect from the other, how-
ever convenient it may be to the individual enquirer,
is but a logical artifice, that in no way affects the real
indivisibility of the one dialectic process.
(2.) Conception, as it is understood by formal logic,
is essentially distinct from conception in the sense of a
law of nature. The latter is obtained, not by abstract-
ing from the specific differences of things, but by recog-
nizing in things the concrete relations to each other
which they involve. What in the scientific compre-
hension of the world seems to be a process of abstraction
or analysis is really a process of concretion, or combined
analysis and synthesis. The fallacy upon which the
ordinary account of conception rests is, however, not
unnatural. In the development of knowledge from
simple apprehension to scientific conception, individual
objects are apparently given to us in their completeness
independently of any activity of thought. To the
394 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
scientific man, as we may say, the facts of observation
are " given," to be subsumed under a law. And this
law, from the point of view of the individual discoverer,
naturally appears to be a mere conception in his own
mind, under which he externally brings the facts pre-
sented to him. But as a conception is a law of nature
only when it correctly formulates the actual relations
of things, no mere conception has any objective value.
Taken by itself, a conception is therefore simply an
abstraction from the concrete relations of which it is a
symbol. Formal logic, however, overlooking altogether
the implicit relation of facts to intelligence, assumes
that what may correctly enough be said to be " given"
to science is " given" to thought ; and, as all the con-
creteness of reality then falls into apprehension, the
activity of thought can manifest itself only as a process
of abstraction. The confusion of an abstract concep-
tion with a concrete or scientific conception goes back
in the historj^ of thought to Socrates, if not further still ;
but it was first developed in the Aristotelian doctrine of
the syllogism from the Platonic method of division, a
doctrine which is itself implicit in the Socratic conception
of definition as an analysis of the meaning of a common
name. The principle of the syllogism is that in reason-
ing we bring an individual under an abstract conception.
The most perfect form of reasoning will therefore be
that in which an individual is subsumed under the
most abstract conception of all. Syllogism thus pre-
supposes that the highest conception is the most
abstract. Thus we have at the top of the logical
ladder the conception of being, and coming gradually
downwards we at last reach the infinity of separate
individual things given in simple apprehension, and
included under that conception. Any given syllogism
xii.] SENSE AND UNDERSTANDING. 395
expresses a particular stage in the descent from the
abstract to the concrete. Thinking, therefore, consists
in all cases in advancing from the concrete to the
abstract, or in going back from the abstract to the
concrete by the way we came. Suppose, for example,
that we begin with the conception "gold." In accord-
ance with the Socratic demand for definition, we ask,
What is " gold ? " Now of course we may easily give
an answer that shall indicate the actual process of know-
ledge. If we know nothing about " gold " but its
superficial properties, by classifying it among the metals
we distinguish it from things that are not metals. But
the doctrine of syllogism does not contemplate this
view of the case. Assuming that " gold " is already
known by simple apprehension to be a "metal," it
formulates that knowledge in the proposition, ''gold is
a metal." As the term " metal " is more abstract than
the term " gold," we have here brought a relatively
concrete conception under a conception relatively
abstract. We may now suppose a second question to
be asked, viz., What is a "metal?" the answer to which
may be that " a metal is a substance." Here again a
conception is put under another more abstract than
itself. Thus we obtain the syllogism :
A metal is a substance ;
Gold is a metal ;
Therefore, gold is a substance.
The syllogism thus rests upon the purely quantitative
relation of whole and part. Now the imperfection of
this doctrine is not far to seek. Put forward as an
account of the process of thought, it completely fails to
formulate that process as it really is. To bring an
individual under an abstract notion adds nothing to
396 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
knowledge. To say that "gold" belongs to the class
" metal " tells us nothing but what we are assumed
already to know, and hence syllogistic logic is no ex-
planation of thought at all. Hence the fallacy of the
supposed process of abstraction by which class notions
are formed ; hence the elaborate trifling of the whole
doctrine of conversion, opposition, reduction, &c., with
its bewildering maze of subtleties, interesting to no
living creature but one who can be contented to dwell
in the realm
" Where entity and quiddity,
The ghosts of defunct bodies fly."
The fallacy underlying the Aristotelian doctrine of
syllogism has its source in the same mistake as caused
Plato, in one phase of his ideal theory, to identify the
universal with an abstract idea. It is wrongly assumed
that the " sensible " is given in an immediate appre-
hension which is absolutely exclusive of any relation of
thought. Heal objects, constituted of various properties,
are first, it is supposed, revealed as wholes in an imme-
diate presentation of sense ; and then thought, of its
own arbitrary choice, selects a certain number of those
properties and sets them apart for special contempla-
tion. A general conception is thus formed, differing
from the individual concretes simply in the absence of
certain properties. By successive generalizations we
go further and further away from the concrete objects
with which we started, until at length we reach the
abstraction of "being." In reasoning we reverse the
process and descend from the abstract to the concrete.
What proceeding could be more superfluous than this
monotonous ascent and descent of the same logical
tree ! Syllogistic logic is necessarily barren of all
results. We may go on in this way for ever, coinbin-
xii.] SENSE AND UNDERSTANDING. 397
ing, separating, and recombining, without ever moving
a step beyond the narrow circle of ideas within which
we have shut ourselves. For, while sense is said to
give us a definite object to reflect about, it can give
us that object only as it first presents itself in simple
apprehension. The attributes thus apprehended and
fixed in a common name are few and superficial. The
real wealth of knowledge, which is found in the concrete
relations discovered by the special sciences, is not em-
bodied in common names ; and even the meagre know-
ledge we are supposed to have obtained in immediate
perception, we are condemned by the doctrine of
syllogism to attenuate still more. We may indeed,
when we have attained to perfect purity for conception
in mere " being," return to the individuals from which
we set out ; but this affords us no new knowledge,
and our toilsome ascent and descent has been to no
purpose whatever.
The principle which dominates Kant's theory of
knowledge is in irreconcilable antagonism with that
upon which syllogistic logic rests. It denies that indi-
vidual objects can be known to exist apart from the
relations of thought by which they are made knowable.
But Kant, while removing the basis on which formal
logic rests, is only half aware of the revolution he has
himself accomplished. Side by side with the cate-
gories, he allows the abstract conceptions to stand.
All that he is prepared to say amounts in effect to this,
that the latter belong to the sphere of ordinary know-
ledge, while the former belong to the ultimate consti-
tution of thought, and must therefore be presupposed
as the condition of any real knowledge whatever.
That the " manifold " is somehow " given " to thought,
Kant is unable to get out of his head, and hence,
398 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
insist as he may on the fact that concrete objects are
not apprehended by sense alone, he yet grants that
something is apprehended or received passively into
the mind. An abstract and a pure conception, as he
thinks, agree in so far as both reduce knowledge to
unity by the combination of differences. In reality,
however, abstraction is not a process of combination,
but a process of separation ; and individual concretes
are not by such a process raised to a higher unity, but
on the contrary divested of the unity which at first
they possessed. On the other hand, the categories
really combine the particulars of sense, or rather, as
Kant would say, make that combination possible ; and
the unity so produced is the real unity of concrete
objects and specific connections of objects.
(3.) The attempted assimilation of mere fictions of
abstraction with real conceptions leads to an imperfec-
tion in Kant's way of looking at the categories them-
selves. A category is a universal or form of thought,
which is potentially a synthesis of. the manifold of
sense. It is, in fact, as treated by Kant, virtually a
function of synthesis. But as the forms of the mind
stand in stiff and abrupt contrast to the manifold, the
categories are held to belong to the constitution of the
intellect, while the particulars of sense are supplied to
the mind in an external way. Accordingly, as before
the forms of perception were held to belong only to us
as men, so now the forms of thought are regarded as
preventing us from getting beyond the limits of ex-
perience. It is true that the categories might apply
to a manifold different from that actually given to us ;
but this possibility of extending our knowledge beyond
experience is of no avail, since no other than a sensuous
manifold can be apprehended by us.
xn.] SENSE AND UNDERSTANDING. 399
I shall not here repeat what has been said above in
regard to the absurdity of supposing the particular
element to be given in any other sense than that in
which we may say, with equal propriety, that the uni-
versal element or category is given ; it will be enough
to point out that, when we have got rid of this contrast
of activity and receptivity, the abstract isolation of the
categories from the other elements of knowledge is
completely done away with. The category in itself is
spoken of by Kant as if it had a sort of independent
existence of its own. It is a potential form of thought
belonging to the framework of the mind, and capable of
coming into actual use only in relation to the manifold
of sense as determined in time by the pure imagination.
But, just as the manifold of sense is simply the par-
ticular element in every real act or product of know-
ledge, taken in abstraction from its relation to the
universal element, and as the schema is simply the ab-
straction of the relation of those elements to each other,
so the category is but the universal element, with its
relation to the particular eliminated. In other words, the
apparent independence of the category is due entirely
to the reflection of the individual thinker. We dis-
tinguish the universal from the particular, but every
real act of knowledge is the mutual reflection of the
one on the other. There is therefore no propriety in
saying that the categories might be extended beyond
experience, provided that a manifold different from
that given to us were supplied to them. One element
of knowledge can by no possibility exist except in its
relation to the other ; if the particular is nothing apart
from the universal, neither is the universal anything
apart from the particular. Kant virtually admits that
his distinction of the categories from the schemata is
400 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS. [CHAP.
merely a temporary stage of thought when he speaks of
imagination as " the effect of the understanding on the
sensibility " ; for here what he elsewhere regards as a
product of pure imagination is affirmed to be a product
of the relation between the categories and the manifold
of sense. Of course the schemata imply the specific
manifold of space and time, and therefore partly belong
to the metaphysic of nature, as distinguished from the
rnetaphysic of knowledge in general ; but in an investi-
gation into the conditions of knowledge this specific
element does not properly come under consideration.
The categories are therefore simply the universal aspect
of knowledge, as logically distinguished from the par-
ticular aspect, and abstracted from the relations which
give them meaning and significance.
(5.) So much has just been said in regard to concep-
tion, that a very few words in regard to judgment as
treated by Kant will be sufficient. As the categories
are potentialities of synthesis, so judgment is the act
of synthesis itself. The manifold of sense has to be
reflected on the universal forms of thought and percep-
tion before there can be any real knowledge, and this
process of reflection is judgment. We must, therefore,
free our minds from the misleading associations which
arise from the attempted assimilation of the analytical
and the synthetical judgment. " To think," Kant tells
us, " is to judge," and judging consists " in referring
conceptions to objects through perceptions." Now, in
strict propriety, this formula is only applicable to the
analytical judgment of formal logic, which rests upon
the supposition that objects, with the full complement
of their attributes, first exist full-formed in conscious-
ness, and are afterwards referred to an abstract uni-
versal. Accordingly, if we follow the letter of Kant's
xii.] SEiVSE AND UNDERSTANDING. 401
account of judgment, we are naturally led to suppose
that objects as such being given in perception, the
understanding proceeds to apply to them its categories.
It is under this misapprehension that Mr. Lewes1 and
others charge Kant with holding that sense and
thought contribute different kinds of knowledge.
His real thought is, that by the application of the
categories to the element of knowledge given in sense,
objects are first constituted as objects. At the same
time the admission of a purely formal judgment at all
is inconsistent with the Critical account of knowledge,
and Kant is himself partly to blame for the misappre-
hension of what his real doctrine is. Rejecting the
analytical judgment altogether, we must regard all
judgments as synthetical, i.e., as constitutive of objects
as such, and of their connexions. And this constitu-
tion of reality is simply another name for the synthesis
of pure imagination, which, when freed from its
psychological taint, is seen to be simply the process
of relating a universal or category to a particular or
manifold.
6. The last element in real knowledge distinguished
by Kant is the self, as the supreme condition of all
unity in knowledge. In his usual fashion, Kant speaks
of the self as if it had a sort of independent reality of
its own, apart from all relation to the other elements
of knowledge. 1 = 1 is, he says, a purely analytical
proposition. Now, such a proposition is not only
tautological but meaningless. Only by bringing the
" I " into relation with knowable objects can we put
any meaning into it at all. If we attempt to compre-
hend the " I " purely in itself, we find that it is a
mere abstraction. And if the " I," taken in its utmost
1 Problems of Life and Miir.l, vol. i., p. 442.
2c
402 KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS.
purity is, as Kant himself asserts, but a logical ele-
ment in real knowledge, there is no propriety in saying
that the self may be independent of the limitations
which apply to phenomena. No doubt intelligence, as
the source of all knowledge, is in a sense independent
of the objects which it constitutes, but it is not for that
reason constituted of itself apart from its relations to
objects. Moreover, while each individual as possessed
of intelligence is capable of recognizing the real world,
which itself exists only in its relations to universal intel-
ligence, we are not entitled to say that the individual
man, with his complex rational and animal nature,
is free from the conditions without which he could not
exist at all. I, as a particular person, with my own
specific character and idiosyncrasy, am a real being,
and in virtue of my rationality am recognized by
myself to be real ; but this does not cut me off from
the special conditions of knowledge or action without
which I could not be, or be known to be, human.
The development of this point, however, belongs to
psychology. Here it is enough to remark that the
" I " cannot be separated from its relations without
becoming a barren abstraction. Intelligence exists
only in and through its specific modes, and it is useless
to attempt sublimating it by isolating it from those
modes : instead of elevating we merely degrade it.
The categories and the particulars of knowledge are
therefore simply the various real relations in which
intelligence manifests its activity, and builds up for
each of us the fair fabric of nature.
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tion of actual life that has hitherto been fashioned into verse. No modern
poet, it may safely be said, has plunged so deeply into the innermost heart
of living men and women, and none has used such remarkable materials for
his drama."— Scottish Rtview.
M£SSXS. MACLEHOSE AND SONS.
POEMS BY THE AUTHOR OF " OLR1G GRANGE"— Contd.
SMITH— NORTH COUNTRY FOLK. Poems by Author of
"Olrig Grange." Ex. fcap. 8vo. 75. 6d.
"These poems are really dramatic, genuinely pathetic, and will bear
reading over and over again." — Westminster Review.
" The follies and pettiness of suburban life provoke Dr. Smith's scorn.
The race for wealth, the desire for position, and other kindred themes, are
treated in a straightforward, outspoken fashion." — Dundee Advertiser.
" ' Wee Curly Pow ' is full of exquisite pathos and tenderness, and ' Dick
Dalgleish ' is rich in genuine humour. We recommend all who are fond of
genuine poetry to get Dr. Smith's poems at once. The book is full of
music. " — Sheffield Independent.
" For rich variety alike in substance and form, for scathing exposure of
all that is mean and base, and for the effective presentation of the loftiest
ideals, for mingled humour and pathos, we do not know a volume in the
whole range of Scottish verse that can be said to surpass ' North Country
Folk'." — Christian Leader.
SMITH— KlLDROSTAN : a Dramatic Poem. By the Author of
" Olrig Grange." Ex. fcap. 8vo. 73. 6d. [This Day.
SMITH— BORLAND HALL : a Poem. By the Author of " Olrig
Grange." [ Third Edition in preparation.
SMITH— RABAN ; OR, LIFE SPLINTERS: a Poem. By the
Author of" Olrig Grange." [Second Edition in preparation.
SMITH— BISHOP'S WALK ; and Other Poems. Extra fcap.
8vo. 2s. 6d.
SPREULL— WRITINGS OF JOHN SPREULL (commonly called
Bass John) 1646-1722. Edited by J. W. BURNS, of Kilma-
hevv. Extra fcap. 410. With Facsimiles and Portrait 125. 6d.
STANLEY, Dean — THE BURNING BUSH. A Sermon. 8vo. is.
STEWART— THE PLAN OF ST. LUKE'S GOSPEL. By WILLIAM
STEWART, M.A., D.D., Professor of Biblical Criticism in
the University of Glasgow. 8vo. 33. 6d.
1 8 BOOKS PUBLISHED BY
STOD DART— VILLAGE LIFE: A Poem. By JAMES H. STOD-
DART, Editor of the Glasgow Herald, Extra fcap. 8vo. 6s. 6d.
These are simply the ripest notes that have appeared in Scotland for
a time too long to calculate." — Examiner.
' ' A remarkable volume of poetry, which will be read by all who have
any keen interest in the progress of English literature." — Standard.
"The ballad of the ' Miller of Birlstane' is really admirable. One cannot
fail to be delighted with it." — Glasgow News.
STORY— CREED AND CONDUCT : Sermons preached in Ros-
neath Church. By ROBERT HERBERT STORY, D.D.,
Minister of the Parish. Crown 8vo. Cheap Edition. 33. 6d.
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Caird and Guthrie, Tulloch and Service." — Glasgow Herald.
" These are excellent sermons. They are sensible, manly, scholarly, and
religious." — Edinburgh Con rant.
" Characterized throughout by profound earnestness and spirituality, and
written in a style at once graceful, clear, and nervous." — Scotsman.
" We heartily commend the book to our readers." — Dundee Advertiser.
VEITCH— THE HISTORY AND POETRY OF THE SCOTTISH
BORDER, THEIR MAIN FEATURES AND RELATIONS. By
JOHN VEITCH, LL.D., Professor of Logic and Rhetoric in
the University of Glasgow. Crown 8vo. IDS. 6d.
" This is a genuine book. We heartily recommend it." — Contemporary
Review.
" We feel as if we were hearing the stories, or listening to the snatches of
song: amon? the breezes of the mountains or the moorland, under the
sun-broken mists of the wild glens, or the wooded banks of the Yarrow or
the Tweed." — Times.
" The fullest, most thorough, and most deeply critical work on Border
history and poetry that we have." — British Quarterly Review.
VEITCH— HILLSIDE RHYMES. Extra fcap. 8vo. 53.
VEITCH— THE TWEED, AND OTHER POEMS. Extra fcap. 8vo.
6s. 6d.
VEITCH— LUCRETIUS AND THE ATOMIC THEORY. Crown
8vo. 33. 6d.
" We have read this little volume with no ordinary delight. We warmly
recommend it." — Nonconformist.
MESSRS. MACLEHOSE AKD SOXS. 19
WADDELL — OSSIAN AND THE CLYDE ; or, Ossian Historical
and Authentic. By P. HATELY WADDELL, LL.D. 410.
i2s. 6d.
WATSON — KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS, a Comparison
of Critical and Empirical Philosophy. By JOHN WATSON,
M.A., LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in Queen's
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"Decidedly the best exposition of Kant which we have seen in Eng-
lish. We cannot too strongly commend it." — Saturday Review.
" C'est 1'oeuvre d'un penseur et d'un maltre. . . . Nous avons lu le livre
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osophique.
" This book is written with clearness and precision, and the author is
thoroughly impregnated with the doctrine which he expounds, and makes
it as plain as it can be made without becoming other than it is." — Professor
T. H. GREEN, in the Academy.
"All students of Kant will recognize his thorough mastery ol the system
he expounds." — Scotsman.
New Books and New Editions
In Preparation.
DR. BA RR— DISEASES OF THE EAR : A Manual for Practi-
tioners and Students. By THOMAS BARR, M.D., Lecturer
on Aural Surgery, Anderson's College, Glasgow. Crown 8vo.
Illustrated.
PROFESSOR CAIRD—TKE. PHILOSOPHY OF KANT. By
EDWARD CAIRO, M.A., LL.D., late Fellow and Tutor of
Merton College, Oxford ; Professor of Moral Philosophy in
the University of Glasgow. Demy 8vo.
20 MESSRS. MACLE HOSE'S PUBLICATIONS.
New Books in Preparation. — Continued.
MONS. GORECKI—& FRENCH GRAMMAR. By A. L.
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PROFESSOR GRANT— CATALOGUE OF 6415 STARS for the
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JANET HAMILTON— POEMS, ESSAYS, AND SKETCHES.
Crown 8vo. [New Edition in preparation.
PROFESSOR JEBB—THZ ANABASIS OF XENOPHON.— Books
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\_Neiv Edition in preparation.
PROFESSOR JEBB—K NEW SELECTION OF GREEK EX-
TRACTS.
PROFESSOR NICHOL— ESSAYS ON ENGLISH LITERATURE.
By JOHN NICHOL, M.A. Oxon, LL.D.
gg the JUtltor of "©Ing ©range."
A NEW DRAMATIC POEM. Ex. fcap. 8vo.
BORLAND HALL : a Poem. By the Author of " Olrig Grange."
[Third Edition in preparation.
RABAN : a Poem. By the Author of " Olrig Grange."
[Second Edition in preparation.
DR. ROSS — SCOTTISH HISTORY AND LITERATURE BEFORE
THE REFORMATION. By the late JOHN M. Ross, LL.D.,
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DR. SCHLOMKA — A GERMAN GRAMMAR. By CLEMENS
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